How many russian die in war against Japan?

[Henrik Andersson]

Sovjet start war against Japan in august 1945. But how many soldiers die in the short war?

[phylo_roadking]

I know its only Wiki - but the short article there in the Soviet invasion of Manchuria seems far better sourced than most LOL

And a nice lot of external sources and links at the bottom of the entry for more research.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_inv ... _Manchuria

The figures there are

8,219 KIA,
22,264 WIA

[nigelfe]

The figures given by Prof Chris Bellamy in 'Absolute War' published last year, and using official Soviet sources are:

Total force 1,669,500 in 3 Fronts, the Amur Flotilla and Pacific Fleet. Only 2 of the Fronts were committed to action. In addition there were 16,000 Mongolians in the joint Soviet-Mongolian Cavalry Mechanised Group on the right flank of the Trans-Baikal Front.

The USSR suffered 12,031 'irrecoverable losses' in the period 9 Aug to 2 Sep. Fighting ceased on 21 August although the Japanese capitulated on 18 August (units in the Khalgan Fortified Region hung on). The Mongolians lost 72.

[Henrik Andersson]

12031 in three weeks. It is much.

[Igorn]

12031 in three weeks. It is much.

"Too often soldiers fall victim to their preconceptions about potential adversaries' patterns of behavior. A popular notion among U.S. officers is that military history in the Soviet Union consists of little but propaganda broadsides to justify Soviet actions. On too few occasions do U.S. officers critically analyze the past campaigns of potential adversaries. In particular, the rich vein of military history in Russian language military periodicals and literature has been neglected. The language barrier, time constraints, and changing Army requirements combine to hinder the type of in-depth historical research that affords penetrating insights into Soviet military planning, operations, and tactics. LTC David M. Glantz, a Russian linguist at the Combat Studies Institute, has, using a wide variety of Soviet sources, reconstructed a comprehensive two-part account of the 1945 Soviet Manchurian campaign. This Leavenworth Paper offers an operational overview of the campaign, while Leavenworth Paper no. 8 expands the general campaign analysis in eight case studies that highlight Soviet tactical doctrine and operations in Manchuria. In both papers, LTC Glantz has also used Japanese accounts of the campaign to check the veracity of the Soviet version. For these reasons, I believe that these two Leavenworth Papers will become the standard works in the English language on the campaign. Two features of Soviet war-making stand out in the Manchurian campaign: (1) meticulous planning at all levels; (2) initiative and flexibility in the execution of assigned missions. For those who dismiss the campaign as a walkover of an already defeated enemy, LTC Glantz presents overwhelming evidence of tenacious, often suicidal, Japanese resistance. The sophistication of Soviet operations made an admittedly inferior Japanese Kwantung Army appear even more feeble than it actually was. Reminiscent of the lightning German victory in northwest Europe in May 1940, surprise, bold maneuver, deep penetrations, rapid rates of advance, and crossing terrain the defender thought impassable enabled the attacker to rupture vital command and control networks of the defenders and to hurl defending
forces into disarray. In 1945 the Soviets demonstrated their mastery of combined arms warfare that four blood-soaked years of fighting against the Germans had perfected. As LTC Glantz observes, the Manchurian campaign was the postgraduate exercise for Soviet combined arms. Finally, this operational level account drawn almost exclusively from Soviet sources gives the U.S. Army officer an insight into how the Soviets interpret the Manchurian campaign, the lessons they draw from it, and how they relate their Manchurian experience to Soviet military art. Indeed, much truth lies in Ovid's words, "It is right to be taught, even by an enemy."



http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources ... nt.asp#aug

Best Regards from Russia,

[Reb]

Great link Igor - thanks. I'm reading Glantz on Kursk now and he certainly provides more info on the Soviet side than I'm used to seeing.

cheers
Reb

[von Salza]

12031 in three weeks. It is much.

Bellamy's figures which nigelfe has provided almost certainly have been reproduced from those disclosed in Krivosheev's "Soviet Casualties and Combat losses in the Twentieth Century".

The introduction, provided by Igorn, to Glantz's Leavenworth Paper No8 indeed declares that the campaign was far from a walkover. However, the casualty figures, taken in this context, show that this wasn't one of the more costlier campaigns undertaken by the Red Army. It seems therefore on the face of it that the Red Army was extremely proficient at waging war at this stage of the Great Patriotic War.

Figures taken from Krivosheev indicate;

Manchurian Strategic Offensive
Trans-Baikal Front/2nd Far Eastern Front/1st Far Eastern Front/Pacific Fleet(incl Amur Flotilla) & Mongolian Peoples Revolutionary Army

Total Numerical Strength: 1,685,500
Irrecoverable Losses: 12,103 (0.72% of total strength)
Sick/Wounded: 24,550 (1.46% of total strength)
Total Losses: 36,653 (2.18% of total strength)
Average daily losses: 1,466

Trans-Baikal Front
Numerical Strength: 638,300
Irrecoverable Losses: 2,228 (0.35% of total front strength)
Sick/Wounded: 6,155 (0.96% of total front strength)
Total Losses: 8,383 (1.31% of total front strength)

2nd Far Eastern Front
Numerical Strength: 334,700
Irrecoverable Losses: 2,449 (0.73% of total front strength)
Sick/Wounded: 3,134 (0.93% of total front strength)
Total Losses: 5,583 (1.66% of total front strength)

1st Far Eastern Front
Numerical Strength: 586,500
Irrecoverable Losses: 6,324 (1.08% of total front strength)
Sick/Wounded: 14,745 (2.51% of total front strength)
Total Losses: 21,069 (3.59% of total front strength)

Pacific Fleet/Amur Flotilla
Numerical Strength: 97,500/12,500
Irrecoverable Losses: 998/32
Sick/Wounded: 300/91
Total Losses: 1,298/123

Mongolian Peoples Revolutionary Army
Numerical Strength: 16,000
Irrecoverable Losses: 72
Sick/Wounded: 125
Total Losses: 197



Regards

David

[nigelfe]

Bellamy cites GF Krivosheyev (he explains his approach to Russian spellings at the beginning of his book). However, the reference (translated) is The 'Secret' Stamp is Lifted. Losses of the USSR Armed Forces in Wars, Military Actions and Armed Conflicts, Moscow, 1993.

He also cites Glantz's Leavenworth Paper No 7, 1983. The only memoir cited is Pliev's (comd of the KMG). I particularly like the orders given to him verbally by the theatre commander on the flight from Moscow to Ulan bator "You, Issa Aleksandrovich, will execute a raid in your favourite style, across the Gobi Desert and the Grand Khingan mountains. Your cavalry-mechanised group will conduct a vigorous offensive on the axis Kalgan-Beijing, and will subsequently exploit success as far as the Gulf of Liaodong. That is where our force will concentrate your mission - to secure the front's forces against attack from the south." Kalgan to the Gulf is some 750 km.

The campaign was notable because a theatre commander and staff were appointed to command the three fronts (army groups) and the fleet. In effect a local STAVKA. Two front HQs were the Karellian and Second Ukrainian who just changed their names. Several of the armies were also specially selected for their relevant experience, although they all seem to have been re-equipped. Given that planning only started in March 1945 this is pretty impressive.