Many books told me that German Army Group Centre lost 28 divisions out of 38. But exactly what were they is hard to confirm. Alex Butcher " Ostfront 1944" mentioned that German lost 6th, 12th, 14th, 31st, 36th, 45th, 57th, 78th, 95th, 110th, 134th, 197th, 206th, 246th, 256th, 260th, 267th, 296th, 299th, 383rd, 707th infantry divisions, 20th Panzer division, 18th, 25th and FHH Panzer Grenadier division and 4th and 6th Luftwaffe Field Divisions and Corp Detachment D.
Some internet sources deducted 14th infantry and 20th Panzer based on these two divisions were not disbanded after this battle. but added 337th infantry since it was emerged with other division.
Paul Adair book only mention 28 divisions were destroyed and its GOC causalties without talking about division loss. Soviet sources said it destroyed 50 divisions.
Anyone have opinion and data on this ? Perhaps German lost more than 28 ?
German division loss in Bagration 1944
Moderator: Tom Houlihan
Gerd Niepold
I've got a copy of Gerd Niepold's "Battle for White Russia," probably the best of all the works that covers the destruction of Army Group Center. Niepold was the 1a of 12th Pz.Div. and a participant in the battle. He states that 28 divisions were destroyed as well and his analysis of the battle is probably the most definitive.
Now, you have to understand the meaning of destroyed - it does not mean the same as annihilated - wiped out 100%. Destroyed, in military lexicon, means that a unit is no longer able to carry out any of its assigned tactical missions. It could have suffered only minor losses in personnel and equipment, but if its forces are dispersed, even temporarily, or left in disarray by an enemy counterstroke, it is as effectively out of action as if every man was killed. Of the 28 Divisions in Army Group Center destroyed, bits and pieces of a lot of them were able to make it out - large parts of the 12th Infantry Division, for example, were able to escape. In some divisions, most of the infantry regiments were lost, but the division logistics base - that is, the various support elements and the HQ, were in many cases able to make it out. But the few divisions that were able to make it out, in some form or another, needed to be completely rebuilt from the ground up with new personnel and equipment, and then had to undergo a long period (2-3 months) of training to become combat effective once again. 28 destroyed is a good number to start from, but by no means does it tell the whole story.
Cheers,
Doug Nash
Now, you have to understand the meaning of destroyed - it does not mean the same as annihilated - wiped out 100%. Destroyed, in military lexicon, means that a unit is no longer able to carry out any of its assigned tactical missions. It could have suffered only minor losses in personnel and equipment, but if its forces are dispersed, even temporarily, or left in disarray by an enemy counterstroke, it is as effectively out of action as if every man was killed. Of the 28 Divisions in Army Group Center destroyed, bits and pieces of a lot of them were able to make it out - large parts of the 12th Infantry Division, for example, were able to escape. In some divisions, most of the infantry regiments were lost, but the division logistics base - that is, the various support elements and the HQ, were in many cases able to make it out. But the few divisions that were able to make it out, in some form or another, needed to be completely rebuilt from the ground up with new personnel and equipment, and then had to undergo a long period (2-3 months) of training to become combat effective once again. 28 destroyed is a good number to start from, but by no means does it tell the whole story.
Cheers,
Doug Nash
Abbott: This sure is a beautiful forest.
Costello: Too bad you can't see it for all those trees!
Costello: Too bad you can't see it for all those trees!
Hi Doug Nash ,
Many sources also tell me 28 destroyed, my calculation based on these below :
260th, 299th and 337th merged and formed into Corp Detachment G and reformed as 299th infantry division on sept 1 1944
95th, 197th and 256th merged with and formed into Corp detachment H and reformed as 95th infantry division
6th, 12th, 31st, 36th, 45th, 78th and 246th, were rebuilt as Volksgrenadier divisions
57th, 110th, 134th, 206th, 267th, 296th, 383rd 707th, 04th and 06th Luftwaffe Field disbanded
PG FHH were rebuilt again. 18th and 25th were rebulit as Panzer Brigades then division
Corp detachment D disbanded
Some sources I found that 14th infantry division were shattered as Florke group.
35th infantry division also suffered casualties in Bobrusik and needed to withdrew and absorbed some march battalions as replacement
201st, 221st, 286th Sicherungs division also suffered heavy casualties and 221st dissolved later
If based on your definition, I will add 14th and 221st total no is 29 divisions were destroyed.
One more division 390th field training division who was rebuilt as Sicherungs Division on 19th July 1944. I am not sure that it was shattered by Russian and then rebuilt .
or actual destruction number is more than 28 ?
It was strange that Russian captured and killed so many German division and corp commander in Bagration : 7 division commander killed (134th, 256th, 267th, 337th, 4th and 6th Luftwaffe and and 1 missing (197th) and 15 (6th, 12th, 31st, 36th, 45th, 57th, 78th, 95th, 110th, 206th, 246th, 260th, 383rd and 707th infantry and 18th PG) were captured. Two corp commanders were killed and five were captured. Another battle like Vistula-Oder operation Russian claimed that destruction of 35 divisions and 25 shattered (losing 50-75 %) but not so many German officers were killed or captured, I found only 4 division commanders were captured (88th, 214th and 304th) and two corp and two division commanders (78th and 291th) were killed.
Vistula-Oder op also confused me in this regard. heavy officer casualties in Bagration also confirmed loss of German division in some way but not in Vistula-Oder operation, otherwise , German succeded in escaping Russian encirclement in Poland ?
Any opinion or feed back on that. or anyone ?
What's your opinion on that ? or anyone give me some feed back.
Many sources also tell me 28 destroyed, my calculation based on these below :
260th, 299th and 337th merged and formed into Corp Detachment G and reformed as 299th infantry division on sept 1 1944
95th, 197th and 256th merged with and formed into Corp detachment H and reformed as 95th infantry division
6th, 12th, 31st, 36th, 45th, 78th and 246th, were rebuilt as Volksgrenadier divisions
57th, 110th, 134th, 206th, 267th, 296th, 383rd 707th, 04th and 06th Luftwaffe Field disbanded
PG FHH were rebuilt again. 18th and 25th were rebulit as Panzer Brigades then division
Corp detachment D disbanded
Some sources I found that 14th infantry division were shattered as Florke group.
35th infantry division also suffered casualties in Bobrusik and needed to withdrew and absorbed some march battalions as replacement
201st, 221st, 286th Sicherungs division also suffered heavy casualties and 221st dissolved later
If based on your definition, I will add 14th and 221st total no is 29 divisions were destroyed.
One more division 390th field training division who was rebuilt as Sicherungs Division on 19th July 1944. I am not sure that it was shattered by Russian and then rebuilt .
or actual destruction number is more than 28 ?
It was strange that Russian captured and killed so many German division and corp commander in Bagration : 7 division commander killed (134th, 256th, 267th, 337th, 4th and 6th Luftwaffe and and 1 missing (197th) and 15 (6th, 12th, 31st, 36th, 45th, 57th, 78th, 95th, 110th, 206th, 246th, 260th, 383rd and 707th infantry and 18th PG) were captured. Two corp commanders were killed and five were captured. Another battle like Vistula-Oder operation Russian claimed that destruction of 35 divisions and 25 shattered (losing 50-75 %) but not so many German officers were killed or captured, I found only 4 division commanders were captured (88th, 214th and 304th) and two corp and two division commanders (78th and 291th) were killed.
Vistula-Oder op also confused me in this regard. heavy officer casualties in Bagration also confirmed loss of German division in some way but not in Vistula-Oder operation, otherwise , German succeded in escaping Russian encirclement in Poland ?
Any opinion or feed back on that. or anyone ?
What's your opinion on that ? or anyone give me some feed back.
Officer Casualties
I think the reason why the number of officers killed and captured during Bagration differs so much from that of the Vistula Operation is that during Operation Bagration, the Soviets were able to successfully pull off a very deep encirclement operation that cut off a large portion of the German forces. That, and Hitler's foolish decision to declare Mogilev, Bobruisk, Minsk and Vitebsk as fortresses doomed those garrisons, and their commanders, to death or capture.
The Vistula-Oder operation, in contrast, was more of a battering ram in that it attacked directly into the German defenses with little tactical subtlety & without any deep encirclements. So the Germans were able to effect a fighting withdrawal across Poland back to the Oder Line. While their losses were horrendous, as you have noted, a good deal of the units,with their commanders at the head, were able to maintain their tactical cohesion. So even though they were defeated, they were not destroyed. Additionally, the situation developed so quickly that Hitler had little opportunity to declare anything a fortress, until the Soviets reached Koenigsberg and Breslau.
Hope this helps -
The Vistula-Oder operation, in contrast, was more of a battering ram in that it attacked directly into the German defenses with little tactical subtlety & without any deep encirclements. So the Germans were able to effect a fighting withdrawal across Poland back to the Oder Line. While their losses were horrendous, as you have noted, a good deal of the units,with their commanders at the head, were able to maintain their tactical cohesion. So even though they were defeated, they were not destroyed. Additionally, the situation developed so quickly that Hitler had little opportunity to declare anything a fortress, until the Soviets reached Koenigsberg and Breslau.
Hope this helps -
Abbott: This sure is a beautiful forest.
Costello: Too bad you can't see it for all those trees!
Costello: Too bad you can't see it for all those trees!
Hi I even think Russian exaggerated the German loss to justify their Oder operation. You know 35 destroyed and 25 shattered is huge figure for me.
I doubt this figure. In 1945, Russian somehow was less successful than in 1944. Many German divisions were destroyed and many officers was captured or killed in Bagration, Jassy-Kishinev and Brody pocket. At least two division commanders was killed (50th and 111st ) and one (73rd) was captured in Crimea in May 1944 was just slightly little than Oder-Vistula Op. In 1945 , no such huge victories as in 1944 and only attrition warfare in East Prussia, Silesia and Hungary. Russian war machine was regressive in 1945 ? one example were six Russian abortive attempt to eliminate the Courland pocket. Russian said that they hold out a huge number of German in Russian concentration camp, there were no need to destroy them. I doubt it too as I think they cannot destroy German Army Group North (later Kurland) is real reason. Stalin and its commander also wanted to gain one more Bagration or Jassy-Kishinev victory to show off to their allies and their people. May to August 1944 was special year to Soviet military. In 1943 and 1945 they only inflicted casualties on German and regain territory. Stalingrad was special case Sixth Army overextended themselves too much and Russian even used three months to eliminate her. Korsun pocket so called second Stalingrad in which German suffered heavy casualties but only one corp commander and one corp detachment commander were killed and no more senior German officers were captured. My point is Russian war machine only worked between May and Aug 1944 and to some extent Stalingrad. In other year, I don't think so, what do you think or anyone think ?
I doubt this figure. In 1945, Russian somehow was less successful than in 1944. Many German divisions were destroyed and many officers was captured or killed in Bagration, Jassy-Kishinev and Brody pocket. At least two division commanders was killed (50th and 111st ) and one (73rd) was captured in Crimea in May 1944 was just slightly little than Oder-Vistula Op. In 1945 , no such huge victories as in 1944 and only attrition warfare in East Prussia, Silesia and Hungary. Russian war machine was regressive in 1945 ? one example were six Russian abortive attempt to eliminate the Courland pocket. Russian said that they hold out a huge number of German in Russian concentration camp, there were no need to destroy them. I doubt it too as I think they cannot destroy German Army Group North (later Kurland) is real reason. Stalin and its commander also wanted to gain one more Bagration or Jassy-Kishinev victory to show off to their allies and their people. May to August 1944 was special year to Soviet military. In 1943 and 1945 they only inflicted casualties on German and regain territory. Stalingrad was special case Sixth Army overextended themselves too much and Russian even used three months to eliminate her. Korsun pocket so called second Stalingrad in which German suffered heavy casualties but only one corp commander and one corp detachment commander were killed and no more senior German officers were captured. My point is Russian war machine only worked between May and Aug 1944 and to some extent Stalingrad. In other year, I don't think so, what do you think or anyone think ?
Exactly, and one of the best examples is Nehring's XXIV Pz. Corps wich succeeded as a rolving cauldron to make it back to german lines. Duffy's book "Red Storm Over the Reich" is a very good source to read at.The Vistula-Oder operation, in contrast, was more of a battering ram in that it attacked directly into the German defenses with little tactical subtlety & without any deep encirclements. So the Germans were able to effect a fighting withdrawal across Poland back to the Oder Line. While their losses were horrendous, as you have noted, a good deal of the units,with their commanders at the head, were able to maintain their tactical cohesion. So even though they were defeated, they were not destroyed. Additionally, the situation developed so quickly that Hitler had little opportunity to declare anything a fortress, until the Soviets reached Koenigsberg and Breslau.
Hope this helps -
Olivier
Kevin,
I think the peak of the soviet army was during summer 1944 too, though if you look closely at this opearation (Bagration) the soviets losses were huge ! And only by soviet standard can it be claimed as a big victory.
About the Kurland battles, I highly advise you to read "Hitler, Dönitz" and the baltic sea 1944-1945 by D. Grier. Very good book. To sum it up, I would say that the first three battles were battles of annihilation and they badly failed to achieve it, as for the last three batlles there goals was more to pin down as many units as possible than trying to destroy AGN.
Olivier
I think the peak of the soviet army was during summer 1944 too, though if you look closely at this opearation (Bagration) the soviets losses were huge ! And only by soviet standard can it be claimed as a big victory.
About the Kurland battles, I highly advise you to read "Hitler, Dönitz" and the baltic sea 1944-1945 by D. Grier. Very good book. To sum it up, I would say that the first three battles were battles of annihilation and they badly failed to achieve it, as for the last three batlles there goals was more to pin down as many units as possible than trying to destroy AGN.
Olivier
Hi all, Yes, the Soviet casualties was huge : 765,815 casualties including 178000 were killed. German lost 350,000 men only. After summer of 1944, Soviet peak passed, in 1945, their casualties were still high but less successful in result. If Hitler could maintain 6 million men in the Eastern front, perhaps he could win the war but he never could do that. But the Western Allies also cannot obtain Bagration style victory over German but their casualties was relatively slight. in area of France and Poland , both terrain provided the place for annhilation battles but both of them (West and Russia) failed to obtain decisive victory in Falaise and Vistula-Oder offensive.
By the way, some theory said that this was German general's conspiracy to surrender in Byelorussia in 1944 to help overthrow Hitler and cooperate with Paulus. If was true, war was already over by August 1944.
What are your opinion ?
By the way, some theory said that this was German general's conspiracy to surrender in Byelorussia in 1944 to help overthrow Hitler and cooperate with Paulus. If was true, war was already over by August 1944.
What are your opinion ?
Generals Conspiracy
I think the theory that the German Generals conspired to bring about the massive surrender of Army Group Center to be pure baloney and a postwar attempt to shift blame for the disaster from Hitler to the Generalstab. The generals didn't need to forfeit this battle. Hitler had put his most incompetent Field Marshall (i.e., GFm Busch) in command, a man who never questioned Hitler, had absolutely no initiative of his own and a yes-man who carried out every order from him to the letter, no matter how senseless, such as the series of "stand fast" and "Feste Platz" orders. Besides, the Soviet plan was brilliant and if you get a copy of Niepold's book, it is very hard to escape the conclusion that by 25 June, it was impossible for the Germans to escape the trap, much less bring about a defensive victory. It was the June 1944 defeat in White Russia - Germany's most decisive defeat in its entire military history - that brought about the conditions that led to the attempt on Hitler's life on 20 July 1944; this disaster pushed the General Staff and the plotters to the decision point. While the individual German battalions, regiments and divisions fought very well in White Russia, the Soviets out-generaled them at the corps, army and army group level, a trend that had begun in the Summer of 1943. The only person who could have probably fought the Soviets to a draw in White Russia was GFm Model, but he was not brought over to command HGr Center until it was too late; even so, he was able to bring the Soviet juggernaut to a halt in late July 1944, helped by the fact that the Red Army had outrun its supply lines.
If you are serious about studying Bagration in greater detail, you need to get a copy of David Glantz' book Proceedings from the 1985 Art of War Symposium, "From the Dniepr to the Vistula, Nov. 1943 to Aug. 1944." In this book, available on Amazon I believe, he brings in many of the key German commanders to participate in a seminar at the US Army War College. It was to be one of the last times a panel of distinguished Wehrmacht-Heer officers were gathered together in one room to discuss the war in the East. The list of commanders (all of whom served in the Bundeswehr after the war) included:
General von Senger und Etterlin
General Rothe
Colonel Rolf Stoves
General Graf von Kielmannsegg
Dr. Dieter Ose, OKH
Colonel van Nes
General Lemm
General Gerd Niepold
General von Trotha
Colonel Helmut Ritgen
If you are serious about studying Bagration in greater detail, you need to get a copy of David Glantz' book Proceedings from the 1985 Art of War Symposium, "From the Dniepr to the Vistula, Nov. 1943 to Aug. 1944." In this book, available on Amazon I believe, he brings in many of the key German commanders to participate in a seminar at the US Army War College. It was to be one of the last times a panel of distinguished Wehrmacht-Heer officers were gathered together in one room to discuss the war in the East. The list of commanders (all of whom served in the Bundeswehr after the war) included:
General von Senger und Etterlin
General Rothe
Colonel Rolf Stoves
General Graf von Kielmannsegg
Dr. Dieter Ose, OKH
Colonel van Nes
General Lemm
General Gerd Niepold
General von Trotha
Colonel Helmut Ritgen
Abbott: This sure is a beautiful forest.
Costello: Too bad you can't see it for all those trees!
Costello: Too bad you can't see it for all those trees!
Hi Doug,
Did von Senger und Etterlin serve in the Bundeswehr? He might have been in the selection commitee. But I cant think of any positions he actually held there.
Anyway, apart from that i completely agree with you. This guy should buy some books and start reading if he's genuinely interested in these battles. Do some work of his own!
And Glantz's is always a good point to begin.
Did von Senger und Etterlin serve in the Bundeswehr? He might have been in the selection commitee. But I cant think of any positions he actually held there.
Anyway, apart from that i completely agree with you. This guy should buy some books and start reading if he's genuinely interested in these battles. Do some work of his own!
And Glantz's is always a good point to begin.Ferdinand von Senger und Etterlin
He was the son of the WWII General Fridolin von Senger und Etterlin - as an Oberleutnant, he was awarded the Deutsches Kreuz in Gold while serving with Pz.Aufkl.Abt. 24 of the 24.Pz.Div. ---
There was another US Army historical manuscript witten shortly after the war by Gen.Maj. Peter von der Groeben, MS T-31, titled "Collapse of Army Group Center, 1944." Groeben had been a general staff officer and commander at various levels during the war. There's quite a bit out there about this battle and we've only just started scratching the surface.
Regards,
Doug
There was another US Army historical manuscript witten shortly after the war by Gen.Maj. Peter von der Groeben, MS T-31, titled "Collapse of Army Group Center, 1944." Groeben had been a general staff officer and commander at various levels during the war. There's quite a bit out there about this battle and we've only just started scratching the surface.
Regards,
Doug
Abbott: This sure is a beautiful forest.
Costello: Too bad you can't see it for all those trees!
Costello: Too bad you can't see it for all those trees!
Indeed! Ferdinand von Senger und Etterlin of the 3./Pz.Aufkl.Abt. 24 on 4 sept 1944. Did he serve in the Bundeswehr?
I forgot to bookmark it, but there is a site out there with all the BW-commanders... Hate it when that happens. Cant remember seeing him there though.. My memory most have lost me
Regards Eric
I forgot to bookmark it, but there is a site out there with all the BW-commanders... Hate it when that happens. Cant remember seeing him there though.. My memory most have lost me
Regards Eric
Etterlin
From Wikipedia:
Bundeswehr 1956 – 1979 [Bearbeiten]
Nach seiner Reaktivierung im März 1956 wurde von Senger und Etterlin im Referat „Grundsatzfragen des Militärischen Nachrichtenwesens und Fremde Streitkräfte Ost“ eingesetzt, hier kam ihm seine Kriegserfahrung in Russland und die Verwendung im OKH sehr zu Gute. Es folgte nach der Generalstabsausbildung eine Tätigkeit als G 3 in der Panzerlehrbrigade 9 (Munster). Hier war er an der Erprobung des Kampfpanzers „Leopard“ beteiligt. Seine nächste Aufgabe bestand in der Mitarbeit der Studiengruppe des Heeres über Fragen der atomaren Taktik und Heeresplanung. 1964 kehrte als Kommandeur des Panzerlehrbataillon 94 nach Munster zurück und konnte nun die praktischen Erfahrungen mit dem Kampfpanzer „Leopard“ erleben.
Erste NATO-Verwendung [Bearbeiten]
Nach dem erfolgreichen Abschluss einer Ausbildung am NATO–Defence–College in Rom folgte nun die erste Verwendung im integrierten NATO-Bereich. In dieser zweijährigen Verwendung war er mit der Einsatzplanung des NATO-Hauptquartier NORTHAG in Mönchengladbach betraut und hatte den Einsatz von niederländischen, britischen, belgischen und deutschen Heerestruppen zu koordinieren.
Der General [Bearbeiten]
Nach einem kurzen Intermezzo von Oktober 1969 bis März 1970 bei der Panzerbrigade 20 in Hemer wurde er in den Führungsstab des Heeres nach Bonn beordert und am 30. September 1970 zum Brigadegeneral befördert. In Stuttgart übernahm er später als Generalmajor die Stelle des Befehlshabers im Wehrbereich V. und erlebte in diesem Territorialkommando die unterschiedlichen Ansätze in der Zusammenarbeit mit zivilen Behörden, Landesministerien und der Bundeswehrverwaltung. Besonders wandte er sich den Verbindungen zu den alliierten Großverbänden und dem deutschen Heer zu und forcierte die Pläne einer schnellen Mobilmachung von Reservisten. Am 1. Juli 1974 kehrte er in das Feldheer zurück und übernahm das Kommando über die 7. Panzerdivision in Unna. Hier war er insbesondere mit der Zusammenlegung unterschiedlicher Einheiten und Verbände betraut, um die Forderungen der neuen „Heeresstruktur 4“ umzusetzen. Danach führte er seine Division durch mehrere erfolgreiche Großübungen. Im Frühjahr 1978 wurde Dr. von Senger und Etterlin, nun Generalleutnant, Kommandierender General des I. Korps in Münster.
NATO-Oberbefehlshaber [Bearbeiten]
Am 1. Oktober 1979 wurde der General Nachfolger des in Pension gehenden General Franz-Joseph Schulze und wurde Oberbefehlshaber der NATO-Streitkräfte Mitteleuropa in Brunssum (NL). Die dramatischen militärpolitischen Ereignisse dieser Jahre führten 1980 zur Planung des „Long-Term-Defence-Program“ und beinhaltete die Schaffung zusätzlicher europäischer Reservetruppen. Trotz dieser mehr politischen als militärischen Verwendung vergaß General Senger von Etterlin nicht den Kontakt zu der Truppe und tauchte in Verbänden und Großverbänden auf, um die taktische und kriegsnahe Ausbildung zu überwachen und wenn nötig korrigierend einzugreifen.
Ruhestand
Bundeswehr 1956 – 1979 [Bearbeiten]
Nach seiner Reaktivierung im März 1956 wurde von Senger und Etterlin im Referat „Grundsatzfragen des Militärischen Nachrichtenwesens und Fremde Streitkräfte Ost“ eingesetzt, hier kam ihm seine Kriegserfahrung in Russland und die Verwendung im OKH sehr zu Gute. Es folgte nach der Generalstabsausbildung eine Tätigkeit als G 3 in der Panzerlehrbrigade 9 (Munster). Hier war er an der Erprobung des Kampfpanzers „Leopard“ beteiligt. Seine nächste Aufgabe bestand in der Mitarbeit der Studiengruppe des Heeres über Fragen der atomaren Taktik und Heeresplanung. 1964 kehrte als Kommandeur des Panzerlehrbataillon 94 nach Munster zurück und konnte nun die praktischen Erfahrungen mit dem Kampfpanzer „Leopard“ erleben.
Erste NATO-Verwendung [Bearbeiten]
Nach dem erfolgreichen Abschluss einer Ausbildung am NATO–Defence–College in Rom folgte nun die erste Verwendung im integrierten NATO-Bereich. In dieser zweijährigen Verwendung war er mit der Einsatzplanung des NATO-Hauptquartier NORTHAG in Mönchengladbach betraut und hatte den Einsatz von niederländischen, britischen, belgischen und deutschen Heerestruppen zu koordinieren.
Der General [Bearbeiten]
Nach einem kurzen Intermezzo von Oktober 1969 bis März 1970 bei der Panzerbrigade 20 in Hemer wurde er in den Führungsstab des Heeres nach Bonn beordert und am 30. September 1970 zum Brigadegeneral befördert. In Stuttgart übernahm er später als Generalmajor die Stelle des Befehlshabers im Wehrbereich V. und erlebte in diesem Territorialkommando die unterschiedlichen Ansätze in der Zusammenarbeit mit zivilen Behörden, Landesministerien und der Bundeswehrverwaltung. Besonders wandte er sich den Verbindungen zu den alliierten Großverbänden und dem deutschen Heer zu und forcierte die Pläne einer schnellen Mobilmachung von Reservisten. Am 1. Juli 1974 kehrte er in das Feldheer zurück und übernahm das Kommando über die 7. Panzerdivision in Unna. Hier war er insbesondere mit der Zusammenlegung unterschiedlicher Einheiten und Verbände betraut, um die Forderungen der neuen „Heeresstruktur 4“ umzusetzen. Danach führte er seine Division durch mehrere erfolgreiche Großübungen. Im Frühjahr 1978 wurde Dr. von Senger und Etterlin, nun Generalleutnant, Kommandierender General des I. Korps in Münster.
NATO-Oberbefehlshaber [Bearbeiten]
Am 1. Oktober 1979 wurde der General Nachfolger des in Pension gehenden General Franz-Joseph Schulze und wurde Oberbefehlshaber der NATO-Streitkräfte Mitteleuropa in Brunssum (NL). Die dramatischen militärpolitischen Ereignisse dieser Jahre führten 1980 zur Planung des „Long-Term-Defence-Program“ und beinhaltete die Schaffung zusätzlicher europäischer Reservetruppen. Trotz dieser mehr politischen als militärischen Verwendung vergaß General Senger von Etterlin nicht den Kontakt zu der Truppe und tauchte in Verbänden und Großverbänden auf, um die taktische und kriegsnahe Ausbildung zu überwachen und wenn nötig korrigierend einzugreifen.
Ruhestand
Abbott: This sure is a beautiful forest.
Costello: Too bad you can't see it for all those trees!
Costello: Too bad you can't see it for all those trees!
thx Doug