After the Soviet offensive cut-off 6th Army it is well known that Hitler forbade any breakout attempt, or even any attempt by 6th Army to assist in Hoth's releif efforts.
What would have happened if, shortly after the initial Soviet attack, Hitler had recognized the danger and allowed a breakout attempt by the 6th Army? Would the army had made it out?
Perhaps more importantly, the strategic situation was very dicey for the Germans in late November 1942. The Soviets had broken their lines and had cut-off one of Germany finest units - however, the 6th army was also tying down perhaps half or more of the Soviet forces available for a general offensive. If the 6th army was not tying down these units, could the Russians have take Rostov before the Germans could have saved their southern army group?
Manstein had concerns for just this scenario.
Stalingrad
Moderator: Commissar D, the Evil
Interesting question for us armchair generals. The battle of Stalingrad tied up 107 soviet divisions and brigades together with 13 tank regiments. It cost the Germans the 6th Army
90,000+ dead, 108,000 pows, 488 aircraft, 1000 airmen. Russian documents list their casualties at 11 million-dead,missing,or wounded.
IF the 6th had been allowed to breakout and retreat behind the river Don / Chir I think the strategic situation would have improved for the Germans. Even if the breakout had cost them 50,000 casualties and all the equipment, they would have saved 200,000 men. Behind a river you are doubled on defense. The supply line would have been shorter, the Russian supply line longer. The air force could have been used for interdiction or resupplying the sixth army.
The German defensive efforts benefited from other circumstances. The Soviet attacks on the Chir front were not conducted in overwhelming strength, Russian assaults were piece meal. Instead of a single, powerful attack in one sector, the Soviet forces attacked at the Chir line for nearly two week. The Russian attacks were conducted mainly by tank forces, and the Soviet infantry played only a minor accompanying role. The Germans were able to make the most of their limited armored reserves. The Germans concentrated their tanks on the destruction of the enemy armor. The superior tactical skill of the German tank crews magnified the combat power. Thus lacking weapons coordination, being on the offensive, the Soviets would have been hard pressed to take Rostov, against a defensive German line.
However what the Germans lacked was an effective anti-tank weapon. The current Pak was great for knocking holes through tin cans but bounced off the Soviet armor. More effort should have been made developing one. Every infantry man needed a PanzerFaust. Ah, so many mistakes.
He who runs away, lives to fight another day!
90,000+ dead, 108,000 pows, 488 aircraft, 1000 airmen. Russian documents list their casualties at 11 million-dead,missing,or wounded.
IF the 6th had been allowed to breakout and retreat behind the river Don / Chir I think the strategic situation would have improved for the Germans. Even if the breakout had cost them 50,000 casualties and all the equipment, they would have saved 200,000 men. Behind a river you are doubled on defense. The supply line would have been shorter, the Russian supply line longer. The air force could have been used for interdiction or resupplying the sixth army.
The German defensive efforts benefited from other circumstances. The Soviet attacks on the Chir front were not conducted in overwhelming strength, Russian assaults were piece meal. Instead of a single, powerful attack in one sector, the Soviet forces attacked at the Chir line for nearly two week. The Russian attacks were conducted mainly by tank forces, and the Soviet infantry played only a minor accompanying role. The Germans were able to make the most of their limited armored reserves. The Germans concentrated their tanks on the destruction of the enemy armor. The superior tactical skill of the German tank crews magnified the combat power. Thus lacking weapons coordination, being on the offensive, the Soviets would have been hard pressed to take Rostov, against a defensive German line.
However what the Germans lacked was an effective anti-tank weapon. The current Pak was great for knocking holes through tin cans but bounced off the Soviet armor. More effort should have been made developing one. Every infantry man needed a PanzerFaust. Ah, so many mistakes.
He who runs away, lives to fight another day!
Stalingrad
There is little doubt that a breakout attempt was the better 6th Army could do to save itself. There were two proper moments to do so. The first was just after the Russian ring was closed around Stalingrad. At this moment the Russians' positions in 6th Army rear (Kalach, Serafimovich) were not consolidated still. Second good scenery for a brakout was during Operation Winterstorm, when Field Marshal von Manstein led a relief force through Russian lines behind 6th Army. If the latter had tried to breakout simultaneously it would have been very difficult for the Russians to prevent von Paulus and Manstein from joining, as Russian General Yeremenko admitted after the war.