German intelligence
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Sebastian Pye
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German intelligence
It seems to me that german intelligence during the war wasnt very good. Im thinking of the radar stations during the battle of britain, Crete, Russias strength etc. Am I correct in my assumption that the quality of the german intelligence was lower than that of the allied countries?
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charlie don't surf
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Sub-standard German intelligence...
Generally speaking, I agree with you, BUT....
Ever heard of "Operation North Pole"? From sometime in early 1941, the German Abwehr was able to catch every single British spy sent into Holland, turn them around and fool the Brit Intelligence for years, that is until late in 1944.
Ever heard of the butler of the Brit ambassador in Turkey who stole the ambassador's paper from an oh so well guarded safe and sold copies of them to the Germans ...for phony pound notes?
Or of the Abwehr sergeant who turned "le chat"around and received priceless informations about the Maquis (sp?), from 1942(?) until 1944?
The Abwehr was ably run by Canaris, but he was stymied by the OKW's orders to run a military organization; and intelligence types are no asphalt soldiers, they are too independent.
Every intelligence service has its triumphs and dismal failures. Joscha
Ever heard of "Operation North Pole"? From sometime in early 1941, the German Abwehr was able to catch every single British spy sent into Holland, turn them around and fool the Brit Intelligence for years, that is until late in 1944.
Ever heard of the butler of the Brit ambassador in Turkey who stole the ambassador's paper from an oh so well guarded safe and sold copies of them to the Germans ...for phony pound notes?
Or of the Abwehr sergeant who turned "le chat"around and received priceless informations about the Maquis (sp?), from 1942(?) until 1944?
The Abwehr was ably run by Canaris, but he was stymied by the OKW's orders to run a military organization; and intelligence types are no asphalt soldiers, they are too independent.
Every intelligence service has its triumphs and dismal failures. Joscha
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charlie don't surf
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Operation North Pole was a sucess because of a combination of things: overbearing British chauvanism, the dedication of an SD sergeant name Ernst May, and lack of support from the SOE for the Dutch agents they had in place.
In 1940, when the queen fled to London, she left Holland in complete disarray. The Dutch intelligence service had made no provision for clandestine operations, not even secret radio stations, and so the government-in-exile was completely isolated until British intelligence could get assets into place. To compound the problem, an SIS agent had abandoned an attache case containing a contact list with names and addresses of his Dutch associates in his haste to depart, and which was quickly exploited by the Abwehr.
Next up, a Dutch intelligence agent named Hans Zomer, working for both the SIS and SOE, was snatched up while in possession of a complete radio post, including his back messages, codes, their keys and his deciphering worksheets. Ernst May, acting on his own initiative, used these materials along with some skullsweating and succeeded in breaking the SIS cypher system. After that, two more key Dutch agents (Laak and van der Reyden) were captured in possession of a second set of codes. Van der Reyden was quite disoriented and angered about his capture, and gave alot of information to the sympathetic May, enabling the latter to increase his knowledge of SIS codes and the existence of security checks and test questions used by the SIS and SOE to prevent impersonation.
With the help of George Ridderhof, a pro-German double agent, the Abwehr next closed in on an SOE group that had been parachuted into the Netherlands in late 1941. Riderhof befriended one of the agents by providing transport to remove supplies from his drops, and also by providing intelligence, which was completely inaccurate. Gradually, Ridderhof was able to discern from tidbits carelessly dropped the details of the SOE network in place, including the location of its radio site. The Abwehr rounded them up, and gave them a choice- cooperate in a deception program or be executed as spies. A few decided to go along with it, believing that the security checks would tell of their capture.
For the next few years, the turned agents transmitted to London, who continued to act on the information supplied by the disinformation, despite the lack of checks and the constant inclusion of netting-in signals and other paraphenalia designed to warn the receivers of capture. On one occasion, one of the transmitters even successfully transmitted, in open language, the message "CAUGHT-CAUGHT-CAUGHT", but Bletchley Park simply chose to edit out what they saw as superfluous. After a few weeks, the fact that security checks were being ommitted was not even relayed to SOE HQ in London.
All-in-all, 51 SOE, 9 SIS and one MI9 agents were captured in Holland by the Abwehr because of the turned radio network. Two managed to escape and make their way to Switzerland and managed to make contact with the SIS head in Berne. The SIS then turned around and transmitted a message to all SIS networks in N Section (the Netherlands operating area) that "Sister service totally infiltrated by Germans. We therefore urge you to break off all contact with their agents and keep clear of them."
The Abwehr, after intercepting this message, broadcast one of their own in the clear (unciphered) to the heads of N Section of SOE in London-
TO MESSRS BLUNT BINGHAM AND SUCCESSORS LTD STOP YOU ARE TRYING TO MAKE BUSINESS IN THE NETHERLANDS WITHOUT OUR ASSISTANCE STOP WE THINK THIS IS RATHER UNFAIR IN VIEW OUR LONG AND SUCCESSFUL COOPERATION AS YOUR SOLE AGENT STOP BUT NEVER MIND WHENEVER YOU COME TO PAY A VISIT TO THE CONTINENT YOU MAY BE ASSURED THAT YOU WILL BE RECEIVEDWITH SAME CARE AND RESULT AS ALL THOSE YOU SENT BEFORE STOP SO LONG STOP
In 1940, when the queen fled to London, she left Holland in complete disarray. The Dutch intelligence service had made no provision for clandestine operations, not even secret radio stations, and so the government-in-exile was completely isolated until British intelligence could get assets into place. To compound the problem, an SIS agent had abandoned an attache case containing a contact list with names and addresses of his Dutch associates in his haste to depart, and which was quickly exploited by the Abwehr.
Next up, a Dutch intelligence agent named Hans Zomer, working for both the SIS and SOE, was snatched up while in possession of a complete radio post, including his back messages, codes, their keys and his deciphering worksheets. Ernst May, acting on his own initiative, used these materials along with some skullsweating and succeeded in breaking the SIS cypher system. After that, two more key Dutch agents (Laak and van der Reyden) were captured in possession of a second set of codes. Van der Reyden was quite disoriented and angered about his capture, and gave alot of information to the sympathetic May, enabling the latter to increase his knowledge of SIS codes and the existence of security checks and test questions used by the SIS and SOE to prevent impersonation.
With the help of George Ridderhof, a pro-German double agent, the Abwehr next closed in on an SOE group that had been parachuted into the Netherlands in late 1941. Riderhof befriended one of the agents by providing transport to remove supplies from his drops, and also by providing intelligence, which was completely inaccurate. Gradually, Ridderhof was able to discern from tidbits carelessly dropped the details of the SOE network in place, including the location of its radio site. The Abwehr rounded them up, and gave them a choice- cooperate in a deception program or be executed as spies. A few decided to go along with it, believing that the security checks would tell of their capture.
For the next few years, the turned agents transmitted to London, who continued to act on the information supplied by the disinformation, despite the lack of checks and the constant inclusion of netting-in signals and other paraphenalia designed to warn the receivers of capture. On one occasion, one of the transmitters even successfully transmitted, in open language, the message "CAUGHT-CAUGHT-CAUGHT", but Bletchley Park simply chose to edit out what they saw as superfluous. After a few weeks, the fact that security checks were being ommitted was not even relayed to SOE HQ in London.
All-in-all, 51 SOE, 9 SIS and one MI9 agents were captured in Holland by the Abwehr because of the turned radio network. Two managed to escape and make their way to Switzerland and managed to make contact with the SIS head in Berne. The SIS then turned around and transmitted a message to all SIS networks in N Section (the Netherlands operating area) that "Sister service totally infiltrated by Germans. We therefore urge you to break off all contact with their agents and keep clear of them."
The Abwehr, after intercepting this message, broadcast one of their own in the clear (unciphered) to the heads of N Section of SOE in London-
TO MESSRS BLUNT BINGHAM AND SUCCESSORS LTD STOP YOU ARE TRYING TO MAKE BUSINESS IN THE NETHERLANDS WITHOUT OUR ASSISTANCE STOP WE THINK THIS IS RATHER UNFAIR IN VIEW OUR LONG AND SUCCESSFUL COOPERATION AS YOUR SOLE AGENT STOP BUT NEVER MIND WHENEVER YOU COME TO PAY A VISIT TO THE CONTINENT YOU MAY BE ASSURED THAT YOU WILL BE RECEIVEDWITH SAME CARE AND RESULT AS ALL THOSE YOU SENT BEFORE STOP SO LONG STOP
In the battle between good and evil, evil usually has more fun.
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charlie don't surf
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One small correction to make: wireless messages from SOE agents in the field were not deciphered at Bletchley Park but at the SOE signals centre at Grendon. If anyone is interested in 'Operation North Pole' I can thoroughly recommend the book 'Between Silk and Cyanide' by Leo Marks published by Harper Collins ISBN 0-00-653063-X. Leo Marks joined SOE in the beginning of 1942 and was made responsible for the codes and coding procedures used by the SOE agents. The book is a fascinating account of his struggle to introduce secure codes and makes it very clear that the Third Reich was by no means unique in having inter-departmental rivalries which acted to the detriment of the war effort; in fact the Dutch Resistance fiasco seems to have been partly due to this reason. (The title is the justification Marks used to get a supply of silk - in short supply - for the printing of agents' new codes as if they didn't have the new codes they would be far more likely to have to use their suicide pills when captured as a result of the over-use of radio transmissions that the old codes required.)