I have read online that when Hitler (27 July '41) ordered Guderian to turn away from Moscow and head to Kiev, Guderian spent a full week embroiling himself in combat so as to keep moving towards Moscow... eventually, Hitler promoted him, cadjoled him into obeying orders, and Guderian linked up with von Kleist on Tuesday 16 Sept. A fortnight later, the drive on Moscow (Operation Typhoon) began (30 Sept). However, Guderian enjoyed only a week of dry weather before the infamous Russian Fall Rains (Rasputitsa) turned the roads to mud. Even still, the Germans clawed their way forward and reached the outskirts of Moscow, even reaching a suburban terminus of the Moscow tram system.
Now, what if...
What if Guderian had immediately clicked heels, snapped his Roman Salute, said "Heil Hitler!", and charged south towards Kiev immediately upon receiving his orders and with maximum haste.
Given that Guderian diddled and daddled for a week, it seems reasonable that Guderian could have closed the Kiev pocket up to a full week earlier than he actually did. This would have moved the whole time-table of Operation Typhoon up a week.
Guderian starts his drive on Moscow on (about) 23 September...
he gets a full extra week, of good weather...
What happens then?
PS: Some documentaries I have watched recently seem to imply that resistance by the German Generals to Hitler's orders wasted 19 days at Smolensk from late July - early August... now, another explanation is that German logistics, always taxed by the vast Russian steppes, had to stop after several hundred miles and let supplies catch up. But if it's true that the German Generals were constantly dragging their feet...
Add a week for Guderian to their delays, you might come up with weeks, perhaps even a month, of extra good weather for the drive on Moscow — if the German Generals had just done what Hitler said, when and how he said it, the first time around.
What if Guderian had obeyed Hitler?
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Iron_Bismarck
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The What Ifs
Alan Clark brought up this very question in his Classic Barbarossa, as have other historians.
It is my understanding that Guderian's stalled panzers at Elenya were over 100 miles East of the mass of infantry of Amry Group Center. His supply chain stretched back over this unprotected distance. To add to the problems, many of his panzers needed maintenence, as wells as the thousands of other assorted vehicles in his Gruppe. The Soviets, were desperate to put anything before his panzerarmy, and offered Guderain and Hoth stiff resistence. If Guderain and Hoth were to proceed to Moscow, mid summer was the time. It would have been a huge gamble. Army Group Center stuck out like a long, narrow snout. Both its flanks were exposed if the Soviets ever recovered enough to launch a riposte. As Alan Clark wrote, a drive to Moscow at this point would have ended the war one way or another.
Your point concerning Hilter's Eastern Marshalls indifference to orders vis-a-vis the ordered support of Army Group South's efforts in and around Kiev is an important one. They wasted precious weeks vainly hoping that somehow the march to Moscow would resume. It was at this point the strategic disagreement between Hitler -who viewed the destruction of Soviet forces more important than the capture of any city, and OKH -who put the capture of Moscow before winter as they main goal - began to be felt.. Field Marshall von Bock, General Hadler, von Braunstitsch, as well as Guderain and Hoth went into the campagin eyeing Moscow; Army Group Center revceived the bulk of panzer forces as well as supporting infantry . Hitler, on the other hand kept his options open. He knew perfectly well that Napolean entered Moscow only to retreat once winter set in. Hitler saw three options available to him. One was to wheel the mobile forces of Army Group Center northward to assist the weaker Army Group North in the capture of Lenningrad; the other was to wheel Amry Group Center's panzers southward in order to help secure the resource rich Ukraine. The capture of Moscow was always secondary to Hitler. As it turned out, the Soviet's immobility in the regions of Kiev and Uman offered Hitler a prize he couldn't refuse. He ordered Guderian and Hoth south.
The diversion of Army Group Center's panzer forces southward, and the destruction of Budenny's Army Group was a huge victory for Hitler. However, even if Halder and Guderain obeyed Hilter and immediatly deployed thier forces southward, their ultimate defeat would still have ensued. They just didn't have enough soldiers and equipment to do all the tasks given them. Thier tactical brillance in various campagins could not overcome the deficiencies in the over-all strategy. Moltke the Elder warned that tactical success no matter how brillant can never overcome deficent strategy. The Eastern Front fit this warning to a T.
It is my understanding that Guderian's stalled panzers at Elenya were over 100 miles East of the mass of infantry of Amry Group Center. His supply chain stretched back over this unprotected distance. To add to the problems, many of his panzers needed maintenence, as wells as the thousands of other assorted vehicles in his Gruppe. The Soviets, were desperate to put anything before his panzerarmy, and offered Guderain and Hoth stiff resistence. If Guderain and Hoth were to proceed to Moscow, mid summer was the time. It would have been a huge gamble. Army Group Center stuck out like a long, narrow snout. Both its flanks were exposed if the Soviets ever recovered enough to launch a riposte. As Alan Clark wrote, a drive to Moscow at this point would have ended the war one way or another.
Your point concerning Hilter's Eastern Marshalls indifference to orders vis-a-vis the ordered support of Army Group South's efforts in and around Kiev is an important one. They wasted precious weeks vainly hoping that somehow the march to Moscow would resume. It was at this point the strategic disagreement between Hitler -who viewed the destruction of Soviet forces more important than the capture of any city, and OKH -who put the capture of Moscow before winter as they main goal - began to be felt.. Field Marshall von Bock, General Hadler, von Braunstitsch, as well as Guderain and Hoth went into the campagin eyeing Moscow; Army Group Center revceived the bulk of panzer forces as well as supporting infantry . Hitler, on the other hand kept his options open. He knew perfectly well that Napolean entered Moscow only to retreat once winter set in. Hitler saw three options available to him. One was to wheel the mobile forces of Army Group Center northward to assist the weaker Army Group North in the capture of Lenningrad; the other was to wheel Amry Group Center's panzers southward in order to help secure the resource rich Ukraine. The capture of Moscow was always secondary to Hitler. As it turned out, the Soviet's immobility in the regions of Kiev and Uman offered Hitler a prize he couldn't refuse. He ordered Guderian and Hoth south.
The diversion of Army Group Center's panzer forces southward, and the destruction of Budenny's Army Group was a huge victory for Hitler. However, even if Halder and Guderain obeyed Hilter and immediatly deployed thier forces southward, their ultimate defeat would still have ensued. They just didn't have enough soldiers and equipment to do all the tasks given them. Thier tactical brillance in various campagins could not overcome the deficiencies in the over-all strategy. Moltke the Elder warned that tactical success no matter how brillant can never overcome deficent strategy. The Eastern Front fit this warning to a T.