julian wrote:lwd wrote:
That is an absurd statement.
No, because the fast, deep advance in july did move german forces far from their railheads beyond the distance within which you can supposedly be fully supported.
And the pause at the end of July and early August was so that the infantry and railheads could catch up with the spear heads.
julian wrote:lwd wrote:
But the drive on Moscow would have had to cover more ground and involve more troops would it not? So the fact that one offensive was adequately supported doesn't mean that the other could have been.
That one offensive even succeeded with logistical issues created by the limited capacity of the railway which supported it. In a movement east PGR 2 Could have been supported much better.
Really? I think it's going to take more than your hand waving to convince me.
And there was much more going on at the same. The divisions of PGR 3 that moved north were supported too. And you are conveniently igroring that the mobile divisions had had their refit and rest in the beginning of august.
Not at all. The problem doesn't occur in August the problems will start occuring later on.
julian wrote:lwd wrote:
No that is not "the issue" it is one issue among many.
It is THE issue because it litterally bogs down any advance and creates massive logistical problems.
By that logic as long as the mud stays away there should be no problem. That explains El Alamein very well doesn't it? Rommel just couldn't deal with the mud ... oh wait there wasn't any mud.
julian wrote:lwd wrote:
But those ways require troops and muntions do they not? And if you have one fragile rail line supporting your thrust they only need a temporary success to put you in a world of hurt.
Nothing to do with more forces. It is partialy about echeloning in depth and the infantry armies also have a role to play. And mobile divisions will always get far beyond the railheads. The prospect of temporary successes by enemy forces on the rear is something that wil not inhibit a bold commander. Mobile forces can get themselves out of trouble as was shown more than once.
Of course it has to do with more forces. If the opposition has little or nothing to threaten your flanks then you don't need to commit much force to secruing them. If they have massive forces on your flank then you need to commit more forces there. As the flank lengthens so does the area that the opposition can attack thus requireing even more forces. A temporary success that takes down the main log channel for a month or two can be critical. As for getting themselves out of trouble indeed sometimes they can but there are a number of well known examples where they failed to do so as well.
julian wrote:lwd wrote:
Exactly. Which means it's not just the readiness of the armored units it's the readiness of the entire force. The mobility of the German infantry was also an issue was it not? Wasn't that also part of the reason for the August hault?
You clearly do not understand. It is the advance of the mobile forces that makes life much easier for the infantry armies. Their situation is better in a mobile advance compared with a heavy defensive battle. The august halt had certainly nothing to do with alleged unreadiness of the infantry armies.
The infantry needs to keep up with the mobile forces. If they advance to quickly then gaps open up or they have to slow down. Again my reading was that this was happening in July. The Infantry also needs more time to recover as the German infantry was for the most part not motorized and there certainly weren't enough horses to transport everyone. Could they have gone on the offensive in August certainly. The question is what shape would they be in by the time the armored units got to Moscow (if they did) then consider that they needed to do more than just get to Moscow. From what I've read the plan was to encircule it at some distance and then the infantry is going to have to assault it.
julian wrote:lwd wrote:
From your response below I take it that the answer to my question is no you can't. That issue settled
Very daring statement given your lack of reading on this subject.
Not really. You were asked a very direct question that based on your posts todate should have been trivial to answer and answering it would have made your point. Instead you tried to ignore it and indeed are still doing so. The implication is clear. It has nothing to do with my knowledge of the subject by the way.
julian wrote:lwd wrote:
So in early August they were getting about half the supplies they needed. This was fixed by late August/September but that didn't help in August.
Bad answer
Not really.
as that would only cause the diminishing of reserves at army and army group level. If you have two basic loads present at army level and 1 1/2 basic load is consumed in a month by the divisions, fully restocking of the divisions while only half of the consumption level is received at the army dumps would cause the dumps at army level to drop by around a third. Not enough to cause a problem after a month.
That really depends on what the stocks are and where they are. Are the Army and group level stocks in supply dumps? If so then moving stuff to the divisions becomes more of a problem as the divisions advance. Once they get far enough you also have to move those dumps and the division supply dumps as well do the various units have the log capability to do this with their own assets? Esspecially when you consider the readiness rates of the various assets after the advances in June and July.
Would therefore not prevent an advance at the end of august ,even more so as you state yourself that in september the problem was fixed.
But would it be fixed if the offense starts in August? or would the problem get worse?