Italian aviation in Greece 1940-1941.

[tigre]

Hello to all ; a little summary about it....................

Italian aviation in Greece, October 1940 - April 1941.

The forces present.

On October 28, when the offensive against Greece was launched, the local command of the Regia Aeronautica based in Tirana had:
- the 38° Stormo BT (Bombardamento Terrestre, ground bombardment), composed of the 39° and 40° Groups, in Valona, ​​​​​​​with 24 SM81,
- the 105° Gruppo BT in Tirana with 15 SM79s,
- the 160° Gruppo CT (Caccia Terrestre, ground fighter) with the 393a (8 Fiat CR32 and 6 Ro 41) and 394a (8 Fiat CR42 and 6 Ro 41) Squadriglie in Drenova,
- the 72º Gruppo OA (Osservazione Aerea, aerial observation) with 27 IMAM Ro 37 bis composed of the 25a, 42a and 120a Squadriglie based in Coritza, Valona and Argirocastro,
- the 355a Squadriglia CT with Fiat G50,
- the 611a transport squadriglia with 5 Breda 44 in Tirana.

These weak forces were joined by the 104° Gruppo BT deployed in Tirana on November 4, with two SM79 squadriglie (252a and 253a), the 24° Gruppo CT with the 354a and 362a Squadriglie with 24 Fiat G50s, arrived in Tirana at the end October, the 154° Gruppo CT with two squadriglie (361a and 395a) with G50 in Berat on November 5, and the 150° Gruppo CT with three squadriglie (363a, 364a and 365a) with 36 FIAT CR42 in Tirana, Valona and Argyrocastro.

In total, as of November 5, 1940, the Comando Aeronautica Albania was equipped with 31 SM79, 24 SM81, 47 Fiat G50, 44 Fiat CR42, 8 Fiat CR32 and 27 IMAM Ro37 (all based in Albania) to support the movements of the army.

To this we must add the aircraft provided to the 4th ZAT (Zona Aerea Territoriale) based in Puglia, which later became the 4th Squadra Aerea in December 1940. For the invasion of Greece, the 4th ZAT had:
- 35° Stormo BM (86° and 95° groups) with 23 Cant Z506 in Brindisi,
- 37° Stormo BT with 18 SM81 (Group 55°) and 18 Fiat BR20 (Group 116°) in Lecce,
- 47° Stormo BT (groups 106° and 107°) from Grottaglie with 24 Cant Z1007 bis,
- 96° Bruppo BaT (Bombardamento a tuffo, dive bombing) in Lecce with 20 Junkers Ju87 B2/R2 “Picchiatelli” and an SM86 W,
- 2° Group CT with Fiat G50 and Fiat CR32 to two squadrigle, 150a and 152a in Grottaglie and Bari,
- 50°Group BT with 20 Cant Z1007 bis in Brindisi,
- 372a Squadriglia CT with Macchi C200 in Brindisi,
- 147° Gruppo T (Transporto, transport) with 10 SM75 Brindisi,
- 149° Gruppo T with 11 SM82, 3 SM75 and one SM83 in Urbe and Brindisi,
- 5º Gruppo OA, with its 31a and 39a squadriglie, with 18 Ro37, based in Bari.

Thus, 44 Cant Z1007bis, 23 Cant Z506, 18 Fiat BR20, 18 SM81, 20 JU87B2/R2, one SM86 W, 12 Macchi C200, 33 Fiat G50, 9 Fiat CR32, 18 Ro37, 11 SM82, 13 SM75 and one SM83 were available in Apulia for operations in Greek territory, that is, in total: 101 bombers, 54 fighters, 41 reconnaissance aircraft and 25 transport aircraft.

A final command that supported the Greek campaign was the Aeronautica Dell'Egeo. This command controlled the Aegean islands. The main functions of this command were to escort convoys, conduct anti-ship operations and conduct armed reconnaissance of Egypt, Turkey, Palestine, Syria and Cyprus. The command supported the campaign against Greece and then against Crete (May 20-31, 1941).

The main Italian islands of the Dodecanese were Rhodes, Scarpanto, Stampalia and the smaller Castelorizzo, 72 miles east of Rhodes. All the main islands had airfields, four in the case of Rhodes. A small air contingent was based in Rhodes. It consisted of 82 aircraft, composed of one Squadriglia of RO.43/44, CR.32 and CR.42 fighters, two Squadriglie of SM.81, four Squadriglie of SM.79 and two Squadriglie of CANT Z.501 and a section of QTY Z.50613s.

Sources: Fuente: L'aviation italienne durant la campagne contre la Grèce Octobre 1940 - Avril 1941. http://www.italie1935-45.com/RA/histoire/histoire.html (offline)
https://www.stormomagazine.com/Articles ... Greece.htm
http://stefanov.no-ip.org/MagWeb/europa/22/eu22regi.htm

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

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Italian aviation in Greece, October 1940 - April 1941.

The forces present.

The Greek air force, Elliniki Vassiliki Aeroporia, could not oppose such a large number of aircraft. The fighter aviation had 36 PZL P24F/G manufactured in Poland, distributed among Squadrons 21, 22 and 23, with a dozen operational aircraft each, which were entrusted with the defense of Thessaloniki, Kastoria, Kozane and Larisa, 9 French-made Bloch MB151 C1, assigned to Squadron 24, based in Eleusina and which guarantees the protection of Athens, 6 Avia B.534 and 2 Gloster Gladiators I.

The bombing aviation could count on 9 modern French Potez 633s from Squadron 31, 12 Bristol Blenheim Mk IVs from Squadron 32 and 10 Fairey Battle Mk Is from Squadron 33. The reconnaissance aircraft was equipped with 16 German Henschel Hs-126a aircraft from Squadron 3, 32 Breguet 19s from Squadrons 1 and 2, as well as 18 Potez 25TOE from Squadron 4. The navy had 10 Avro Anson I from Squadron 13, Dornier Do.22 from Squadron 12 and 9 combat biplanes Fairey IIIF of Squadron 11, completely obsolete. These meager forces were joined by 6 naval Hawker Horsley IIs at Tatoi, 20 Avro 621 Tutors and 22 Avro 626 Prefects for training.

On paper, the disparity was considerable, both numerically and technologically. It should also be added that, although the Potez and Bloch were indeed present on Greek soil, they were immobilized because the pilots had not completed their training on these new aircraft. Therefore, the Regia Aeronautica should have wiped out the Greek air force in less than five days and supported the ground troops unmolested, but that is not what happened. Until the arrival of the Germans, the Greeks and the English gave the Italian air force a hard time.

The mission of the Albanian Aeronautical Command at the beginning of the Greek campaign was threefold. First, provide support to ground forces and participate in the proposed occupation of Corfu. Secondly, maintain an air offensive against the airfields of Epirus, Thessaloniki and Macedonia; against the military ports of Preveza and Thessaloniki; and against the main line of Greek communications. Finally, it was to provide air defenses to Albanian territory, in particular to the fleet bases at Valona and Durazzo. The mission of the 4 ZAT Commando was to directly reinforce the Albanian Aeronautical Command while the war with Greece lasted.

The Italian aviator was generally well trained and excelled at aerobatics and general handling of his aircraft. The Italian fighter pilot used to carry out more aerial combat than his German counterpart to take advantage of his good maneuverability. Morale always remained high in the air units throughout the campaign. During the retreat from Greece during the first Greek counterattack, the only way the Italian army could counterattack was from the air. Losses from air and anti-aircraft fire were light and new units and reinforcements entered the campaign.

Sources: L'aviation italienne durant la campagne contre la Grèce Octobre 1940 - Avril 1941. http://www.italie1935-45.com/RA/histoire/histoire.html (offline)
https://www.stormomagazine.com/Articles ... Greece.htm
http://stefanov.no-ip.org/MagWeb/europa/22/eu22regi.htm

Cheers. Raúl M .

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Italian aviation in Greece, October 1940 - April 1941.

Bad joint cooperation.

The Air Force and Navy were not informed of the planning of operations against Greece, so Superaereo received "enigmatic" requests, such as this letter from Benini, Undersecretary of State for Albanian Affairs, to General Francesco Pricolo, Head of the General Staff of the Regia Aeronautica, September 6, 1940:

"September 6, 1940 - n. 195520/2784 –

Dear Pricolo,

In the program that we are going to prepare for any eventuality, with the aim of carrying out the planned action against the Albanian regions under Greek domination, we have maintained the need to:

a) make parachutes available to drop weapons and ammunition in Cyamuria, at agreed locations.
b) ask the Ministry of Aeronautics to keep ready a unit of parachutists possibly destined to operate in Ciamuria. Taking this into account, it would be appropriate to offer a training course for Albanians who wish to participate in this action.

His Excellency Count Ciano approved these proposals in general terms, as long as they are considered viable by the Ministry of Aeronautics. I was looking forward to letting you know and I would appreciate it if you would share his opinions with me.

Cordially,
Benini. "

Pricolo responded that he had only been informed indirectly of the planned action against Greece, and although he thought that the drop of ammunition and weapons was feasible, the action of the paratroopers left him, to say the least, skeptical. Fortunately, this project was canceled, saving time and money. Only on September 9, Superesercito officially contacted Supermarina and Superaereo to establish the terms of action against Epirus and the Ionian Islands. The following document was transmitted to the two Commands on September 12:

"1 - OPERATIONS AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA, (Plan E)
The General Staff requested that the deployment of Italian troops be completed before the end of October 1940 in anticipation of a possible revolution in Yugoslavia.

2 - OPERATIONS AGAINST GREECE, (Plan G)
An intervention by our army to occupy Cyamuria, Epirus and the Ionian Islands is probable. The general lines of the operation are those provided for operations in Albania, disseminated by Directive No. 2100 of Esercito. "Transportation by ship of the necessary troops should be completed by the end of September."

The rivalry between the three arms played a major role in the poor preparation of the campaign: the Army wanted to appear as the great winner in a war that promised to be easy, leaving Aeronautics and the Navy a marginal participation. For this reason the army did not inform the two General Staffs until the last moment. Even during the meeting held on the morning of October 15 at the Venice Palace, in which the declaration of war on Greece was decided, initially scheduled for October 26, the Chiefs of Staff of the Navy and the Air were not summoned . It was only in the afternoon that they received the minutes of the meeting.

Sources: L'aviation italienne durant la campagne contre la Grèce Octobre 1940 - Avril 1941. http://www.italie1935-45.com/RA/histoire/histoire.html (offline)
https://www.stormomagazine.com/Articles ... Greece.htm
http://stefanov.no-ip.org/MagWeb/europa/22/eu22regi.htm

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

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Italian aviation in Greece, October 1940 - April 1941.

Start of operations and arrival of the RAF.

By mid-October 1940, with the exception of the Tirana countryside, the Italian air bases in Albanian territory were far from ready to support the invasion. In Valona, Durazzo and Argirocastro, for example, the personnel had no accommodation or shelter, but only, in most cases, some barracks pompously called "aerostazione". Fuel reserves in Tirana amounted to 1,500 barrels, spare parts were insufficient, and ammunition only reached 2,500 tons. There was no reserve of clothing, few vehicles and only a team of mechanics in Tirana.

There was no telegraphic or telephone communication between the different areas. Orders therefore had to be given by coded radio messages or by airmail. Radiometric assistance was based on stations in Brindisi, Italy. All efforts to send material from Italy failed due to the action of the English submarines, which sank the ships Chisone, Hermada and Olympia, loaded with radio stations, fuel and spare parts.

The choice of the date for the start of operations, at the beginning of winter, was unfortunate, because it favored the defenders. The day of the attack was postponed until October 28 due to weather conditions. From the first day of the campaign, the BR.20s of the 116th Gruppo attacked the ports of Patras and Lepanto (Naypaktos). Until November 1, the weather was so bad that it made any aerial activity almost impossible. On November 2, when the rain had transformed the Albanian terrain into swamps and, therefore, bombers and ground attack aircraft operating from Apulia alternated over important targets such as the Corinth canal, the railway port of Thessaloniki and the ports of Corfù, Kastoria and Gianina without appreciable results.

On November 3, the "strategic objectives" had to be abandoned and Italian bombers were used on secondary objectives in an attempt to stop the Greek counteroffensive. The commitment of the Italian pilots was notable during this time: according to various sources, they made between 200 and 400 sorties in a single day. All available Ju-87s were diverted to the Greek front at the cost of neglecting the important task against maritime traffic and attacking Allied supply convoys headed towards Libya, tasks for which they were better suited. The SM.79 and CANT Z.1007 could do little if they did not have real targets to attack.

Sources: L'aviation italienne durant la campagne contre la Grèce Octobre 1940 - Avril 1941. http://www.italie1935-45.com/RA/histoire/histoire.html (offline)
https://www.stormomagazine.com/Articles ... Greece.htm
http://stefanov.no-ip.org/MagWeb/europa/22/eu22regi.htm

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

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Italian aviation in Greece, October 1940 - April 1941.

Start of operations and arrival of the RAF.

On November 2, an SM.81 was shot down by a P24F north of Giannina. In the following days, Italian bombers, escorted or not by fighters, were often the target of Greek fighters. Losses amounted to 2 Cant Z1007bis, an SM.79 and a CR.42, against one P24F shot down. On November 7, the Valona field was unexpectedly attacked by 6 Vickers Wellingtons of the 70th RAF Squadron, during daylight, without escort. They were intercepted by the G.50s: four aircraft were lost, two shot down and two forced to land. Much to the dismay of Wavell, who was then engaged in Libya against Graziani, the RAF decided to send units to the Greek front: on November 1, the 30th Bomber Squadron equipped with Bristol Blenheim Mk Is was the first English unit to arrive in Greece. The 70th Squadron arrived on November 7, followed, at the end of November, by the Blenheims of the 211th Squadron and the Gladiators Mk IIs of the 80th Squadron.

On November 15 all missions were concentrated in the Corciano sector where things were going badly. The few Greek bombers did not appear much, apart from an attack on Bari, during which they suffered losses. The first engagement between the Regia Aeronautica and RAF fighters took place on November 19, when 20 Gladiators of 80 Squadron attacked 5 Fiat CR.42s and shot down 4. On November 27, another CR.42 from a three-aircraft patrol fell under the impact of 7 Gladiators. The following day, another duel resulted in the loss of four Gladiators and 3 CR.42s. The fighting that took place at the end of the month was quite violent, involving 20 or 30 aircraft from both sides, just before the enforced pause in December.

During the latter part of November, the Regia Aeronautica received the 373a and 374a Squadriglie Autonomo CT and the 42º Gruppo BT. The 373a and 374a Squadriglie were equipped with 24 Macchi C.200s, bringing the strength of this type to 36 operational aircraft. The 42º Gruppo BT was equipped with 14 SM.79s, bringing the strength of the SM.79s to 45 aircraft. All reinforcements went to 4 ZAT Command for operations over Albania and Greece.

In early December, the RAF presence in Greece was increased by the arrival of the 113th Squadron with Blenheim Mk IVs and part of the Gladiators of the 112th, which received all its aircraft on January 18, 1941. Still in January 1941, it was the turn of the 11th Squadron to arrive in Greece with its Blenheims.

Sources: L'aviation italienne durant la campagne contre la Grèce Octobre 1940 - Avril 1941. http://www.italie1935-45.com/RA/histoire/histoire.html (offline)
https://www.stormomagazine.com/Articles ... Greece.htm
http://stefanov.no-ip.org/MagWeb/europa/22/eu22regi.htm

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more....................

Italian aviation in Greece, October 1940 - April 1941.

Start of operations and arrival of the RAF.

The weather conditions were getting worse. At the beginning of December, the few SM.81s still in service were transferred to Lecce and used as transport aircraft in an attempt to improve the supply situation, which was becoming dramatic. The other aircraft were then transferred to the airports of Puglia or concentrated in the Albanian lands of Berat, Devoli, Argirocastro (Gyrokastër) and Tirana. It was at this time that the 55º Gruppo of the 37º Stormo BT began to replace its old three-engined SM.81s with Fiat BR.20s.

In Puglia, 23 Macchi C.200s of the 373rd and 374th Squadriglie of the Veneto were transferred to Bari, 27 SM.79s of the 42nd Stormo were reassigned to Grottaglie, 18 Ju-87 B2/R2s of the 97th Gruppo Tuffatori (238th and 239th squadriglie) to Lecce, increasing the Ju-87 strength from 20 to 40 aircraft, and 8 Macchi C.200s of the 370th squadriglia at Foggia. The 95th Stormo was transformed into a land unit, thus abandoning its Cant Z506 seaplanes for Cant Z1007bis bombers. On December 6, the 37th Gruppo BT, with 16 BR.20s, was transferred to Grottaglie and began its missions against Greece.

December was a busy month for the Regia Aeronautica. On December 10, the first of 53 Ju-52 troop transport aircraft arrived in Italy. This would be the first help for the Italians from their German allies. Desperately short of air transport to assist in the immediate reinforcement of the Albanian front, Mussolini asked Adolf Hitler for help. As a result, the Germans sent I./KGzbV 1.

It is necessary to underline the selflessness and sacrifice of the pilots and crews of the Picchiatelli, which was the only tactical support aircraft available to the Regia. On the rare days in December when they were able to fly, the Ju-87s provided valuable support to the ground troops. The planes and pilots of the 97th Gruppo carried out 23 missions per crew in a single day on 20 December without suffering losses, which halted the Greek offensive. The front was then less than twenty minutes' flight from the field.

Due to the British offensive in Libya, the Command had to send aircraft to save the crumbling front lines. The 14 SM.79s of the 42º Gruppo BT and the Fiat G.50bis fighters of the 2º Gruppo Autonomo CT were quickly transferred to Libya to support the Italian army.

Sources: L'aviation italienne durant la campagne contre la Grèce Octobre 1940 - Avril 1941. http://www.italie1935-45.com/RA/histoire/histoire.html (offline)
https://www.stormomagazine.com/Articles ... Greece.htm
http://stefanov.no-ip.org/MagWeb/europa/22/eu22regi.htm

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

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Italian aviation in Greece, October 1940 - April 1941.

Start of operations and arrival of the RAF.

In early January 1941, despite poor weather conditions, Italian bomber aviation resumed its attacks on the strategic targets of Salonika, Volos, Piraeus and the Corinth Canal, in addition to its tactical support missions. On 16 January 1941, the 95º Gruppo BM began its transition as a ground unit receiving 15 Cant Z1007bis.

The month of January saw much activity for the Regia Aeronautica, with a number of important changes. One was the 5º Gruppo OA, which arrived in theatre. This group was equipped with 16 RO.37bis aircraft. These observation biplanes served a double role as fighters when needed. During this period, the CANT Z.506 was also slowly being exchanged for the CANT Z.1007bis. And on 30 January, the Commando would lose one of its dive bomber units when the 96º Gruppo BaT took its Ju-87s to Libya to support Graziani's army there. And finally, the 4 ZAT Commando changed its designation to 4º Squadra Aerea.

On February 15, the Ro37s of the 31a and 39a Squadriglie of the 5º Gruppo OA were transferred from Bari to Devoli, in Albania. They began their cycle of operations on 20 January, often escorted by the G.50s of the 154º Gruppo CT, also transferred to Devoli. The Ro37's missions were more ground support missions than reconnaissance. In February 1941, an improvement in weather conditions allowed duels between the RA and the RAF to resume.

On February 9, 24 CR.42s escorting BR.20s encountered a mixed formation of Gladiators and PZLs, with each side losing two fighters. On February 13, 12 Blenheims on a mission to Tepeleni were attacked by 12 G.50s, with five lost. The first six Hurricanes arrived on February 17 and were assigned to 80º Squadron to replace the lost Gladiators. On the 27th, Italian fighters were unable to prevent the bombing of the port of Valona (Vlöre).

At the beginning of March 1941, to support the imminent Italian offensive, the RA General Staff considered it necessary to reinforce the units deployed against Greece. In Albania, the SM.81s of the 38th Stormo gave way to the BR.20s and the CR.42s of the 150º Gruppo to the MC.200s. New units were also transferred to Albania between March 3 and 7: the 371a squadriglia with 10 MC.200s at Valona, ​​the 22º Gruppo CT with 36 MC.200s at Tirana, the 238a squadriglia BaT with 17 Ju-87Bs at Tirana and the 114a squadriglia OA with 8 Ro37s also at Tirana. On March 9, the 208a Ju-87 squadriglia began operations over Albania, from its base at Lecce. The 209a squadriglia joined it on March 18.

On March 4, 11 CR.42s attacked a Blenheim formation escorted by Hurricanes. Two Italian and one English fighter were lost. Between March 9 and 14, losses amounted to two MC.200s, one Gladiator and one Hurricane. On the 16th the British lost two Wellingtons at Tirana while Italian fighters increasingly flew low-level missions. On the March 22 the Greek airfield at Paramythia was attacked; this resulted in the loss of two Blenheims and one Wellington on the ground. On the same day, six Picchiatelli of the 239a squadriglia carried out their first anti-shipping mission, from their base at Galatina. That day a merchant ship was sunk and another set on fire.

Sources: L'aviation italienne durant la campagne contre la Grèce Octobre 1940 - Avril 1941. http://www.italie1935-45.com/RA/histoire/histoire.html (offline)
https://www.stormomagazine.com/Articles ... Greece.htm
http://stefanov.no-ip.org/MagWeb/europa/22/eu22regi.htm

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

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Italian aviation in Greece, October 1940 - April 1941.

German intervention in the Balkans.

With a view to the intervention in Yugoslavia, on April 2, 9 Ju-87Bs of the 208th Squadriglia arrived in Tirana to form the 101st BaT Group with the 238th Squadriglia, as well as 7 Ca.311s of the 87th Squadriglia OA and 8 Ro.37s of the 35th Squadriglia in Peqini. The 97th BaT Group received reinforcements from the 209th Squadriglia, commanded by Captain Romanese, with its 8 Ju-87s.

On April 6, the German intervention in the Balkans began: the VIII. Fliegerkorps of Luftflotte 4 was mobilized in Bulgaria to attack Greece and Yugoslavia. This unit was equipped with Ju-87B Stukas of I./St.G.2, III./St.G.2, I./St.G.1 and I./St.G.3, Messerschmitt Bf-109Es of II./JG 27 and III./JG 27 and Bf-110C reconnaissance aircraft of II./ZG 26, Hs-126 and Fi-156 Storches of I(H)./4, and Ju-52 transport aircraft of IV./KgzbV 1. Other units were ready to intervene in Austria, Hungary and Sicily. The meager Yugoslav air force was literally shattered within 48 hours, and things did not improve for Greece. To make matters worse, the Axis air force sank a ship loaded with 250 tons of explosives. On April 8, the 13º Stormo was moved to Gioia del Colle, south of Bari, with 24 BR.20s, to provide air cover for the Oltrante Channel and the Ionian Sea.

On April 9 the Germans reached Salonika and 5 days later the Greek air force ceased to exist. No. 113 Squadron RAF was wiped out on the ground, the same happened to other English bases. By the evening of the 14th, the RAF had only 35 operational aircraft, while German losses were only two fighters. On April 6, Cant Z1007 bis attacked the port of Mostar in Yugoslavia, losing one aircraft and shooting down two. A Ju-87B was lost over Spalato.

On April 13, 300 Regia fighters and bombers ventured over Mostar and the arsenal at Cattaro, losing only one Ju-87B. On April 21, Captain Cenni, with two other crews of the 239a Squadriglia of Ju-87s, sank a merchant ship already damaged on April 4 at Corfu. On April 26, the loss of the last 13 Hurricanes due to bombing raids by some Bf-110s put an end to the RAF presence in Greece. The next day the armistice was signed. But the operations of the Regia Aeronautica did not cease, as it was to take part in operations against the partisans.

The following table shows the breakdown by type and number of aircraft available to the Regia Aeronautica in April 1941 in the Balkans: (see below)

Sources: L'aviation italienne durant la campagne contre la Grèce Octobre 1940 - Avril 1941. http://www.italie1935-45.com/RA/histoire/histoire.html (offline)
https://www.stormomagazine.com/Articles ... Greece.htm
http://stefanov.no-ip.org/MagWeb/europa/22/eu22regi.htm

Cheers. Raúl M .

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Italian aviation in Greece, October 1940 - April 1941.

The last command to support the Greek campaign was the Aeronautica Dell'Egeo. This command controlled the Aegean islands. The main functions of this command were to escort convoys, conduct anti-shipping operations and carry out armed reconnaissance of Egypt, Turkey, Palestine, Syria and Cyprus. The command supported the campaign against Greece and then Crete (20-31 May 1941).

The main Italian islands of the Dodecanese were Rhodes, Scarpanto, Stampalia and the smaller Castelorizzo, 72 miles east of Rhodes. All the main islands had airfields, four in the case of Rhodes. A small air contingent was based at Rhodes. It consisted of 82 aircraft, consisting of a Squadriglia of RO.43/44, CR.32 and CR.42 fighters, two Squadriglia of SM.81, four Squadriglia of SM.79 and two Squadriglia of CANT Z.501. and a section of CANT Z.506B.

The Italian effort at the end of May was focused on helping their German allies in the attack on Greece. The Regia Aeronautica supported this operation with the Aeronautica Dell'Egeo. This command was reinforced with the 231a Squadriglia and six CANT Z.1007bis bombers. These aircraft would remain there until June 1, 1941.

Sources: L'aviation italienne durant la campagne contre la Grèce Octobre 1940 - Avril 1941. http://www.italie1935-45.com/RA/histoire/histoire.html (offline)
https://www.stormomagazine.com/Articles ... Greece.htm
http://stefanov.no-ip.org/MagWeb/europa/22/eu22regi.htm

Cheers. Raúl M .

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Italian aviation in Greece, October 1940 - April 1941.

The campaign in figures.

Of the 176 days of operations against Greece, 82 were unusable for air operations and 30 only allowed flight activity for 1/3 of the day. In addition, when it was not raining, the cloud ceiling remained very low, making it impossible for bombers to focus on targets at altitude and therefore operate in good conditions. Fighter and assault units were less affected by this cloud cover and ended up taking on the largest number of missions. This reduced the number of operational aircraft by more than half.

A report of 28 October 1940 on ground conditions at Albanian airfields indicates that 1 in 7 airfields was available on the day of the attack. This did not prevent General Papagos, Chief of Staff of the Greek Army, from speaking in his book Greece at War about a hundred Italian aircraft supporting infantrymen on 28 October 1940.

In total, Italian bombers carried out 7,777 missions, including at least 5,560 tactical support missions, during which they dropped 4,546 tons of bombs. Fighter aircraft carried out 12,000 missions and reconnaissance aircraft 1,400, with 99 tons of bombs dropped.

In 176 days of campaigning against Greece, the Regia Aeronautica lost 32 bombers, 29 fighters and 4 other aircraft in aerial combat, in addition to 14 machines destroyed on the ground. The losses inflicted on the Greek and English air forces amounted to 162 fighters and 56 bombers shot down, in addition to 36 fighters and 19 bombers considered probably shot down. The Regia also sank 8 Allied ships.

Transport and supply activities played a very important role, especially parachute dropping, which was sometimes the only means of supplying the troops. More than 200 tons of different types of materials were dropped, most often using obsolete aircraft. The pilots, without escort, did not hesitate to carry out these missions despite the bad weather conditions. Could the Italian troops have withdrawn without turning their retreat into a rout without these drops of ammunition and food?

Fuente: L'aviation italienne durant la campagne contre la Grèce Octobre 1940 - Avril 1941. http://www.italie1935-45.com/RA/histoire/histoire.html (offline)
https://www.stormomagazine.com/Articles ... Greece.htm
http://stefanov.no-ip.org/MagWeb/europa/22/eu22regi.htm

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

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Italian aviation in Greece, October 1940 - April 1941.

The campaign in figures.

To convince oneself of the lack of cooperation between the Army and the Air Force, it is enough to read the letter of January 15, 1941, addressed to Rome:

"Letter 021202 from the Comando Superiore FF.AA. Albania to the Comando Aeronautica Albania:

Given the situation of our troops and those of the enemy, I think it is appropriate to draw your attention to the following negative factors:
1) the impossibility of opposing the considerable and tenacious efforts of the new enemy troops due to the lack of reserves in the bases of the front-line units;
2) lack of field artillery pieces and almost total absence of long-range artillery;
3) the serious insufficiency of transport vehicles, which has made for some time the resupply of the troops deployed in the mountains, far from the roads, problematic, if not impossible;
4) material conditions of the combat units for several months: it is not necessary to remember it since the repercussions were serious for morale.

All this led me to ask the RA for all the help it could provide. Their participation was important, and their actions were carried out with a great spirit of sacrifice and dedication; but the results obtained have rarely been as desired.

This is due to:
a. the lack of speed in the intervention.
b. the lack of communication to carry out the operation successfully.

The first cause is easily explained when we know the long procedure to request the intervention. The second cause, on the other hand, is more delicate and requires an in-depth study of our troops and those of the enemy. In order to carry out this study, it is necessary to have a deep knowledge of the battlefield environment and the equipment provided.

I now believe that the intervention of aviation in close cooperation with ground forces cannot lead to the desired results, despite the sacrifices of our comrades in the air, if these conditions are not met.

In my opinion, to obtain better results, it is essential that the Air Force Command that intends to compete in the tactical field be subject to the orders of whoever leads the action.

It is clear that in such a case the command of the air forces assigned to tactical support must have a perfect spirit of understanding, if only by personally observing the different needs of the ground troops and ensuring that the air intervention is considerably improved both in terms of time and results. In this way, it would be possible to attack the enemy at the right time and place, saving human lives and equipment.

To allow this closer cooperation, I propose:
a. That a squadron of Junkers and a group of G.50s be placed directly at the disposal of the army at the bases close to the Army Headquarters.
b. That the commander of this unit be accommodated at the headquarters of the Army Command, at my own disposal."

It was therefore necessary that the Aviation Command and not that of the ground forces should have perfect control of the terrain. The Air Command must always be present. Indeed, what would have happened if the action had taken place in two different places? The duty of attacking and destroying the enemy was reserved solely to the aviation, with the army having to establish the place of attack. In this way, the aviation would have made up for the lack of new recruits, supplies, light and medium-calibre guns, and would have raised the morale of the troops. The Army commanders considered the aviation as a force dependent on the Army, whose only mission was to support the latter, forgetting the other essential roles that the RA should have played.

But the failures were not due only to one component of the army. The Air Force Command, for example, never did anything to guarantee a reliable communications network with other military forces. Tactical bombings were greatly favoured, which ultimately proved effective. On the other hand, the few strategic actions failed to destroy the Greek military potential or to curb the Greeks' will to fight.

Fuente: L'aviation italienne durant la campagne contre la Grèce Octobre 1940 - Avril 1941. http://www.italie1935-45.com/RA/histoire/histoire.html (offline)
https://www.stormomagazine.com/Articles ... Greece.htm
http://stefanov.no-ip.org/MagWeb/europa/22/eu22regi.htm

It's all. Cheers. Raúl M .