Hi Rich,
Berlin gave the war political closure, especially as Hitler decided to stay in his capital. However, from the military point of view it is not a particularly distinguished engagement, showing neither the Germans nor the Soviets at their best.
I would not characterise Zhukov's attack at Seelow as a disaster. It was certainly initially a failure, but the Germans didn't have the resources to turn it into a disaster. In fact it succeeded at the second attempt on only the second day. I would characterise the first day at Seelow as just a hiccup in the otherwise smoothe development of Soviet plans.
Cheers,
Sid.
Battle of Berlin
Moderator: sniper1shot
Semantics!..........no? For the time, place, and situation, the orginal attack was ill concieved, badly executed, and failed to ID the main line of enemy resistance before it was launched. Sounds like "disaster" to me.
Obviosly anything short of "an act of God" wouldnt change the inevitable. And "God" had taken a vacation from Germany for 5 &1/2 years.
Obviosly anything short of "an act of God" wouldnt change the inevitable. And "God" had taken a vacation from Germany for 5 &1/2 years.
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Hi Rich,
As the old adage goes, "No plan survives contact with the enemy". If having your plans set back by a single day, as at Seelow, is a disaster, that doesn't leave much vocabulary to describe genuinely disasterous engagements like Cannae, Stalingrad or even Berlin from the German point of view. I think you are overstating the case considerably.
God looked pretty uncommitted until late 1941, and then came in on the side of the atheists at Moscow! Ideological consistency doesn't appear to be His strong point!
Cheers,
Sid.
As the old adage goes, "No plan survives contact with the enemy". If having your plans set back by a single day, as at Seelow, is a disaster, that doesn't leave much vocabulary to describe genuinely disasterous engagements like Cannae, Stalingrad or even Berlin from the German point of view. I think you are overstating the case considerably.
God looked pretty uncommitted until late 1941, and then came in on the side of the atheists at Moscow! Ideological consistency doesn't appear to be His strong point!
Cheers,
Sid.
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Hi Bruno,
There are other examples. i.e. Brest Litovsk, Odessa, Leningrad etc.
There is no doubt that the Russians were prepared on several occasions to make much greater sacrifices than the Germans were ever prepared to. The Wehrmacht gave the Germans the more effective killing machine, but it was rarely obliged to make the same level of sacrifice as the Red Army and the Russian people. At the end of the day the Russians proved tougher, either as a people or as a political system, or both.
but we can not forget that the choice for the Soviet Soldier to sacrifice him self was not always his to make, like the "not on step bacward" order by stalin
"Gott Mit Uns"
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Hi Wilhelm,
The decision as to whether to sacrifice himself was not always left to the German soldier either. Flying courts martial and summary execution played their role in stiffening the German defence at Berlin.
It should be noted that Stalin's "Not a Step Backwards!" call was made in the summer of 1942 and was actually largely ignored by the Red Army, which evacuated the Don bend and North Caucasus in defiance of it. This frustrated the Germans, who were much struck by the few prisoners they took compared with the year before.
Cheers,
Sid.
The decision as to whether to sacrifice himself was not always left to the German soldier either. Flying courts martial and summary execution played their role in stiffening the German defence at Berlin.
It should be noted that Stalin's "Not a Step Backwards!" call was made in the summer of 1942 and was actually largely ignored by the Red Army, which evacuated the Don bend and North Caucasus in defiance of it. This frustrated the Germans, who were much struck by the few prisoners they took compared with the year before.
Cheers,
Sid.
Maskirovka had been bad that time and the Germans pretty well knew where and when the Soviets had attacked. This meant they could build a defensive concentration of effort exactly in the path of the Soviet attack force, so that even despite highest operational concentration of troops in the attack sectors Soviet superiority there was somewhat less marked than in quiet sectors.Semantics!..........no? For the time, place, and situation, the orginal attack was ill concieved, badly executed, and failed to ID the main line of enemy resistance before it was launched. Sounds like "disaster" to me.
Soviet reconnaissance had been bad and German dispositions, especially those located in depth had not been properly reconnoitered.
Due to this a large part of the artillery barrage was wasted on empty positions.
Additionally troop concentrations in the attack sectors were too high so that different troops disturbed each other and had no room for tactical maneuver.
Details on this can be found in Lakowski, Seelow 1945.
Generally the fact that the battle for Berlin was shorter than others does not mean it was not ferocious, actually both sides' accounts give testimony for that. The Germans simply had concentrated their forces at the front line east of Berlin and after this had been broken had little troops to feed the battle, unlike e.g. the Soviets at Stalingrad.
Well, few has a relative meaning here. The Germans counted 1,518,000 (by accounts of the general quarter master, FHO counted even 1,653,000) Soviet PoWs in 1942. Army group A counted 309,000 Soviet PoWs in July/August 1942 alone, IIRC.This frustrated the Germans, who were much struck by the few prisoners they took compared with the year before.
The important fact was that despited very large losses the Soviets managed to continually increase the number of troops in the frontline.
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Hi Michate,
Stalin issued his "Not a Step Back" on 28 July 1942 in response to Operation Edelweiss launched by the Germans on 25 July. I would therefore suggest that only August's prisoner toll would be applicable.
I have a strong suspicion that a high proportion of the prisoner haul you quote for Army Group A came in early July with the fall of Sevastopol.
Do you have more refined statistics?
Cheers,
Sid.
Stalin issued his "Not a Step Back" on 28 July 1942 in response to Operation Edelweiss launched by the Germans on 25 July. I would therefore suggest that only August's prisoner toll would be applicable.
I have a strong suspicion that a high proportion of the prisoner haul you quote for Army Group A came in early July with the fall of Sevastopol.
Do you have more refined statistics?
Cheers,
Sid.
Hello Sid:
The figures are from vol. 6 of the "Germany and the 2nd World war" series, I will have to look up the exact dates to which the quoted figures apply.
The number of PoWs at Sevastopol was roughly 97,000. This would still leave more than 200,000 PoWs in the Donez-Don-Caucasus area.I have a strong suspicion that a high proportion of the prisoner haul you quote for Army Group A came in early July with the fall of Sevastopol.
Do you have more refined statistics?
The figures are from vol. 6 of the "Germany and the 2nd World war" series, I will have to look up the exact dates to which the quoted figures apply.
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Sid,
a good overview on figures of PoWs captured can be found at axis history forum: http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=83306
Especially the two messages from Qvist.
a good overview on figures of PoWs captured can be found at axis history forum: http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=83306
Especially the two messages from Qvist.
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Hi Sid
The figure of 625,000 is the Foreign Armies East figure for all PoWs captured at eastern front in July and August 1942 (Germany and the second World War", volume 6, German paperback edition, p. 1090). This figure fits well with the August figure 297,000, which Qvist has found at BA-MA. It leaves 328,000 PoWs for July 1942.
I could not agree more.sid guttridge wrote:Hi Michate,
Qvist is always good value.
No, the figure of 309,000 is for PoWs captured in the area of army group A in the time 1 July - 10 August alone, according to the OKH situation report of 13 August 1942 (War diary OKW, Vol. 2.1, p. 583, also mentioned in the "Germany and the second World War", volume 6, German paperback edition, p. 1069).The link gives 297,000 POWs in August, which does not fit well with your earlier figure 309,000 for July and August combined. There is still some confusion here, I think.
The figure of 625,000 is the Foreign Armies East figure for all PoWs captured at eastern front in July and August 1942 (Germany and the second World War", volume 6, German paperback edition, p. 1090). This figure fits well with the August figure 297,000, which Qvist has found at BA-MA. It leaves 328,000 PoWs for July 1942.
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hey all i see that this topic hasn't been updated for a long time, so i just post in here cuz my interest in battle for berlin that kept me curious.
i buy book The Last Battle by Cornelius Ryan that contains much story about battle for berlin and I finish read it only 2 days!
but now i hardly found website that contains photos and info or battle story about it, do you guys know ??
thanks before..
i buy book The Last Battle by Cornelius Ryan that contains much story about battle for berlin and I finish read it only 2 days!
but now i hardly found website that contains photos and info or battle story about it, do you guys know ??
thanks before..