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Experiences of the II./ Gebirgs-Artillerie-Regiment 79 in the French Campaign 1940.

The Gebirgs-Artillerie-Regiment (Mountain Artillery Regiment) 79 was formed on 06 October 1936 in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, in Military District VII. The regiment was subordinated to the 1. Mountain Division. After the Polish campaign, the regiment moved westwards. In May 1940 it advanced through Belgium to the Oise-Aisne canal. The C.O. was Oberst Karl Wintergerst.

The experiences of the 2d Battalion of a mountain artillery regiment, participating as part of a mountain division in the low, hill country and the plains of France, indicate advantages in the slow but mobile mountain artillery transported on pack animals. As to the gaining of time and keeping in close touch with the infantry, the advantages are conspicuous.

Experiences noted hastily in a war diary will introduce each of the selected examples, which will then be explained by a narration of the respective events.

Combat Report of 15 May 1940.

"The advantage of mountain artillery manifested itself in that, despite the congested main road, it was possible to reach the small road Les Hautes Buttes- Revin (sketch 1) leading toward the west without loss of time. "

Situation.

At 6:45 AM on 15 May,the commander of the 2d Mountain Artillery Battalion received orders at Haut Fays 23 kilometers (about 14½ miles) east- northeast of Les Hautes Buttes to reconnoiter north of the road Les Hautes Buttes-Revin for observation posts and battery positions from where it could be possible to support the attack of
the mountain division across the Meuse River north of Revin. The artillery commander had given the division commander his recommendation of the situation stating it was expected that in the zone facing the division the enemy would defend the strong Meuse sector. Preparations for attack should be kept concealed from the enemy.

Reconnaissance in the dense brushwood of the eastern Meuse Heights was carried on with much difficulty and loss of time. When, at its conclusion, the mountain artillery battalion commander drove back in a motor car over the small road Revin-Les Hautes Buttes at 1:00 PM, and was about to turn northward into the main road Montherme-Bans Jakob (sketch 2) he found it completely choked with motorized columns, heavy motorized artillery and tanks, with two and three rows abreast, so that he must proceed to Bans Jakob, the appointed meeting point, on foot. There he learned from the orders issued by the commander of the rifle regiment (to which he was attached) of the complete change in the situation.

The tanks pushing southward via Montherme as well as the neighboring divisions at Givet (sketch 1) and west thereof had gained so much terrain west of the Meuse that the enemy in front of our own division abandoned the defense of the strong Meuse sector. According to air reconnaissance, the enemy was retreating south of Rocroi and Mezieres.

The mountain artillery battalion had been assigned to the mountain regiment for the crossing of the Meuse, and now it was essential that the battalion follow close up behind the infantry in the direction of the river crossing at Revin. The battalion, meanwhile, had been moved up to position in readiness east of Bans Jakob. The main road which had to be crossed, blocked all movement like a bolt, because most of the motorized vehicles, lined up in several rows close together, were unable to move. In addition to this, the road had been demolished by a gigantic explosive charge at Grande Croix (sketch 2).

The battalion, therefore, packed its equipment on pack animals and, leaving its horse-drawn wagons behind, proceeded through woods and ditches alongside the road. Thus it was able to get through the crammed main road and through a forest impassable for horse-drawn vehicles, and to catch up with the rifle regiment which was already on the march. (War Diary, night of 15-16 May 1940).

Sources: Mountain Artillery on Pack Animals. Military Review. January 1942.
https://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gl ... AR79-R.htm

Any idea of ​​the name of the C.O. of the II./ GAR 79? Cheers. Raúl M .

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Experiences of the II./ Gebirgs-Artillerie-Regiment 79 in the French Campaign 1940.

Experiences:

"The building of a narrow footbridge for pack animals has stood the test very well during the crossing of the Meuse, because in that way the whole reinforced mountain regiment, less vehicles, needed not wait for the completion of the heavier bridges. "

Situation:

In the late afternoon of May 15, 1940, the 2d Battalion of the mountain rifle regiment was in a position of readiness at the border of the heights falling in a steep slope to the Meuse toward Revin, awaiting orders to cross.

The artillery battalion commander went to the commander of the mountain rifle regiment, at that time at the point of crossing. The crossing was carried out with floatsacks and floatsack ferries without enemy disturbance.

He there learned that at about 9:00 PM a footbridge for pack animals, about three feet wide, made of secondhand building material, would be finished across the Meuse on which the battalion might cross after the heavy weapons of the advance infantry battalions.

The footbridge had been build by rifle pioneers on a dam where a row of small concrete posts led through the river. Doors and window shutters from nearby houses formed the planking.

At 10:30 PM, the first battery inserted into the rifle regiment passed across, while the last pack animal of the battalion reached the other shore safe and sound on the following morning at 6:00 AM. Over a steep and narrow serpentine road the mountain ridge on the other side was climbed and the road reached. The crossing, favored by moonlight, was carried out without accident, though one or two of the 300 pack animals of the battalion broke through the thin planking.

After a rest of 12 hours during the night near Revin, the battalion, in full fighting strength, was able to join the further advance of the regiment to Rocroi, moving through the forests with its strong wire entanglements-with many hours' start over the other elements of the division which had been confined to the temporary bridge at Fumay (sketch 1). Thus it came about that the pursuit order upon Hirson found the rifle regiment and its artillery battalion far ahead at the point of the division and that neither of them was dislodged from there until 20 May 1940.

Sources: Mountain Artillery on Pack Animals. Military Review. January 1942.
https://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gl ... AR79-R.htm

Cheers. Raúl M .

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Experiences of the II./ Gebirgs-Artillerie-Regiment 79 in the French Campaign 1940.

War Diary of 5 June 1940.

Extract : ( From the paragraph relating to artillery of the division order for position in readiness and attack across the Oise- Aisne Canal of 4 June 1940, 6:20 PM. "Batteries of the mountain battalions are to be arranged for change of position in such manner that they can execute the crossing close behind the assault infantry battalions."

Situation : During the night before the attack the battalion had gone into position south of Jumencourt on the high plateau sloping down toward the enemy side. Observation posts were established where the high plateau breaks off steeply against the valley of the Ailette River. As part of an infantry combat group which had been ordered to cooperate with the regiment of mountain troops in the front line, the battalion took part in the artillery preparation which, after the beginning of the attack on 6 June at 5:30 AM provided for lifting of the fire upon the half slope, then upon the tops of the heights at Crecy-au-Mont rising steeply beyond the canal.

After an impressive performance of the first act-a short time after, nothing could be seen any more with all the smoke and haze-a battery was ordered to the front at 8:00 AM in order to advance under cover of this haze to Bois de Monthizel lying along the canal (the great forest two kilometers or about 1 1/4 miles south of Coucy-le- Chateau— northwest corner of sketch 5) , and to follow the foremost battalion which by this time had succeeded in making a narrow breach in the enemy position. At 8:30 AM the foremost infantry had reached Crecy- au-Mont after hard fighting, while the enemy on both banks of the canal still held out.

At La Glorie and Le Paradis, our heavy artillery fire could be seen still falling, while strong enemy barrage fire was noticed in the forest of Monthizel and on both sides of Jumencourt. The battalion suffered under flanking fire from the east. On its right, the position was still confused.

The battery arrived at the forest of Monthizel without losses. The battery commander had hurried ahead to the canal to look for the place of crossing and for the command post of the battalion of the regiment. From the commander of the rifle regiment he received orders to advance across a footbridge into the terrain north of La Valee where his battery was to be assigned to the foremost battalion. At 9:30 AM, he reported to its commander at Crecy-au-Mont in such manner as to help the battalion along toward the south and protect against flanking fire from the east.

After reconnoitering fire position and observation post, the battery commander hurried back to the crossing point. Just then the first pack animals of the battery started to cross the canal. A short time before, the battery had suffered its first losses from trench mortar fire.

Hardly had the pack animals crossed the footbridge when they sank into the swampy soil. The battery commander had to order a withdrawal under enemy fire . While further reconnaissance for crossing possibilities at Pont a Couleuvre proves such at present impracticable due to strong enemy occupation on the other shore, the battery at 12:30 PM, in its prepared position, meets with heavy trench mortar fire and suffers losses of men and animals.

The battery once more is rendered fit for action, but is not employed on account of the poor observation available. Nevertheless, during late afternoon it was the first battery to reach the south bank of the canal by means of a temporary crossing. The situation meanwhile had relaxed owing to the retreat of the enemy behind the railroad embankment south of Crecy-au-Mont.

Sources: Mountain Artillery on Pack Animals. Military Review. January 1942.
https://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gl ... AR79-R.htm

Cheers. Raúl M .

Hello Raul,
Very interresting post.
Congratulations
Prosper

Hello to all ; thanks Prosper , more...............

Experiences of the II./ Gebirgs-Artillerie-Regiment 79 in the French Campaign 1940.

War Diary of 10 June 1940.

Experiences:

"At the crossing of the Ourcq on footbridges passable only for pack animals, the mountain artillery for hours was the only available artillery on the other shore."

Situation:

On 10 June 1940, the battalion is in position south of Billy-sur- Ourcq ready to open fire, with observation posts close east of the road leading to Vichel to cover the attack of the infantry across the Ourcq beginning at 9:00 AM.

As early as 7:45 AM, it could be reported that single parties were crossing the river against weak resistance from the enemy. Between 11:00 AM and 1:00 PM the batteries could cross the narrow, but deep Ourcq on temporary footbridges. After attaining the first objective the rifle regiment takes a rest at noon south of Latilly.

The battalion commander, who at 11:00 AM finds at Latilly the commander of the foremost battalion, can ascertain that at least up to 4:00 PM the mountain artillery is the only artillery that can be south of the Ourcq.

Sources: Mountain Artillery on Pack Animals. Military Review. January 1942.
https://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gl ... AR79-R.htm

Cheers. Raúl M .

Hello to all ; more...............

Experiences of the II./ Gebirgs-Artillerie-Regiment 79 in the French Campaign 1940.

War Diary of 10 June 1940.

Experiences:

"At the crossing of the Ourcq on footbridges passable only for pack animals, the mountain artillery for hours was the only available artillery on the other shore."

Situation:

During the rest, the battery commander is ordered by the battalion commander to march again with instructions to accompany the foremost infantry battalion. After a while, this battalion leaves the road in order to advance upon Etrepilly, (sketch 7), across hilly terrain. In order to be able to follow, the commander prepares the battery for the march.

When at 4:00 PM the battalion on the height one kilometer south of Buire, five kilometers or about three miles south of Latilly, takes a short halt. High explosive shells of light caliber strike in the halting space from the right flank. The adjacent unit on the right has been held back. While the riflemen evacuate the endangered terrain, the battery commander quickly decided to go into position and open fire. He caught a firing enemy battery from the flank and then took under fire a series of profitable targets on the hilly terrain north of Lucy-le- Bocage. The range was too great to catch the enemy retreating further to the west.

Examples above, show cases where the transportability and mobility of mountain batteries could be used to advantage also in flat country. To the brave employment in Example of 5 June 1940, complete success was denied because the moment of proceeding was selected too soon and the unfavorable position of the sole possibility for crossing forced the battery to turn back. The example, however, on the other hand shows what special demands may be made upon mountain batteries in unfavorable terrain and in the absence of crossings passable for horse- drawn artillery, also how justified the command is in ordering the timely following up by mountain artillery.

Sources: Mountain Artillery on Pack Animals. Military Review. January 1942.
https://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gl ... AR79-R.htm

It's all. Cheers. Raúl M .