CAFE,
I can only confirm Piave and Nembo, March 1943 planning.
I can do a study about the aviability of Italian Divisions during Spring 1942 but it would be only a speculative work as I cofirm to have been unable to discover any hard evidence.
The British claimed, in Feb. 1941, that there was an Italian Plan to land in the Balearic Is. ; perhaps Sid may find something more about this Intelligence opinion (again without any Italian confirm)
Bye EC
Operation Ilona and Operation Gisela: The Invasion of Spain.
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Enrico Cernuschi
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Well, French and British were very ansious about a possible Italian mainmise of the Baleari is. since Aug. 1936 in spite of Mussolini's promise to the British conservative government made in Aug. 1936 he was not going to ask anything there also if he was going to help the local nationalist against the reds.
The Italian Premier idea, in spite of the Regia Marina desire to have the use of Minorca harbour after the war, if necessary, and an airfield, was that the Spanish friendship would be more than enough in the case of a a "confrontation" with Paris and London. Since July 1939 the last Italian elements leaved so the Balearic Is. in sight of the planned attack to Greece which had to begin, accorgin the original programs made in march 1939, for Sept. 1939.
After to have drop, Spring 1940, in spite of the Regia Marina desire to get Minorca by force, if necessary, a renewed idea to land in the Baleari, the Italians hoped again, in May and June 1940, that Spain would let the Regia Aeronautica bombers to use an airport to bomb Gibraltar, This progam too vanished after the Italian declaration of war and, since then, there wero no more programs upon the Spanich territory except for the almost desperate idea to cross Spain, with a German substantial partecipation of 80% !, in March-May 1943.
Spanish benevolent attitude since 1940 until Sept. 1943 towards the Italian submarines, freighters, small combatants units and crafts of the Navy and planes is well known. The Italy-Spain sea and economical trade was too an important one.
Useful, unofficial relations between Spain and the R.S.I. were still active in 1943 and 1944 and humanitarian ones still in 1945.
Saludos amigo, EC
The Italian Premier idea, in spite of the Regia Marina desire to have the use of Minorca harbour after the war, if necessary, and an airfield, was that the Spanish friendship would be more than enough in the case of a a "confrontation" with Paris and London. Since July 1939 the last Italian elements leaved so the Balearic Is. in sight of the planned attack to Greece which had to begin, accorgin the original programs made in march 1939, for Sept. 1939.
After to have drop, Spring 1940, in spite of the Regia Marina desire to get Minorca by force, if necessary, a renewed idea to land in the Baleari, the Italians hoped again, in May and June 1940, that Spain would let the Regia Aeronautica bombers to use an airport to bomb Gibraltar, This progam too vanished after the Italian declaration of war and, since then, there wero no more programs upon the Spanich territory except for the almost desperate idea to cross Spain, with a German substantial partecipation of 80% !, in March-May 1943.
Spanish benevolent attitude since 1940 until Sept. 1943 towards the Italian submarines, freighters, small combatants units and crafts of the Navy and planes is well known. The Italy-Spain sea and economical trade was too an important one.
Useful, unofficial relations between Spain and the R.S.I. were still active in 1943 and 1944 and humanitarian ones still in 1945.
Saludos amigo, EC
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Enrico Cernuschi
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Legionario
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Enrico Cernuschi
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Well Legionario,
it's almost impossible to give a full answer in such a small space. It'm more an universitary thesis subject.
I can tell you, anyway, that:
the Alzamiento and the Civil war were a surprise in Italy and abroad.
Before 1936 there were a sort of "alliance" between Italy and Spain since 1922 until 1931. It was not an initiative by the still coming Fascism but by the Royal Houses of these two countries based upon their common interest to face France. UK welcomed this idea as London had come back, after 1918, to the old schemes of Divide and impera in a "balanced" Europe.
During the 1931-1936 period there were some not very brilliant projects of future coups d'etait by Spanish insurgents with the Italian help, always accorging the traditional anti-France scheme. The most important one was planned by marshall Balbo and gen. Sanjurio but it failed in Aug. 1932; during that same season the sudden, new foreign policy decided by Mussolini to create a new "alliance" between Rome, Paris and Moscow against the resurging Germany and UK put an end to the various Spanish schemes.
This line of thought was still acive in July 1936, in spite of the new Popolar Front in France which had torpedoed for personal motives (Blum socialist hate for Mussolini in mane of his old friendship with Matteotti) the previous 1932-1936 Italian-French entente.
It was only the arrive of the first, modern aircrafts from France (fighters and bombers) in july 1936 to help the Spanish Republican government which induced, at least, Mussonlini, to send, in Aug. 1936, the first Italian planes in Marocco and, then, some small helps (a destroyer, two fighters, some floatplanes and a lone man, the Console of the Militia Arconovaldo Bonaccorsi) at Maiorca to counter attack after the Republican landing. This initiative was blesed by the British Conservatoce government as the Duce had promised, in spite of the request advanced by the Regia Marina staff, he would not ask any facilities, then and after the war, in the Balearic Is.
During the following Civil war years the Italian Support for the nationalist was huge while the German one was modeste in confront. The economic aides were very important too and, as a matter of fact, the "White" fraction was able to go on, until the end of the war, mainly by Italian and United States (oil and tankers) helps.
After the fall of Madrid Italy and Spain (without Germany) become to project an huge recovery program beginnin effectively it. The naval (both merchant and military) aspects of this plan are available in the excellent juan Coello Lillo, Buquel de la Armada espanola, los annos de la post-guerra, ed. Aldaba, Madrid, 1997.
Since late Jan. 1941, anyway, the end of the italian "Guerra parallela" and the new phase of the strict alliance and economical linkage with Germany put an end to the various Itaòian and Spanish common programs. An useful work toghether in ecnomy and a benevolent neutrality of Madrid went on, anyway, until the Italian armistice. After 8 Sept. 1943 Spain was still in a friendish, not official, mood towards the new RSI.
The German and Spainish conctats were, during the Second World war, good and profitable but Berlin had little to spare and Hitler had always a poor opinion of the help he could get from Spain thinking it would be, anyway, too much expensive. after the total oil stoppage ordered by the British and (now, first time) by the USA during Spring 1944 the embarassed Spanish Government had, at least, to adopt a new policy of strict neutrality towards Germany (the Anglosaxons had declared that grain would be the next stoppage step) since may 1944 until the end of the war.
Let me know if you need any further detail. EC
PS: Viva Roger de Lauria, Colombo, Gravina y Malaspina, marineros Italianos do Espana, una, grande, libre.
Parada Inglesos.
EC
it's almost impossible to give a full answer in such a small space. It'm more an universitary thesis subject.
I can tell you, anyway, that:
the Alzamiento and the Civil war were a surprise in Italy and abroad.
Before 1936 there were a sort of "alliance" between Italy and Spain since 1922 until 1931. It was not an initiative by the still coming Fascism but by the Royal Houses of these two countries based upon their common interest to face France. UK welcomed this idea as London had come back, after 1918, to the old schemes of Divide and impera in a "balanced" Europe.
During the 1931-1936 period there were some not very brilliant projects of future coups d'etait by Spanish insurgents with the Italian help, always accorging the traditional anti-France scheme. The most important one was planned by marshall Balbo and gen. Sanjurio but it failed in Aug. 1932; during that same season the sudden, new foreign policy decided by Mussolini to create a new "alliance" between Rome, Paris and Moscow against the resurging Germany and UK put an end to the various Spanish schemes.
This line of thought was still acive in July 1936, in spite of the new Popolar Front in France which had torpedoed for personal motives (Blum socialist hate for Mussolini in mane of his old friendship with Matteotti) the previous 1932-1936 Italian-French entente.
It was only the arrive of the first, modern aircrafts from France (fighters and bombers) in july 1936 to help the Spanish Republican government which induced, at least, Mussonlini, to send, in Aug. 1936, the first Italian planes in Marocco and, then, some small helps (a destroyer, two fighters, some floatplanes and a lone man, the Console of the Militia Arconovaldo Bonaccorsi) at Maiorca to counter attack after the Republican landing. This initiative was blesed by the British Conservatoce government as the Duce had promised, in spite of the request advanced by the Regia Marina staff, he would not ask any facilities, then and after the war, in the Balearic Is.
During the following Civil war years the Italian Support for the nationalist was huge while the German one was modeste in confront. The economic aides were very important too and, as a matter of fact, the "White" fraction was able to go on, until the end of the war, mainly by Italian and United States (oil and tankers) helps.
After the fall of Madrid Italy and Spain (without Germany) become to project an huge recovery program beginnin effectively it. The naval (both merchant and military) aspects of this plan are available in the excellent juan Coello Lillo, Buquel de la Armada espanola, los annos de la post-guerra, ed. Aldaba, Madrid, 1997.
Since late Jan. 1941, anyway, the end of the italian "Guerra parallela" and the new phase of the strict alliance and economical linkage with Germany put an end to the various Itaòian and Spanish common programs. An useful work toghether in ecnomy and a benevolent neutrality of Madrid went on, anyway, until the Italian armistice. After 8 Sept. 1943 Spain was still in a friendish, not official, mood towards the new RSI.
The German and Spainish conctats were, during the Second World war, good and profitable but Berlin had little to spare and Hitler had always a poor opinion of the help he could get from Spain thinking it would be, anyway, too much expensive. after the total oil stoppage ordered by the British and (now, first time) by the USA during Spring 1944 the embarassed Spanish Government had, at least, to adopt a new policy of strict neutrality towards Germany (the Anglosaxons had declared that grain would be the next stoppage step) since may 1944 until the end of the war.
Let me know if you need any further detail. EC
PS: Viva Roger de Lauria, Colombo, Gravina y Malaspina, marineros Italianos do Espana, una, grande, libre.
Parada Inglesos.
EC
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Hi Enrico,
During the SCW, I think it was more important the Italian aid that German one.
The Italian soldiers were more numerous (CTV) than the Legion Condor, and after the war was numerous the material from Italy (planes, artillery, guns, tanks and ships).
Besides, I also think that our War was an excellent training camp for the Italians.
Bye Enrico and Regards from Spain.
Viva l'Italia - Viva il CTV
During the SCW, I think it was more important the Italian aid that German one.
The Italian soldiers were more numerous (CTV) than the Legion Condor, and after the war was numerous the material from Italy (planes, artillery, guns, tanks and ships).
Besides, I also think that our War was an excellent training camp for the Italians.
Bye Enrico and Regards from Spain.
Viva l'Italia - Viva il CTV
¡Legionarios a luchar!
¡Legionarios a morir!
¡Viva la Muerte!
¡Legionarios a morir!
¡Viva la Muerte!
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Enrico Cernuschi
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Well, about the Italian experience during the spanish Civil War things are not easy to explain.
The Regia Marina gained a good experience in traffic protection, submarine activity and in the various services testing the materials too.
The Regia Aeronautica didn't learn, as doctrine, a damn as they fought always the same old fashion war of 1918. Pilots were able to collect, sur le champ, a good esperience in dogfighting but nothing more. During the 1940-1941 campaing in North Africa an old Italian figheer ace, Gen. Guidi, told me, many years ago, that this was not a problem as the RAF pilots were very "verdi" (green, without combat experience) and tactics were on both sides the old one, big patrols and dogfight, so the Spain times he had spent two years before was useful (but not decisive). The British had, at least, since Summer 1941, RDF guide available in N. Africa too but their pilots went on with the much more loved dogfights tactics untuil the beginning of 1943 when flight discipline imposed them to stop to believe David Niven in Dawn Patrol and to do things in the most efficient and effective way.
For the Regio Esercito and the Milizia the Spain experience was quite unuseful. The Army was able to do many manuals which reflected the new kind of war, first of all the anti-tank matter. But the books remained in the shelves. The Italian army had expanded in a too much fast way with too many 6 mouthes made officiers without not only the necessary stuff and stamina but the very will to study tactics (and the instructoris were not better at all). The Royal Army had sent a Division, the Littorio, which gained as a complex a good experience. It become, late 1939, an armoured Div and fought well in Egypt in 1942 but this was almost all the Army otained by the Spainsh experience: a war hardned division.
The Militia results were even less. Some individuals (like Console Generale Francisi, the best MVSN Gen. died in Sicily in July 1943) give a good proof then and later but training did not gain nothing. The tactics were and remained, in the best cases, the old World War one Arditi's ones (courage but nothing to do with the sofhisticated German and Austrian sturmtruppen tactics the Americans had to re learn after the Vietnam experience). The legions sent in Spain were dispersed and the real value of that war in sight of the next one remained debatable.
Not a single world against the Spainsh people (white or red) is anyway available in the various memories of the CTV men (and in the Italian members of the International Brigades too). We have got too much common history, I think.
Next time EC
The Regia Marina gained a good experience in traffic protection, submarine activity and in the various services testing the materials too.
The Regia Aeronautica didn't learn, as doctrine, a damn as they fought always the same old fashion war of 1918. Pilots were able to collect, sur le champ, a good esperience in dogfighting but nothing more. During the 1940-1941 campaing in North Africa an old Italian figheer ace, Gen. Guidi, told me, many years ago, that this was not a problem as the RAF pilots were very "verdi" (green, without combat experience) and tactics were on both sides the old one, big patrols and dogfight, so the Spain times he had spent two years before was useful (but not decisive). The British had, at least, since Summer 1941, RDF guide available in N. Africa too but their pilots went on with the much more loved dogfights tactics untuil the beginning of 1943 when flight discipline imposed them to stop to believe David Niven in Dawn Patrol and to do things in the most efficient and effective way.
For the Regio Esercito and the Milizia the Spain experience was quite unuseful. The Army was able to do many manuals which reflected the new kind of war, first of all the anti-tank matter. But the books remained in the shelves. The Italian army had expanded in a too much fast way with too many 6 mouthes made officiers without not only the necessary stuff and stamina but the very will to study tactics (and the instructoris were not better at all). The Royal Army had sent a Division, the Littorio, which gained as a complex a good experience. It become, late 1939, an armoured Div and fought well in Egypt in 1942 but this was almost all the Army otained by the Spainsh experience: a war hardned division.
The Militia results were even less. Some individuals (like Console Generale Francisi, the best MVSN Gen. died in Sicily in July 1943) give a good proof then and later but training did not gain nothing. The tactics were and remained, in the best cases, the old World War one Arditi's ones (courage but nothing to do with the sofhisticated German and Austrian sturmtruppen tactics the Americans had to re learn after the Vietnam experience). The legions sent in Spain were dispersed and the real value of that war in sight of the next one remained debatable.
Not a single world against the Spainsh people (white or red) is anyway available in the various memories of the CTV men (and in the Italian members of the International Brigades too). We have got too much common history, I think.
Next time EC
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Legionario
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Hi Enrico,
I think that German learned the lesson better than Regio Esercito in Spain.
They fought bravely in Spain, the Italian soldiers were defeated several times (ex. Guadalajara, althought they won a Militar Medal) when their L-3 were destroyed by the heavier T-26 (and it was repeated in N. Africa).
However, the Italian Pilots had a good trainning here, where the Cr-32 and SM-79 had good opportunities for showing their abilities.
About the International Brigades, there were other little civil wars in Spain
(Legion Condor vs Centuria Thaelmann and CTV vs Brigada Garibaldi).
I think that German learned the lesson better than Regio Esercito in Spain.
They fought bravely in Spain, the Italian soldiers were defeated several times (ex. Guadalajara, althought they won a Militar Medal) when their L-3 were destroyed by the heavier T-26 (and it was repeated in N. Africa).
However, the Italian Pilots had a good trainning here, where the Cr-32 and SM-79 had good opportunities for showing their abilities.
About the International Brigades, there were other little civil wars in Spain
(Legion Condor vs Centuria Thaelmann and CTV vs Brigada Garibaldi).
¡Legionarios a luchar!
¡Legionarios a morir!
¡Viva la Muerte!
¡Legionarios a morir!
¡Viva la Muerte!
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Enrico Cernuschi
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Hello Legionario,
Guadalajara is a well know episode. Too many trumpets before ect. It was a perfect precedent at the many shortcomings of the Regio Esercito bad officier corps and subsequnt awful training in 1940-1941 (after they tried to do something better but it was almost too much late) but I didn't know about others defeats at Bilbao, Santander, Vinaroz, Tortosa and Barcellona with only Italian or mixed Italian and Spanish divisions and corps.
Next time, EC
Guadalajara is a well know episode. Too many trumpets before ect. It was a perfect precedent at the many shortcomings of the Regio Esercito bad officier corps and subsequnt awful training in 1940-1941 (after they tried to do something better but it was almost too much late) but I didn't know about others defeats at Bilbao, Santander, Vinaroz, Tortosa and Barcellona with only Italian or mixed Italian and Spanish divisions and corps.
Next time, EC
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Hi Guys,
My impression is that the Italian forces in Spain have been the victims of propaganda, both from the Republicans, wanting to emphasise their one victory over the Italians at Guadalajara, and by the Nationalists, who do not want to concede a major role to non-Spanish nationals.
The first point to note is that the Italian ground formations used were not elite fascist military units, as Republican propaganda would have it. The units were improvised and many of the men had originally been enlisted for labour service in Ethiopia!
Secondly, Guadalajara was the ONLY significant defeat suffered by the Italians in three years in Spain, and even this has been greatly exaggerated.
Thirdly, the Italian corps was one of the three elite offensive corps used by the nationalists to head all their successful advances. If there was a major nationalist advance without the central participation of the Italians after the capture of Malaga in 1936, I would be be very suprised.
Finally, the Italian Air Force conducted the most influential air raid of the inter war years when it first bombed Barcelona from the Balearics. In full view of numerous international journalists twelve SM79s hit the city in daylight.
Because the raid and its results were so public and quantifiable, international aviation experts were able to divide the weight of bombs dropped into the number of civilian casualties caused and it was from this single raid that all the major powers worked out the likely effect of enormous bomber fleets on their cities. For example, it set in train the great evacuation plans used in Britain at the outbreak of WWII, greatly inhibited French will power when confronting Germany at Munich, led to the construction of millions of air raid shelters all over Europe and gave an enormous spur to air defence construction everywhere.
However, the calculations were wrong because exceptional circumstances had made the Barcelona casualties exceptionally high. The Barcelona civilian population had not been bombed before and so had no shelters and did not take cover. Furthermore, an ammunition truck had exploded causing exceptional casualties. There had also been widespread panic amongst the unseasoned population. None of these effects were reproduced by late raids on Barcelona, but this went unnoticed.
Thus, the first Italian Barcelona raid was far more influential than German raid on Guernica at the time and gave Europe an exaggerated appreciation of the true air threat.
Cheers,
Sid.
My impression is that the Italian forces in Spain have been the victims of propaganda, both from the Republicans, wanting to emphasise their one victory over the Italians at Guadalajara, and by the Nationalists, who do not want to concede a major role to non-Spanish nationals.
The first point to note is that the Italian ground formations used were not elite fascist military units, as Republican propaganda would have it. The units were improvised and many of the men had originally been enlisted for labour service in Ethiopia!
Secondly, Guadalajara was the ONLY significant defeat suffered by the Italians in three years in Spain, and even this has been greatly exaggerated.
Thirdly, the Italian corps was one of the three elite offensive corps used by the nationalists to head all their successful advances. If there was a major nationalist advance without the central participation of the Italians after the capture of Malaga in 1936, I would be be very suprised.
Finally, the Italian Air Force conducted the most influential air raid of the inter war years when it first bombed Barcelona from the Balearics. In full view of numerous international journalists twelve SM79s hit the city in daylight.
Because the raid and its results were so public and quantifiable, international aviation experts were able to divide the weight of bombs dropped into the number of civilian casualties caused and it was from this single raid that all the major powers worked out the likely effect of enormous bomber fleets on their cities. For example, it set in train the great evacuation plans used in Britain at the outbreak of WWII, greatly inhibited French will power when confronting Germany at Munich, led to the construction of millions of air raid shelters all over Europe and gave an enormous spur to air defence construction everywhere.
However, the calculations were wrong because exceptional circumstances had made the Barcelona casualties exceptionally high. The Barcelona civilian population had not been bombed before and so had no shelters and did not take cover. Furthermore, an ammunition truck had exploded causing exceptional casualties. There had also been widespread panic amongst the unseasoned population. None of these effects were reproduced by late raids on Barcelona, but this went unnoticed.
Thus, the first Italian Barcelona raid was far more influential than German raid on Guernica at the time and gave Europe an exaggerated appreciation of the true air threat.
Cheers,
Sid.
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Legionario
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There is a lot of Propaganda about the Spanish Civil war:
-Guernica Raid- It is said that there wasn't any important military objetive (I think a Gun Factory is). It really was a sad act, because the fire propagated over the wooden roofs and caused most of the victims, but there were also raids over Madrid and Barcelona and they are not as famous, I think the Republica need Propagando to offer to the other countries. (When Picasso was ordered to paint it, he didn't like their own work)
-The internationals brigades didn't fight as good as people think.
-Besides firing churches and kill priest and violate nuns, the Republican killed a lot of people (8000 in Paracuellos de Jarama ordered by soviet agents) and most of people only know Republican Victims.
-People consider that Legion Condor and CTV were only mercenaries without knowing their actions during the war.
-Guernica Raid- It is said that there wasn't any important military objetive (I think a Gun Factory is). It really was a sad act, because the fire propagated over the wooden roofs and caused most of the victims, but there were also raids over Madrid and Barcelona and they are not as famous, I think the Republica need Propagando to offer to the other countries. (When Picasso was ordered to paint it, he didn't like their own work)
-The internationals brigades didn't fight as good as people think.
-Besides firing churches and kill priest and violate nuns, the Republican killed a lot of people (8000 in Paracuellos de Jarama ordered by soviet agents) and most of people only know Republican Victims.
-People consider that Legion Condor and CTV were only mercenaries without knowing their actions during the war.
¡Legionarios a luchar!
¡Legionarios a morir!
¡Viva la Muerte!
¡Legionarios a morir!
¡Viva la Muerte!