An excerpt from MS B 273 p 15 by the commander of 277 VGD
" As already mentioned in the beginning, the densely wooded terrain, which obstructed our full view into the enemy positions, also made the attack very difficult. The two roads leading through the woods in the direction of Rotherath and Krinkelt were, to some extent,narrow and because of heavy traffic, became almost boggy when wet.This condition was srtill further aggravated while these roads , as well as the road leading from Hollerath became clogged by the tank unists closely following one after another, all of which made it almost impossible to bring the heavy weapons and artillery up in time as well as regulate the supplying of the infantry units which was fighting in the west of the forest."
To be continued.
battle of the bulge north shoulder
Moderator: sniper1shot
Re: battle of the bulge north shoulder
MS B 273 pp 15-17
"The first crisis occurred, right at the beginning of the attack, at the 990. IR , when the attack of the right wing of the regiment-which suffered heavy casualties, broke down before the enemy line of resistance, and even the commitment of the 990.IR could not set it in motion quickly enough again. The leftwing of the 990. IR (rifle company) left to shift for itself, was also in danger of being annihilated by superior enemy enemy forces. While crossing the Jans stream, the situation at 989. IR became critical , which was overcome only through the commitment of the II . batallion of the infantery regiment of the HJ division.
C. In i my opinion the reasons why on 16 december the division was not able to carry out the order of the corps were the following:
1) The division was not sufficiently trained for the extremely difficult offensive operations through the 4 km deep forest region.
2) The forces at the disposal of the division were too small for the double task of clearing both roads, especially since the reinforcemnts by engineers and assault guns, promised by the corps, did not appear.
3) Batalion and company commanders could not be instructed regarding their task adequately and in time, because up to the time just before the attack, the attack orders were-for reasons of secrecy ,allowed to be issued only to the regimental commanders, and even then only upon express request by the division
4) Due to the delayed arrival of our righthand neighbour(326. VGD) which was to have relieved the 990. IR in the Rohren Wahlerscheid secor, the assembly aound Udenbreth of the 990. IR could not be completed before the night of 15/16 december and only after strenuous marches. Consequently , the troops were not fresh enough for the attack on 165 december.
5) The artillery preparation and rocket projectors did not have the necessary effect, because, for reasons of secrecy, no adjustment fire was possible. The points of penetration were not softened up, because apparently, the firing range was mostly too wide. Due to scarcity of ammunition, it was not possible to employ the originally decided upon quantity of ammunition. THe enemy artillery was not held down.
6) The heavy losses in officers and NCO's took place right at the start of the attack.'
"The first crisis occurred, right at the beginning of the attack, at the 990. IR , when the attack of the right wing of the regiment-which suffered heavy casualties, broke down before the enemy line of resistance, and even the commitment of the 990.IR could not set it in motion quickly enough again. The leftwing of the 990. IR (rifle company) left to shift for itself, was also in danger of being annihilated by superior enemy enemy forces. While crossing the Jans stream, the situation at 989. IR became critical , which was overcome only through the commitment of the II . batallion of the infantery regiment of the HJ division.
C. In i my opinion the reasons why on 16 december the division was not able to carry out the order of the corps were the following:
1) The division was not sufficiently trained for the extremely difficult offensive operations through the 4 km deep forest region.
2) The forces at the disposal of the division were too small for the double task of clearing both roads, especially since the reinforcemnts by engineers and assault guns, promised by the corps, did not appear.
3) Batalion and company commanders could not be instructed regarding their task adequately and in time, because up to the time just before the attack, the attack orders were-for reasons of secrecy ,allowed to be issued only to the regimental commanders, and even then only upon express request by the division
4) Due to the delayed arrival of our righthand neighbour(326. VGD) which was to have relieved the 990. IR in the Rohren Wahlerscheid secor, the assembly aound Udenbreth of the 990. IR could not be completed before the night of 15/16 december and only after strenuous marches. Consequently , the troops were not fresh enough for the attack on 165 december.
5) The artillery preparation and rocket projectors did not have the necessary effect, because, for reasons of secrecy, no adjustment fire was possible. The points of penetration were not softened up, because apparently, the firing range was mostly too wide. Due to scarcity of ammunition, it was not possible to employ the originally decided upon quantity of ammunition. THe enemy artillery was not held down.
6) The heavy losses in officers and NCO's took place right at the start of the attack.'
Re: battle of the bulge north shoulder
An excerpt from MS B 779 by Rudolf Lehmann on the 1.SS Pz corps in the battle of the Bulge
"The mission was to be carried out in two phases . The first phase, the breakthrough, was to be carried out after preparatory artillery fire, with the three assigned infantry divisions. During the second phase, the two Panzerdivisions were to advance towards the Meuse.
The Wehrmacht High Command had forbidden all reconnaissance activities in the future attack area. So there was no acquired tactical reconnaissance,especially concerning the enemy's main line of resistance. Visual reconnaissance was impossible because of the wooded terrain. For this reason the corps had repeatedly requested that there be no preparatoy artillery barrage but that the artillery open fire with the beginning of the attack. This was al the more advisable because the attack sectors of the enemy positions lay in a wood 7-9 kilometers deep, its course could noteven be suspected and the amount of ammunition did not suffice for a rolling barrage. Moreover , corps headquarters held the view that by an artillery preparation of one hour along this comparatively quiet front, the advantage of secrecy would be surrendered one hour too soon. The attacking troops would hereby be deprived of a great advantage; the surprise factor without gaining any substantial support.
The artillery reinforcement assigned by the Wehrmacht High command consisted besides the three Volks artillery corps and the rocket artillery brigades of a number of army batteries as a number of captured guns of heavy and heaviest caliber.
These army batteries were immobile,they had to be moved in position and supplied with ammunition by means of towing means and vehicles available in the panzerdivisisons. THis led , already before the beginning of the attack, to the unavailability of many of the towing means of the artillery regiments of the Pz divisions."
"The mission was to be carried out in two phases . The first phase, the breakthrough, was to be carried out after preparatory artillery fire, with the three assigned infantry divisions. During the second phase, the two Panzerdivisions were to advance towards the Meuse.
The Wehrmacht High Command had forbidden all reconnaissance activities in the future attack area. So there was no acquired tactical reconnaissance,especially concerning the enemy's main line of resistance. Visual reconnaissance was impossible because of the wooded terrain. For this reason the corps had repeatedly requested that there be no preparatoy artillery barrage but that the artillery open fire with the beginning of the attack. This was al the more advisable because the attack sectors of the enemy positions lay in a wood 7-9 kilometers deep, its course could noteven be suspected and the amount of ammunition did not suffice for a rolling barrage. Moreover , corps headquarters held the view that by an artillery preparation of one hour along this comparatively quiet front, the advantage of secrecy would be surrendered one hour too soon. The attacking troops would hereby be deprived of a great advantage; the surprise factor without gaining any substantial support.
The artillery reinforcement assigned by the Wehrmacht High command consisted besides the three Volks artillery corps and the rocket artillery brigades of a number of army batteries as a number of captured guns of heavy and heaviest caliber.
These army batteries were immobile,they had to be moved in position and supplied with ammunition by means of towing means and vehicles available in the panzerdivisisons. THis led , already before the beginning of the attack, to the unavailability of many of the towing means of the artillery regiments of the Pz divisions."
Re: battle of the bulge north shoulder
MS B 779 continued
"The 3 infantrydivisions assigned for the attack were very different in compostion and battle worth.
The 277th VGD which had taken position in the attack sector had been set up in september 1944 and was in this quiet sector without fighting since october. It lacked battle experience, particularly in the attack; in addition it was not schooled in forest fighting. A lack of towing means for the artillery made the division relatively immobile. Preparing for the attack necessitated only a redistribution along the front coupled with a foot march of maximum 20 km.
The 12th VGD coming from the Aachen front was a unit which had proved its worth in a number of major engagements and was very well equipped. It was 15% below strength. It arrived in the assembly area promptly and without difficulties and subsequently relieved elements of the 277th VGD .
The 3rd parachute division, which was also to be moved up from the Aachen sector, had considerable losses during the fighting in the Dueren forest. The combat value of the division was dimished by a lack of experience in ordinary ground fighting, particularly among the regimental commanders. Its armament was excellent, but it was deficient in prime movers. The vehicles of the two Panzer divisions moved the bulk of this division into the assembly area promptly. But since relief had not arrived for the troops in the Dueren forest , one parachute regiment could not be counted on for the first day of the attack.
At the request of corps headquarters, one GHQ assault gun batallion each was promised for the 277 th VGD and the 3rd parachute division but they did not arrive. The 12th VGD had 12 assaultguns at its disposal."
"The 3 infantrydivisions assigned for the attack were very different in compostion and battle worth.
The 277th VGD which had taken position in the attack sector had been set up in september 1944 and was in this quiet sector without fighting since october. It lacked battle experience, particularly in the attack; in addition it was not schooled in forest fighting. A lack of towing means for the artillery made the division relatively immobile. Preparing for the attack necessitated only a redistribution along the front coupled with a foot march of maximum 20 km.
The 12th VGD coming from the Aachen front was a unit which had proved its worth in a number of major engagements and was very well equipped. It was 15% below strength. It arrived in the assembly area promptly and without difficulties and subsequently relieved elements of the 277th VGD .
The 3rd parachute division, which was also to be moved up from the Aachen sector, had considerable losses during the fighting in the Dueren forest. The combat value of the division was dimished by a lack of experience in ordinary ground fighting, particularly among the regimental commanders. Its armament was excellent, but it was deficient in prime movers. The vehicles of the two Panzer divisions moved the bulk of this division into the assembly area promptly. But since relief had not arrived for the troops in the Dueren forest , one parachute regiment could not be counted on for the first day of the attack.
At the request of corps headquarters, one GHQ assault gun batallion each was promised for the 277 th VGD and the 3rd parachute division but they did not arrive. The 12th VGD had 12 assaultguns at its disposal."
Re: battle of the bulge north shoulder
MS B 779 continued
"Because the rapid success effecting a breakthrough was the main condition for the success of the operation, the Generalkommando proposed, taking into account the battle worth of 277 th VGD and 3rd parachute division and the difficult terrain, that at least part of the Panzer divisisons should be used in the breakthrough. This was the more advisable as the right neighbour would not attack in close contact which would create a 15 km gap.This request was denied. In spite of that, the Generalkommando prepared a battlegroup of each Panzer division(1 batallion reinforced by assaltguns) behind 277 th VGD and 3 rd parachute division.
Sixth seventh of the attack area consisted of very rugged terrain of medium altitude, in the northern Eiffel mountains. Only the most southern part( one regimental sector) was open, slowly rising towards the enemy positions. Only one good road led through the central part of the attack sector. The other future 'Rollbahnen' consisted of field and wood tracks with weak bridges and steep upgrades and downgrades. The good road parallel to the front from Hollerath to Losheimergraben was in no mans land and had been completely blocked since the west wall engagements of 1940. The conditions made it necessary to have each battle group of the Panzer divisions take along sufficient supplies, since it was impossible to bypass on these roads. This could not be done because of lack of fuel. Corps headquarters therefore decided to concentrate on the opening of the Hallschlag-Losheimergraben-Büllingen road by the 12 th VGD. This was done with the full realisation that the commitment of the 277 th VD in the northern sector would endanger the northern flank of the corps. For its protection the battle group mentioned above was kept ready. Since the 3rd parachute divivion arrived too late, it was committed in the southern sector, which was favourable for road traffic.
Thus, the infantry divisions subordinate to the corps were distributed to the attack as follows:
277th VGD on the right
(behind it a battle group of 12th SS Panzer
12th VGD in the center
3rd parachute divivion on the left
(behind it a battlegroup of 1st SS Panzer) "
"Because the rapid success effecting a breakthrough was the main condition for the success of the operation, the Generalkommando proposed, taking into account the battle worth of 277 th VGD and 3rd parachute division and the difficult terrain, that at least part of the Panzer divisisons should be used in the breakthrough. This was the more advisable as the right neighbour would not attack in close contact which would create a 15 km gap.This request was denied. In spite of that, the Generalkommando prepared a battlegroup of each Panzer division(1 batallion reinforced by assaltguns) behind 277 th VGD and 3 rd parachute division.
Sixth seventh of the attack area consisted of very rugged terrain of medium altitude, in the northern Eiffel mountains. Only the most southern part( one regimental sector) was open, slowly rising towards the enemy positions. Only one good road led through the central part of the attack sector. The other future 'Rollbahnen' consisted of field and wood tracks with weak bridges and steep upgrades and downgrades. The good road parallel to the front from Hollerath to Losheimergraben was in no mans land and had been completely blocked since the west wall engagements of 1940. The conditions made it necessary to have each battle group of the Panzer divisions take along sufficient supplies, since it was impossible to bypass on these roads. This could not be done because of lack of fuel. Corps headquarters therefore decided to concentrate on the opening of the Hallschlag-Losheimergraben-Büllingen road by the 12 th VGD. This was done with the full realisation that the commitment of the 277 th VD in the northern sector would endanger the northern flank of the corps. For its protection the battle group mentioned above was kept ready. Since the 3rd parachute divivion arrived too late, it was committed in the southern sector, which was favourable for road traffic.
Thus, the infantry divisions subordinate to the corps were distributed to the attack as follows:
277th VGD on the right
(behind it a battle group of 12th SS Panzer
12th VGD in the center
3rd parachute divivion on the left
(behind it a battlegroup of 1st SS Panzer) "
Re: battle of the bulge north shoulder
Excerpts from MS B 779 continued
" During october and november the enemy had continued his constant attacks from the area of Aachen and on either side of the city and had assembled considerable forces in the sector. In the Ardennes individual units were being rehabilitated(at Elsenborn the US 1ST Armored); in the Malmedy sector a cavalry group). The corps knew that the US 90 th division was committed in the Arenberg-Manderfeld sector along a width of 20 kilometers(opposite the attack sector of the corps). This was a division that had recently arrived from the USA; in the quiet sector it was to accustom itself to european combat conditions.
The meager result of artillery reconnaissance limited as they were by the quietness of the front, showed that there were nests of artillery around Rocherath,east of Wirzfeld,between Krinkelt and Münningen, east of Hünningen and in the Lanzerath,Holzheim-Manderfeld area. As aleady pointed out , the corps had to expect the forces around Elsenborn to intervene within a few hours and the reserves from Aachen to arrive not later than the second day......
A change in the artillery fire plan by which a strong bombardment of the enemy artillery position that had recently been identified in the area north of Rocherath was possible, resulted in the silencing of the artillery on the first day of attack.
The weather conditions were marked by temperatures below zero degrees centigrade with little snowfall and very low and dense clouds. According to the weather forecast, which was to be confirled later on, the dense cloud cover was to persist until 23 december and thereby considerable hinder enemy air activity.
As for the road conditions, movements on little used roads were handicapped by strong snowfalls during the preceding days."
" During october and november the enemy had continued his constant attacks from the area of Aachen and on either side of the city and had assembled considerable forces in the sector. In the Ardennes individual units were being rehabilitated(at Elsenborn the US 1ST Armored); in the Malmedy sector a cavalry group). The corps knew that the US 90 th division was committed in the Arenberg-Manderfeld sector along a width of 20 kilometers(opposite the attack sector of the corps). This was a division that had recently arrived from the USA; in the quiet sector it was to accustom itself to european combat conditions.
The meager result of artillery reconnaissance limited as they were by the quietness of the front, showed that there were nests of artillery around Rocherath,east of Wirzfeld,between Krinkelt and Münningen, east of Hünningen and in the Lanzerath,Holzheim-Manderfeld area. As aleady pointed out , the corps had to expect the forces around Elsenborn to intervene within a few hours and the reserves from Aachen to arrive not later than the second day......
A change in the artillery fire plan by which a strong bombardment of the enemy artillery position that had recently been identified in the area north of Rocherath was possible, resulted in the silencing of the artillery on the first day of attack.
The weather conditions were marked by temperatures below zero degrees centigrade with little snowfall and very low and dense clouds. According to the weather forecast, which was to be confirled later on, the dense cloud cover was to persist until 23 december and thereby considerable hinder enemy air activity.
As for the road conditions, movements on little used roads were handicapped by strong snowfalls during the preceding days."