Paul
The statement that infantry divs are better for defense makes sense at the macro level - at the higher level it always best to put your least mobile and most expendable assets at the sharper edge while retaining your best troops for the riposte.
The pz Divs were surely used for defense in Normandy - but not by choice. a) They could get there quicker and, b) OKW wasn't too keen on releasing infantry assets from 15 Army due to supposed threat of another landing.
The pz Divs did a lovely job of defense - for a while. But the dirty little secret is the daily 'wastage' rate which occurs even when there is no specific combat operations under way. Wastage is easier to deal with in Inf units which are typically less specialized. For a pz div there is little choice but to use your panzer grenadiers and pioneers - and its possible to lose them all in a very short time period.
What made the panzers good for defense also made it a waste to use them for that. Integral heavy weapons, lots of AT capable tubes, the 88 mm bn and for the SS - the Werfer Abteilungen. The latter in particular was a quick and dirty way to get plenty of fire down on the enemy. And their own vulnerabilities are well known as well.
The downside (other than the fact that you are burning up your tactical and even statregic reserves) is that replacing all that stuff is very difficult. It also becomes much more of a target when tied to a static position. Mobility is the key to successful use of a panzer div - even Omar Bradley (not my favorite general...) noted that it is an utter waste to use tanks as pillboxes.
The paradox in studying the Normandy campaign is that the Allied Forces were completely mechanized and had a luxury of tanks and guns the Germans did not have. I used to wonder how the British held off counterattacks by II SS Pz K during Epsom - after all their forces were mostly infantry divisions. Yeah...except these infantry divs were each supported by a tank brigade and had approx 75 AT guns integral with battleships for fire support. To compare a German infantry division to that is no comparison at all.
So the Germans used their best mobile troops for static defense ultimately - so why not use them as such initially? Because it all goes back to mobility. Whenever you tie a tank div to a map square you give the enemy gunners a bonanza. That the Allies were able to use mech forces for darn near everything doesn't change that. The Germans had those ten or so mobile divs and after they were burned out at the front - the battle of movement began in earnest. horse drawn inf and arty had no chance at all in a movement battle.
I quite agree with our remark that it would have been better if the Germans had gone whole heartedly with one philosphy or the other - compromise in this case produced a catastraphe.
cheers
Reb
Any chance for the 12 SS Panzer division to beat the Allies
Moderator: sniper1shot
Reb,
Absolutely. I think we are having a "heated agreement."
I will even concede your excellent point about wastage. My point in my final para was simply that a pz div was a tactically more powerful tool in a defensive task than a leg infantry div (by virtue of the superior firepower organic to pz divs, and the strength of panzers as pillboxes, the larger waste that such use represented notwithstanding). However, Reb, you are quite correct that whilst this is true on day one, it is also true that due to the fewer numbers of humble infantrymen in a pz divs strength, and the greater fragility of tanks, the greater strength of the pz div will not last in the line as long as an infantry div. (ie suffering 2000 infantry casualties would result in a German inf div losing probably about 50% of their combat effectiveness, whereas suffering 2000 infantry casualties would essentially destroy a pz divs ability to hold ground)
Absolutely. I think we are having a "heated agreement."
I will even concede your excellent point about wastage. My point in my final para was simply that a pz div was a tactically more powerful tool in a defensive task than a leg infantry div (by virtue of the superior firepower organic to pz divs, and the strength of panzers as pillboxes, the larger waste that such use represented notwithstanding). However, Reb, you are quite correct that whilst this is true on day one, it is also true that due to the fewer numbers of humble infantrymen in a pz divs strength, and the greater fragility of tanks, the greater strength of the pz div will not last in the line as long as an infantry div. (ie suffering 2000 infantry casualties would result in a German inf div losing probably about 50% of their combat effectiveness, whereas suffering 2000 infantry casualties would essentially destroy a pz divs ability to hold ground)
Paul
A "heated agreement?"
I'd add one more point that occurred to me later on - the Tiger tanks which were such a disproportionate problem in the British area near Caen were obviously quite useful in the defensive role. But...
In contradiction of my own statements in my previous post I'll note that had Geyr / Rundstedt had their way - the Tigers which were so useful in defense would have found themselves in a mobile battle for which they were quite unsuited. (admittedly - only three battalions but considered very important by both allies and Germans) Did Germany have any where near enough tanks in the West to confront the massive array of allied armour in the open? I wonder.
What I've enjoyed about this thread is not so much defending a point as hearing what all have said and having to examine my opinions as a result.
cheers
Reb
A "heated agreement?"
I'd add one more point that occurred to me later on - the Tiger tanks which were such a disproportionate problem in the British area near Caen were obviously quite useful in the defensive role. But...
In contradiction of my own statements in my previous post I'll note that had Geyr / Rundstedt had their way - the Tigers which were so useful in defense would have found themselves in a mobile battle for which they were quite unsuited. (admittedly - only three battalions but considered very important by both allies and Germans) Did Germany have any where near enough tanks in the West to confront the massive array of allied armour in the open? I wonder.
What I've enjoyed about this thread is not so much defending a point as hearing what all have said and having to examine my opinions as a result.
cheers
Reb
Paul, Reb -
Just a point of detail:
cheers
Well, I still don't get the "catastrophic compromise" argument, the relevance of which presupposes that both were feasible approaches. And I do not see how there existed any possibility whatsoever of pursuing a policy of keeping the Panzer divisions back as an intact reserve, at least not without allowing the front in Normandy to collapse within a short time.2. QVist argues that the Germans would have done better if they had only whole-heartedly followed Rommel's advice. Strictly speaking, I agree. But only because I would strongly argue that the Germans would have done better if only they'd whole-heartedly followed either Rommel's advice or Geyr/Rundstedt's. In the event, Hitler produced a muddled compromise between the two that, essentially, offered the cons of both and the pros of neither. (Thank God eh?)
Just a point of detail:
Only LAH and HJ among the five SS divisons in Normandy had a Werfer batallion nominally, and in both cases the unit was not operational when the respective divisions were committed. One battery was eventually committed of HJ's Werfer batallion, while LAHs batallion remained behind in Belgium, at least initially. It should also be noted that they both had a Werfer Batallion in lieu of a IV artillery batallion. And there was no "88mm batallion" in any Panzer Division, SS or Heer.What made the panzers good for defense also made it a waste to use them for that. Integral heavy weapons, lots of AT capable tubes, the 88 mm bn and for the SS - the Werfer Abteilungen. The latter in particular was a quick and dirty way to get plenty of fire down on the enemy. And their own vulnerabilities are well known as well.
cheers
Qvist - Pz Lehr had 18 88 mm, SS pz div each had a bn of 12. The normal Flak Abt in Heer pz divs was also 12 pieces.
The SS Divs had Werfer Abteilungen at Div level and / or at Corps level
Given the damage done by werfers (see Brit and US accounts) they were a mighty fine replacement for 4th Arty bn.
The Germans were already in crisis mode before the allies even landed so a div here and there might not have all it should - ie HJ went into battle originally without its Pz Jager Abt, LAH was short most of its werfers etc.
cheers
Reb
ps Here is the organization of the Heavy Flak Battalion in '44 pz Div as submitted by Ron Klages:
•HEERES-FLAK ABTEILUNG:
Headquarters:
Kettenkrad=1
Motorcycle=2
Light cross country car=12
medium civilian truck=4
heavy civilian truck=7
light cross country truck=5
medium cross country truck=5
heavy cross country truck=1
office body truck=2
ambulance=1
trailer=3
Rifles=94
Pistols=16
Machine pistols=12
Light machine guns=2
Officers=9
Officials=3
NCOs=27
Enlisted men=83
1st Battery:
Kettenkrad=1
Motorcycle=1
Light cross country car=4
medium civilian truck=1
light cross country truck=6
medium cross country truck=6
heavy cross country truck=2
office body truck=1
Sdkfz 8=6
Trailer=11
Rifles=148
Pistols=7
Machine pistols=9
Light machine guns=3
2cm Flak38 towed=3
8.8cm Flak towed=6
Officers=3
Officials=0
NCOs=33
Enlisted men=128
2nd Battery:
Kettenkrad=1
Motorcycle=1
Light cross country car=4
medium civilian truck=1
light cross country truck=6
medium cross country truck=6
heavy cross country truck=2
office body truck=1
Sdkfz 8=6
Trailer=11
Rifles=148
Pistols=7
Machine pistols=9
Light machine guns=3
2cm Flak38 towed=3
8.8cm Flak towed=6
Officers=3
Officials=0
NCOs=33
Enlisted men=128
3rd Battery:
Kettenkrad=4
Motorcycle=1
Light cross country car=10
medium civilian truck=1
light cross country truck=7
medium cross country truck=8
office body truck=1
Sdkfz 11=6
SdKfz 7=3
SdKfz 7/1=3 with 2cm Flak Quad mounted
Trailer=17
Rifles=165
Pistols=8
Machine pistols=12
Light machine guns=4
3.7cm Flak towed=9
Officers=3
Officials=0
NCOs=38
Enlisted men=144
The SS Divs had Werfer Abteilungen at Div level and / or at Corps level
Given the damage done by werfers (see Brit and US accounts) they were a mighty fine replacement for 4th Arty bn.
The Germans were already in crisis mode before the allies even landed so a div here and there might not have all it should - ie HJ went into battle originally without its Pz Jager Abt, LAH was short most of its werfers etc.
cheers
Reb
ps Here is the organization of the Heavy Flak Battalion in '44 pz Div as submitted by Ron Klages:
•HEERES-FLAK ABTEILUNG:
Headquarters:
Kettenkrad=1
Motorcycle=2
Light cross country car=12
medium civilian truck=4
heavy civilian truck=7
light cross country truck=5
medium cross country truck=5
heavy cross country truck=1
office body truck=2
ambulance=1
trailer=3
Rifles=94
Pistols=16
Machine pistols=12
Light machine guns=2
Officers=9
Officials=3
NCOs=27
Enlisted men=83
1st Battery:
Kettenkrad=1
Motorcycle=1
Light cross country car=4
medium civilian truck=1
light cross country truck=6
medium cross country truck=6
heavy cross country truck=2
office body truck=1
Sdkfz 8=6
Trailer=11
Rifles=148
Pistols=7
Machine pistols=9
Light machine guns=3
2cm Flak38 towed=3
8.8cm Flak towed=6
Officers=3
Officials=0
NCOs=33
Enlisted men=128
2nd Battery:
Kettenkrad=1
Motorcycle=1
Light cross country car=4
medium civilian truck=1
light cross country truck=6
medium cross country truck=6
heavy cross country truck=2
office body truck=1
Sdkfz 8=6
Trailer=11
Rifles=148
Pistols=7
Machine pistols=9
Light machine guns=3
2cm Flak38 towed=3
8.8cm Flak towed=6
Officers=3
Officials=0
NCOs=33
Enlisted men=128
3rd Battery:
Kettenkrad=4
Motorcycle=1
Light cross country car=10
medium civilian truck=1
light cross country truck=7
medium cross country truck=8
office body truck=1
Sdkfz 11=6
SdKfz 7=3
SdKfz 7/1=3 with 2cm Flak Quad mounted
Trailer=17
Rifles=165
Pistols=8
Machine pistols=12
Light machine guns=4
3.7cm Flak towed=9
Officers=3
Officials=0
NCOs=38
Enlisted men=144
Close.Reb wrote:Qvist - Pz Lehr had 18 88 mm, SS pz div each had a bn of 12. The normal Flak Abt in Heer pz divs was also 12 pieces.
The SS Divs had Werfer Abteilungen at Div level and / or at Corps level
Given the damage done by werfers (see Brit and US accounts) they were a mighty fine replacement for 4th Arty bn.
The Germans were already in crisis mode before the allies even landed so a div here and there might not have all it should - ie HJ went into battle originally without its Pz Jager Abt, LAH was short most of its werfers etc.
Lehr did have 18 Flak 8.8cm, wheras the other divisions nominally had 12 each (1 SS, 2 SS, 9 SS, 10 SS, 2, 9, 21, 116, and 17 SS-PzGD). But the reality was a little different.
17 SS-PzGD had just 8 8.8cm Flak in Normandy, the remaining 4 stayed at Saumur because of lack of transport.
21 Pz had just 8 Flak 8.8cm, but also 24 PaK 8.8cm.
The situation regarding Werfers was a little different. Nominally there were three battalions in Normandy, two of four and one of three batteries. But there were none at both the "corps/division" level as you appear to imply. Rather, the division battalions were also in some cases corps battalions.
Werfer Abteilung 1 (101/5010) of 1 SS-PzD had four batteries, but was initially only nominally part of the division, since it was supposed to be a corps asset of I SS-PzK. Only one battery arrived initially, with two more arriving later in July. The last battery evidently never left Belgium.
Werfer Abteilung 2 (102/502) of 2 SS-PzD had three batteries, but was only nominally part of the division, since it was supposed to be a corps asset of II SS-PzK. It is unclear when it arrived in Normandy.
Werfer Abteilung 12 of 12 SS-PzD had four batteries, all non-motorized, and only one of which evidently arrived with the division in June, the remaining three arrived sometime in July.
And although they were able to deliver a massive volume of fire, werfers like all MRL had distinct disadvantages over conventional artillery. These included short range, distinctive firing signature and difficulty in resupply and reloading.
-
Hans Weber
- Enthusiast
- Posts: 457
- Joined: Wed Oct 09, 2002 11:48 am
Hello
I should only get involved into this sort of discussion if on holidays. I will take up matters with Qvist first and time permitting, deal with the other new issues later.
Qvist, you noticed my reluctance to evaluate the Rommel position vs. the Geyr/Rundstedt/Guderian position. I'm still convinced that the issues were becoming irrelevant once the landing happend. Still, for the argument's sake I will try to take up the challenge and advocate for the other side, as you obviously invested a lot of thinking in your reply. I'm actually pretty convinced that the concept of mobile defense was the only with a real chance of success and thus superior to Rommel's concept of area defense. A lot of ink has been spilled on this topic, the most interesting parts imho by the opponents themselves. Each party voiced sound military thinking as can be expected from competent officers in their positions. I also stated before, that it is interesting that the concepts provided can be linked to the mission received by the master minds of these plans. Rundstedt's position as OB-West, Geyr's position as head of Pz. Gruppe West and Rommel's as chief of Heeresgruppe B (notably the Heeresgruppe tasked to defend against the invasion, be it on the Mediterranean or the Channel) all influenced the decisions taken.
You said if I'm correct that Rommel's approach was the right one because he tried to defeat the invasion within 1 or 2 days and everything should have been undertaken to acertain this. Everything in this case especially implies what Rommel proposed, i.e. moving the Panzer Reserves towards the Coast. You also said that this is the more unconventional or risk frought approach. Starting with the last one, this is not the case, Rommel simply traded in one risk against another. He was of the opinion that the forces available in France were not enough to permit both a strong enough occupation of the main line of resistance (MLR) and to keep an operational reserve. Under the impression that the enemy was at the weakest at the time of the landing and that he would be successfull in locking up the combat area with his air force he thus wanted a) to fortify the MLR to keep the enemy at the critical spot as long as possible b) move up 1 (one) Panzerdivision ready to intervene within 3 (three) hours of the landing. This already was a compromise caused by the available forces. There would not be a Panzerdivision for Utah, Omaha, Sword, Gold and Juno respectivly other namessakes he wouldn't have an idea on but one for dealing with all the Allies could beach on D-Day. To put a ring of Panzer Divisions this tight behind every spot a landing with a substantial fraction of force could have taken place would not have been possible. I didn't make a calculation based on the evaluation maps the Wehrmacht drew up, but I would suppose the result would not be far from the number Reb proposed as he said forty Divisions. Rommel then was faced with the same dilema the others where, only a little bit later on the time axe. What if the initial forces would not suffice? He then assumed somewhat illogical by his own prior reasoning that it would be possible to draw on reserves at this moment. This was a kind of forced wishfull thinking, he called it a compromise. It was necessary to feed more reserves into the battle for him by all means, why? Because by taking up the battle on the beach and reinforcing this option with positioning the reserves near the beach he had reduced the defense area in depth. This was the disadvantage i mentioned above he traded in for having the units close. If the Allies would break through, there would be no second line, no more reserves for a mobile in depth defense.
Rundstedt was from the start of the opinion to keep both options open. He a) wanted a strong Atlantik Wall, but - and I think this is ultimately true and has been shown through ages of military history (Limes, Chinese Wall etc) - he knew in his heart that every defense line can be breached by enough means. If you make a stand at a prepared line you are starting a race against the enemy building up a force stronger than you build your line. And in this the Germans lost.
He then b) wanted to keep a reserve big enough to make a Schwerpunkt. The Germans had experienced very well results with relativly small forces hitting bigger forces at the right time at the right spot on the Eastern Front. With hindsight on Sicily and Salerno, he was aware of the effect ship artillery would inevitably have on armoured forces " This means that a wandering in of Panzers into directed enemy fire of heavy ship artillery and with this the reckless vertical thrust to the Coast Line is no longer the remedy these days, but the big Panzerunits have to fight away from the zone of fire if the enemy fleet can not be forced to maintain a distance from the Coast by our countermesures and with this have to give up influencing the outcome of the land battle." (Rundstedt, OB West I a Nr. 696/45, 26.11.1943).
To keep the Panzerunits as an element of reserve also necessitated to have them not under fire or in enemy contact at once at the start (e.g. air landings). If it is the enemy who decides when you have to fight, the unit can not be considered a reserve anymore. This is a further reason for spacing them from the Coast Line. Both he and Geyr were aware of the possibilities of airpower. Geyr by the way was not obsessed by some air landing in central France. This was a discrediting jibe on the part of Rommel, having in mind that Geyr empazised this possibility in one or two of his Planspiele he conducted. However this notion never entered into Geyr's appreciation and propositions on the question how to employ operational reserves (Panzergruppe West, Ia Nr. 17/44, 30.1.44). Geyr was of the opinion that it would still be possible to move units during the night into position unmolested and to be able to execute a concentrated blow later. He called this the "Jungle Tiger tactic".
What happened actually: The Rommel concept was implemented to a certain degree as I outlined above with the disposition of troops. OB West's loss on units would question the operational value of the reserves remaining.
On the first day, Rommel was proven wrong regarding the Atlantik Wall, or better he was shown he had lost the race. The Allies managed to breach the Wall, having enough forces and firepower to overcome it. As predicted by the others, his armoured intervention force was engaged at once (by a para landing) and thus hampered on the onset (The Allies had exact knowledge on the disposition of German forces, this was not by accident). Rundstedt and Geyr were proven right that still with air superiority, it was possible to move units ( as 12 HJ and PLD did) a substantial way to the front. Rundstedt was proven right regarding the devastating effect of shipfire. It was Rommel who wrote on 11. June 44 (Okdo d.H.Gr.B. Ia) "On the effect of heavy ship artillery:Up to 640 heavy tubes were used. Their effect is that strong, that operating in a area dominated by this fast firing artillery is possible neither for infantry nor for Panzer units."
I would add that HJ's thrust against the Canadians after overcoming them at Buron on the 7th June was stopped by heavy ship artillery. Not to speak of the effect of air power. It is correct that the kill tally of the Allies was exagerated. We should howerver not burry our noses too deep into numbers and fail to see that the mere presence of these Jabos changed the face of the battle but completely. You speak of lost opportunties regarding 21. PD. I would rank higher the one lost in the night of 10/11 June when Pz. Gruppe West was prevented to mount the counterattack by 12. SS. PLD and 21. PD it had anticipated for months because the HQ was bombed out by air. Imho this was one of the only real chances to get some success and it was based primarly on the concept of Geyr, not Rommel's, to combat the landing with a Schwerpunkt after all the forces had arrived even if it would take some days. After this the Germans could only hope to fight the symptoms, not the desease. They tried to regain the initiative later some times, notably at Mortain, and indeed, as Geyr had claimed, managed to move Panzer Divisions by night unopposed and unnoticed. Only and this is the big difference, it was another matter by day after the mists disolved to move in combat formation and attack. I therefore maintain and it has again been proven later through the Ardennes Offensive that the Germans only had a chance of success while conducting a mobile defense in depth, striking the enemy were he didn't expect it. The hope wasn't with holding fortifications but in maouvering. Every time the effect of Allied Air force could be ruled out (weather, night) they had a chance of regaining the initiative.This was after all what Panzer Divisions were meant to do. Wasting them and here I can agree with allmost everything what Reb wrote later as some sort of heavy infantry was a mistake, draining on exactly these last reserves. In this context I would also make a point out of the show 11. PD made with a skillfull delaying mobile defence up the Rhone Valley. Obviously it was very good nobody intefered too much with Blaskowitz' lost boys in this case and issued hold at all costs orders...
Cheers
Hans
I should only get involved into this sort of discussion if on holidays. I will take up matters with Qvist first and time permitting, deal with the other new issues later.
Qvist, you noticed my reluctance to evaluate the Rommel position vs. the Geyr/Rundstedt/Guderian position. I'm still convinced that the issues were becoming irrelevant once the landing happend. Still, for the argument's sake I will try to take up the challenge and advocate for the other side, as you obviously invested a lot of thinking in your reply. I'm actually pretty convinced that the concept of mobile defense was the only with a real chance of success and thus superior to Rommel's concept of area defense. A lot of ink has been spilled on this topic, the most interesting parts imho by the opponents themselves. Each party voiced sound military thinking as can be expected from competent officers in their positions. I also stated before, that it is interesting that the concepts provided can be linked to the mission received by the master minds of these plans. Rundstedt's position as OB-West, Geyr's position as head of Pz. Gruppe West and Rommel's as chief of Heeresgruppe B (notably the Heeresgruppe tasked to defend against the invasion, be it on the Mediterranean or the Channel) all influenced the decisions taken.
You said if I'm correct that Rommel's approach was the right one because he tried to defeat the invasion within 1 or 2 days and everything should have been undertaken to acertain this. Everything in this case especially implies what Rommel proposed, i.e. moving the Panzer Reserves towards the Coast. You also said that this is the more unconventional or risk frought approach. Starting with the last one, this is not the case, Rommel simply traded in one risk against another. He was of the opinion that the forces available in France were not enough to permit both a strong enough occupation of the main line of resistance (MLR) and to keep an operational reserve. Under the impression that the enemy was at the weakest at the time of the landing and that he would be successfull in locking up the combat area with his air force he thus wanted a) to fortify the MLR to keep the enemy at the critical spot as long as possible b) move up 1 (one) Panzerdivision ready to intervene within 3 (three) hours of the landing. This already was a compromise caused by the available forces. There would not be a Panzerdivision for Utah, Omaha, Sword, Gold and Juno respectivly other namessakes he wouldn't have an idea on but one for dealing with all the Allies could beach on D-Day. To put a ring of Panzer Divisions this tight behind every spot a landing with a substantial fraction of force could have taken place would not have been possible. I didn't make a calculation based on the evaluation maps the Wehrmacht drew up, but I would suppose the result would not be far from the number Reb proposed as he said forty Divisions. Rommel then was faced with the same dilema the others where, only a little bit later on the time axe. What if the initial forces would not suffice? He then assumed somewhat illogical by his own prior reasoning that it would be possible to draw on reserves at this moment. This was a kind of forced wishfull thinking, he called it a compromise. It was necessary to feed more reserves into the battle for him by all means, why? Because by taking up the battle on the beach and reinforcing this option with positioning the reserves near the beach he had reduced the defense area in depth. This was the disadvantage i mentioned above he traded in for having the units close. If the Allies would break through, there would be no second line, no more reserves for a mobile in depth defense.
Rundstedt was from the start of the opinion to keep both options open. He a) wanted a strong Atlantik Wall, but - and I think this is ultimately true and has been shown through ages of military history (Limes, Chinese Wall etc) - he knew in his heart that every defense line can be breached by enough means. If you make a stand at a prepared line you are starting a race against the enemy building up a force stronger than you build your line. And in this the Germans lost.
He then b) wanted to keep a reserve big enough to make a Schwerpunkt. The Germans had experienced very well results with relativly small forces hitting bigger forces at the right time at the right spot on the Eastern Front. With hindsight on Sicily and Salerno, he was aware of the effect ship artillery would inevitably have on armoured forces " This means that a wandering in of Panzers into directed enemy fire of heavy ship artillery and with this the reckless vertical thrust to the Coast Line is no longer the remedy these days, but the big Panzerunits have to fight away from the zone of fire if the enemy fleet can not be forced to maintain a distance from the Coast by our countermesures and with this have to give up influencing the outcome of the land battle." (Rundstedt, OB West I a Nr. 696/45, 26.11.1943).
To keep the Panzerunits as an element of reserve also necessitated to have them not under fire or in enemy contact at once at the start (e.g. air landings). If it is the enemy who decides when you have to fight, the unit can not be considered a reserve anymore. This is a further reason for spacing them from the Coast Line. Both he and Geyr were aware of the possibilities of airpower. Geyr by the way was not obsessed by some air landing in central France. This was a discrediting jibe on the part of Rommel, having in mind that Geyr empazised this possibility in one or two of his Planspiele he conducted. However this notion never entered into Geyr's appreciation and propositions on the question how to employ operational reserves (Panzergruppe West, Ia Nr. 17/44, 30.1.44). Geyr was of the opinion that it would still be possible to move units during the night into position unmolested and to be able to execute a concentrated blow later. He called this the "Jungle Tiger tactic".
What happened actually: The Rommel concept was implemented to a certain degree as I outlined above with the disposition of troops. OB West's loss on units would question the operational value of the reserves remaining.
On the first day, Rommel was proven wrong regarding the Atlantik Wall, or better he was shown he had lost the race. The Allies managed to breach the Wall, having enough forces and firepower to overcome it. As predicted by the others, his armoured intervention force was engaged at once (by a para landing) and thus hampered on the onset (The Allies had exact knowledge on the disposition of German forces, this was not by accident). Rundstedt and Geyr were proven right that still with air superiority, it was possible to move units ( as 12 HJ and PLD did) a substantial way to the front. Rundstedt was proven right regarding the devastating effect of shipfire. It was Rommel who wrote on 11. June 44 (Okdo d.H.Gr.B. Ia) "On the effect of heavy ship artillery:Up to 640 heavy tubes were used. Their effect is that strong, that operating in a area dominated by this fast firing artillery is possible neither for infantry nor for Panzer units."
I would add that HJ's thrust against the Canadians after overcoming them at Buron on the 7th June was stopped by heavy ship artillery. Not to speak of the effect of air power. It is correct that the kill tally of the Allies was exagerated. We should howerver not burry our noses too deep into numbers and fail to see that the mere presence of these Jabos changed the face of the battle but completely. You speak of lost opportunties regarding 21. PD. I would rank higher the one lost in the night of 10/11 June when Pz. Gruppe West was prevented to mount the counterattack by 12. SS. PLD and 21. PD it had anticipated for months because the HQ was bombed out by air. Imho this was one of the only real chances to get some success and it was based primarly on the concept of Geyr, not Rommel's, to combat the landing with a Schwerpunkt after all the forces had arrived even if it would take some days. After this the Germans could only hope to fight the symptoms, not the desease. They tried to regain the initiative later some times, notably at Mortain, and indeed, as Geyr had claimed, managed to move Panzer Divisions by night unopposed and unnoticed. Only and this is the big difference, it was another matter by day after the mists disolved to move in combat formation and attack. I therefore maintain and it has again been proven later through the Ardennes Offensive that the Germans only had a chance of success while conducting a mobile defense in depth, striking the enemy were he didn't expect it. The hope wasn't with holding fortifications but in maouvering. Every time the effect of Allied Air force could be ruled out (weather, night) they had a chance of regaining the initiative.This was after all what Panzer Divisions were meant to do. Wasting them and here I can agree with allmost everything what Reb wrote later as some sort of heavy infantry was a mistake, draining on exactly these last reserves. In this context I would also make a point out of the show 11. PD made with a skillfull delaying mobile defence up the Rhone Valley. Obviously it was very good nobody intefered too much with Blaskowitz' lost boys in this case and issued hold at all costs orders...
Cheers
Hans
To cut to the heart of the issue -- the real factor here is the deployment and employment of the pz divs.
The Atlantic Wall is neither here nor there. Both camps wanted it to be as strong as possible, and neither expected it to hold. Obviously the Germans wanted the landings to be as costly and difficult as possible, but neither Rundstedt nor even Rommel expected the beach defences to actually stop any serious landing attempt.
The debate was, as I said, all about the pz divs.
Rommel wanted to forward deploy them -- close enough to counter-attack on the first day. "Close enough to counter-attack on the first day" means at least as close as 12th SS was, ideally as close as 21 Pz was. The trade-off involved in this was not, I would humbly suggest, that it "reduced the defense area in depth" as Herr Weber suggests. The problem (which it is clear Rommel was acutely aware of) was which beaches to put them close to.
Pz divs deployed for immediate counter-attack of those ideal beaches in the PAS-DE-CALAIS would never make to, say just as an example, beaches in NORMANDY, for the first day (or likely the second or third...) In other words, reserves that are deployed that far forward are in essence "pre-committed" to the beaches they are sited to cover. They can't be sent elsewhere within the time-frame Rommel wanted. Frankly, they aren't operational reserves at all any more -- they are merely tactical reserves for the beach defences.
This is why what Rommel was proposing was so radical (especially in German military thought). In essence, he was arguing that OB West should forego having any operational reserves at all. They should all be committed to the beaches.
Rundstedt, on the other hand, and Geyr, were more classical German officers. They too were keen on an Atlantic Wall that would impose as much delay as possible, but the critical pz divs they wanted grouped in a single, powerful, operational level reserve, to be located primarily in the forests just West of PARIS on the North bank of the SEINE. From there, this mighty armoured fist would strike a concerted blow on the Allies, once their main operational thrust lines were clear, in a classic German mobile battle.
So ... to summarize:
Rommel wanted no pz divs in op level reserve, but rather to commit all of them to the beachs. Since there so palpably weren't enough to cover all of the potential landing sites (40 is somewhat high, a dozen would have been more than enough), the gamble here was where to put them.
Rundstedt/Geyr wanted to put all of the pz divs in op level reserve, to be located just west of PARIS. The gamble here was whether, in the face of Allied air power, they would have been able to successfully intervene in the battle.
These two camps couldn't reach agreement, and the argument escalated all of the way up to Hitler. Hitler, perhaps not surprisingly for a man who after all was a politician, produced a compromise. He put about half of the pz divs in op level reserve, but scattered them behind the various possible invasion beaches. He put the other half in strategic reserve under his own personal control, but didn't concentrate them in one central location either (they were scattered as well, but in slightly greater depth).
Both of the schools of though were gambles (as both Rommel and Rundstedt fully appreciated) but both, in my humble opinion, had a chance of succeeding. But the thing is -- both were diametrically opposite. There was no middle ground (which is precisely why they couldn't come to an agreement). A compromise such as Hitler produced simply delivered the cons of both and the pros of neither possible approach. There was no strong reserve for a concerted blow. And indeed, no concerted counter-attack of the landings was ever attempted, and nor could there have been given the dispositions. Conversely, neither were enough pz divs close enough to the beaches for Rommel's strategy either.
End result: no concerted counter-attack, and no immediate counter-attack.
Thank God for the Fuehrer!
The Atlantic Wall is neither here nor there. Both camps wanted it to be as strong as possible, and neither expected it to hold. Obviously the Germans wanted the landings to be as costly and difficult as possible, but neither Rundstedt nor even Rommel expected the beach defences to actually stop any serious landing attempt.
The debate was, as I said, all about the pz divs.
Rommel wanted to forward deploy them -- close enough to counter-attack on the first day. "Close enough to counter-attack on the first day" means at least as close as 12th SS was, ideally as close as 21 Pz was. The trade-off involved in this was not, I would humbly suggest, that it "reduced the defense area in depth" as Herr Weber suggests. The problem (which it is clear Rommel was acutely aware of) was which beaches to put them close to.
Pz divs deployed for immediate counter-attack of those ideal beaches in the PAS-DE-CALAIS would never make to, say just as an example, beaches in NORMANDY, for the first day (or likely the second or third...) In other words, reserves that are deployed that far forward are in essence "pre-committed" to the beaches they are sited to cover. They can't be sent elsewhere within the time-frame Rommel wanted. Frankly, they aren't operational reserves at all any more -- they are merely tactical reserves for the beach defences.
This is why what Rommel was proposing was so radical (especially in German military thought). In essence, he was arguing that OB West should forego having any operational reserves at all. They should all be committed to the beaches.
Rundstedt, on the other hand, and Geyr, were more classical German officers. They too were keen on an Atlantic Wall that would impose as much delay as possible, but the critical pz divs they wanted grouped in a single, powerful, operational level reserve, to be located primarily in the forests just West of PARIS on the North bank of the SEINE. From there, this mighty armoured fist would strike a concerted blow on the Allies, once their main operational thrust lines were clear, in a classic German mobile battle.
So ... to summarize:
Rommel wanted no pz divs in op level reserve, but rather to commit all of them to the beachs. Since there so palpably weren't enough to cover all of the potential landing sites (40 is somewhat high, a dozen would have been more than enough), the gamble here was where to put them.
Rundstedt/Geyr wanted to put all of the pz divs in op level reserve, to be located just west of PARIS. The gamble here was whether, in the face of Allied air power, they would have been able to successfully intervene in the battle.
These two camps couldn't reach agreement, and the argument escalated all of the way up to Hitler. Hitler, perhaps not surprisingly for a man who after all was a politician, produced a compromise. He put about half of the pz divs in op level reserve, but scattered them behind the various possible invasion beaches. He put the other half in strategic reserve under his own personal control, but didn't concentrate them in one central location either (they were scattered as well, but in slightly greater depth).
Both of the schools of though were gambles (as both Rommel and Rundstedt fully appreciated) but both, in my humble opinion, had a chance of succeeding. But the thing is -- both were diametrically opposite. There was no middle ground (which is precisely why they couldn't come to an agreement). A compromise such as Hitler produced simply delivered the cons of both and the pros of neither possible approach. There was no strong reserve for a concerted blow. And indeed, no concerted counter-attack of the landings was ever attempted, and nor could there have been given the dispositions. Conversely, neither were enough pz divs close enough to the beaches for Rommel's strategy either.
End result: no concerted counter-attack, and no immediate counter-attack.
Thank God for the Fuehrer!
Hello Hans
Thank you for taking the time and effort to write such a thorough analysis, a post of more value than the discussion found of this issue in many published works. You provide a thought-provoking case, to be sure. So what I'm mainly going to do is to let it provoke me to further thought.
But the first product of further thought is usually a series of questions, and several occur to me immediately. Most of them are however already mentioned in my previous post. The most critical of them would IMO still be this:
Which forces would conceivably hold the invasion front while a Panzer Schwerpunkt was gathered? Or was it a conceivable course of action to allow the invasion front to collapse and then attempt to remedy the situation with a later counterstroke? If so, what of the numerous and largely static divisions in Normandy and Brittany who would have possessed scant chance of making a timely withdrawal, with the invasion coming where it did, or for that matter at any other likely spot?
cheers
Thank you for taking the time and effort to write such a thorough analysis, a post of more value than the discussion found of this issue in many published works. You provide a thought-provoking case, to be sure. So what I'm mainly going to do is to let it provoke me to further thought.
But the first product of further thought is usually a series of questions, and several occur to me immediately. Most of them are however already mentioned in my previous post. The most critical of them would IMO still be this:
Which forces would conceivably hold the invasion front while a Panzer Schwerpunkt was gathered? Or was it a conceivable course of action to allow the invasion front to collapse and then attempt to remedy the situation with a later counterstroke? If so, what of the numerous and largely static divisions in Normandy and Brittany who would have possessed scant chance of making a timely withdrawal, with the invasion coming where it did, or for that matter at any other likely spot?
cheers
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Hans Weber
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- Posts: 457
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Hello PaulJ
The debate was not in the vacuum of the actual situation, facing the possibility of an Allied Sea Landing, therefor the fortification of the Coastal Line = Atlantik Wall was of course part of it. To understand that Rommel indeed wanted to make it impregnable is to understand also why he emphazised on having the Pz. Div under his command. Rundstedt had a more realistic outlook on the Atlantik-Wall.
Cheers
Hans[/quote]
No, the tradeoff was the loss of operational reserves with which to defend the in depth. Carefull evaluation of the Coastal Line made sure that the Germans knew where the dangerous areas where. Protecting them all , respectivly moving them nearer to the coast and still keeping the reserves was not possible. On D-day, the Reserves of Heeresgruppe B were committed as Rommel wanted, in case of 21. PD poised to intervene H + 3 hours and thus in accordance with his concept. The operational reserves of OKW were orientated also to the Channel (excp 17 SS). Rommel: "A halfway strong occupation of the endangered Coastal Region can only be accomplished by drawing on the operational reserves, whereas a strong operational reserver can only be built by pulling troops out of the Coastal Defense System." (see the Rommel Papers).Rommel wanted to forward deploy them -- close enough to counter-attack on the first day. "Close enough to counter-attack on the first day" means at least as close as 12th SS was, ideally as close as 21 Pz was. The trade-off involved in this was not, I would humbly suggest, that it "reduced the defense area in depth" as Herr Weber suggests. The problem (which it is clear Rommel was acutely aware of) was which beaches to put them close to.
The debate was not in the vacuum of the actual situation, facing the possibility of an Allied Sea Landing, therefor the fortification of the Coastal Line = Atlantik Wall was of course part of it. To understand that Rommel indeed wanted to make it impregnable is to understand also why he emphazised on having the Pz. Div under his command. Rundstedt had a more realistic outlook on the Atlantik-Wall.
Cheers
Hans[/quote]
Hi Reb
There is no disagreement that German Panzer Divisions had a FLAK batallion, and that this was normally equipped partly with 88mm guns. But we will avoid misunderstanding if we refer to that as a FLAK batallion rather than an "88mm batallion", which in fact it was not, in terms of nomenclature as well as substance.
cheers
There is no disagreement that German Panzer Divisions had a FLAK batallion, and that this was normally equipped partly with 88mm guns. But we will avoid misunderstanding if we refer to that as a FLAK batallion rather than an "88mm batallion", which in fact it was not, in terms of nomenclature as well as substance.
cheers