Failure of 16. PD, 17. PD, 1.PD and 8. PD at Brody, 1944

[Rich]

Yes, Rich,
it's info from document, that you can look here:
http://panzeralex.narod.ru/StuGAbt_911.jpg

And as for me, I'm interesting too, why Chris and Jay counted only 8 StuH?

best regards,
Panzeralex

I'll ask Chris, but I don't know if he will remember? The only thing I can imagine is that one may have been lost before 4 July? Either that or they didn't have enough fingers and toes between them to count to nine? Mistakes like that happen sometimes, even when you're trying to be as accurate as possible.

[Panzeralex]

I think, that it simply was mistaken
but each of us can be mistakes
On the whole - KDB - it's a great research and help me begin to deeply study battle of Kursk some years ago.
After studied KTB, I became find and work with German documents.

Rich, maybe you know:
what about Chris's Kursk book?
when we can look and read it?

best regards,
Panzeralex

[Rich]

I think, that it simply was mistaken
but each of us can be mistakes
On the whole - KDB - it's a great research and help me begin to deeply study battle of Kursk some years ago.
After studied KTB, I became find and work with German documents.

Rich, maybe you know:
what about Chris's Kursk book?
when we can look and read it?

best regards,
Panzeralex

He is in the final editing process, but we are snowed under with work right now, so he has very little time to work on it in a day. I know he wants to finish and is very frustrated by that.

[Igorn]

Here we go.

1) Pz-35 (t) and Pz-38 (t) were used extensively by the German Army as tanks, through 1943.

This is exactly my point that booty Czech tanks or if you like tanks of Czech origin were extensively used by Germans in 1943. Unfortunately some authors in order to reduce the German armor strength deliberately forget to count them.

2) With regards to Zitadelle, they are also clearly shown. The Lage for 10 July reports the 9 with 20. Pz.-Div., 3 with 8.Pz.-Div., 1 with 72 Inf.-Div.; there were no others with HG-Mitte and none with HG-Sued, although the Romainians had 45 with HG-A.

Yes, they were shown by the Lage for 10 July reports. But I am wondering if authors like Zetterling really included them in the German armor strength during Zitadelle.

3) Yes, but they were not booty tanks.

I don’t care whether Germans officially called them booty tank in their documents. De-facto they were booty Czech tanks or tanks of Czech origin (t). Let’s remember that Czechoslovakia was invaded by Nazi Germany and ceased to exist as the state in 1939. All the booty Check tanks were “incorporated” into Wehrmacht. The Skoda and other Czech factories were serving needs of Nazi Germany throughout WW2.

Beutepanzer were reported in the Beutepanzerlage prepared by OKH. Unfortunately most of those reports are missing or were not microfilmed. In the sole extant copy I have found the listing for Beutepanzer included:
Somua 35 (f) and Befehl
Hotchkiss 38 (and 39, but the Germans rarely distinguuished the two)
Renault 17/18, B1, B2, Flamm, R35
Mark 1 and II (British)
T26, T34, T60, T70, KV I, KV II
MG (?), Funk-Sp.Wg.

Again one call above such tanks as booty tanks in German service or Beutepanzer this is not really important. What is important while Germans were recording such machines in their reports many western authors preferred deliberately to forget about them as well as about Pz-I, Pz-II or Command tanks.

So include the 13 that were missed. Otherwise, the 26 T-34 are counted. AFA the other types on the Ostfront, as of 31 May there were a grand total of:
HG-A - 4 Renault B2 and 12 Flamm
2 A - ung.-Sich.-Div. 2 S35 (f) and 15 H38(f)
2 Pz (scattered amongst many formations) - 11 T34, 3 T70, 1 KV I, 5 MG, 6 Pz.-Spah.
Mitte (ditto) - 1 T26, 8 T34, 1 KV I, 1 KV II, 12 Pz.-Spah .

You can be sure that in my book I will include the 13 that were missed as well as not counted Pz-I, Pz-II, Marder II, Marder III, Wespe, Hummel, Grille etc.

Nonsense, they were later used mostly for those purposes. At Kursk they were still being used as battle tanks

It is useless to argue with indoctrinated people. Repeat last time. T-60 and T-70 were light tanks (like German Pz-I and Pz-II) and were never designed as battle tanks for armor engagements.

(snip)Therefore I don’t buy your argument that Zetterling and some others should be excused for not including these tanks since much of the original German documentation leaves them out.

Then I suppose I shouldn't excuse you either for failing to know how many there were?

Compared to Zetterling I didn’t publish the statistical analysis of Kursk, which pretends to be the comprehensive and full in regards to the armor strength and losses of the German army during Citadel.

If they really wanted to collect information about the exact number of these vehicles used in Citadel they could had found data in the original German overall armor status of the divisions as of 2 and 11 July 1943.

Uh, they did? But they missed the 9 Pz-38 (t). I don't know the how or why, so why don't you ask them?

Why should I? And why you are on defensive? I just proved to you that Mr. Zetterling forgot to count these tanks, which makes his figures not accurate.

BTW, Hornissen did not participate in Zitadelle in any function. They were not in the zone of the German attack and due to various teething problems were not considered operational. IIRC their first use was in opposing the Soviet counteroffensive, which is outside the timeframe of Zetterling's study.

Again why one should suspect respected http://www.achtungpanzer.com in lying?

“From February of 1943 to March of 1945, only 474 Nashorns and 20 Hornisses were produced. Both models were issued to the schwere Panzerjager Abteilungens and had their debut during the Kursk Offensive with 560 sPzJagAbt and 655th sPzJagAbt and with 525 sPzJagAbt in Italy. Even with their light armor protection and high silhoutte but powerful armament, they proved to be successful tank destroyers.”

Source: http://www.achtungpanzer.com/pz2.htm

Marder were never used as substitutes for Panzers, although at this time the reformed "Stalingrad" Panzer divisions (which did not participate in Zitadelle) did have a third battalion in the Panzer regiment equipped with StuG. That may be the source of his confusion.

You are quite incorrect in this point. According to Steven Newton, Kursk: The German view. Eyewitness Reports of Operation Citadel by the German Commanders, the 4. Panzer Division of the 9. Armee of General Model on the eve of Citadel was on par with so called “Stalingrad” Panzer divisions. This division was engaged in continuous combats from end of Jan 1943 to 27.03.1943 (Kursk, Mzensk, Novgorod-Seversky and Sevsk) and lost over 3550 personnel and had only 13 operational panzers including Pz-IV, StuG III, Marder II and booty T-34. Booty French and Russian guns and cannons accounted for almost half of all available artillery of the 103rd Artillery Regiment of the 4. P.D. This division had such a shortage of vehicles that it got 2500 horses. Even during refitting in April 1943 the 4. P.D. was committed in punitive actions against partisans. By 31.05.1943 when Lt-General von Zoken was appointed as its commanding General it had only about 70 operational panzers and 2840 soldiers in combat units.

Since you claimed that Marder was never used as substitutes for Panzers, I can refer you to another example stated by Velimir Vuksic:
“On 7 January 1944, the “LSSAH” had at its disposal 4 Tigers, 8 Panthers, 11 StuG’s, plus 4 Marders and 4 towed antitank guns that were used as tanks!”

Velimir Vuksic, SS Armor on the Eastern Front 1943-1945, P.48

Remark concerning German documentation. It is interesting to see that when Rudolf Lehman in his Leibstandarte III provides German armor strength of the LAH, for example, as of 02.07.1943 he includes Pz II’s, Command Panzers, Motorized Pak Z, Self-propelled Pak, Sturmgeschuetze in the number of German available operational Panzers.

Your failure to comprehend simple concepts is remarkable. "Liebstandarte" is a Panzer division, not an Infanterie division. Both Lehman and Zetterling identify them. .

Question: Where Zetterling identified and counted all Pz-II, Motorized Pak Z and Self-propelled Pak of the “LAH”?

Since you have obviously never seen any of the original documentation I doubt that you know what is and is not available in them.

You are quite incorrect in this point. I saw the original German documentation (e.g. in the Central Archive of the Russian Defense Ministry).

When you leave your cozy library and books behind and start digging into the actual records we can discuss your "willingness and aim" to dig for information.

Re. my cozy library and books: I spend monthly about 500 USD on different WW2 titles mostly books published by J.J.Fedorowicz, Stackpole, Voenizdat etc. and have in my private library over two thousand titles published in Canada, USSR, Russia, UK, Germany, USA etc. On top of it if necessary I can order and pay for the microfilms of the actual records.

Nowadays if one has enough money there is no need to dig himself into the actual records. Others can do it for him. I can simply pay and order others to do it for me since I don’t have much free time left for such things.

I suggest you criticize after you learn what it takes to do such work instead of simply sitting in your chair grabbing books off the shelf.

It is not on you to decide my friend. I have already shown the real value of Zetterling’s statistical research, where the author was deliberately diminishing the armor strength and losses of one side and exaggerating the armor strength and losses of the other side.

In any case, the numbers were given and correctly, you can count them however you like, since you are the one creating specious comparisons.

Question: Where Zetterling gave the correct numbers on Wespe, Hummel, Grille, Marder II and Marder III SP guns, which saw action in Citadel?

The Grille was an infantry support gun and was utilized exclusively in the Panzergrenadier regiments of Panzer divisions. They were never assigned to any "tank-destroyer battalions" either in Panzer or infantry divisions. And the weapon it mounted was a low-velocity 15cm howitzer

While I was referring to Panzerjaeger 38 (t) Ausf. M with a 7.5 cm PaK 40/3 antitank gun, which saw combat service in the tank-destroyer battalions you probably referred to a self-propelled 15 cm/Sig33/AUF Sft 38 (t) Ausf. K heavy infantry gun, which was issued to the infantry gun companies of the mechanized infantry regiments and was used to provide a mobile, direct fire heavy-support weapon.

I have already answered this one above. The bottom line that German Pz-I, Pz-II, S-35 (f). 38 (t) used in Citadel were not counted by Mr. Zetterling and many other western historians while when referring to the Soviet armor strength they counted all the light vehicles in the Soviet service.

Nine Pz-38 (t) of 20. Pz.-Div. were missed. Panzer-I were not counted because nowhere in the original German sources did they appear as tanks, we found them mentioned in LSSAH (IIRC), but I'm not even sure they were still armed. The Panzer-II were reported by Zetterling, but the numbers were inconsistantly reported, he inserted the line in his tables but when he wasn't sure what the quantity was he placed a "?" rather than making up numbers.

This is exactly my point that Zetterling didn’t accurately count German light tanks and SP guns, which saw action in Citadel.

BTW, since I am one of those "western historians" you have been trying to use yourself, please stop referring to S-35 (f) that were not there. I have already told you what they were and Zetterling also correctly identified them.

What about 2 S35 (f) and 15 H38(f) in 2 A - ung.-Sich.-Div?

Finally, I wanted to give an opinion of Steven Newton about Zetterling’’s book:

“German casualties at Kursk according to Zetterling and Frankson were “relatively small” and could not be considered as decisive, at least in context of combats on the eastern front. The total German casualties of HG Center and HG South during offensive were 56,827 men, that were about 3 per cent of the total number of 1,601,454 German soldiers killed in action in Russia in 1943. Besides it Zetterling and Frankson showed that 89,480 men, which required USSR to replenish its casualties suffered in July 1943 were more then enough to cover casualties during Citadel. This statement is not correct since it supposed that number of soldiers KIA in this battle was equal to the replenishments but this was not the case. What is worse that often in the figures analysis authors applied logical circle. While considering the matter with the 9. Armee of Model, Zetterling and Frankson had to admit that the German 9. Armee from 5 July to 11 July 1943 lost 22,273 in KIA… Casualties of the 9.Armee were the highest during the first day of offensive and later this number was less. When compared to the numerical strength of the 9. Armee before offensive, the casualties on July 9 were standing at 5 per cent while total casualties for the whole month of July were about 10 per cent.

The problem with this analysis is the point that according to accepted norms the total strength of the 9. Armee as of July 5th 1943 was about 335,000 personnel while combat strength including soldiers in the army reserve was only 75,713 personnel. The army combat strength by July 9th reduced to 55,941 personnel, which means reduction by 19,782 men (26 per cent). Thus 2,491 out of 22,273 of total casualties took place in infantry army units, pioneer, reconnaissance and reserve units. Therefore while total number of KIA in the army was only 6.6 per cent this number for the soldiers who took part in combats was up to 26.1 per cent. Even at glance the combat strength of German divisions of the 9. Armee from July 4 to July 9th shows considerable reduction of some formations.

Combat strength of some formations of 9. Armee as of July 4th, 1943


258. Infantry Division: 3,392 personnel
7. Infantry Division: 3,532 personnel
31. Infantry Division: 3,068 personnel
20. Panzer Division: 2,831 personnel
2. Panzer Division: 4,062 personnel
4. Panzer Division: 3,549 personnel
6. Panzer Division: 3,121 personnel
9. Panzer Division: 3,571 personnel
86. Infantry Division: 3,650 personnel
292. Infantry Division: 3,714 personnel
78. Sturm Division: 4,545 personnel
8th and 13th Jaeger Abt.: 1,407 personnel


Combat strength of some formations of 9. Armee as of July 9th, 1943


258. Infantry Division: 1,869 personnel (45% of casualties)
7. Infantry Division: 1,573 personnel (55% of casualties)
31. Infantry Division: 1,939 personnel (37% of casualties)
20. Panzer Division: 1,751 personnel (38% of casualties)
2. Panzer Division: 1,040 personnel (74% of casualties)
4. Panzer Division: 3,142 personnel (11% of casualties)
6. Panzer Division: 1,604 personnel (49% of casualties)
9. Panzer Division: 2,255 personnel (37% of casualties)
86. Infantry Division: 2,481 personnel (32% of casualties)
292. Infantry Division: 1,710 personnel (54% of casualties)
78. Sturm Division: 2,322 personnel (49% of casualties)
8th and 13th Jaeger Abt.: 883 personnel (37% of casualties)

Source: Armeeoberkommando 9, Ia Nr. 4007/43, 13 July 1943, Ist-und Gefechsstarken, Verlust (Nach dem Stand vom 4. und 9.07.43), T-315, Reel 322

It is necessary to note that (Zetterling) conclusion about 6.6 per cent as the total KIA losses in 9. Armee is not accurate since XX Korps on the left flank of the 9. Armee was not committed in combats and several divisions, namely 4. P.D, 12. P.D and 10. Panzer-Grenadier Division were committed after July 5. For example, 11 per cent of casualties for 4. Panzer Division were suffered only during one day of combat. For eleven divisions, which participated in combats during July 5th to July 9th the average casualty level was immense number of 45 per cent. Thus, Zetterling and Frankson in order to diminish the casualties of 9. Armee during July 5 to July 9 presented them as the percentage of the total numerical strength of the army, which formed a distorted picture of Model’s troops casualties during their short offensive.

These authors, probably deliberately, presented wrong casualties figures of the 9. Armee suffered at the end of July 1943 during defense of Orel bend. Zetterling and Frankson claim that the total number of KIA in the period between 12 and end of July was only 5 per cent of total numerical strength of the 9.Armee as of before Citadel. As was shown above it is risky to assess combat casualties and total numerical strength. It is even worse that authors didn’t take into account the fact that al least the half of all divisions, which belonged to the 9.Armee as of July 1 were transferred to the 2. Panzer-Armee effective of mid of July 1943. Thus, casualties comparison in percentages for the beginning and the end of July 1943 without doubt gives the distorted picture for the 9.Armee. It is much more accurate method to define the total casualties on the north of the Kursk to sum up casualties suffered by 9. Armee and 2. Panzer-Armee during July 1943. If one does that he/she would better understand the number of Germans casualties. During July 1943 casualties of 9. Armee were 37,355 personnel and casualties of the 2. Panzer-Armee were 45,928 personnel, which makes total German casualties in the north as 83,283 personnel. Casualties split between two armies shows the different significance of combats during July 1943, in which both armies took part.

Casualties comparison of 9. Armee and 2. Panzer-Armee between July 1 to July 31 1943


From July 1 to July 10th

9. Armee: 20,189 casualties
2. Panzer-Armee: 1,059 casualties

From July 11 to July 20th

9. Armee: 8,258 casualties
2. Panzer-Armee: 10,120 casualties

From July 21 to July 31th

9. Armee: 8,908 casualties
2. Panzer-Armee: 34,749 casualties

Grand Total in July 1943:

9. Armee: 37,355 casualties
2. Panzer-Armee: 45,928 casualties


In conclusion Steven Newton clearly shows that casualties in combat units of the 9.Armee and 2. Panzer-Armee were about 56 per cent of their combat strength during one month of July only. Such casualties rate since beginning of July 1943 for the 9.Armee only or during the whole month of July for both armies (9.A and 2. P.A) barely could be characterized as “insignificant”. Similar calculations can be done concerning the casualties of the 4. Panzer-Armee and Army Detachment Kempf.



Best Regards from Russia,

[Igorn]

Gents,

According to Steven Newton, Zetterling and Frankson German armor loss data during Citadel also don’t impress. Authors assumed that losses of German tanks and SP guns suffered during Citadel, which they estimated as 300 machines “were not too high… and could had been replenished”. Having provided statistics concerning production of tanks, transportation of machines to the armies as well as total number of tanks and SP guns on the eastern front as of end of December 1943 they conclude that: “quality of tanks were constantly improving that can be confirmed by growth of number of Tigers, Panthers and Pz-IV (long)… Therefore one can assert that the “East Army” was better equipped with tanks by the end of 1943 than before Citadel.”

Authors backed up their final conclusion by comparing the armor strength of the German Army on the eastern front as of June 30th 1943 and December 31 1943. Below stated table defines “special tanks” as command tanks and flamethrower tanks, out-of date tanks as Pz-II, Pz-III (s) and Pz-IV (s) and up-to-date tanks as Pz-IV (long), Pz-V, Pz-VI. Assault guns include all StuG III, StuH’s and StuPz IV’s

Strength of German tank forces on the eastern front as of June 30 1943:


Out –of-date tanks: 1,028 machines (29,9%)
Special tanks: 157 machines (4,6%)
Up-to-date tanks: 1,213 machines (35,3%)
Assault guns: 1,036 (30,2%)

Total: 3,434 machines


Strength of German tank forces on the eastern front as of December 31 1943:


Out –of-date tanks: 290machines (8,6%)
Special tanks: 156 machines (4,6%)
Up-to-date tanks: 1,403 machines (41,8%)
Assault guns: 1,507 (44,9%)

Total: 3,356 machines


It is clear that if one looks just on numbers than Zetterling and Frankson were probably right since total number of available machines for the defined date was almost equal while the number of modern tanks and assault guns increased from 65.7 per cent to 86.7 per cent.

However these look misleading for two reasons: increasing concentration of tanks and SP guns in the separate formations, which were not organic part of divisions and constantly reducing percentage of forces engaged in real combat operations. It have no be noted that growth in per cent for SP guns was higher indeed than new tanks. In December 1943 there were thirty nine batteries of assault guns. Thirteen of them were integral part of tank and tank-grenadier divisions replacing the tank battalions that also meant that 66.7% of assault guns (e.g. StuG) were in battalions, which were often attached to the infantry Corps’ and infantry divisions, where they were mostly used for tactical purposes as self-propelled anti-tank guns. Aas was shown by David Glantz under the rapidly increasing number of Soviet tanks German infantry divisions were almost defenseless if they depended on relatively slow anti-tank towed guns. The bold fact that 2/3 of German assault guns were applied in such manner means that they could had not been committed in mid-sized and large tank forces operations. The same goes in lesser extent for Tigers although sPzAbt’s were often attached to the Panzer Divisions to execute some particular missions but they were organically beyond Waffen SS Divisions or “GD” division.

The situation as of June 30 1943 was radically different compared to Dec 31 1943 since the great part of tanks and assault guns were part of battalions, which were organically part of the Panzer Divisions. Armor power in December 1943 on the front was significantly reduced and could be used only for tactical missions. Panzer Divisions, which could had been gathered for operational counter-blows were becoming weaker and weaker. Thus, any conclusion based only on total number of available tanks is necessarily leads to distorted picture.

When one examines combat readiness of German machines in perspective claims of Zetterling-Frankson are even more exposed. Of course, Germans managed to improve their combat readiness during the quite periods of the war. However when the active phases of the war were breaking out it was getting much harder for them to restore the disabled and damaged combat vehicles. As can be seen from the below table the period of on-going mobile combats, which started at Kursk and ended by pushing Wehrmacht from Ukraine to Galicia became a hell for the maintenance units, which were trying to reduce battlefield losses.

Combat readiness of German tanks and assault guns on the Eastern Front from March 1943 to December 1943 (per cent of operational machines vs. machines in repair)

March 1943: 53,3% of tanks and 77,0% of assault guns
April 1943: 74,6% of tanks and 81,4% of assault guns
May 1943: 83,6% of tanks and 85,6% of assault guns
June 1943: 88,5% of tanks and 90,5% of assault guns
July 1943: 51,7% of tanks and 72,9% of assault guns
August 1943: 40,6% of tanks and 67,9% of assault guns
September 1943: 31,0% of tanks and 48,3% of assault guns
October 1943: 43,8% of tanks and 55,7% of assault guns
November 1943: 35,7% of tanks and 46,2% of assault guns
December 1943: 50,8% of tanks and 58,3% of assault guns


Source: Jentz, Panzer Truppen, vol.2 p.110, Spilberger, Sturmgeschutz, p. 249


Therefore there was a big difference between the total number of tanks & SP guns and number of operational machines. Now let’s see adjusted comparison of tank strength as of June 30th and as of December 31 1943


Strength of German tank forces on the eastern front as of June 30 1943:

Total tank strength: 2,398 tanks, including 2,122 operational tanks
Total assault guns strength: 1,036, including 938 operational assault guns

Total: 3,434 machines including 3,060 operational machines


Strength of German tank forces on the eastern front as of December 31 1943:

Total tank strength: 1,849 tanks, including 939 operational tanks
Total assault guns strength: 1,507, including 879 operational assault guns

Total: 3,356 machines including 1,818 operational machines


Conclusion: as of December 31 1943 the German Army on the eastern front had 1,242 tanks and SP guns less compared to number of operational machines before Citadel and the number of tanks and SP guns was not the same as was claimed by Zetterling and Frankson. That would be thoughtless to consider that reduction of operational combat ready machines by 41 per cent made the Hitler’s army “better equipped with tanks by the end of December 1943 than before Citadel”

Source: Steven Newton, Kursk: The German view. Eyewitness Reports of Operation Citadel by the German Commanders,



Best Regards from Russia,

[GaryD]

The total German casualties of HG Center and HG South during offensive were 56,827 men, that were about 3 per cent of the total number of 1,601,454 German soldiers killed in action in Russia in 1943. Besides it Zetterling and Frankson showed that 89,480 men, which required USSR to replenish its casualties suffered in July 1943 were more then enough to cover casualties during Citadel

Is this an accurate quote? Did Newton really say that 1,601,454 German soldiers were killed in Russia in 1943? That is absolutely wrong. By the end of 1943 the number of Germans killed on the E. Front since June 22 1941 in the Wehrmacht was around 700,000. That 1.6 mil. must refer to total casualties, not killed.

[GaryD]

BTW, since I am one of those "western historians" you have been trying to use yourself, please stop referring to S-35 (f) that were not there. I have already told you what they were and Zetterling also correctly identified them.

What about 2 S35 (f) and 15 H38(f) in 2 A - ung.-Sich.-Div?

Igor,

What relevance does the presence of French tanks in a Security Division fighting partisans as part of an Army which did not participate in Citadelle have to this discussion? How does it serve as evidence that Zetterling miscounted?

[Rich]

Here we go.

It took you a week to come up with this? Since you simply repeat everything you've said before without thinking, why does it take you so long?

This is exactly my point that booty Czech tanks or if you like tanks of Czech origin were extensively used by Germans in 1943. Unfortunately some authors in order to reduce the German armor strength deliberately forget to count them.

A nuance of English, "extensively" does not neccessarily mean "large numbers at the end of the period of time referred to." 55 at the end of 1943 was just under 3 percent of the total of tanks reported on hand on the Eastern Front. 3 percent is not "extensive" in the sense you are trying to make it mean. However, they were utilized in large numbers over the entire period of time from 1 September 1939 to 31 December 1943, since they constituted over 1,400 of the tanks produced for Germany in that period. But subtracting 55 from 1,800+ does not result in a signficant change, nor does adding 9 to nearly 1,200.

Yes, they were shown by the Lage for 10 July reports. But I am wondering if authors like Zetterling really included them in the German armor strength during Zitadelle.

8. Panzer and 72. Inf.-Div. are explicitly not included in the German offensive, so why should any part of them be included? We already established that the 9 with 20. Panzer, which was part of the offensive, were missed.

I don’t care whether Germans officially called them booty tank in their documents. De-facto they were booty Czech tanks or tanks of Czech origin (t). Let’s remember that Czechoslovakia was invaded by Nazi Germany and ceased to exist as the state in 1939. All the booty Check tanks were “incorporated” into Wehrmacht. The Skoda and other Czech factories were serving needs of Nazi Germany throughout WW2.

Goodness, who is getting defensive now? And frankly insisting on using incorrect terminology when one knows better is childish.

Again one call above such tanks as booty tanks in German service or Beutepanzer this is not really important. What is important while Germans were recording such machines in their reports many western authors preferred deliberately to forget about them as well as about Pz-I, Pz-II or Command tanks.

Actually, using the correct terminology is important. Would you not object if I insisted on calling the Soviet Union Russia, or Soviets Russians?

And who is being deliberate?

Pz-I - were no longer being utilized as tanks and were no longer counted in any Lage. They appeared in the Gliederungen of 19. Pz. (4), DR (1), and LSSAH (3), and DR and LSSAH mention 1 being lost (LSSAH) and 1 being damaged (DR). Noticing them was a fluke on our part, I'm not sure that many had previously?
Pz-II - are not forgotten, they are counted in numerous places, so I'm not sure what you mean?
Command tanks - ditto?

You can be sure that in my book I will include the 13 that were missed as well as not counted Pz-I, Pz-II, Marder II, Marder III, Wespe, Hummel, Grille etc.

I see, so now you are deliberately trying to twist reality?

Pz-I - see above.
Pz-II - are reported, so they are not "missed."
Marder II and III - are reported for Panzer divisions and for the infantry divisions where the information was available.
Wespe and Hummel - are reported, so they are not "missed."
Grille - see below.

It is useless to argue with indoctrinated people. Repeat last time. T-60 and T-70 were light tanks (like German Pz-I and Pz-II) and were never designed as battle tanks for armor engagements.

Who or what am I supposedly indoctrinated by Igorn? And try to answer the question? If they are "like German Pz-I and Pz-II" and so "were never designed as battle tanks for armor engagements" (I guess that includes the Pz-IV and M4 then?), then why are the loss patterns in units so different?

Compared to Zetterling I didn’t publish the statistical analysis of Kursk, which pretends to be the comprehensive and full in regards to the armor strength and losses of the German army during Citadel.

Back to strawmen I see. For one thing, you haven't published anything AFAIK, for another, Zetterling neither "pretends" (?) to be or is "comprehensive and full". Now Glantz states that Zetterling and Frankson "offer a definitive view of the strength, losses, and loss rates of German forces" (Series Editor's Forward, xii), but nowhere do I find Zetterling and Frankson making that claim. And I'm not sure how they could claim that, since the tables presented include frequent use of a question mark?

[Why should I? And why you are on defensive? I just proved to you that Mr. Zetterling forgot to count these tanks, which makes his figures not accurate.

Because you seem to be the only one that think it's a question that needs answered? And why are you so defensive when time after time I have shown that when you claim that some things were "forgotten" that you are incorrect? Pz-II, Wespe, Hummel, and so on.

Again why one should suspect respected http://www.achtungpanzer.com in lying?

“From February of 1943 to March of 1945, only 474 Nashorns and 20 Hornisses were produced. Both models were issued to the schwere Panzerjager Abteilungens and had their debut during the Kursk Offensive with 560 sPzJagAbt and 655th sPzJagAbt and with 525 sPzJagAbt in Italy. Even with their light armor protection and high silhoutte but powerful armament, they proved to be successful tank destroyers.”

Source: http://www.achtungpanzer.com/pz2.htm

You have that curious Russian habit of being obssesed with "respected" authorities. So you accept a "respected" authorities imprecise (and incorrect) statement over facts.

You are quite incorrect in this point. According to Steven Newton, (snip)

Please show me the order that incorporated the Marder into the organization of the Panzer divsion as Panzers?

Question: Where Zetterling identified and counted all Pz-II, Motorized Pak Z and Self-propelled Pak of the “LAH”?

Pz-II - p. 30, p. 187, for the East, p. 95.
Are Pak (mot) now also included in your count of "tanks"?
Pak (Sfl) - p. 46.

You are quite incorrect in this point. I saw the original German documentation (e.g. in the Central Archive of the Russian Defense Ministry).

Re. my cozy library and books: I spend monthly about 500 USD on different WW2 titles mostly books published by J.J.Fedorowicz, Stackpole, Voenizdat etc. and have in my private library over two thousand titles published in Canada, USSR, Russia, UK, Germany, USA etc. On top of it if necessary I can order and pay for the microfilms of the actual records.

Nowadays if one has enough money there is no need to dig himself into the actual records. Others can do it for him. I can simply pay and order others to do it for me since I don’t have much free time left for such things.

I see, so you "saw" records but use books. So you've never actually done any of the research work yourself? You've just relied on others to do it for you and then decided to criticize as you see fit?

It is not on you to decide my friend. I have already shown the real value of Zetterling’s statistical research, where the author was deliberately diminishing the armor strength and losses of one side and exaggerating the armor strength and losses of the other side.

Of course it is for me to decide. I could as easily dismiss your interminable rantings as the fevered expressions of a deluded mind, but I don't. But I rather prefer to think that you just don't have access to accurate information.

Question: Where Zetterling gave the correct numbers on Wespe, Hummel, Grille, Marder II and Marder III SP guns, which saw action in Citadel?

Question: Why do you keep repeating strawmen and asking questions that have already been answered, in some case three or more times?

While I was referring to Panzerjaeger 38 (t) Ausf. M with a 7.5 cm PaK 40/3 antitank gun, which saw combat service in the tank-destroyer battalions you probably referred to a self-propelled 15 cm/Sig33/AUF Sft 38 (t) Ausf. K heavy infantry gun, which was issued to the infantry gun companies of the mechanized infantry regiments and was used to provide a mobile, direct fire heavy-support weapon.

Wow, that's some torturous "logic". You referred to "Grille" in that post - and have repeatedly referred to them in your latest post again - as something different from the Marder II and Marder III. And now it's my fault because I thought you were referring to the vehicle that was called a "Grille", the SdKfz 138/1? But instead you were supposedly referring to a vehicle you had just asked about in the same line? A vehicle that was never referred to as a "Grille."?

That's astonishing even for you.

This is exactly my point that Zetterling didn’t accurately count German light tanks and SP guns, which saw action in Citadel.

No, that is not what you claim. What you claim is:

the author was deliberately diminishing the armor strength and losses of one side and exaggerating the armor strength and losses of the other side

And in any case, so far we have established that the inaccuracy - whether deliberate or accidental, which is something you cannot prove either way consists of 9 Pz-38 (t) and 8 Pz-I, which is an "inaccuracy" rate of about 1.4 percent, compared to your inaccuracy rate, which I estimate as above 50 percent.

What about 2 S35 (f) and 15 H38(f) in 2 A - ung.-Sich.-Div?

What part of not part of the German offensive operation codenamed Zitadelle do you have difficulty understanding? I suppose I could assume you are blind, so haven't actually the capability of reading posts? Are you simply typing replies at random?

Finally, I wanted to give an opinion of Steven Newton about Zetterling’’s book:

Are you having problems formulating your own arguments?

(Snip)

[Michate]

Pz-I - were no longer being utilized as tanks and were no longer counted in any Lage. They appeared in the Gliederungen of 19. Pz. (4), DR (1), and LSSAH (3), and DR and LSSAH mention 1 being lost (LSSAH) and 1 being damaged (DR). Noticing them was a fluke on our part, I'm not sure that many had previously?

IIRC, the ONHAND figures in Mr. Zetterling's Kursk book actually DO include Pz. I. They were however lumped together with the Pz. II and accounted for under the category "light tanks" in the strength table for the armoured vehicles of the Panzer and Pzgdr. divisions (p. 46) and - somewhat incorrectly - labelled as Pz. II in the previous corps strength breakdowns, both in chapter 3.

E. g. Mr. Zetterling counts 7 light tanks in LSSAH = 4 Pz. II and 3 Pz. I, and 1 light tank in DR = 1 Pz. I.

The book also in one of the appendices contains the onhand figures for Pz. 38 (t) tanks on the Eastern front.

[Rich]

Pz-I - were no longer being utilized as tanks and were no longer counted in any Lage. They appeared in the Gliederungen of 19. Pz. (4), DR (1), and LSSAH (3), and DR and LSSAH mention 1 being lost (LSSAH) and 1 being damaged (DR). Noticing them was a fluke on our part, I'm not sure that many had previously?

IIRC, the ONHAND figures in Mr. Zetterling's Kursk book actually DO include Pz. I. They were however lumped together with the Pz. II and accounted for under the category "light tanks" in the strength table for the armoured vehicles of the Panzer and Pzgdr. divisions (p. 46) and - somewhat incorrectly - labelled as Pz. II in the previous corps strength breakdowns, both in chapter 3.

E. g. Mr. Zetterling counts 7 light tanks in LSSAH = 4 Pz. II and 3 Pz. I, and 1 light tank in DR = 1 Pz. I.

The book also in one of the appendices contains the onhand figures for Pz. 38 (t) tanks on the Eastern front.

But it was all done that way as a perfidious and vicious attempt to conceal the true facts from the Western indoctrinated historians who missed the 17 obsolete and obsolescent tanks that decisivelyshows thatthe Germans actually were stronger than has been previously suspected but lost more casualties and vehicles because that was concealed too including losses to combat strength which are more important than losses you yes it really was the decisive battle of World War II.

Or something like that?

Actually I've looked and I think Zetterling missed the Pz-38 (t). Neat catch on the Pz-I/Pz-II though, I'll have to look again. I know on one table he lists "Light Tanks" while on others he lists the Pz-II.

[Igorn]

It took you a week to come up with this? Since you simply repeat everything you've said before without thinking, why does it take you so long?

Clown, I am amazed by your insulting comments and arrogance. Do you really think that someone on this forum is obliged to reply to you immediately? Don’t you think that people have their own business and can be traveling on some business events? If you keep up your offensive tone I will just ignore you.

A nuance of English, "extensively" does not neccessarily mean "large numbers at the end of the period of time referred to." 55 at the end of 1943 was just under 3 percent of the total of tanks reported on hand on the Eastern Front. 3 percent is not "extensive" in the sense you are trying to make it mean. However, they were utilized in large numbers over the entire period of time from 1 September 1939 to 31 December 1943, since they constituted over 1,400 of the tanks produced for Germany in that period. But subtracting 55 from 1,800+ does not result in a signficant change, nor does adding 9 to nearly 1,200.

What makes you to believe that I meant by “extensively” large numbers? Don’t put words in my mouth.

And frankly insisting on using incorrect terminology when one knows better is childish.

Why one should stick to Nazi terminology? For example, they called Czechs, Polish or Russians as “Untermenschen” – subhuman. So, do you want me to repeat the same Nazi nonsense?

Pz-I - were no longer being utilized as tanks and were no longer counted in any Lage. They appeared in the Gliederungen of 19. Pz. (4), DR (1), and LSSAH (3), and DR and LSSAH mention 1 being lost (LSSAH) and 1 being damaged (DR). Noticing them was a fluke on our part, I'm not sure that many had previously?
Pz-II - are not forgotten, they are counted in numerous places, so I'm not sure what you mean?
Command tanks - ditto?

Don’t divert attention from the fact that Zetterling didn’t provide the exact number of Pz-I and Pz-II, which took part in Citadel.

You can be sure that in my book I will include the 13 that were missed as well as not counted Pz-I, Pz-II, Marder II, Marder III, Wespe, Hummel, Grille etc.

I see, so now you are deliberately trying to twist reality?

Just the opposite. I just want to restore the reality and balance the chorus of history revisionist who want to re-write the history.

Pz-I - see above.
Pz-II - are reported, so they are not "missed."

See above

Marder II and III - are reported for Panzer divisions and for the infantry divisions where the information was available.

Which means that considerable number of Marder II and III have not been counted by Zetterling.

Wespe and Hummel - are reported, so they are not "missed."

Were they counted by Zetterling as self-propelled guns?

Grille - see below.

How many of self-propelled 15 cm/Sig33/AUF Sft 38 (t) Ausf. K “Grille” were counted by Zetterling? Were they counted as self-propelled guns?

Back to strawmen I see. For one thing, you haven't published anything AFAIK

Back to arrogance. You are quite incorrect in this point. I have publications in Russia.

Again why one should suspect respected http://www.achtungpanzer.com in lying?

“From February of 1943 to March of 1945, only 474 Nashorns and 20 Hornisses were produced. Both models were issued to the schwere Panzerjager Abteilungens and had their debut during the Kursk Offensive with 560 sPzJagAbt and 655th sPzJagAbt and with 525 sPzJagAbt in Italy. Even with their light armor protection and high silhoutte but powerful armament, they proved to be successful tank destroyers.”

Source: http://www.achtungpanzer.com/pz2.htm

You have that curious Russian habit of being obssesed with "respected" authorities. So you accept a "respected" authorities imprecise (and incorrect) statement over facts.

You have that curious Yankee habit to insult people. Where exactly you proved with reference to daily reports of Schwere Panzer-Jager-Abteilung 560 from July 4 to July 17th 1943 that Hornissen were not committed in Citadel?

You are quite incorrect in this point. According to Steven Newton, (snip)

Please show me the order that incorporated the Marder into the organization of the Panzer divsion as Panzers?

My dear friend, you can address your question to Steven Newton or Velimir Vuksic who documented in their titles application of Marder in panzer capacity.

Pz-II - p. 30, p. 187, for the East, p. 95.
Are Pak (mot) now also included in your count of "tanks"?
Pak (Sfl) - p. 46.

Look how many of those were counted and compare the figure, for example, with you study.

I see, so you "saw" records but use books. So you've never actually done any of the research work yourself? You've just relied on others to do it for you and then decided to criticize as you see fit?

Don’t teach me what to do. Do you think that companies like Microsoft, Oracle or SAP do market research on their own or they contract companies like IDC or Gartner who do it for them?

Of course it is for me to decide. I could as easily dismiss your interminable rantings as the fevered expressions of a deluded mind, but I don't. But I rather prefer to think that you just don't have access to accurate information.

Be careful of wording. You Yankee always think about yourself as the super nation who have the right to decide for others but you sucked in Korea, sucked in Vietnam and now you are sucking in Afganistan and Iraq where we see the results of you wins.

Wow, that's some torturous "logic". You referred to "Grille" in that post - and have repeatedly referred to them in your latest post again - as something different from the Marder II and Marder III. And now it's my fault because I thought you were referring to the vehicle that was called a "Grille", the SdKfz 138/1? But instead you were supposedly referring to a vehicle you had just asked about in the same line? A vehicle that was never referred to as a "Grille."?

For your information I referred to 7.5 cm Pak 40/2 antitank gun as Marder II and self propelled 7,5 cm Ausf. H. as Marder III.

In that particular statement I was referring to Panzerjaeger 38 (t) Ausf. M with a 7.5 cm PaK 40/3 antitank gun.

And in any case, so far we have established that the inaccuracy - whether deliberate or accidental, which is something you cannot prove either way consists of 9 Pz-38 (t) and 8 Pz-I, which is an "inaccuracy" rate of about 1.4 percent, compared to your inaccuracy rate, which I estimate as above 50 percent.

You are joker, I showed to you that your lovely Z was playing with statistics and while counting all Russian and Lend-Lease light tanks and all SP guns he was not counting all German light tanks, booty Czech tanks (if you like Beutepanzer) or Marder II and III. He was not counting Wespe, Grille, Hummel or Hornisse as self propelled guns.

Finally, I wanted to give an opinion of Steven Newton about Zetterling’’s book:

Are you having problems formulating your own arguments?(Snip)

I formulated my own arguments and supported them by respected opinion of Steven Newton who completely exposed the conclusions made by the authors of statistical analysis which you vigorously advocate on this thread.

Best Regards from Russia,

[Rich]

Clown, I am amazed by your insulting comments and arrogance. Do you really think that someone on this forum is obliged to reply to you immediately? Don’t you think that people have their own business and can be traveling on some business events? If you keep up your offensive tone I will just ignore you.

Kettle to pot, over.

What makes you to believe that I meant by “extensively” large numbers? Don’t put words in my mouth.

Then please clarify what you meant by "extensive"?
Extensive as in 9 used by a single division engaged in Zitadelle?
Extensive as in 3 percent?

Why one should stick to Nazi terminology? For example, they called Czechs, Polish or Russians as “Untermenschen” – subhuman. So, do you want me to repeat the same Nazi nonsense?

Nonsense back at you. Using correct terminology aids clarity. We are referring to a machine, not people, so take your strawman and peddle it elsewhere.

Don’t divert attention from the fact that Zetterling didn’t provide the exact number of Pz-I and Pz-II, which took part in Citadel.

So do you really believe if you repeat it enough times someone will think it is correct? And pray tell, what do you think is the "exact number"?

Just the opposite. I just want to restore the reality and balance the chorus of history revisionist who want to re-write the history.

What chorus, which history revisionists and what re-writing have they done?

Which means that considerable number of Marder II and III have not been counted by Zetterling.

Really? How many?

Were they counted by Zetterling as self-propelled guns?

They were counted as Wespe and Hummel, which are self-propelled guns. Pray tell, which table on which page do you believe they are missing from?

How many of self-propelled 15 cm/Sig33/AUF Sft 38 (t) Ausf. K “Grille” were counted by Zetterling? Were they counted as self-propelled guns?

None. So how many should have been counted? How many s.I.G. were counted? Or not. How many 76.2mm Regimental Guns were counted for the Soviets? How many 120mm mortars? How many Zis-3? You evidently need 7.5cm Pak (mot) counted now, why not 45mm and 57mm antitank guns?

BTW, note that these and many of your other missing items appear on page 192, as for 30 August, which makes me suspect that Zetterling was using the data available from the records.

Back to arrogance. You are quite incorrect in this point. I have publications in Russia.

Congratulations. Which ones? And BTW, believe or not, I'm not being sarcastic, I wish I had more time to work on my own projects, you're lucky.

You have that curious Yankee habit to insult people. Where exactly you proved with reference to daily reports of Schwere Panzer-Jager-Abteilung 560 from July 4 to July 17th 1943 that Hornissen were not committed in Citadel?

I'm proud to be a Yankee, but that was unscholarly of me, I apologize for that remark. I will also strive not to do so again, but in return I think it only fair that you stop the "clown" remarks, they are also unscholarly.

s.Pz.-Jg.-Abtl. 560 was not engaged with any of the formations during Zitadelle, but were part of XXXXII AK IIRC (I will check the reference tomorrow). It's first equipments had not been delivered until April and many were defective, the primary problem being the sights could not be kept in alignment when firing, making them virtually useless. The problem is referred to a number of times again I should be able to give you the reference tomorrow. Their first actual engagements and claims for kills was made during the Soviet counteroffensive that followed Zitadelle.

My dear friend, you can address your question to Steven Newton or Velimir Vuksic who documented in their titles application of Marder in panzer capacity.

Sorry, but why is it that you have no need to address your questions to Zetterling as I suggest, but that I must now address my questions to Newton and Vuksic? A bit of a double-standard there I'm afraid.

Look how many of those were counted and compare the figure, for example, with you study.

Er, Igorn, I did, and have, a couple of times. Zetterlings count of Pz-II more or less matches ours, he shows them in the divisional counts and in the front counts (p.195). And Michate may in fact be correct, Zetterling may not have belived the Pz-I were really there and so counted "light tanks", I honestly don't know?

And I've already told you, Zetterling did identify Marders with the mechanized units correctly and where he could find them for the infantry divisions. And, wait a minute, looky there, we didn't find any with the infantry of HG-S either? And here I remembered that we did. So that's a non-issue too (sometimes it pays to go back over things).

Don’t teach me what to do. Do you think that companies like Microsoft, Oracle or SAP do market research on their own or they contract companies like IDC or Gartner who do it for them?

I can't teach you anything, you're too far away for me to throw the chalk at you. But why anyone who has such easy access to all the original records would depend on what are all too often poor transcriptions is beyond me?

Be careful of wording. You Yankee always think about yourself as the super nation who have the right to decide for others but you sucked in Korea, sucked in Vietnam and now you are sucking in Afganistan and Iraq where we see the results of you wins.

This Yankee was frustrated, but on the other hand that's a pretty oddly worded response as well? What exactly does Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq have to do with the discussion at hand?

For your information I referred to 7.5 cm Pak 40/2 antitank gun as Marder II and self propelled 7,5 cm Ausf. H. as Marder III.

In that particular statement I was referring to Panzerjaeger 38 (t) Ausf. M with a 7.5 cm PaK 40/3 antitank gun.

You never can just come out and admit when you've made a mistake or misstated something, can you? They were all Marder, none were known as a Grille.

You are joker, I showed to you that your lovely Z was playing with statistics and while counting all Russian and Lend-Lease light tanks and all SP guns he was not counting all German light tanks, booty Czech tanks (if you like Beutepanzer) or Marder II and III. He was not counting Wespe, Grille, Hummel or Hornisse as self propelled guns.

Uh, Igorn, he didn't do any "counting" of Soviet and lend-Lease tanks and SP guns, he simply repeated what was available in the documentation he could use, the Soviet staff studies. He states in a number of places that his Soviet figures are of necessity less precise. Descibing the limitations of a study are the exact antithesis of "playing with statistics." So complain to the Soviet General Staff if their figures are inaccurate, Zetterling could only report them as they were presented to him, anything else would have been "playing". As for the rest:

The light tanks were reported.
9 Pz-38 (t) were missed, unless Michate can find the footnote he thinks exists.
Alol Marder in mechanzied formations were counted, none existed in HG-S infantry formations that were committed and he may be spot on with the ones he found in infantry of 9. Armee?
Hornisse were not part of Zitadelle, they were not operational until the Soviet counteroffensive.
Grille, Wespe and Hummel are self-propelled artillery. Wespe and Hummel are reported as such, Grille appear spottily. In either case they are not assault guns, which is the rubric used in the Soviet tables, further complaints about their presence or abscence is a semantical and doctrinal argument.

I formulated my own arguments and supported them by respected opinion of Steven Newton who completely exposed the conclusions made by the authors of statistical analysis which you vigorously advocate on this thread.

Best Regards from Russia,

I "vigorously advocate"? You make me sound like a shyster. Part of the problem is that I have very little respect for 90 percent of the historians I run into and have problems with the remaining 10 percent as well, including Zetterling, we've had a number of occasions to disagree.

The argument that the German Panzer force was less operationally capable as of 31 december 1943 is of course correct. OTOH the argument that its on hand strength was virtually unchanged and that the tanks themselves were better is also correct. But the state of the German tank force in December 1943 had very little to do with Zitadelle and everything to do with the Soviet counteroffensives that began at Orel and then followed at Belgorod-Kharkov, and continued through the fall and winter. Zitadelle was a tactical victory for the Germans in one small sector and for a brief time, but it was an operational and strategic defeat, it just wasn't the single decisive defeat of the war, such don't really exist, at least in modern national wars like World War II.

[Michate]

9 Pz-38 (t) were missed, unless Michate can find the footnote he thinks exists.

Sorry, it seems I expresed myself in an unclear way.

I did not want to contest that they were missed.

What I wanted to mention is that the aggregate numbers of Pz. 38 (t) on the eastern front in 1943 (without any breakdown by unit) are documented in the appendix showing the Panzerlage / StuG-Lage. The numbers are fluctuating somewhat eratically, but generally less than 50 for the whole Eastern front, IIRC.

Last evening I had a look at the book again, and it seems in his table on p. 46 he lumped together the Pz. I and II as "light tanks" and gave their sums.
He did the same in the table showing onhand tank strength in II. SS-Pz. corps, while in that of IIIrd Pz. corps, Pz. I are explicitly shown as a separate category (showing 3 Pz. I and 2 Pz. II for 19 Pz. Div.).

[Rich]

s.Pz.-Jg.-Abtl. 560 was not engaged with any of the formations during Zitadelle, but were part of XXXXII AK IIRC (I will check the reference tomorrow). It's first equipments had not been delivered until April and many were defective, the primary problem being the sights could not be kept in alignment when firing, making them virtually useless. The problem is referred to a number of times again I should be able to give you the reference tomorrow. Their first actual engagements and claims for kills was made during the Soviet counteroffensive that followed Zitadelle.

Sorry, I meant to get back to this earlier. s.Pz.-Jg.-Abtl. 560 began forming in March in the zone of 7. Armee in France and completed organizing as of 6 April. On 23 April 1. and 3. Kompanie began moving east after receiving the first 30 vehicles. 15 more were then issued to 2. Kompanie 15-17 May and it followed. The battalion was assigned to XXXXII AK on 2 July but was not operational due to teething problems. They are noted in report by the Pz.Offz. b. Chef GenStdH to the Organisationsabteilung (III) d. H.Qu. on 17 June (NARA RG242, T78, R418, F3152~) and XXXXII AK repeated that assessment on 7 July. I'm still trying to find the exact date, but the battalions first entry into combat was late July or early August. By 1 September the battalion had been in combat, it only had 18 operational, with 11 in short-term and 6 in long-term repair, so it had lost 10.

Sadly I can't pinpoint the date they entered combat, since I can't find my copy of the report. I do have my note that the report is in NARA RG242, T78, R620, F0335~. If I can't locate the damn thing to double-check I suppose I'll try to wander over to College Park to make another copy.

[Martin Block]

On the 'Zustandsbericht' of s.H.Pz.Jg.Abt. 560 dated 1.7.1943 the CO noted that none of the units 45 'Hornissen' was operational because of some not nearer specified basic technical problems that could not be solved by the battalions own means.

On 9.7.1943 the commanding general of the XXXXII. A.K. added a note to that same report stating that the unit was subordinated to his corps since 2.7.1943 but still none of the 'Hornissen' was combat ready despite many tests and technical changes.

The 'Zustandsbericht' for 1.8.1943 is missing in the BA/MA but on the one for 1.9.1943 it is noted that the "Abt. seit dem 6.8.1943 im Einsatz ist". Maybe that's the date you're looking for, Rich.

Martin Block