Dieppe raid
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Rodger Herbst
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Dieppe raid
Read in J.Pericos book,Roosevelts secret war,that the 320I.D.is the one that met and knocked hell out of the allies at Dieppe.After the battle the officers prepared a critique on what the allies did wrong,sort of a how not to,report. The 320 was in Russia,thier HQ was over run and thier documents captured.The Russians sent a copy of the report to the allies who were preparing for D day,an army G2 officer said it was most important document in prepering for D day.Can anyone verify this,I'm not great on were the German I.D. were at certain times. Bowser
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Jason Pipes
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Not sure about the story of the Russians capturing their documents and providing them to the Allies, seems like the oposite would be true, that they wouldn't give them to the western Allies.
What I do know is that it wasn't the 320.Infanterie-Division that beat back the attack at Dieppe, it was the the 302.Infanterie-Division. The unit was stationed at Dieppe in August of 1942 when the assault hit, and was later transfered to Russia where it served on the southern sector of the front. It was totally destroyed in August of 1944 when the Russians basically rolled over it, By that time I think it would have been a little late for the Russians to capture, evaluate and pass on any intel documents they found!
From what I've read I think the western Allies learned what they needed to learn just from their own experiences alone. They saw first hand what to do and not to do in any future invasion, mainly as a result of the huge losses their troops incured on the beaches. This forced them to evaluate everything they did and to plan totally different for the next one in order to not see a rehash of Dieppe. The Germans, although they won at Dieppe, were worse off in the end because they saw a vindication of their tactics and weren't as well prepared for the sort of assault that would be landed on D-Day, two years later, as a result.
What I do know is that it wasn't the 320.Infanterie-Division that beat back the attack at Dieppe, it was the the 302.Infanterie-Division. The unit was stationed at Dieppe in August of 1942 when the assault hit, and was later transfered to Russia where it served on the southern sector of the front. It was totally destroyed in August of 1944 when the Russians basically rolled over it, By that time I think it would have been a little late for the Russians to capture, evaluate and pass on any intel documents they found!
From what I've read I think the western Allies learned what they needed to learn just from their own experiences alone. They saw first hand what to do and not to do in any future invasion, mainly as a result of the huge losses their troops incured on the beaches. This forced them to evaluate everything they did and to plan totally different for the next one in order to not see a rehash of Dieppe. The Germans, although they won at Dieppe, were worse off in the end because they saw a vindication of their tactics and weren't as well prepared for the sort of assault that would be landed on D-Day, two years later, as a result.
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Rodger Herbst
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Sacred Secrets
I was at first VERY impressed by the penetration of American secrets by the Russians as described in "Sacred Secrets".
However, the authors' discussion of the alleged military impacts of specific bits of spy work make it clear that the authors were willing to accept any claim someone from the spy community (KGB or FBI) wanted to make.
I believe that the US and England were simply infested with Russian spies, but I also believe that the result of this spying had little practical effect on the battlefield.
In general, the spy guys want to sound like they won a battle simply because they provided 1 piece of information to a general who already had 9 other pieces, and then still had to demonstrate some management and leadership skill to WIN the battle once the forces were engaged.
There is also the problem that a well-meaning senior general may actually tell 10 different people he meets during a day's meeting, "I'm sure glad you gave me this report. It's the most important information I've received." So each of those 10 people can quote the general as saying their worthless and outdated information was "critical". A competent author takes the trouble to find other sources that prove which "critical" information wa actually used by the staff to plan operations.
The US Army started decrypting the VENONA Files (i.e., copies of diplomatic telegrams between the Russian embassy in Washington and Moscow) because the US was receiving NOTHING from the Russians about the number of German trooops deployed on the Eastern Front or ANY details about combat, tactics, etc. The idea that the Russians would pass on to the West a detailed German analysis of Allied tactics in a timely manner, would seem to be a war story of low probability of correctness.
However, the authors' discussion of the alleged military impacts of specific bits of spy work make it clear that the authors were willing to accept any claim someone from the spy community (KGB or FBI) wanted to make.
I believe that the US and England were simply infested with Russian spies, but I also believe that the result of this spying had little practical effect on the battlefield.
In general, the spy guys want to sound like they won a battle simply because they provided 1 piece of information to a general who already had 9 other pieces, and then still had to demonstrate some management and leadership skill to WIN the battle once the forces were engaged.
There is also the problem that a well-meaning senior general may actually tell 10 different people he meets during a day's meeting, "I'm sure glad you gave me this report. It's the most important information I've received." So each of those 10 people can quote the general as saying their worthless and outdated information was "critical". A competent author takes the trouble to find other sources that prove which "critical" information wa actually used by the staff to plan operations.
The US Army started decrypting the VENONA Files (i.e., copies of diplomatic telegrams between the Russian embassy in Washington and Moscow) because the US was receiving NOTHING from the Russians about the number of German trooops deployed on the Eastern Front or ANY details about combat, tactics, etc. The idea that the Russians would pass on to the West a detailed German analysis of Allied tactics in a timely manner, would seem to be a war story of low probability of correctness.
Vinnie O
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Rodger Herbst
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Jason Pipes
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That's what I'm trying to figure out too! Where does the 320.ID fit in here?!? The German report mentions it, but I'm not aware it was involved nor even in reserve at the time. It's listed as being in the Cotentin area of the Channel Coast during the time of Dieppe (8/42), which is fairly far away if I'm not mistaken.
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Peter
Not 320 but 302...
Well I think there was not an 320 I.D at Dieppe but this has to be 302.i D simple mistake what I come across a lot of times with my research about Arnhem, they often mention the wrong unit number....
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Rodger Herbst
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101stDoc
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Evening Jason...Jason Pipes wrote:It's listed as being in the Cotentin area of the Channel Coast during the time of Dieppe (8/42), which is fairly far away if I'm not mistaken.
Sorry...missed your post first time round.
Yeah, it's a little bit of a jaunt.
The following link is a good map of the Allied unit dispositions on the beachs at Dieppe and company.
http://www.rhli.ca/historical/dieppemap.html
Another decent map (tho not as good as the first).
http://www.vac-acc.gc.ca/content/histor ... _map_e.jpg
The one below has several diff maps (IIRC this' the official town website).
http://www.mairie-dieppe.fr/cartes-plan ... esGBF.html
Doc
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Benoit Douville
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Benoit Douville -
AMEN !
My father-in-law was picked out of the South Saskatchewan Regt. just before Dieppe by Canadian General H. Crerar (who commanded the forces at Dieppe) to attend a series of Staff Colleges.
He later became Gen. Crerar's (as G.O.C. Canadian 1st Army) aide-de-camp for operations from Apr.44 til the end of the war.
My father-in-law mentioned to me once that Gen. Crerar, in conversation on several occasions, told him how sad he was of the tremendous bloodletting the Canadian forces received at Dieppe - but how greatful he was that the lessons learned saved so many allied lives on D-Day!
regards -
AMEN !
My father-in-law was picked out of the South Saskatchewan Regt. just before Dieppe by Canadian General H. Crerar (who commanded the forces at Dieppe) to attend a series of Staff Colleges.
He later became Gen. Crerar's (as G.O.C. Canadian 1st Army) aide-de-camp for operations from Apr.44 til the end of the war.
My father-in-law mentioned to me once that Gen. Crerar, in conversation on several occasions, told him how sad he was of the tremendous bloodletting the Canadian forces received at Dieppe - but how greatful he was that the lessons learned saved so many allied lives on D-Day!
regards -
Signed: "The Shadow"
The ger units usually didn´t carry every single report with them for eternity. Reports which were submitted copies were kept for 6 months then bundled up and sent back to ger. This alone makes this story unlikly. Units moving from one front to another until the end of the war probably also got rid of thier earlier reports as well. This last one is just a guess but seems reasonable.
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Dackelstaffel
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Benoit Douville
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Shadow,
I know that General H Crerar was very controversial but he was a great General not affraid to say what he have to say to guy like Montgomery. Also, I think the landing at Dieppe was not necessary to test the German defense, the Canadians sacrifice so many lives for nothing I believe. The Allied High Command knew exactly how the German will defend the beach of Normandy two years later.
Regards
I know that General H Crerar was very controversial but he was a great General not affraid to say what he have to say to guy like Montgomery. Also, I think the landing at Dieppe was not necessary to test the German defense, the Canadians sacrifice so many lives for nothing I believe. The Allied High Command knew exactly how the German will defend the beach of Normandy two years later.
Regards