At least one Flakdivision served in the oil field refining center; presently I cannot recall the exact division. I thought German/Romanian relations were bad from the start of the war due to German demand of returning Transylvania to Hungary. It seems the Romanian Army under Soviet control fought eagerly against thier former German Allies at the end of the war. A couple of Romanian Regiments served under the Waffen-SS at the end,
AHK
Romanians
Moderator: George Lepre
Re: Romanians
It was 5th Flak Division.
Q
Q
Re: Romanians
Hello to all 
; a brief complement.........................
Light tank R-35.
In December 1937 began the negotiations with France trying to establish a local production line in the country. However this could not be completed and eventually the tanks were ordered from France. The needs of the French Army and exports to Yugoslavia, Poland and Turkey made the delivery slow, therefore only forty-one Renault R-35 tanks were received by 1939, the delivery ceased after the fall of France in 1940. In late September 1939 a number of thirty-four Polish R-35 tanks that have escaped into Romania were also interned in accordance with a Romanian-Polish agreement, resulting in a total of seventy-five R-35 tanks available to the Romanian Army in late 1939. The R-35 tanks equipped the 2nd Tank Regiment, organized on November 1, 1939.
Sources: http://www.ebay.ch/itm/Rumanischer-Panz ... Swll1WueDQ
http://www.worldwar2.ro/arme/?article=237
Cheers. Raúl M
.
; a brief complement.........................Light tank R-35.
In December 1937 began the negotiations with France trying to establish a local production line in the country. However this could not be completed and eventually the tanks were ordered from France. The needs of the French Army and exports to Yugoslavia, Poland and Turkey made the delivery slow, therefore only forty-one Renault R-35 tanks were received by 1939, the delivery ceased after the fall of France in 1940. In late September 1939 a number of thirty-four Polish R-35 tanks that have escaped into Romania were also interned in accordance with a Romanian-Polish agreement, resulting in a total of seventy-five R-35 tanks available to the Romanian Army in late 1939. The R-35 tanks equipped the 2nd Tank Regiment, organized on November 1, 1939.
Sources: http://www.ebay.ch/itm/Rumanischer-Panz ... Swll1WueDQ
http://www.worldwar2.ro/arme/?article=237
Cheers. Raúl M
.- Attachments
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- Romanian tank type R-35 (Allegedly)with radio antenna............................
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Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
Re: Romanians
Hello to all ; after a while.........................
Romanian contribution to the crusade against Bolshevism - The actions of the Romanian troops in the Caucasus and Kuban.
A. The offensive actions of the Romanian army in the Caucasus and Kuban.
I. The context of military actions.
The Moscow counteroffensive (December 6, 1941) meant the end of the "blitzkrieg" for Germany, the only tool with which it could win the war. As a result, the conflict was prolonged and A. Hitler and the German military leaders were forced to restructure their strategic intentions.
Hitler's new political-strategic vision was embodied in the "Blue Plan" ("Directive No. 41"), signed on April 5, 1942. According to this document, the main goal was the final destruction of the Soviet forces and their deprivation of the most important resources necessary for the war economy. Priority was given to action in the southern sector (destroying the enemy on the Don, conquering the oil region, forcing the Caucasus), while the conquest of Stalingrad and Karelia was put on hold until new forces were released. From the analysis of the document it can be concluded that the main forces were heading towards the Caucasus.
Operations began on 28 June 1942, with Army Group "South" advancing rapidly eastwards, without this leading to the destruction of the Soviet armies, which had learned the lessons of 1941 and skillfully avoided the manoeuvres of the German command. Deceived by this rapid advance, on 23 July 1942 Hitler signed Operational Directive No. 45, by which he substantially modified the initial campaign plan, deciding to simultaneously conquer both the Caucasus and Stalingrad, objectives that had been separate until then.
He divided Army Group South into two groups: Army Group B (German 4th Panzer Army, German 2nd and 6th Armies, Hungarian 2nd Army), commanded by Field Marshal Freiherr von Bock, and Army Group A. In accordance with Directive No. 45 of 23 July, Army Group A, commanded by Field Marshal von List, launched an offensive towards the Caucasus from 25 July. The group consisted of:
- The 1st Panzer Army, commanded by Colonel General von Kleist
- The 17th Army, commanded by Colonel General Ruoff.
The German troops channelled their offensive in two directions: Krasnodar-Tuapse (17th Army) and Mozdok-Groznîi-Baku (1st Panzer Army). The advance was particularly rapid, with the Army Group's front expanding from 150 km (initially) to about 700 km, which required covering its right flank towards the eastern coast of the Black Sea.
Sources: Acțiunile trupelor române în Caucaz și Kuban. By univ. prof. dr. Petre Otu, president of the Roman Military History Commission
Cheers. Raúl M.
; after a while.........................Romanian contribution to the crusade against Bolshevism - The actions of the Romanian troops in the Caucasus and Kuban.
A. The offensive actions of the Romanian army in the Caucasus and Kuban.
I. The context of military actions.
The Moscow counteroffensive (December 6, 1941) meant the end of the "blitzkrieg" for Germany, the only tool with which it could win the war. As a result, the conflict was prolonged and A. Hitler and the German military leaders were forced to restructure their strategic intentions.
Hitler's new political-strategic vision was embodied in the "Blue Plan" ("Directive No. 41"), signed on April 5, 1942. According to this document, the main goal was the final destruction of the Soviet forces and their deprivation of the most important resources necessary for the war economy. Priority was given to action in the southern sector (destroying the enemy on the Don, conquering the oil region, forcing the Caucasus), while the conquest of Stalingrad and Karelia was put on hold until new forces were released. From the analysis of the document it can be concluded that the main forces were heading towards the Caucasus.
Operations began on 28 June 1942, with Army Group "South" advancing rapidly eastwards, without this leading to the destruction of the Soviet armies, which had learned the lessons of 1941 and skillfully avoided the manoeuvres of the German command. Deceived by this rapid advance, on 23 July 1942 Hitler signed Operational Directive No. 45, by which he substantially modified the initial campaign plan, deciding to simultaneously conquer both the Caucasus and Stalingrad, objectives that had been separate until then.
He divided Army Group South into two groups: Army Group B (German 4th Panzer Army, German 2nd and 6th Armies, Hungarian 2nd Army), commanded by Field Marshal Freiherr von Bock, and Army Group A. In accordance with Directive No. 45 of 23 July, Army Group A, commanded by Field Marshal von List, launched an offensive towards the Caucasus from 25 July. The group consisted of:
- The 1st Panzer Army, commanded by Colonel General von Kleist
- The 17th Army, commanded by Colonel General Ruoff.
The German troops channelled their offensive in two directions: Krasnodar-Tuapse (17th Army) and Mozdok-Groznîi-Baku (1st Panzer Army). The advance was particularly rapid, with the Army Group's front expanding from 150 km (initially) to about 700 km, which required covering its right flank towards the eastern coast of the Black Sea.
Sources: Acțiunile trupelor române în Caucaz și Kuban. By univ. prof. dr. Petre Otu, president of the Roman Military History Commission
Cheers. Raúl M
.Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
Re: Romanians
Hello to all ; more........................
Romanian contribution to the crusade against Bolshevism - The actions of the Romanian troops in the Caucasus and Kuban.
A. The offensive actions of the Romanian army in the Caucasus and Kuban.
II. The actions of the Romanian troops in the Caucasus (August 1, 1942-February 12, 1943).
The Romanian troops acted in two strategic directions:
a) In the west of the Caucasus
b) In the center of the Caucasus
a) In the west of the Caucasus.
To cover the right flank of the German troops, the Romanian 3rd Army was called upon, commanded by Army Corps General Petre Dumitrescu, whose command was in Mariupol, waiting for larger units that had to act in the Don Bend.
The 3rd Army initially (August 1-6, 1942) had:
- 1st Army Corps (2nd Mountain Division and 298th German Division);
- Cavalry Corps (5th, 6th and 9th Cavalry Divisions).
The 3rd Army was subordinated to the German 17th Army which also included the 5th German Army Corps (German 9th, 73rd, 125th, 198th German Divisions) and, for a short period, the German 49th Army Corps (4th Romanian Mountain, 73rd and 298th German Divisions).
From August 7, 1942, the 3rd Army consisted of only the Cavalry Corps, commanded by General Mihail Racoviţă.
Until August 9, the divisions of the corps pursued the Soviet forces, destroying their rearguard resistance. On August 9, the 8th Regiment of the 5th Cavalry Division captured the port of Jeisk, a very important objective for the control of the Sea of Azov. In the next two days, August 10 and 11, the Protoka canal was forced and the city of Slavianska was conquered, the victory being very precious, because it decided the fate of the Taman Peninsula and opened the way to Temriuk, Varenikovskaia and the port of Anapa. At this stage, the march performances are noteworthy, the large units covering 550 km in 11 days, the daily average being 50 km.
Between August 16 and 20, the Cavalry Corps forced the Kurka Canal, then engaged in efforts to capture the city of Temriuk. To conquer it, the 6th Division launched the attack on August 23, reaching the edge of the town in the evening. The next day, at four o'clock, after an artillery preparation, the advance was resumed, Temriuk being captured three hours later.
At the same time, the 8th roşiori (lancers) Regiment established a bridgehead south of the Kuban River. On August 23, 1942, on the eve of the conquest of Temriuk, by order no. 55, the 3rd Army assigned new combat missions to the Cavalry Corps. The 6th Cavalry Division continued to operate in the Temriuk area, and the main forces (the 5th and 9th Cavalry Divisions) were to pass south of the Kuban River, on the Troiskaia bridge, behind the German 5th Army Corps, then advance in the direction of Kijevskoe-Varenikovskaia -Anapa.
By August 27, 1942, the 5th and 9th Cavalry Divisions had moved south of the Kuban, attacking from the northwest Krîmskaia towards Anapa. This port was conquered in the morning of August 31 by the units of the 9th Cavalry Division, forced to liquidate the resistance of the partisans, sheltered in houses, gardens, etc.
Beginning with the night of August 30/31, 1942, the 6th Cavalry Division, leaving safety elements at Temriuk, was moved south of the Kuban River, on the Starii Kuban River, at the entrance to the Taman Peninsula. The attack to conquer this objective started on September 2, 1942, and continued until September 4.
On this date, by order of the German 17th Army, the 6th Cavalry Division was transferred to Krîmskaia, where it arrived on September 8, 1942. The conquest of the Taman Peninsula represented a very important operation because it opened the way for the forces from Crimea across the Kerch Strait.
The 3rd Mountain, 10th and 19th Infantry Divisions were transferred from the Crimea to the Caucasus across the Kerch Strait.
Sources: Acțiunile trupelor române în Caucaz și Kuban. By univ. prof. dr. Petre Otu, president of the Roman Military History Commission
Cheers. Raúl M.
; more........................Romanian contribution to the crusade against Bolshevism - The actions of the Romanian troops in the Caucasus and Kuban.
A. The offensive actions of the Romanian army in the Caucasus and Kuban.
II. The actions of the Romanian troops in the Caucasus (August 1, 1942-February 12, 1943).
The Romanian troops acted in two strategic directions:
a) In the west of the Caucasus
b) In the center of the Caucasus
a) In the west of the Caucasus.
To cover the right flank of the German troops, the Romanian 3rd Army was called upon, commanded by Army Corps General Petre Dumitrescu, whose command was in Mariupol, waiting for larger units that had to act in the Don Bend.
The 3rd Army initially (August 1-6, 1942) had:
- 1st Army Corps (2nd Mountain Division and 298th German Division);
- Cavalry Corps (5th, 6th and 9th Cavalry Divisions).
The 3rd Army was subordinated to the German 17th Army which also included the 5th German Army Corps (German 9th, 73rd, 125th, 198th German Divisions) and, for a short period, the German 49th Army Corps (4th Romanian Mountain, 73rd and 298th German Divisions).
From August 7, 1942, the 3rd Army consisted of only the Cavalry Corps, commanded by General Mihail Racoviţă.
Until August 9, the divisions of the corps pursued the Soviet forces, destroying their rearguard resistance. On August 9, the 8th Regiment of the 5th Cavalry Division captured the port of Jeisk, a very important objective for the control of the Sea of Azov. In the next two days, August 10 and 11, the Protoka canal was forced and the city of Slavianska was conquered, the victory being very precious, because it decided the fate of the Taman Peninsula and opened the way to Temriuk, Varenikovskaia and the port of Anapa. At this stage, the march performances are noteworthy, the large units covering 550 km in 11 days, the daily average being 50 km.
Between August 16 and 20, the Cavalry Corps forced the Kurka Canal, then engaged in efforts to capture the city of Temriuk. To conquer it, the 6th Division launched the attack on August 23, reaching the edge of the town in the evening. The next day, at four o'clock, after an artillery preparation, the advance was resumed, Temriuk being captured three hours later.
At the same time, the 8th roşiori (lancers) Regiment established a bridgehead south of the Kuban River. On August 23, 1942, on the eve of the conquest of Temriuk, by order no. 55, the 3rd Army assigned new combat missions to the Cavalry Corps. The 6th Cavalry Division continued to operate in the Temriuk area, and the main forces (the 5th and 9th Cavalry Divisions) were to pass south of the Kuban River, on the Troiskaia bridge, behind the German 5th Army Corps, then advance in the direction of Kijevskoe-Varenikovskaia -Anapa.
By August 27, 1942, the 5th and 9th Cavalry Divisions had moved south of the Kuban, attacking from the northwest Krîmskaia towards Anapa. This port was conquered in the morning of August 31 by the units of the 9th Cavalry Division, forced to liquidate the resistance of the partisans, sheltered in houses, gardens, etc.
Beginning with the night of August 30/31, 1942, the 6th Cavalry Division, leaving safety elements at Temriuk, was moved south of the Kuban River, on the Starii Kuban River, at the entrance to the Taman Peninsula. The attack to conquer this objective started on September 2, 1942, and continued until September 4.
On this date, by order of the German 17th Army, the 6th Cavalry Division was transferred to Krîmskaia, where it arrived on September 8, 1942. The conquest of the Taman Peninsula represented a very important operation because it opened the way for the forces from Crimea across the Kerch Strait.
The 3rd Mountain, 10th and 19th Infantry Divisions were transferred from the Crimea to the Caucasus across the Kerch Strait.
Sources: Acțiunile trupelor române în Caucaz și Kuban. By univ. prof. dr. Petre Otu, president of the Roman Military History Commission
Cheers. Raúl M
.Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
Re: Romanians
Hello to all ; more........................
Romanian contribution to the crusade against Bolshevism - The actions of the Romanian troops in the Caucasus and Kuban.
A. The offensive actions of the Romanian army in the Caucasus and Kuban.
II. The actions of the Romanian troops in the Caucasus (August 1, 1942-February 12, 1943).
a) In the west of the Caucasus.
In the first days of September, the German 5th Army Corps carried out the operation to capture Novorossiisk, to which the 5th Cavalry Division contributed, which attacked the city from the southwest, managing to penetrate inside it on the 9-10 September 1942.
By mid-September, the Romanian divisions, acting on the right flank of the German 17th Army, penetrated deep into the Caucasus. They conquered a significant part of the eastern coast of the Black Sea, with important objectives such as Jeisk, Temriuk, Anapa posts, most of the Taman Peninsula, Novorossiisk.
Reaching the northern slopes of the Caucasus Mountains, Army Group "A" was forced to move to the defensive due to the wooded mountainous terrain, the increasing resistance of Soviet forces, the length of the front and the reduced forces available.
Under these conditions, even the large Romanian units had to endure resubordination, organizational restructuring and new missions. Due to the situation at Stalingrad, the command of the 3rd Army was ordered to return to Rostov to receive the front on the Don. The 5th Cavalry Division was removed from the Cavalry Corps which received the 19th Infantry Division instead.
The Cavalry Corps (the 6th, 9th Cavalry, 19th Infantry Divisions) together with the 10th Infantry Division and the 3rd Mountain Division were part of the 5th German Army Corps (commander General Georg Wetzell), which also had the 9th German Infantry Division under its command. In the months of September-December 1942, the missions of this army corps were to secure the Krasnodar-Krîmskaia road and railway, the only link of the German-Romanian forces operating in the Central Caucasus, and to ensure the safety of the Pontic coast from Taman to Novorossiisk.
In order to fulfill these missions, the large Romanian units were forced to adopt deployments with wide fronts, out of proportion to their combative force and the means at their disposal. On December 1, 1942, they were as follows: 6th Cavalry Division – 24 km, 19th Infantry Division – 24 km; 9th Cavalry Division – 30 km.
The large Romanian units in the Central Caucasus remained in defensive positions until the beginning of 1943, when they began the retreat to the west, then fighting in the Kuban bridgehead.
Between August 1 and December 24, 1942, the Cavalry Corps lost 257 officers, 118 non-commissioned officers, 7,098 soldiers (dead, wounded and missing).
Sources: Acțiunile trupelor române în Caucaz și Kuban. By univ. prof. dr. Petre Otu, president of the Roman Military History Commission
Cheers. Raúl M.
; more........................Romanian contribution to the crusade against Bolshevism - The actions of the Romanian troops in the Caucasus and Kuban.
A. The offensive actions of the Romanian army in the Caucasus and Kuban.
II. The actions of the Romanian troops in the Caucasus (August 1, 1942-February 12, 1943).
a) In the west of the Caucasus.
In the first days of September, the German 5th Army Corps carried out the operation to capture Novorossiisk, to which the 5th Cavalry Division contributed, which attacked the city from the southwest, managing to penetrate inside it on the 9-10 September 1942.
By mid-September, the Romanian divisions, acting on the right flank of the German 17th Army, penetrated deep into the Caucasus. They conquered a significant part of the eastern coast of the Black Sea, with important objectives such as Jeisk, Temriuk, Anapa posts, most of the Taman Peninsula, Novorossiisk.
Reaching the northern slopes of the Caucasus Mountains, Army Group "A" was forced to move to the defensive due to the wooded mountainous terrain, the increasing resistance of Soviet forces, the length of the front and the reduced forces available.
Under these conditions, even the large Romanian units had to endure resubordination, organizational restructuring and new missions. Due to the situation at Stalingrad, the command of the 3rd Army was ordered to return to Rostov to receive the front on the Don. The 5th Cavalry Division was removed from the Cavalry Corps which received the 19th Infantry Division instead.
The Cavalry Corps (the 6th, 9th Cavalry, 19th Infantry Divisions) together with the 10th Infantry Division and the 3rd Mountain Division were part of the 5th German Army Corps (commander General Georg Wetzell), which also had the 9th German Infantry Division under its command. In the months of September-December 1942, the missions of this army corps were to secure the Krasnodar-Krîmskaia road and railway, the only link of the German-Romanian forces operating in the Central Caucasus, and to ensure the safety of the Pontic coast from Taman to Novorossiisk.
In order to fulfill these missions, the large Romanian units were forced to adopt deployments with wide fronts, out of proportion to their combative force and the means at their disposal. On December 1, 1942, they were as follows: 6th Cavalry Division – 24 km, 19th Infantry Division – 24 km; 9th Cavalry Division – 30 km.
The large Romanian units in the Central Caucasus remained in defensive positions until the beginning of 1943, when they began the retreat to the west, then fighting in the Kuban bridgehead.
Between August 1 and December 24, 1942, the Cavalry Corps lost 257 officers, 118 non-commissioned officers, 7,098 soldiers (dead, wounded and missing).
Sources: Acțiunile trupelor române în Caucaz și Kuban. By univ. prof. dr. Petre Otu, president of the Roman Military History Commission
Cheers. Raúl M
.Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
Re: Romanians
Hello to all ; more........................
Romanian contribution to the crusade against Bolshevism - The actions of the Romanian troops in the Caucasus and Kuban.
A. The offensive actions of the Romanian army in the Caucasus and Kuban.
II. The actions of the Romanian troops in the Caucasus (August 1, 1942-February 12, 1943).
b) In the Central Caucasus.
The 2nd Mountain Division, commanded by General Ion Dumitrache, operated in the central region of the Caucasus. The large unit was composed of two mountain hunter groups (4th and 5th) with three battalions each. The strength was 404 officers, 444 non-commissioned officers and 14,623 troops.
The division left the country on July 13, 1942, traveled by rail and, on July 31, disembarked at Volnovaha station, from where it was directed south of the Don, towards the Caucasus. From mid-August 1942, it came under the German XXXX. Panzer Corps of the 1st Panzer Army. After marching 1,060 km, on August 20, the 2nd Mountain Division arrived in the Malka area (south of Pitiagorsk), on the Baksan River. Here it received the mission to achieve, south of the river, between the villages of Bakssanenok and Kisburun, a bridge, then giving the main blow in the Kurkuşin-Nalcik direction.
The battles took place between August 22 and September 2 and had a particularly fierce character. The units of the division conquered the height 910, achieved a bridgehead, but failed to reach Nalcik, an important communications center that flanked the actions of the main German forces operating in the South Caucasus.
On August 26, the 2nd Mountain Division was subordinated to the German III. Armored Corps (13th and 23rd Armored, and 370th Infantry Divisions), commanded by General von Mackensen. On 19 October, the large unit was tasked with attacking Nalcik again, with the offensive beginning on 25 October. Despite the enemy's resistance, the mountain hunter battalions conquered Nalcik on October 29.
It was one of the biggest victories achieved by the Romanian troops in the battles in the Caucasus, the 2nd Mountain Division capturing 3,079 prisoners and a large amount of weaponry and combat equipment. Their own losses amounted to 30 officers, 22 non-commissioned officers and 768 soldiers (dead, wounded and missing).
Starting on November 1, 1942, the 2nd Mountain Division handed over the strip between the Bakssan and Nalcik rivers (including) to the German troops, being moved to the Alagir-Ordjonikidze/Ввладикавказ/ area, where it received the mission to secure the mountain flank of the German III. Armored Corps to whom it remained subordinate.
Due to the situation created on the Stalingrad front, on December 4, the large unit was ordered to withdraw to the west. The redeployment took about three months, with the division fighting in the Kuban bridgehead and then being moved into the Crimea in mid-March 1943. The 2nd Mountain Division was the largest unit to reach the easternmost point in Soviet territory, and due its performance it won the name "iron division".
Note: Between August and October 1942, the losses of the Romanian troops were 39,074 soldiers (dead, wounded and missing)
Sources: Acțiunile trupelor române în Caucaz și Kuban. By univ. prof. dr. Petre Otu, president of the Roman Military History Commission
Cheers. Raúl M.
; more........................Romanian contribution to the crusade against Bolshevism - The actions of the Romanian troops in the Caucasus and Kuban.
A. The offensive actions of the Romanian army in the Caucasus and Kuban.
II. The actions of the Romanian troops in the Caucasus (August 1, 1942-February 12, 1943).
b) In the Central Caucasus.
The 2nd Mountain Division, commanded by General Ion Dumitrache, operated in the central region of the Caucasus. The large unit was composed of two mountain hunter groups (4th and 5th) with three battalions each. The strength was 404 officers, 444 non-commissioned officers and 14,623 troops.
The division left the country on July 13, 1942, traveled by rail and, on July 31, disembarked at Volnovaha station, from where it was directed south of the Don, towards the Caucasus. From mid-August 1942, it came under the German XXXX. Panzer Corps of the 1st Panzer Army. After marching 1,060 km, on August 20, the 2nd Mountain Division arrived in the Malka area (south of Pitiagorsk), on the Baksan River. Here it received the mission to achieve, south of the river, between the villages of Bakssanenok and Kisburun, a bridge, then giving the main blow in the Kurkuşin-Nalcik direction.
The battles took place between August 22 and September 2 and had a particularly fierce character. The units of the division conquered the height 910, achieved a bridgehead, but failed to reach Nalcik, an important communications center that flanked the actions of the main German forces operating in the South Caucasus.
On August 26, the 2nd Mountain Division was subordinated to the German III. Armored Corps (13th and 23rd Armored, and 370th Infantry Divisions), commanded by General von Mackensen. On 19 October, the large unit was tasked with attacking Nalcik again, with the offensive beginning on 25 October. Despite the enemy's resistance, the mountain hunter battalions conquered Nalcik on October 29.
It was one of the biggest victories achieved by the Romanian troops in the battles in the Caucasus, the 2nd Mountain Division capturing 3,079 prisoners and a large amount of weaponry and combat equipment. Their own losses amounted to 30 officers, 22 non-commissioned officers and 768 soldiers (dead, wounded and missing).
Starting on November 1, 1942, the 2nd Mountain Division handed over the strip between the Bakssan and Nalcik rivers (including) to the German troops, being moved to the Alagir-Ordjonikidze/Ввладикавказ/ area, where it received the mission to secure the mountain flank of the German III. Armored Corps to whom it remained subordinate.
Due to the situation created on the Stalingrad front, on December 4, the large unit was ordered to withdraw to the west. The redeployment took about three months, with the division fighting in the Kuban bridgehead and then being moved into the Crimea in mid-March 1943. The 2nd Mountain Division was the largest unit to reach the easternmost point in Soviet territory, and due its performance it won the name "iron division".
Note: Between August and October 1942, the losses of the Romanian troops were 39,074 soldiers (dead, wounded and missing)
Sources: Acțiunile trupelor române în Caucaz și Kuban. By univ. prof. dr. Petre Otu, president of the Roman Military History Commission
Cheers. Raúl M
.Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
Re: Romanians
Hello to all ; more........................
Romanian contribution to the crusade against Bolshevism - The actions of the Romanian troops in the Caucasus and Kuban.
A. The offensive actions of the Romanian army in the Caucasus and Kuban.
III. The actions of the Romanian troops in the Kuban bridgehead (February 12-October 9, 1943).
a) Kuban bridgehead - constitution, strategic role.
The Kuban bridgehead, after the name of the river that runs through the area, was created as a result of the withdrawal of German and Romanian forces from the Caucasus, towards the Taman Peninsula.
The Soviet High Command was embarrassed in its offensive actions after the victories at Stalingrad and Kursk-Orel, by the presence on its southern wing of important German-Romanian forces that endangered the development of the offensive to the west and, at the same time, blocked the Soviet fleet's freedom of action from the Black Sea.
For the first purpose, the forces of two Fronts (North Caucasian and Transcaucasian) were concentrated, totaling 50 units, including four tank brigades, grouped into five armies (58, 9, 37, 56 and 18). As the offensive progressed, these forces were successively reduced, finally remaining only three armies, grouped in the North Caucasian Front.
For its part, the German High Command considered that by maintaining the Kuban bridgehead, Crimea was indirectly defended and hoped for the possibility of resuming the offensive towards the Caucasian oil lands.
The defense of the bridgehead of the German 17th Army, commanded by Colonel General Erwin Jänecke. This army had 17 divisions, of which 11 German (73, 9, 125, 97, 98, 79, 370 and 50 infantry and 4, 97 and 101 mountain hunters) and 6 Romanian (10 and 19 infantry; 2 and 3 mountain; 6 and 9 cavalry). The Romanian units totaled 64,606 officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers. The balance of forces is obviously in favor of the enemy.
On February 12, 1943, the Kuban bridgehead measured from the front, on the alignment: Novorossiisk-South Abinskaia-Krasnodar-Protoka canal, approximately 200 km, and in depth over 180 km. The defense system was based on the realization of successive alignments and positions, staggered in depth, a special role being given to support points and resistance nodes. The distance between the various successive positions was, depending on the terrain, 10-15 km. A special role within the system was played by the fortified alignment (Novorossiisk-Krîmskaia-Vaijenikovskaia-Temriuk), also known as the "Blue Line", with a width of around 80 km and located at a depth of around 75 km, at level of the alignment Krasnodar.
On February 12, 1943, when the enemy offensive was launched, the Romanian divisions were in the following formation: 10th Infantry Division, from Taman to 15 km southwest of Novorossiisk; further, to the southeast of the town of Abinskaja, the 3rd Mountain and 19th Infantry Divisions; the 6th and 9th Cavalry Divisions followed, up to 15 km east of Severskaia; at the northern end of the front and to the left of the German 50th Division – the 2nd Mountain Division.
Sources: Acțiunile trupelor române în Caucaz și Kuban. By univ. prof. dr. Petre Otu, president of the Roman Military History Commission
Cheers. Raúl M.
; more........................Romanian contribution to the crusade against Bolshevism - The actions of the Romanian troops in the Caucasus and Kuban.
A. The offensive actions of the Romanian army in the Caucasus and Kuban.
III. The actions of the Romanian troops in the Kuban bridgehead (February 12-October 9, 1943).
a) Kuban bridgehead - constitution, strategic role.
The Kuban bridgehead, after the name of the river that runs through the area, was created as a result of the withdrawal of German and Romanian forces from the Caucasus, towards the Taman Peninsula.
The Soviet High Command was embarrassed in its offensive actions after the victories at Stalingrad and Kursk-Orel, by the presence on its southern wing of important German-Romanian forces that endangered the development of the offensive to the west and, at the same time, blocked the Soviet fleet's freedom of action from the Black Sea.
For the first purpose, the forces of two Fronts (North Caucasian and Transcaucasian) were concentrated, totaling 50 units, including four tank brigades, grouped into five armies (58, 9, 37, 56 and 18). As the offensive progressed, these forces were successively reduced, finally remaining only three armies, grouped in the North Caucasian Front.
For its part, the German High Command considered that by maintaining the Kuban bridgehead, Crimea was indirectly defended and hoped for the possibility of resuming the offensive towards the Caucasian oil lands.
The defense of the bridgehead of the German 17th Army, commanded by Colonel General Erwin Jänecke. This army had 17 divisions, of which 11 German (73, 9, 125, 97, 98, 79, 370 and 50 infantry and 4, 97 and 101 mountain hunters) and 6 Romanian (10 and 19 infantry; 2 and 3 mountain; 6 and 9 cavalry). The Romanian units totaled 64,606 officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers. The balance of forces is obviously in favor of the enemy.
On February 12, 1943, the Kuban bridgehead measured from the front, on the alignment: Novorossiisk-South Abinskaia-Krasnodar-Protoka canal, approximately 200 km, and in depth over 180 km. The defense system was based on the realization of successive alignments and positions, staggered in depth, a special role being given to support points and resistance nodes. The distance between the various successive positions was, depending on the terrain, 10-15 km. A special role within the system was played by the fortified alignment (Novorossiisk-Krîmskaia-Vaijenikovskaia-Temriuk), also known as the "Blue Line", with a width of around 80 km and located at a depth of around 75 km, at level of the alignment Krasnodar.
On February 12, 1943, when the enemy offensive was launched, the Romanian divisions were in the following formation: 10th Infantry Division, from Taman to 15 km southwest of Novorossiisk; further, to the southeast of the town of Abinskaja, the 3rd Mountain and 19th Infantry Divisions; the 6th and 9th Cavalry Divisions followed, up to 15 km east of Severskaia; at the northern end of the front and to the left of the German 50th Division – the 2nd Mountain Division.
Sources: Acțiunile trupelor române în Caucaz și Kuban. By univ. prof. dr. Petre Otu, president of the Roman Military History Commission
Cheers. Raúl M
.Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
Re: Romanians
Hello to all ; more........................
Romanian contribution to the crusade against Bolshevism - The actions of the Romanian troops in the Caucasus and Kuban.
A. The offensive actions of the Romanian army in the Caucasus and Kuban.
III. The actions of the Romanian troops in the Kuban bridgehead (February 12-October 9, 1943).
b. Operation to defend the Kuban bridgehead. The contribution of the Romanian large units.
The implementation of actions from the Kuban bridgehead included two main stages:
- defense operation (February 12-September 9, 1943)
- evacuation of German-Romanian troops through the Taman Peninsula to Crimea (September 9-October 9, 1943).
The Soviet command planned that in the first phase of its offensive it should break through the German-Romanian defense in the central sector of the front and encircle the main enemy forces in the area, applying a double encircling maneuver, with the 37th Army north of Krasnodar and with the 56th Army south of the city; subsequently, develop the offensive in the center, along the Kuban River, towards the Taman Peninsula.
The city of Krasnodar was occupied from the first day of the enemy offensive, while forces of the Soviet 56th Army, consisting of 20 large units, including three tank units, attacked in the Abinskaya sector, where the Romanian 3rd Mountain Division and the German 9th Infantry Division were defending. With all the stubborn resistance and heavy losses inflicted on the enemy, the defense in this area was restructured by February 20, the 6th and 9th Cavalry Divisions were withdrawn from the front and sent to protect the Black Sea coast west of Anapa.
The Romanian 3rd Mountain Division was directed to the Moldovanskoye area, and part of the battalions were subordinated to the German 9th and 97th Divisions. The battalions of the Romanian 19th Division were also placed at the disposal of the German 97th and 101st Jäger Divisions, while the heroic 2nd Mountain Division, which was left with only 1,000 fighters, was withdrawn from the front and on March 17, 1943, headed for the Crimea. In these circumstances, the tendency of the German command to subordinate Romanian units to German divisions is evident.
By February 25, the front had retreated about 20 km to the north and 50 km to the center and south. On this date, the Soviet offensive was resumed, with major battles taking place in the Abinskaya area, where the 94th and 95th infantry regiments of the Romanian 19th Division were prominent. Due to heavy losses, between 12 and 25 March the defence was withdrawn to a new alignment (Novorossiisk-west of Abinskaya-Slavianskaya-northeast of Temryuk), which ensured the reduction of the front by half compared to the initial one (Krasnodar). Between 25 March and 6 April the enemy launched a new offensive, provoking renewed resistance from units of the Romanian 19th Infantry Division, in particular Major Pălăghiţâ of the 94th Infantry Regiment, decorated with the "Iron Cross".
After the actions until 6 April 1943, the German and Romanian forces were installed on the fortified line ("Blue Line"), in the following disposition: the German V. Army Corps in the south; the German XXXXIV. Army Corps in the centre and the XXXXIX. German Army Corps in the north. The Romanian 6th, 9th Cavalry and 10th Infantry Divisions were in defence on the Black Sea coast, and the 3rd Mountain and 19th Infantry Divisions were in the German zone: the first in the Varenikovskaia area, and the second in the Krîmskaia area and north of there. Gostagaevskaia was the headquarters of the Romanian Cavalry Corps, commanded by General Gheorghe Cialâk, whose mission was to deal only with the material and moral condition of the two large cavalry units.
Sources: Acțiunile trupelor române în Caucaz și Kuban. By univ. prof. dr. Petre Otu, president of the Roman Military History Commission
Cheers. Raúl M.
; more........................Romanian contribution to the crusade against Bolshevism - The actions of the Romanian troops in the Caucasus and Kuban.
A. The offensive actions of the Romanian army in the Caucasus and Kuban.
III. The actions of the Romanian troops in the Kuban bridgehead (February 12-October 9, 1943).
b. Operation to defend the Kuban bridgehead. The contribution of the Romanian large units.
The implementation of actions from the Kuban bridgehead included two main stages:
- defense operation (February 12-September 9, 1943)
- evacuation of German-Romanian troops through the Taman Peninsula to Crimea (September 9-October 9, 1943).
The Soviet command planned that in the first phase of its offensive it should break through the German-Romanian defense in the central sector of the front and encircle the main enemy forces in the area, applying a double encircling maneuver, with the 37th Army north of Krasnodar and with the 56th Army south of the city; subsequently, develop the offensive in the center, along the Kuban River, towards the Taman Peninsula.
The city of Krasnodar was occupied from the first day of the enemy offensive, while forces of the Soviet 56th Army, consisting of 20 large units, including three tank units, attacked in the Abinskaya sector, where the Romanian 3rd Mountain Division and the German 9th Infantry Division were defending. With all the stubborn resistance and heavy losses inflicted on the enemy, the defense in this area was restructured by February 20, the 6th and 9th Cavalry Divisions were withdrawn from the front and sent to protect the Black Sea coast west of Anapa.
The Romanian 3rd Mountain Division was directed to the Moldovanskoye area, and part of the battalions were subordinated to the German 9th and 97th Divisions. The battalions of the Romanian 19th Division were also placed at the disposal of the German 97th and 101st Jäger Divisions, while the heroic 2nd Mountain Division, which was left with only 1,000 fighters, was withdrawn from the front and on March 17, 1943, headed for the Crimea. In these circumstances, the tendency of the German command to subordinate Romanian units to German divisions is evident.
By February 25, the front had retreated about 20 km to the north and 50 km to the center and south. On this date, the Soviet offensive was resumed, with major battles taking place in the Abinskaya area, where the 94th and 95th infantry regiments of the Romanian 19th Division were prominent. Due to heavy losses, between 12 and 25 March the defence was withdrawn to a new alignment (Novorossiisk-west of Abinskaya-Slavianskaya-northeast of Temryuk), which ensured the reduction of the front by half compared to the initial one (Krasnodar). Between 25 March and 6 April the enemy launched a new offensive, provoking renewed resistance from units of the Romanian 19th Infantry Division, in particular Major Pălăghiţâ of the 94th Infantry Regiment, decorated with the "Iron Cross".
After the actions until 6 April 1943, the German and Romanian forces were installed on the fortified line ("Blue Line"), in the following disposition: the German V. Army Corps in the south; the German XXXXIV. Army Corps in the centre and the XXXXIX. German Army Corps in the north. The Romanian 6th, 9th Cavalry and 10th Infantry Divisions were in defence on the Black Sea coast, and the 3rd Mountain and 19th Infantry Divisions were in the German zone: the first in the Varenikovskaia area, and the second in the Krîmskaia area and north of there. Gostagaevskaia was the headquarters of the Romanian Cavalry Corps, commanded by General Gheorghe Cialâk, whose mission was to deal only with the material and moral condition of the two large cavalry units.
Sources: Acțiunile trupelor române în Caucaz și Kuban. By univ. prof. dr. Petre Otu, president of the Roman Military History Commission
Cheers. Raúl M
.Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
Re: Romanians
Hello to all ; more........................
Romanian contribution to the crusade against Bolshevism - The actions of the Romanian troops in the Caucasus and Kuban.
A. The offensive actions of the Romanian army in the Caucasus and Kuban.
III. The actions of the Romanian troops in the Kuban bridgehead (February 12-October 9, 1943).
b. Operation to defend the Kuban bridgehead. The contribution of the Romanian large units.
During the deployment of the "Blue Line" a real "positional war" - in the classical sense of the word - took place for 5 months without the German-Romanian defense being able to be defeated. During this time, Soviet forces launched three large-scale offensive actions.
The first offensive, which began in the second half of April and ended in the first days of May, directed the forces of the Soviet 56th Army, supported by a tank brigade, in the direction of the main attack. The impact in the Krîmskaia area was borne by the Romanian 19th Infantry Division and the Romanian 3rd Mountain Division. Due to heavy losses, the 19th Infantry Division was withdrawn from the front and put into recovery. The fate of the 3rd Mountain Division, subordinated to the German 9th Infantry Division, was also no easier, its combat capability was greatly reduced.
Between May 26 and June 4, the Soviets carried out the second offensive against the fortified line, with the main attack in the same direction, Krîmskaia, with the desire to extend it towards Anapa. In the breakthrough sector, 6 infantry divisions and 3 tank brigades were concentrated. The pocket created at a depth of 5 km was quickly reduced to just 2 km by vigorous counterattacks in which the Romanian forces again excelled, but the percentage of casualties increased accordingly.
As a result of the numerous losses on both sides on the Kuban bridgehead front, there was a period of calm (from 04 June to 15 July), during which the necessary replacements and regrouping of forces were carried out. Within the Romanian forces, the 19th Infantry Division was replaced by the 10th Infantry Division, and the 3rd Mountain Division was permanently withdrawn from its deployment and sent to Crimea, being replaced by the Romanian 1st Mountain Division.
The third offensive action was resumed on 15 July and, after a one-week operational pause, continued between 7 and 12 August 1943. During this period, the 6th Cavalry Division was withdrawn from the front and transferred to the Crimea, simultaneously with the replacement of the 3rd Romanian Mountain Division. Following these replacements, by the end of August 1943, the German 17th Army had five Romanian divisions (10th and 19th Infantry, 1st and 4th Mountain and 9th Cavalry).
During the third large-scale Soviet offensive, the exceptional performance of the 23rd Mountain Hunter Battalion/1st Romanian Mountain Division, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Niculescu, subordinated to the German 213th Infantry Regiment, as well as the 23rd Infantry Regiment/10th Infantry Division, should be highlighted. By June 30, as a result of fierce fighting, the 23rd Mountain Hunter Battalion had lost 6 officers, 12 non-commissioned officers and 420 soldiers, and the 23rd Infantry Regiment, in the battles in the Krymskaia-Moldovanskoie area from August 7 to 11, 26 officers, 21 non-commissioned officers and 905 personnel. The commander of the German 97th Division, to which the Romanian 23rd Regiment was subordinated, noted: "I am especially glad to be able to express to you my full satisfaction with the heroism and the way this admirable regiment fulfilled its duty."
Sources: Acțiunile trupelor române în Caucaz și Kuban. By univ. prof. dr. Petre Otu, president of the Roman Military History Commission
Cheers. Raúl M.
; more........................Romanian contribution to the crusade against Bolshevism - The actions of the Romanian troops in the Caucasus and Kuban.
A. The offensive actions of the Romanian army in the Caucasus and Kuban.
III. The actions of the Romanian troops in the Kuban bridgehead (February 12-October 9, 1943).
b. Operation to defend the Kuban bridgehead. The contribution of the Romanian large units.
During the deployment of the "Blue Line" a real "positional war" - in the classical sense of the word - took place for 5 months without the German-Romanian defense being able to be defeated. During this time, Soviet forces launched three large-scale offensive actions.
The first offensive, which began in the second half of April and ended in the first days of May, directed the forces of the Soviet 56th Army, supported by a tank brigade, in the direction of the main attack. The impact in the Krîmskaia area was borne by the Romanian 19th Infantry Division and the Romanian 3rd Mountain Division. Due to heavy losses, the 19th Infantry Division was withdrawn from the front and put into recovery. The fate of the 3rd Mountain Division, subordinated to the German 9th Infantry Division, was also no easier, its combat capability was greatly reduced.
Between May 26 and June 4, the Soviets carried out the second offensive against the fortified line, with the main attack in the same direction, Krîmskaia, with the desire to extend it towards Anapa. In the breakthrough sector, 6 infantry divisions and 3 tank brigades were concentrated. The pocket created at a depth of 5 km was quickly reduced to just 2 km by vigorous counterattacks in which the Romanian forces again excelled, but the percentage of casualties increased accordingly.
As a result of the numerous losses on both sides on the Kuban bridgehead front, there was a period of calm (from 04 June to 15 July), during which the necessary replacements and regrouping of forces were carried out. Within the Romanian forces, the 19th Infantry Division was replaced by the 10th Infantry Division, and the 3rd Mountain Division was permanently withdrawn from its deployment and sent to Crimea, being replaced by the Romanian 1st Mountain Division.
The third offensive action was resumed on 15 July and, after a one-week operational pause, continued between 7 and 12 August 1943. During this period, the 6th Cavalry Division was withdrawn from the front and transferred to the Crimea, simultaneously with the replacement of the 3rd Romanian Mountain Division. Following these replacements, by the end of August 1943, the German 17th Army had five Romanian divisions (10th and 19th Infantry, 1st and 4th Mountain and 9th Cavalry).
During the third large-scale Soviet offensive, the exceptional performance of the 23rd Mountain Hunter Battalion/1st Romanian Mountain Division, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Niculescu, subordinated to the German 213th Infantry Regiment, as well as the 23rd Infantry Regiment/10th Infantry Division, should be highlighted. By June 30, as a result of fierce fighting, the 23rd Mountain Hunter Battalion had lost 6 officers, 12 non-commissioned officers and 420 soldiers, and the 23rd Infantry Regiment, in the battles in the Krymskaia-Moldovanskoie area from August 7 to 11, 26 officers, 21 non-commissioned officers and 905 personnel. The commander of the German 97th Division, to which the Romanian 23rd Regiment was subordinated, noted: "I am especially glad to be able to express to you my full satisfaction with the heroism and the way this admirable regiment fulfilled its duty."
Sources: Acțiunile trupelor române în Caucaz și Kuban. By univ. prof. dr. Petre Otu, president of the Roman Military History Commission
Cheers. Raúl M
.Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
Re: Romanians
Hello to all ; more........................
Romanian contribution to the crusade against Bolshevism - The actions of the Romanian troops in the Caucasus and Kuban.
A. The offensive actions of the Romanian army in the Caucasus and Kuban.
III. The actions of the Romanian troops in the Kuban bridgehead (February 12-October 9, 1943).
c. Evacuation of German-Romanian troops through the Taman Peninsula to Crimea.
Due to the large-scale Soviet offensive in the central and southern sectors of the Eastern Front, which led to the withdrawal of German forces to the Dnieper River, the problem of withdrawal and evacuation of the German 17th Army from the Kuban bridgehead to Crimea arose. It should be noted that by the orders and measures taken, the forces on this bridgehead evaded the main attacks of the enemy, without the latter noticing the German-Romanian maneuver.
The Soviet High Command, in a hurry to liquidate the existing danger on the southern wing of the strategic front, ordered the North Caucasus Front to resume the offensive and, through successive attacks from land and sea, together with the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Sea Flotilla, break through the enemy defenses, destroy its grouping on the Taman Peninsula and then proceed to the liberation of Crimea.
After carrying out the necessary regroupings, the enemy structures on September 9, 1943 were as follows: the North Caucasus Front, with 3 armies (9th, 56th and 18th), had 21 divisions and 5 infantry brigades, 2 naval infantry battalions and tank regiments and numerous spare units. The most powerful force was represented by the 56th Army, located in the central part of the Soviet deployment; The German 17th Army had 4 army corps: 3 German (V., XXXXIV. and XXXXIX.) and the Romanian Cavalry Corps, totaling 14 divisions (9 German and 5 Romanian), of which 10 infantry, 3 mountain and 1 cavalry, with 1,815 guns and 74 tanks and assault guns.
The disposition of these forces was as follows: the Romanian Cavalry Corps, with 2 divisions (9th Cavalry and 19th Infantry) in the security of the Black Sea coast, between Taman and Lobanovo; The German V. Army Corps, with 5 divisions (4th Mountain, 79th and 9th German Infantry, 4th and 1st Romanian Mountain), occupied the front between Lobanovo and 5 km north of Krymskaia; The XXXXIV. German Army Corps, with 5 divisions (German 125th, 97th, 98th and 79th Infantry, Romanian 10th Infantry), between 5 km north of Krymskaya and 10 km east of Varenikovskaya; German XXXXIX Army Corps, with 2 divisions (German 370th and 50th Infantry) occupied the front from Varenikovskaya to the Sea of Azov (20 km northeast of the town of Temryuk).
To ensure an orderly withdrawal and evacuation of troops and equipment, five main withdrawal positions were organized, at distances ranging from 10 to 20 km. For each large unit (division type) and unit (regiment type, battalion) the following was provided: the date and time of withdrawal, the direction of withdrawal, the sector for moving to the next successive position in defense, etc.
An ideal concealment plan, carefully prepared and implemented, would probably conceal and deceive the enemy about the manner of maneuver and the moment of execution. It is also worth mentioning the supply and evacuation system that worked continuously; ships and various vessels arrived at the port of Anapa, as well as at the Kerch Strait where a funicular line was installed that served for the withdrawal and evacuation until the last hours of the exit from the Taman Peninsula.
Sources: Acțiunile trupelor române în Caucaz și Kuban. By univ. prof. dr. Petre Otu, president of the Roman Military History Commission
Cheers. Raúl M.
; more........................Romanian contribution to the crusade against Bolshevism - The actions of the Romanian troops in the Caucasus and Kuban.
A. The offensive actions of the Romanian army in the Caucasus and Kuban.
III. The actions of the Romanian troops in the Kuban bridgehead (February 12-October 9, 1943).
c. Evacuation of German-Romanian troops through the Taman Peninsula to Crimea.
Due to the large-scale Soviet offensive in the central and southern sectors of the Eastern Front, which led to the withdrawal of German forces to the Dnieper River, the problem of withdrawal and evacuation of the German 17th Army from the Kuban bridgehead to Crimea arose. It should be noted that by the orders and measures taken, the forces on this bridgehead evaded the main attacks of the enemy, without the latter noticing the German-Romanian maneuver.
The Soviet High Command, in a hurry to liquidate the existing danger on the southern wing of the strategic front, ordered the North Caucasus Front to resume the offensive and, through successive attacks from land and sea, together with the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Sea Flotilla, break through the enemy defenses, destroy its grouping on the Taman Peninsula and then proceed to the liberation of Crimea.
After carrying out the necessary regroupings, the enemy structures on September 9, 1943 were as follows: the North Caucasus Front, with 3 armies (9th, 56th and 18th), had 21 divisions and 5 infantry brigades, 2 naval infantry battalions and tank regiments and numerous spare units. The most powerful force was represented by the 56th Army, located in the central part of the Soviet deployment; The German 17th Army had 4 army corps: 3 German (V., XXXXIV. and XXXXIX.) and the Romanian Cavalry Corps, totaling 14 divisions (9 German and 5 Romanian), of which 10 infantry, 3 mountain and 1 cavalry, with 1,815 guns and 74 tanks and assault guns.
The disposition of these forces was as follows: the Romanian Cavalry Corps, with 2 divisions (9th Cavalry and 19th Infantry) in the security of the Black Sea coast, between Taman and Lobanovo; The German V. Army Corps, with 5 divisions (4th Mountain, 79th and 9th German Infantry, 4th and 1st Romanian Mountain), occupied the front between Lobanovo and 5 km north of Krymskaia; The XXXXIV. German Army Corps, with 5 divisions (German 125th, 97th, 98th and 79th Infantry, Romanian 10th Infantry), between 5 km north of Krymskaya and 10 km east of Varenikovskaya; German XXXXIX Army Corps, with 2 divisions (German 370th and 50th Infantry) occupied the front from Varenikovskaya to the Sea of Azov (20 km northeast of the town of Temryuk).
To ensure an orderly withdrawal and evacuation of troops and equipment, five main withdrawal positions were organized, at distances ranging from 10 to 20 km. For each large unit (division type) and unit (regiment type, battalion) the following was provided: the date and time of withdrawal, the direction of withdrawal, the sector for moving to the next successive position in defense, etc.
An ideal concealment plan, carefully prepared and implemented, would probably conceal and deceive the enemy about the manner of maneuver and the moment of execution. It is also worth mentioning the supply and evacuation system that worked continuously; ships and various vessels arrived at the port of Anapa, as well as at the Kerch Strait where a funicular line was installed that served for the withdrawal and evacuation until the last hours of the exit from the Taman Peninsula.
Sources: Acțiunile trupelor române în Caucaz și Kuban. By univ. prof. dr. Petre Otu, president of the Roman Military History Commission
Cheers. Raúl M
.Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
Re: Romanians
Hello to all ; more........................
Romanian contribution to the crusade against Bolshevism - The actions of the Romanian troops in the Caucasus and Kuban.
A. The offensive actions of the Romanian army in the Caucasus and Kuban.
III. The actions of the Romanian troops in the Kuban bridgehead (February 12-October 9, 1943).
c. Evacuation of German-Romanian troops through the Taman Peninsula to Crimea.
The Soviet offensive began on the night of September 9-10 with the 18th Army, after a violent artillery and aviation preparation, with the main effort in the Novorossiisk-Anapa-Taman direction; on September 11 with the 9th Army and on September 14 with the 56th Army, with the main effort in the center of the area of action. It is worth noting that the directions of the main efforts of the 3 Soviet armies were inscribed in the compartments of the terrain dictated by their nature: the 18th Army - between the Black Sea coast and the southern lakes; the 9th Army - between the Azov Sea coast and the northern lakes, and the 56th Army between the southern and northern lakes.
The dramatic actions took place in the Novorossiysk sector, where, in support of the 18th Army's offensive, the enemy engaged a group of 150 aircraft belonging to the 4th Air Army and approximately 150 combat and auxiliary ships of the Black Sea Fleet. The 20th Mountain Hunters Battalion (of the 4th Romanian Mountain Division), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Constantin Anghel, and Captain Lambru, company commander, stood out in these clashes. The Romanian battalion, subordinated to General von Bünau's Group, had 750 fighters and by the night of 15-16 September, when it was decided to begin the retreat, after 5 days of fighting, it had lost 32% of its personnel.
The Romanian Cavalry Corps also assumed command of the 4th Romanian Mountain Division from 15 September, coordinating the withdrawal and evacuation of the three Romanian divisions. In the Anapa area, a heroic episode also occurred at this time. The enemy, seeking to overwhelm the defence and block the retreat to the southern flank, landed a detachment - equipped with Romanian uniforms - which occupied the bridge sector west of Anapa. The subunit commanded by Second Lieutenant Petre Zamfirescu (part of the 8th Romanian Mountain Hunter Group, commanded by Colonel Oscar Hönig) intervened promptly and on its own initiative, quickly liquidated the landed forces, resolutely preserving the line of communication intended for the withdrawal of the 4th Romanian Mountain Division and the 4th German Mountain Division.
An even more difficult problem arose in the defence of the Romanian 9th Cavalry Division on the morning of 24 September. Major Minescu's detachment, defending in the area of Kiziltovski Bay, was attacked by an enemy battalion, accompanied by 7 tanks and strongly supported by artillery and heavy machine guns. After two hours of continuous combat, the detachment retreated behind the main defence position.
A few hours later, another attack, accompanied by two tank companies, was repelled by the counterattack of the sector reserves and the intervention of a Stuka formation, placed at the disposal of the 9th Cavalry Division —commanded by General Dumitru Popescu— by the German V Army Corps. During the night of 25–26 September, according to plan, the 9th Cavalry Division withdrew from the defensive position, heading towards Taman and beginning the crossing of the Kerch Strait, which was completed on 28 September. The last Romanian division evacuated from the Kuban bridgehead was the 19th Infantry Division.
Sources: Acțiunile trupelor române în Caucaz și Kuban. By univ. prof. dr. Petre Otu, president of the Roman Military History Commission
Cheers. Raúl M.
; more........................Romanian contribution to the crusade against Bolshevism - The actions of the Romanian troops in the Caucasus and Kuban.
A. The offensive actions of the Romanian army in the Caucasus and Kuban.
III. The actions of the Romanian troops in the Kuban bridgehead (February 12-October 9, 1943).
c. Evacuation of German-Romanian troops through the Taman Peninsula to Crimea.
The Soviet offensive began on the night of September 9-10 with the 18th Army, after a violent artillery and aviation preparation, with the main effort in the Novorossiisk-Anapa-Taman direction; on September 11 with the 9th Army and on September 14 with the 56th Army, with the main effort in the center of the area of action. It is worth noting that the directions of the main efforts of the 3 Soviet armies were inscribed in the compartments of the terrain dictated by their nature: the 18th Army - between the Black Sea coast and the southern lakes; the 9th Army - between the Azov Sea coast and the northern lakes, and the 56th Army between the southern and northern lakes.
The dramatic actions took place in the Novorossiysk sector, where, in support of the 18th Army's offensive, the enemy engaged a group of 150 aircraft belonging to the 4th Air Army and approximately 150 combat and auxiliary ships of the Black Sea Fleet. The 20th Mountain Hunters Battalion (of the 4th Romanian Mountain Division), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Constantin Anghel, and Captain Lambru, company commander, stood out in these clashes. The Romanian battalion, subordinated to General von Bünau's Group, had 750 fighters and by the night of 15-16 September, when it was decided to begin the retreat, after 5 days of fighting, it had lost 32% of its personnel.
The Romanian Cavalry Corps also assumed command of the 4th Romanian Mountain Division from 15 September, coordinating the withdrawal and evacuation of the three Romanian divisions. In the Anapa area, a heroic episode also occurred at this time. The enemy, seeking to overwhelm the defence and block the retreat to the southern flank, landed a detachment - equipped with Romanian uniforms - which occupied the bridge sector west of Anapa. The subunit commanded by Second Lieutenant Petre Zamfirescu (part of the 8th Romanian Mountain Hunter Group, commanded by Colonel Oscar Hönig) intervened promptly and on its own initiative, quickly liquidated the landed forces, resolutely preserving the line of communication intended for the withdrawal of the 4th Romanian Mountain Division and the 4th German Mountain Division.
An even more difficult problem arose in the defence of the Romanian 9th Cavalry Division on the morning of 24 September. Major Minescu's detachment, defending in the area of Kiziltovski Bay, was attacked by an enemy battalion, accompanied by 7 tanks and strongly supported by artillery and heavy machine guns. After two hours of continuous combat, the detachment retreated behind the main defence position.
A few hours later, another attack, accompanied by two tank companies, was repelled by the counterattack of the sector reserves and the intervention of a Stuka formation, placed at the disposal of the 9th Cavalry Division —commanded by General Dumitru Popescu— by the German V Army Corps. During the night of 25–26 September, according to plan, the 9th Cavalry Division withdrew from the defensive position, heading towards Taman and beginning the crossing of the Kerch Strait, which was completed on 28 September. The last Romanian division evacuated from the Kuban bridgehead was the 19th Infantry Division.
Sources: Acțiunile trupelor române în Caucaz și Kuban. By univ. prof. dr. Petre Otu, president of the Roman Military History Commission
Cheers. Raúl M
.Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
Re: Romanians
Hello to all ; more........................
Romanian contribution to the crusade against Bolshevism - The actions of the Romanian troops in the Caucasus and Kuban.
A. The offensive actions of the Romanian army in the Caucasus and Kuban.
III. The actions of the Romanian troops in the Kuban bridgehead (February 12-October 9, 1943).
c. Evacuation of German-Romanian troops through the Taman Peninsula to Crimea.
The crossing of the Kerch Strait began on the morning of October 4, 1943, from the "small bridgehead" of Taman for the main forces, and ended the next day for units (the 96th Infantry Regiment and the 2nd Group of the 42nd Artillery Regiment) from the north (Batareika area) across the beach of the small peninsula of Kossa Kuska.
The last forces of the German 17th Army (the 97th Jäger Division and the 13th and 91st Regiments of the German 4th Mountain Division), which also played a combat rearguard role, were transported across the Kerch Strait on the night of October 8-9, 1943. By that date, the entire Kuban bridgehead had been evacuated, with no enemy forces able to oppose this operation.
By the night of 9-10 October 1943, 177,355 German and 50,139 Romanian soldiers, 28,486 Russian volunteers and labour column personnel, 72,899 horses, 1,815 guns, 74 tanks and 115,477 tons of other material had been evacuated.
Losses between February and October 1943:
- 51,705 German soldiers (10,008 killed, 26,225 wounded, 5,562 missing)
- 9,668 Romanian soldiers (1,558 killed, 7,264 wounded, 806 missing)
Sources: Acțiunile trupelor române în Caucaz și Kuban. By univ. prof. dr. Petre Otu, president of the Roman Military History Commission
It's all. Cheers. Raúl M.
; more........................Romanian contribution to the crusade against Bolshevism - The actions of the Romanian troops in the Caucasus and Kuban.
A. The offensive actions of the Romanian army in the Caucasus and Kuban.
III. The actions of the Romanian troops in the Kuban bridgehead (February 12-October 9, 1943).
c. Evacuation of German-Romanian troops through the Taman Peninsula to Crimea.
The crossing of the Kerch Strait began on the morning of October 4, 1943, from the "small bridgehead" of Taman for the main forces, and ended the next day for units (the 96th Infantry Regiment and the 2nd Group of the 42nd Artillery Regiment) from the north (Batareika area) across the beach of the small peninsula of Kossa Kuska.
The last forces of the German 17th Army (the 97th Jäger Division and the 13th and 91st Regiments of the German 4th Mountain Division), which also played a combat rearguard role, were transported across the Kerch Strait on the night of October 8-9, 1943. By that date, the entire Kuban bridgehead had been evacuated, with no enemy forces able to oppose this operation.
By the night of 9-10 October 1943, 177,355 German and 50,139 Romanian soldiers, 28,486 Russian volunteers and labour column personnel, 72,899 horses, 1,815 guns, 74 tanks and 115,477 tons of other material had been evacuated.
Losses between February and October 1943:
- 51,705 German soldiers (10,008 killed, 26,225 wounded, 5,562 missing)
- 9,668 Romanian soldiers (1,558 killed, 7,264 wounded, 806 missing)
Sources: Acțiunile trupelor române în Caucaz și Kuban. By univ. prof. dr. Petre Otu, president of the Roman Military History Commission
It's all. Cheers. Raúl M
.Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.