Why was the Luftwaffe defeated in the Battle of Britain?

[Rheinmetall]

What is your opinion about the victory of England against Germany in the Battle of Britain ?

What about the Bf-109 ? Do you think one of the main reasons was the low range of the one-o-nine- 'Emil' ?

[sid guttridge]

Hi Reheinmetal,

Another reason was that not only were German aircraft losses almost twice as high as the RAF's at a time when British aircraft production was higher than Germany's, but the RAF recovered many of its downed pilots because they came down over the UK, whereas the Luftwaffe lost virtually all its downed aircrew for the same reason. I would guess that in terms of permanent aircrew losses, the Luftwaffe suffered perhaps four times as heavily as the RAF.

The Luftwaffe was attempting to grind down the RAF through attrition but was itself ground down even more seriously.

Has anyone got the stats?

Cheers,

Sid.

[donwhite]

Hello Gents,
I don't have any stats but do you think the change in the bombing strategy of the Luftwaffe from targeting fighter airfields to cities may have been a crucial factor in allowing the RAF fighter command a little breathing space?

Cheers

[sid guttridge]

Hi donwhite,

This was a factor. However, I would suggest that it is sometimes over emphasised. The German attacks on fighter airfields were almost exclusively on strips to the south and east of London. However, throughout the battle Dowding was careful not to commit all (or even a majority?) of his fighter forces to that area. Thus the attacks on these air fields were damaging to only part of Fighter Command's strength (albeit in the most key area). Similar attacks against air fields could not be mounted by the Luftwaffe outside the south-east because of the range limitations of the Bf109 - which brings us nicely back to Rheinmetall's original question.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Rheinmetall]

In my opinion, another reason is tha the Luftwaffe was only equiped with 2-engine middle bombers. If the He-177 and the FW-190 had come out of producrion earlier the BoB could have been won by the germans.

Sorry for my writing. I am actually half german / half greek and I can't speak vey well English

[Blackie]

There are many documented and substantiated reasons but the bottom line is that they did and "if'n" it won't change it... but what the heck, I love a good discussion

The initial plan to attack English airfields and establish air superiority was sound, even restricted to the southeast as it was. However, it was unleashed to soon. Hitler had promised his military leaders that he would hold off until, I believe, 1944 or 1945. By that time all forces would have been built up to larger numbers, superior weapons and manned by the best trained personnel in the world. After the Polish and French campaigns even, had he stopped and waited a few years while holding England at bay and keeping Old Joe on a tight leash, to build up he would have had a great situation. Holding the French ports, he could have built advanced submarines which could have increased their stranglehold on England and with frontline jet fighters and bombers he could have attacked a weaker England.

But he didn't wait. Hilter just couldn't imagine he'd loose so he pounced on Winnie's front porch with aircraft restricted by their range, armament and capabilities while being led by an idiot. The English clinched their teeth, punched down a shot of whiskey and opened up a large can of whoopass (another name for Spitfire fighters).

Oh yeh... a lot of German pilots whose planes did not make it home to France did make it there themselves. If they could make the channel, they had a good chance to get home.

So what do you think? Am I like a Junkers aircrew, a little wet and shot full of wholes?

[redcoat]

What is your opinion about the victory of England against Germany in the Battle of Britain ?

With Dowding at the head of RAF Fighter Command the Luftwaffe didn't really have much of a chance.
The RAF had since the German air raids in the First World War been studying how to build up a defence system against bombers, by 1940 they had the worlds most advanced muti-layered air defence system. The Germans on the other hand hadn't even studied how to fight a campaign of this type.
The Luftwaffe also didn't have enough advantage in aircraft numbers where it mattered, single-seat fighters. They only had a 5 to 3 advantage at the start, and the odds got worse as the battle progressed.

I don't have any stats but do you think the change in the bombing strategy of the Luftwaffe from targeting fighter airfields to cities may have been a crucial factor in allowing the RAF fighter command a little breathing space?

While it made things easier for the RAF, the change didn't in any way lose the battle for the Luftwaffe, they were already losing.
Fighter Command on the 8th September, the date of the change in tactics, had 750 operational Hurricanes and Spitfires, up from 600 at the start of the battle.
Fighter Command was getting stronger not weaker.

The Luftwaffe was attempting to grind down the RAF through attrition but was itself ground down even more seriously.

Actually no. The Luftwaffe realized that to win the battle and still retain enough forces to defend the invasion forces they needed to defeat the RAF in a knock-out blow, a battle of attrition was not what they wanted. However Dowdings battle plan was to fight the Luftwaffe in an attritional battle.

what about the Bf-109 ? Do you think one of the main reasons was the low range of the one-o-nine- 'Emil' ?

No.
The Luftwaffe lost the battle in the South-West, where the Bf 109 did have the range. The range of the Bf 109 only became a factor when they switched to attacking London.

[Adam]

"With Dowding at the head of RAF Fighter Command the Luftwaffe didn't really have much of a chance."

I'm sorry Redcoat but this has almost nothing to do with the original question, in the same way that England didn't so much achieve a victory over Germany in the BoB as Germany didn't manage to attain the goals it set itself for the summer/autumn of 1940.

As Mr. Guttridge points out attrition had a definate influence on the battle but in itself this was not a decisive factor. Even working on the factor that the Germans lost four aircrew to every one the RAF did, the odds were still only relatively even.

Donwhite makes the point that shifting the focus from airfields to cities made a difference - in as much as it left airfield facilties and services alone, it did. However, in itself, again, this was not enough to decisively shift the balance. If the Luftwaffe maintained its sortie rate per day then the RAF still would have found itself stretched to the limit; it just would have taken slightly longer to attain. Which brings us to the point of the heavy bomber and 'long-range' fighters.

Four years after the Battle the Allies held superiority over the Luftwaffe to the extent that D-Day could be launched. 1940 and the Battle of Britian may not be on the scale of 1944 and D-Day but only exponentially. If the RAF was forced to withdraw its fighters from the south-east then the Channel straights and south-east of Britain would have become exposed regardless to the Germans in much the same way that Normandy/France was exposed to the Allies after they had forced the Luftwaffe (via attrition, on the ground and in the air) from those sectors. Perhaps over simplifying, but the facts remain. Had the RAF been forced from these sectors then the Germans would certainly have had an easier time in Seelowe vis-a-vis limited operational time of the RAF over the threatened/invaded sectors (thereby limiting the time the RAF could influence and interfere with German operations in that sector).

This, then, brings us back to the original question. During the Battle the Luftwaffe targeted, amongst other things, airfields of Bomber and Coastal Command and OTU's. This 'wastage' of operational sorties 'helped' the RAF in wearing down the Luftwaffe. At the hieght of the Battle, and indeed until late 1941, Bomber Command represented little more than nuisance value while Coastal Command was unable to effectively influence Channel operations while the OTU's by virtue of their relative inexperience were of limited value in the short-term. Even if 1% of sorties flown against the RAF was against 'wasted' targets - ie not industrial, oil or Fighter Command airfields and DIRECT support systems [radar] - then those sorties were not flown to their best effect. The losses (indeed expenditure in fuel, oil, bombs, ammunition, etc) incurred, then, were not as effective as they could have been had they been employed in the pursuit of a SINGLE objective: air supremecy.

Waiting for 1944/5 is not a plausible answer, either. Britain was as under-prepared as the Luftwaffe, if not more so. Let's not forget that the RAF still used flights of three until 1940 when the Luftwaffe had figured out long before this the inadequacies of this system. Germany was under-prepared ONLY in that it had a leadership not prepared to put the country on a war footing and adequately prepare and equip its forces to the best of its ability.

Germany gave away victory in the Battle because the German leadership, like so many times, focused on the next objective BEFORE finishing the current assignment. Victory in the BoB in the air was something that was more than attainable for Germany in the sense of the original plan which was air supremecy/defeat of the RAF over the Channel and south-eastern Britain.

Had Germany/Luftwaffe remained focused on the primary mission then there is little that the RAF could have done about it. What would have happened AFTER seelow was launched is an entirely different matter. The Luftwaffe gave away their chance at victory (rather than lost) the Battle of Britain because politics and inadequate leadership got in the way of strategy. In the 1930's General Wever had advocated ideas of strategic bombing and many of his ideas were operation by 1940 as was seen by the attacks against shipping, radar and airfields. Nazi politics, however, were divergent from operational doctrine. The eternal struggle as advocated by Nazism meant an eye for an eye, racial superiority; hence London had to become a target. Aryan superiority meant a misguided faith in current arms deployment, while at the same time insecurities in political heirarchies meant a lack of confidence in demanding total war footing to ensure industrial and training out put was at a maximum.

The Battle of Britain was lost because German intelligence failed to adequately represent facts because of the myth of Nazi superiority, while Nazi politics influenced military strategy to the point were, to quote, war became an extension of state politics by other means to the detriment of military strategy.

[Schachbrett]

as always there is no simple answer to the question.

one of the more important reasons is dowding`s or (british if you want) command skill and excellence!
secondly luftwaffe did very poor job in choosing targets. bombing of the cities was stupidity of course but even more stupid was leaving the radar towers operational. it was obvious that the raf couldn`t be so effecitive without their "eyes and ears" jet the luftwaffe failed to launch any systematic attack against radar network (remember in those days radars were quite big things in towers and couldn`t be easily masked)! that is a grave mistake if you ask me!
true that the luftwaffe didn`t have the rigth tools to do the job at the time but they had quite a lot sucess in using 109s as fighter-bomber. they would fly high-speed, low altitudes (below radar) acheived suprise and in most cases achieved direct hits on the targets (mostly airfields). but for no valid reason they didn`t use this tactic for the most part of the battle of britain.
The battle of britain was lost for the germans mainly becouse of poor leadership and horrible planing. when we add to that the lack of range by the machinery and british abilty we get the end result.

"With Dowding at the head of RAF Fighter Command the Luftwaffe didn't really have much of a chance." - i can`t agree with you there redcoat. they did have a chance and a fat one, but they didn`t use it! the most advanced multi-layer system that you glorify so much, was far from perfect. and another thing, fighter command did have the numbers of hurricane and spits that you mentioned but the number of pilots wasn`t so pinky

[Karaya1]

Horrido,
meine Herren, leider I used to speak german about 35 years und aus diesem Grund werde ich mich Deutsch fassen müssen. Zur Sache, RAF hat zur Verfügung sowohl Radar als auch sämtliche Enigmameldungen , also nicht ohne Bedeutung. Die Reichweite der Jäger spielt auch eine Rolle, genauso wie die Möglichkeit eigene abgeschossene Piloten nach Hause zurückzubringen können. Als Pole natürlich muss ich auch über sgn bloody foreigners sprechen - Polen , Tschechen usw haben auch etwas beigebracht - siehe die Statistik.Das III Reich hat vom Anfang an fast nie über Langstreckenbomber gedacht, wenns schon, dann war es vorbei. Genauso die Entwicklung und Einsatz der Düsenjäger - das ist aber wohl andere Geschichte.
So wärs meine Herren - gibts hier kein Lady, nicht wahr - und nochmals sorry for german, but my english is , I would say, a kind of pidgin english.
Fluuuuuten....

[Villers-Bocage]

The Battle of Britain was lost by Hitler rather than won by the British. Hitler's incessant interference with military planning resulted not just in inappropriate shifts in tactics, like the bombing of London, but also the callous neglect of the industrial needs of the Luftwaffe since Hitler's real goal was to wage war through Barbarossa. A power projecting German Navy would also have been a great asset, but Hitler could not forsee this simple fact. German aircraft carriers would have increased the potency of German airpower manifold. German heavy battleships could have shelled much of inland Britain. So basically what happened is that Hitler gave the Luftwaffe a ridiculous and unreasonable timetable given the circumstances and then came back numerous times to make even more unreasonable requests. The result, the Battle of Britain was lost. While today Americans complain that the only reason so called victory can be questioned while their troops are on the field, is because of political incompetence, they fail to realise that the German armed forces had to deal with more than incompetence. They had to deal with a leader who literally hamstrung their operations.

[dazedandconfused]

Okay, this is off-topic, but

German aircraft carriers would have increased the potency of German airpower manifold. German heavy battleships could have shelled much of inland Britain.

and where would the Royal Navy have been during this?? The RAF would have had to be completely disabled before the Kriegsmarine, even with these hypothetical Carriers and Battleships, could get involved. The RN was still one of the most powerful navies in the world and, in defence of the Home Islands, would have been prepared to take massive casualties for just a chance of stopping the Nazis. The BoB would have had to be won before this kind of operation could even be thought about.
And, by the way, I live about as far from the sea as you can get in the UK, and it would have to be a bloody special Battleship to reach here!!!

[sid guttridge]

Hi Villers-Bocage,

Most battles are won or lost both by a combination of correct decisions on the part of the victors and errors on the part of the losers. The Battle of Britain was no different. The Germans made errors that contributed to their defeat and the British got some things right that contributed to their victory.

I suspect that, had both sides made the correct tactical decisions in the Battle of Britain, the Germans would still have failed to gain sufficient air superiority to guarantee a successful invasion. I think that the Luftwaffe's advantages were never enough to outweigh its various disadvantages in the autumn of 1940 and the odds against an RAF defensive victory were never as long as myth would have it.

I also think you give Hitler less than full credit. He had to repeatedly overcome the opposition of the army general staff to all his moves between the remilitarisation of the Rhineland in 1936 and the conquest of France in 1940. If it had been left to the German general staff, it is highly unlikely that there would ever have been a Battle of Britain. Hitler almost single handedly was the driving force that got Germany into a position to launch the Battle of Britain in the first place.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Villers-Bocage]

Sid, the Germans, a la the Nazis, made mistakes, we're agreed on that. Nevertheless, the Nazi political hierarchy had a definite impact on military decision making especially with respect to people like Goering who depended many times on their special relationship with Hitler. Instead of winning decision making sessions on standrad criterion like quality/level of planning, Goering could just count on his excellent relationship with the commander in chief. Hitler's gambles with regard to remilitarization were nothing more than that. Just gambles. Running through France is a slightly more complex issue. Hesitance of the genuine military staff to launching an attack on France should never be interpreted as a sign that they felt defeat was imminent or possible were that decision to be made. They simply didn't like the idea of taking too many gambles. My argument is that Hitler was a gambler whose luck was bolstered my German competence and brilliance. In the end however, his gambling became so outrageous, that not even the brilliance of the German armed forces could cope up. To the point of the Battle of Britain, the Luftwaffe did not exist as a strategic/power projecting force. They were simply an extension of ground power into the air as the naming of the USAAF so amply demonstrated. When told that they had to invade Britain by air with what they had, the braggart Goering obviously had no problem with taking on the challenge, and ultimately, no-one was willing to state with any conviction that Hitler was asking too much of them. Combinations of error and good decision making is most often the case. But in instances of overwhelming superiority being defeated by inferiority, it is most often the case that serious errors were made. In this case, the overwhelming superiority of the German Armed Forces had not been adapted to the circumstances at hand. Namely a limited invasion of British airspace. The first of Hitler's major gambles that went wrong. He gambled again on Barbarossa, and German genius carried him all the way to Moscow while simultaneously running through most of the caucasus, but his penchant for gambling just got out of hand.

[Villers-Bocage]

Dazed and confused, the Royal Navy was still one of the most powerful navies in the world by virtue of the simple fact that there weren't many serious navies around at the time. However a comparison of serious navies like those of the USA and Japan would show up the RN as quite pathetic. The Yamato's guns were rated for 45,000 yards, and the Paris gun exceeded 100 km during world war 2. Which is not to say that all of Britain would have been within reach of battleship guns, but certainly a German Navy significantly superior to the comparatively weak and pathetic, in real terms, Royal Navy; was not too daunting a task. In any case, there would have been naval battles too, but the point is that all other things being equal, it was better for the Germans to fight with a Navy than without.