The Med would now either be Italian or British, mainland Europe would be for the most part Soviet, Japan would cover eastern Asia (no Hiroshima), Israel would probably not exist because of a Soviet holocaust, Neil Armstrong would never have landed on the moon, and we would still be waiting for colour tv and the internet and a pc in every home. England would still be dotted with US airbases, and the next British monarch would have a different name, probably either Eugene Montgomery or Borislav.
Just one enclave: Switzerland, as the world bank hq and gold reserve
but of course, all this is mere speculation...
What if? Europe's map if Adolf Hitler had never existed.
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Carl Schwamberger
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There was a question here about the development of German military doctrine for WWII. I read a bit about this as part of my mlitary education and offer the following:
1. The term Blitzkrieg had nothing to do with Wehrmacht or German military doctrine. It was a propaganda term that entered general use through Gobbels propagand in 1939. I've never seen the term in anything I've read from Guderian & the other German military writers of the 1920 or 1930s.
2. The foundation of WWII doctrine had its roots in the old Prussian army, which gradually instituted a method of critical thiking in its officer corps during the 19th Century. One aspect of this was the allowance of a degree of independance in execution of orders.
3. In WWI the ideas of 'combined arms' , breakthrough or penetration tactics, mission orders, ect.. were battle tested with infantry & artillery. There were many failings in execution of these concepts, but Seeckts Reichweher made a serious effort to learn from the mistakes. The Reichwehrs critical problem was that they had to defend to state with a very small army. They had no choice but to find tactics and operational doctrine that would raise even remote possiblity of defending against the large Polish & French armys. The most important solution they choose was to emphasise speed at all levels. It was thought a small fast acting battle group or corps could defeat a larger corps by fast manuver and striking at critcal points "schwerpunkt". This doctrine required emphasis & development of the WWI tested ideas of combined arms, pneentration tactics, mission orders, and independance in execution.
4. From Recihswehr documents and Guderians writing we know he was assigned to the section of the Reichswehr concerned with the use of motorization in the early 1920s. He was already educated in the emerging doctrines of the Reichweher and naturally his mission was to examine how motorization would affect these doctrines. He did read the ideas of the British writers. However DeGualle wrote long after this period & Guderian does not mention his book. In his post war book Panzer Leader ' Guderian gives considerable credit to other officers in the Reichswehr for advancing the use of motorization and armor as part of a 'combined arms doctrine'. Although there were officers who opposed his proposals (the cavalry were one group) many more endorsed the new ideas.
5. Guderians proposals were for the the motorization & armoring of combined arms battle groups. He did not focus on the 'tank' but of groups of all arms in a mechanized team.
6. A critcal point is that Guderian thought Close Air Support was important to the sucess of this doctrine. As we know the Luftwaffe was well organized and equipped for CAS. But until the death of Wever this was not the case. Under Wevers direction the Luftwaffe was developing heavy bombers and studing tactics and doctrine closer to that of the other airforces. Guderian had little influence over this development & was fortunate Luftwaffe doctrine/equipment fell out as it did.
7. Guderians proposed doctrines did not develop entirely as he wanted. In 1940 there was little armored artillery, only a few MkIV support tanks and some SiGIII of GW38 assualt weapons. The provsion of armored infantry carrier lagged. Practically no armored halftracks were present in 1939, and only a few more in 1940 & 1941. In tactics Guderian did not see all he wanted. In both the 1939 & 1940 campaign he was critical (as were other generals like Rommel) of infantry & tank commanders who failed to operate together as a team. The cavalry officers obstructed development of mechanzed divsions and force the fielding of the 'Light' divsions with their horse mounted regiments for the Poliish campaign.
8. More important was the use of the mechanized or panzer forces as tactical rather than stratigic elements. Central to Guderians doctrine was the point that these mechanized units would be massed (with their air support) as a stratigic strike force. The Sickle Cut plan of 1940 with the seven Pz Div in Kliests Group is the best example. In the opening stages of Barbarosa this was still the case, but confusion and stratigic incoherence meant the German mechanized forces were steadily dissipated as tactical/operational groups.
9. Hitler made his wishes known along the way in the building of the Wehermacht, but my oopinon is things would have developed much the same without his intrusion. Later Hitler was directlyresponsible for the misuse of the German mechanized forces. ie: as an assualt force in Stalinggrad or Kursk rather than as a manuver group. My conclusion here is the German military would have developed their doctine without nazi presence, and would have done it betterwithout Hitlers interference.
1. The term Blitzkrieg had nothing to do with Wehrmacht or German military doctrine. It was a propaganda term that entered general use through Gobbels propagand in 1939. I've never seen the term in anything I've read from Guderian & the other German military writers of the 1920 or 1930s.
2. The foundation of WWII doctrine had its roots in the old Prussian army, which gradually instituted a method of critical thiking in its officer corps during the 19th Century. One aspect of this was the allowance of a degree of independance in execution of orders.
3. In WWI the ideas of 'combined arms' , breakthrough or penetration tactics, mission orders, ect.. were battle tested with infantry & artillery. There were many failings in execution of these concepts, but Seeckts Reichweher made a serious effort to learn from the mistakes. The Reichwehrs critical problem was that they had to defend to state with a very small army. They had no choice but to find tactics and operational doctrine that would raise even remote possiblity of defending against the large Polish & French armys. The most important solution they choose was to emphasise speed at all levels. It was thought a small fast acting battle group or corps could defeat a larger corps by fast manuver and striking at critcal points "schwerpunkt". This doctrine required emphasis & development of the WWI tested ideas of combined arms, pneentration tactics, mission orders, and independance in execution.
4. From Recihswehr documents and Guderians writing we know he was assigned to the section of the Reichswehr concerned with the use of motorization in the early 1920s. He was already educated in the emerging doctrines of the Reichweher and naturally his mission was to examine how motorization would affect these doctrines. He did read the ideas of the British writers. However DeGualle wrote long after this period & Guderian does not mention his book. In his post war book Panzer Leader ' Guderian gives considerable credit to other officers in the Reichswehr for advancing the use of motorization and armor as part of a 'combined arms doctrine'. Although there were officers who opposed his proposals (the cavalry were one group) many more endorsed the new ideas.
5. Guderians proposals were for the the motorization & armoring of combined arms battle groups. He did not focus on the 'tank' but of groups of all arms in a mechanized team.
6. A critcal point is that Guderian thought Close Air Support was important to the sucess of this doctrine. As we know the Luftwaffe was well organized and equipped for CAS. But until the death of Wever this was not the case. Under Wevers direction the Luftwaffe was developing heavy bombers and studing tactics and doctrine closer to that of the other airforces. Guderian had little influence over this development & was fortunate Luftwaffe doctrine/equipment fell out as it did.
7. Guderians proposed doctrines did not develop entirely as he wanted. In 1940 there was little armored artillery, only a few MkIV support tanks and some SiGIII of GW38 assualt weapons. The provsion of armored infantry carrier lagged. Practically no armored halftracks were present in 1939, and only a few more in 1940 & 1941. In tactics Guderian did not see all he wanted. In both the 1939 & 1940 campaign he was critical (as were other generals like Rommel) of infantry & tank commanders who failed to operate together as a team. The cavalry officers obstructed development of mechanzed divsions and force the fielding of the 'Light' divsions with their horse mounted regiments for the Poliish campaign.
8. More important was the use of the mechanized or panzer forces as tactical rather than stratigic elements. Central to Guderians doctrine was the point that these mechanized units would be massed (with their air support) as a stratigic strike force. The Sickle Cut plan of 1940 with the seven Pz Div in Kliests Group is the best example. In the opening stages of Barbarosa this was still the case, but confusion and stratigic incoherence meant the German mechanized forces were steadily dissipated as tactical/operational groups.
9. Hitler made his wishes known along the way in the building of the Wehermacht, but my oopinon is things would have developed much the same without his intrusion. Later Hitler was directlyresponsible for the misuse of the German mechanized forces. ie: as an assualt force in Stalinggrad or Kursk rather than as a manuver group. My conclusion here is the German military would have developed their doctine without nazi presence, and would have done it betterwithout Hitlers interference.
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phylo_roadking
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Rolf Steiner
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sid guttridge
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Hi Carl,
A first rate and most informed post.
However, I also tend to agree with Phylo's proviso. While German generals wanted much of what Hitler wanted on the international stage, they were far more cautious than he was and opposed the timing of all his moves in the 1930s because they felt they were not yet ready.
However, had things developed at their preferred pace their prospective foreign opponents would have had more time to prepare effective doctines and means to oppose them. These were in gestation everywhere from Czechoslovakia to Italy, France to the USSR. There was only a narrow window of opportunity in which the Germans had a virtual monopoly of the necessary mechanised tactics and means and I would suggest that it may only have been Hitler's willpower that allowed it to be exploited in time.
Cheers,
Sid.
A first rate and most informed post.
However, I also tend to agree with Phylo's proviso. While German generals wanted much of what Hitler wanted on the international stage, they were far more cautious than he was and opposed the timing of all his moves in the 1930s because they felt they were not yet ready.
However, had things developed at their preferred pace their prospective foreign opponents would have had more time to prepare effective doctines and means to oppose them. These were in gestation everywhere from Czechoslovakia to Italy, France to the USSR. There was only a narrow window of opportunity in which the Germans had a virtual monopoly of the necessary mechanised tactics and means and I would suggest that it may only have been Hitler's willpower that allowed it to be exploited in time.
Cheers,
Sid.
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phylo_roadking
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It always struck me that the Blitzkrieg-capable army of September 1939 was a force specifically developed for several possible uses....but in the end, only one of these was ever pursued in its purity...
Going by the old adage, an army is always ready to fight its last war....and for the Reichswehr that still sat underneath the huge 1930s expansions...this was NOT WWI, but the fighting against the Poles by the Freikorps in 1919....where just by chance you had small, combined-arms combat groups, almost a microcosm of what was to come later.
Apart from that - you can't really say that the Wehrmacht was "designed" to fight the French or British, because on paper, if it hadn't been for the actual events of Spring, 1940, and Hitler's total revision of the plans for the assault on the West to make the key point the breakthrough in the Ardennes after pulling them into Belgium....the Wehrmacht shouldn't have been able to fight it out on the wide open spaces of Central and Northern France against an army far more mechanised than the Wehrmacht was. Through the period that the doctrine that later became "blitzkrieg" was being developed, the Frecnh were still fighting their budgetary problems and general apathy and planning to oppose an invasion in their interior by field armies that would have been as heavy in armour as the Germans.
What it DOES look like, however, is that the Wehrmacht was developing a doctrine that COULD chop up a bigger but inferior army; and as Sid said, this means they would be trying to juggle the coming to full flower of their own rearmament plans with everyone else's! Sid, your window reduces even further if you think that they were aiming towards having an army that could defeat Poland OR France OR Holland OR Belgium OR Britain OR Russia! That's a LOT of time variables to juggle....BUT
The Polish were NOT the last enemy the Reichswehr had fought - just the last foreign enemy. If you look at its tactics being developed to chop up into small pieces a bigger but poorly-equiped army as you by pass them on your way to the heart of the enmy's defence...could you ALSO be looking at tactics being developed for use against Germans? A popular Communist putsch, another Munich or a "Red Saxony"???
Going by the old adage, an army is always ready to fight its last war....and for the Reichswehr that still sat underneath the huge 1930s expansions...this was NOT WWI, but the fighting against the Poles by the Freikorps in 1919....where just by chance you had small, combined-arms combat groups, almost a microcosm of what was to come later.
Apart from that - you can't really say that the Wehrmacht was "designed" to fight the French or British, because on paper, if it hadn't been for the actual events of Spring, 1940, and Hitler's total revision of the plans for the assault on the West to make the key point the breakthrough in the Ardennes after pulling them into Belgium....the Wehrmacht shouldn't have been able to fight it out on the wide open spaces of Central and Northern France against an army far more mechanised than the Wehrmacht was. Through the period that the doctrine that later became "blitzkrieg" was being developed, the Frecnh were still fighting their budgetary problems and general apathy and planning to oppose an invasion in their interior by field armies that would have been as heavy in armour as the Germans.
What it DOES look like, however, is that the Wehrmacht was developing a doctrine that COULD chop up a bigger but inferior army; and as Sid said, this means they would be trying to juggle the coming to full flower of their own rearmament plans with everyone else's! Sid, your window reduces even further if you think that they were aiming towards having an army that could defeat Poland OR France OR Holland OR Belgium OR Britain OR Russia! That's a LOT of time variables to juggle....BUT
The Polish were NOT the last enemy the Reichswehr had fought - just the last foreign enemy. If you look at its tactics being developed to chop up into small pieces a bigger but poorly-equiped army as you by pass them on your way to the heart of the enmy's defence...could you ALSO be looking at tactics being developed for use against Germans? A popular Communist putsch, another Munich or a "Red Saxony"???
"Well, my days of not taking you seriously are certainly coming to a middle." - Malcolm Reynolds
PHylo - good points. To me, the Whermact was very much like Napoleon's Army of 1805 - startlingly superior to armies of the old regime.
(because of first rate training and superior organization)
The Austrians and Russians soon learned the new ways however- organizing corps and massing their artillery. hence Eylau and Wagram.
Just as the WW2 western allies and Russians adapted their organizations to deal with the German mechanized forces.
And once they did that - it was all over. Because the forces they created to whip the German mech forces totally overmatched the horsedrawn divisions that made up the bulk of the Whermact. Once they got them out of their fortifications or prepared lines - it was adios muchachos.
Examples - France and Poland '44. Only badly stretched supply lines kept the allies from winning the war in autumn '44.
(because of first rate training and superior organization)
The Austrians and Russians soon learned the new ways however- organizing corps and massing their artillery. hence Eylau and Wagram.
Just as the WW2 western allies and Russians adapted their organizations to deal with the German mechanized forces.
And once they did that - it was all over. Because the forces they created to whip the German mech forces totally overmatched the horsedrawn divisions that made up the bulk of the Whermact. Once they got them out of their fortifications or prepared lines - it was adios muchachos.
Examples - France and Poland '44. Only badly stretched supply lines kept the allies from winning the war in autumn '44.
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sid guttridge
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Hi Guys,
I would sugguest that a victorious army has a tendency to fight the last war, but that a beaten army has a tendency to analyse its defeat more closely and to be more imaginative in its preparation for the next war as a result. Victory breeds complacency, and this was what befell the Allies over 1919-1939.
Cheers,
Sid.
I would sugguest that a victorious army has a tendency to fight the last war, but that a beaten army has a tendency to analyse its defeat more closely and to be more imaginative in its preparation for the next war as a result. Victory breeds complacency, and this was what befell the Allies over 1919-1939.
Cheers,
Sid.
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phylo_roadking
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Sid, TWO things do that, defeat....and money!more imaginative in its preparation for the next war
As we know, this doctrine was developING under the Reichswehr, and continued by Reichswehr officers in the Wehrmacht. Leave aside for a moment the size of the RW - though thats as good a reason as any to develop tactics that would let it fight above its weight....how much of the Weimar Republic's military budget was actually spent in Russia, at Lipetsk and Kazan??? In Depression Europe? I would guess that the Reichswehr had to come up with tactics that let it do what it normally would take two or three times as many troops to do - because until Hitler "intervened" again by getting his hands on the Von Papen loans, and started spending like he had promised the Army - they had no guarantee they would get all the new toys he was promising them.
"Well, my days of not taking you seriously are certainly coming to a middle." - Malcolm Reynolds
Maybe without Hitler and nazi party Germany could find more allies? Was possible that UK and could agree to give them Danzig? Who knows? Hitlers foreign politicy was awful, and goes nowhere. With wine salesman Ribbentrop as FM.
Almost all agreed that Germany after WWI did not resign to take back lost territories, not only in Europe but also in Afirca, and will try reject all permitions and contributions. But maybe without Hitler They could be more efective? Hitler always was talking about 1000 years Reich, but in fact he had very short perspective.
Almost all agreed that Germany after WWI did not resign to take back lost territories, not only in Europe but also in Afirca, and will try reject all permitions and contributions. But maybe without Hitler They could be more efective? Hitler always was talking about 1000 years Reich, but in fact he had very short perspective.
amicus Plato, sed magis amica veritas
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sid guttridge
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I read that German-Polish talks about freeway trhough "corridor" were very advaced (sterted in 1928). Goering and Lipski often meets and talks about that. Hitler in 1938 cancelled that talks. He surprised Goering with this decision.
I also read article in historic magazine, that in March 1936, Hitler played va-banque. If wehrmacht enter to Rheinland without French and British reaction it will be graet success. If France and UK will react wehrmacht has no other way like return to barracks after "lost battle", and Hitlers position would be very weak. This was best time to stop Hitler, then his power inside Germany was not so great yet.
I also read article in historic magazine, that in March 1936, Hitler played va-banque. If wehrmacht enter to Rheinland without French and British reaction it will be graet success. If France and UK will react wehrmacht has no other way like return to barracks after "lost battle", and Hitlers position would be very weak. This was best time to stop Hitler, then his power inside Germany was not so great yet.
amicus Plato, sed magis amica veritas
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John Kilmartin
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Hi Sid,
Wasn't there actually a bomb attempt on Hitler's life in November of 1939? If I recall the fellow was a carpenter with the last name Elser.
Cheers,
John K
Wasn't there actually a bomb attempt on Hitler's life in November of 1939? If I recall the fellow was a carpenter with the last name Elser.
Cheers,
John K
' Strip war of the mantle of its glories and excitement, and it will disclose a gibbering ghost of pain , grief, dissappointment and despair'
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phylo_roadking
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From Wiki...
I've always wondered if Elser was a Lee Harvey Oswald-style cutoff, unaware of who actually set him in motion....
...'cos November 1939 was ALSO the time of the second Canaris/Oster-planned coup after Halder lost his nerve in 1938. When it looked again as if Hitler was going to launch a premature attack on the West in November, Halder gave his support again, but the invasion of Norway instead caused support to wain. There was also a plot in and around November at the Army HQ at Zossen, by a group of officers calling themselves "Action Group Zossen".The only really resolute attempt to remove Hitler during this period came in November 1939, from an unexpected quarter. Georg Elser, a carpenter from Württemberg, acting completely on his own, developed a plan to assassinate Hitler. Elser had been peripherally involved with the KPD before 1933, but his exact motives for acting as he did remain a mystery. He read in the newspapers that Hitler would be addressing a Nazi Party meeting on 8 November, in the Bürgerbräukeller, a beer hall in Munich where Hitler had launched the Beer Hall Putsch in 1923. Stealing explosives from his workplace, Elser built a powerful time-bomb. For over a month, he managed to stay inside the Bürgerbräukeller after closing hours each night, during which time he hollowed out the pillar behind the speaker's rostrum to place the bomb inside.
On the night of 7 November, Elser set the timer and left for the Swiss border. Unexpectedly, because of the pressure of wartime business, Hitler made a much shorter speech than usual and left the hall ten minutes before the bomb went off, killing eight people. Had Hitler still been speaking, the bomb almost certainly would have killed him, with consequences which can only be guessed at. Elser was arrested at the border, sent to the Sachsenhausen Concentration Camp, and then in 1945 moved to the Dachau concentration camp. Elser was executed two weeks before the liberation of Dachau KZ. This attempt on Hitler’s life set off a witch-hunt for potential conspirators which intimidated the opposition and made further action more difficult.
I've always wondered if Elser was a Lee Harvey Oswald-style cutoff, unaware of who actually set him in motion....
"Well, my days of not taking you seriously are certainly coming to a middle." - Malcolm Reynolds