Excerpt from MS D 258 statement by Hermann Breith commander III Pz corps
"Mission and manpower requirements
A. The III Panzer corps consisted almost exclusively of Panzerdivisions. It faced an especially difficult task in its attack across the river, and its drive through an enemy defensive system which was echeloned in depth; the attack zone was relatively narrow and afforded only limited freedom of movement. Hemmed in by creeks and dense forests, the mobile units were limited in their movements and could make only narrow penetrations. The hilly, broken terrain was particularly advantageous to the defender, forcing the attacker to conduct frontal attacks as enemy positions could not be bypassed. Such frontal attacks exhausted the Panzer divisions and made their their primary mission, that of engaging enemy reserves. There was a shortage of infantry for the establishment of the bridgehead across the Donets, for attacks against enemy defensive positions, and particularly for the protection of the flanks, since the latter increased in length in proportion to the depth of the penetration.
B. The postponement of the attack for two months had a detrimental effect in many respects. Although it proved of benefit for further training, it gave the enemy more time to construct additional defenses, bring up reinforcements, and take other countermeasures.
C. In future operations, training should be conducted under realistic combat conditions with emphasis on combined exercises of all arms with live ammunition. It is important to co-ordinate the fire of the heavy infantry weapons and artillery with the advance of the infantry by establishing fire concentration areas, by exploiting their effectiveness, and to attack the enemy when he is pinned down. In this way the losses of the attacking force are kept to a minimum. In the German manuals this was called “fire and movement”. In its heavy weapons, especially the mortars, the infantry possesses an exceptionally fine offensive weapon. The organization of mortars into battalions and regiments for specific missions in order to establish fire concentrations may often prove effective. Mortars are mobile and easily committed, the high fragmentation effect of their projectiles makes them highly effective, and it is difficult for the enemy to locate their positions. Careful consideration must be given to fire synchronization .Ample time should always be allowed for the preparation of attacks(reconnaissance and selection of positions) since these preparations will ensure a smoothly running attack. Co-operation between infantry and tanks requires special training. The infantry must be trained not to be wait for the arrival of the tanks and then abandon the fighting but exploit its own fire power while advancing. It is especially important that all arms, particularly heavy infantry weapons and artillery keep a careful and constant watch over the battlefield. In approaching the enemy positions, the infantry’s losses should always be kept to a minimum by adequate artillery support because the infantry strength must be maintained for close combat."
To be continued
lessons from kursk
Moderator: sniper1shot
Re: lessons from kursk
Breith continued
"Conduct of battle
To carry out its mission, the corps had to force the crossing of the Donets along the entire front construct bridges as early as possible, and prepare the crossing of heavy weapons, tanks and motorized units. The enemy situation and the terrain led German commanders to believe the Belgorod sector offered no opportunity for a rapid crossing and a speedy advance while conditions on the southern wing were less favorable.
The divisions in the main effort, the 19th and 6th Panzerdivision were heavily equipped with artillery and tanks(GHQ tank units) so as to secure a decisive success at an early date. The 7th Panzer division at the southern wing gained an unexpected initial advantage which made early bridge construction possible, after which the division crossed to the east bank of the river, while the divisions near Belgorod were unable to advance quickly. Regrouping and transfer of the 6th Panzerdivision from the northern to the southern wing, had a favorable effect on the continuation of the attack. The old experience again proved its worth, that as soon as a weak spot in the enemy defenses is detected, it becomes imperative that all available forces be concentrated there, lest time be lost and troops in other sectors suffer heavy losses in frontal attacks. Mobile attacks must immediately be set in motion and be kept moving. By concentration the 6th and 7th Panzer divisions at the northern wing, and later by bringing up the 19th Panzer division, a strong wedge in great depth was prepared, which in break through would be safe against flank attack.
The question arose whether or not the attack should be preceded by an artillery preparation. After weighing its advantages and disadvantages, it was decided to forego it. Instead, a three minute concentration by all heavy infantry weapons and artillery was directed against forward enemy positions. The broken terrain made identification of enemy positions difficult in spite of careful reconnaissance. The enemy’s strong points were detected only during the attack. The great number of alternate positions for heavy weapons, tanks and artillery in the Russian’s defense position made a correct estimate of their defensive main effort impossible. Under such circumstances a long artillery preparation would have been a complete waste of ammunition, without producing concrete results for the attack.
A special artillery groups was placed at III panzer corps disposal for counter battery fire. It consisted of one 105 mm,one 150 mm,and one 210 mm howitzer battalion. After the attack along the eastern bank of the river was in full progress, the group was dissolved and the individual battalions attached to the divisions were committed at the points of main effort.
"
"Conduct of battle
To carry out its mission, the corps had to force the crossing of the Donets along the entire front construct bridges as early as possible, and prepare the crossing of heavy weapons, tanks and motorized units. The enemy situation and the terrain led German commanders to believe the Belgorod sector offered no opportunity for a rapid crossing and a speedy advance while conditions on the southern wing were less favorable.
The divisions in the main effort, the 19th and 6th Panzerdivision were heavily equipped with artillery and tanks(GHQ tank units) so as to secure a decisive success at an early date. The 7th Panzer division at the southern wing gained an unexpected initial advantage which made early bridge construction possible, after which the division crossed to the east bank of the river, while the divisions near Belgorod were unable to advance quickly. Regrouping and transfer of the 6th Panzerdivision from the northern to the southern wing, had a favorable effect on the continuation of the attack. The old experience again proved its worth, that as soon as a weak spot in the enemy defenses is detected, it becomes imperative that all available forces be concentrated there, lest time be lost and troops in other sectors suffer heavy losses in frontal attacks. Mobile attacks must immediately be set in motion and be kept moving. By concentration the 6th and 7th Panzer divisions at the northern wing, and later by bringing up the 19th Panzer division, a strong wedge in great depth was prepared, which in break through would be safe against flank attack.
The question arose whether or not the attack should be preceded by an artillery preparation. After weighing its advantages and disadvantages, it was decided to forego it. Instead, a three minute concentration by all heavy infantry weapons and artillery was directed against forward enemy positions. The broken terrain made identification of enemy positions difficult in spite of careful reconnaissance. The enemy’s strong points were detected only during the attack. The great number of alternate positions for heavy weapons, tanks and artillery in the Russian’s defense position made a correct estimate of their defensive main effort impossible. Under such circumstances a long artillery preparation would have been a complete waste of ammunition, without producing concrete results for the attack.
A special artillery groups was placed at III panzer corps disposal for counter battery fire. It consisted of one 105 mm,one 150 mm,and one 210 mm howitzer battalion. After the attack along the eastern bank of the river was in full progress, the group was dissolved and the individual battalions attached to the divisions were committed at the points of main effort.
"
Re: lessons from kursk
Breith continued
"Traffic control in the rear area
The success of such a difficult operation depended on a rigid traffic discipline of the troops and well organized movements to and from the front. All traffic was restricted to a very narrow area, and had to proceed along a few hard surface roads and across the donets over relatively few bridges which were exposed to air attacks. In an operation of this type an attempt should be made to assign at least one crossing site to each division, and if possible a two-way bridge for traffic in both directions. Provisions must be made for co-ordinating traffic to the front(always a priority)with that to the rear. Continuously moving traffic must be ensured in order to avoid losses from air attacks. Traffic jams and congestions on bridges and their approaches must be prevented. Dispatch ^points should be organized far from the bridge sites in both directions, from which troops and convoys must proceed according to priority schedule. Only the most necessary supply and combat items have to be carried across bridges during the first few days of the attack. The III Panzer corps enforced this rule rigidly. The number of supply vehicles was kept to a minimum and the rest was parked in the rear, west of the Donets. Essential vehicles were required to display on their windshields a special sticker authorizing them to cross the bridge; the division commander had signed these stickers. Sixty-ton bridges had to be constructed for armored divisions. At the same roads were built by special road construction engineers, and a towing service was organized along the advance road, particularly at critical points (bridges, bad stretches of road, swamps, villages), in order to keep traffic moving and bridges open. The infantry moved to and fro the front over dirt roads or across country. In order to secure a continuous flow of traffic, the division supply roads wereonly open to vehicular traffic. Parked columns had to disperse of the roads in order to avoid losses through air attacks. Roads and bridges required strong antiaircraft protection. The traffic on both sides of the Donets river was controlled by III corps and handled by a special regimental staff. Traffic control did not present any major difficulties."
"Traffic control in the rear area
The success of such a difficult operation depended on a rigid traffic discipline of the troops and well organized movements to and from the front. All traffic was restricted to a very narrow area, and had to proceed along a few hard surface roads and across the donets over relatively few bridges which were exposed to air attacks. In an operation of this type an attempt should be made to assign at least one crossing site to each division, and if possible a two-way bridge for traffic in both directions. Provisions must be made for co-ordinating traffic to the front(always a priority)with that to the rear. Continuously moving traffic must be ensured in order to avoid losses from air attacks. Traffic jams and congestions on bridges and their approaches must be prevented. Dispatch ^points should be organized far from the bridge sites in both directions, from which troops and convoys must proceed according to priority schedule. Only the most necessary supply and combat items have to be carried across bridges during the first few days of the attack. The III Panzer corps enforced this rule rigidly. The number of supply vehicles was kept to a minimum and the rest was parked in the rear, west of the Donets. Essential vehicles were required to display on their windshields a special sticker authorizing them to cross the bridge; the division commander had signed these stickers. Sixty-ton bridges had to be constructed for armored divisions. At the same roads were built by special road construction engineers, and a towing service was organized along the advance road, particularly at critical points (bridges, bad stretches of road, swamps, villages), in order to keep traffic moving and bridges open. The infantry moved to and fro the front over dirt roads or across country. In order to secure a continuous flow of traffic, the division supply roads wereonly open to vehicular traffic. Parked columns had to disperse of the roads in order to avoid losses through air attacks. Roads and bridges required strong antiaircraft protection. The traffic on both sides of the Donets river was controlled by III corps and handled by a special regimental staff. Traffic control did not present any major difficulties."
Re: lessons from kursk
Breith continued
"Airforce,antiaircraft defense camouflage
In order to assure the success of the operation, which required large troop concentrations in a narrow area and their transport across the Donets river at the few available sites,it was necessary to provide for air superiority. During the first days of the attack, air supremacy was clearly on the german side, and German aircraft and flak inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. Owing to this circonstance, German troops crossed the Donets during the initial phase without much enemy interference to German bridge construction and traffic. Later, in order to counteract the german breakthrough, Russian airforce appeared in greater strength to both the German front and rear area. The Luftwaffe at the time was committed in other sectors of the front. The III Panzer corps initially committed a flak brigade (2 regiments) at points of main effort for the protection of the Donets bridges and of the advance routs. As the attack progressed, strong flak elements crossed the river and were committed in assembly and artillery areas.
In future operations, troops at the front or in rear areas must be trained to fire on enemy aircraft within effective range with all available weapons, even rifles, irrespective of fighter and flak protection. To this end units on the march or during rest should organize air guards with the necessary equipment to prevent surprise raids by enemy aircraft. Combat troops as well as the combat trains should disperse during halts, camouflage their equipment ,and if they remain in an area for extended periods, use their shovels and dig in. Any negligence in this respect may result in large casualties.
"Airforce,antiaircraft defense camouflage
In order to assure the success of the operation, which required large troop concentrations in a narrow area and their transport across the Donets river at the few available sites,it was necessary to provide for air superiority. During the first days of the attack, air supremacy was clearly on the german side, and German aircraft and flak inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. Owing to this circonstance, German troops crossed the Donets during the initial phase without much enemy interference to German bridge construction and traffic. Later, in order to counteract the german breakthrough, Russian airforce appeared in greater strength to both the German front and rear area. The Luftwaffe at the time was committed in other sectors of the front. The III Panzer corps initially committed a flak brigade (2 regiments) at points of main effort for the protection of the Donets bridges and of the advance routs. As the attack progressed, strong flak elements crossed the river and were committed in assembly and artillery areas.
In future operations, troops at the front or in rear areas must be trained to fire on enemy aircraft within effective range with all available weapons, even rifles, irrespective of fighter and flak protection. To this end units on the march or during rest should organize air guards with the necessary equipment to prevent surprise raids by enemy aircraft. Combat troops as well as the combat trains should disperse during halts, camouflage their equipment ,and if they remain in an area for extended periods, use their shovels and dig in. Any negligence in this respect may result in large casualties.