German War crimes in Russia

Schultz · Post by **Schultz** » Fri Dec 03, 2004 10:35 pm

So yer sources have atrocitys by soviet forces from 1920-1985?
A trocities are committed by maney nations we can post connections for all, the photos you show are no different than any other, does that justify the atrocities the soviets commited, I agree the iensatzgruppe where brutal but not much different than the NKVD, OR THE POLES OR THE UKRAINES OR THE BOSNIANS OR THE CROATES,.
My father knows a Polish fighter pilot that hates russians fer some reason? wonder why? maybe he saw stuff before he escaped from the train taken his butt to the gulag in '39-40 before he got to England.
War is brutal.

Schultz

Schultz · Post by **Schultz** » Fri Dec 03, 2004 10:47 pm

O'ya cant forget the people killed by the postguards and landmines in berlin, the ones that dissappeared from all the eastern european countries after the war. You got figures for them?

Schultz

Igorn · Post by **Igorn** » Sat Dec 04, 2004 12:41 am

Mr. Schultz,

Don't advocate Nazi war crimes by saying that war is brutal and don't try to divert attention from the topic of this thread, which is German war crimes in Russia.

Best Regards from Russia,

Schultz · Post by **Schultz** » Sat Dec 04, 2004 2:39 am

I'm not advocating the crimes done by the NAZI's you are you where first to bring up crimes by the iensatz, original poster was asking about wehrmacht, you brought NAZI's to the table and others, get off yer propoganda mission for the great socialist republic, i merely replied not to just your comments but all to the way it was going, you stay n track poster asked wehrmacht you post ss execution squads.
Maybe i show some good photos of Pomerenia, Selesia or Afghanistan or Khazahkstan. Hell maybe Lithuania, Estonia an i bet some Finnish photos to really top it off.
But just talkin what the Germans did in Russia, ya they did quit a few things wrong, just talkin Wehrmacht there where quit a few but not more than normal for the front, the russian troops did the same and that was still in there own territory, civilians caught between armies are never lucky and the Eastern front of WW2 was definatly not the place to be.
The soviet population sufferd harder than probably anyone except the Chinese, but this isn't about them either, it's about what did the wehrmacht do. So you remember what the question was to.

Schultz

sid guttridge · Post by **sid guttridge** » Sat Dec 04, 2004 4:30 am

Hi Schultz,

The thread is entitled "German War Crimes in Russia."

This allows Igorn to quite legitimately bring in all German warcrimes, whether committed by the Wehrmacht or other agencies.

Cheers,

Sid.

Schultz · Post by **Schultz** » Sat Dec 04, 2004 5:09 am

I am a little bit confused. Several times a week there´s shows on German TV here that tell the people that the Wehrmacht (not the SS!) committed unbelievable atrocities during the war on the eastern front.

I was wondering about the evidence for this. I´ve tried for several weeks now to find specific evidence. It´s easy to find stuff about Oradour sur Glane or Wormhoudt. But why didn´t I find any SPECIFIC evidence about crimes on the eastern front? No city-names, no units - nothing!

he says (not the SS)

Thanks Sid

Schultz

Igorn · Post by **Igorn** » Sat Dec 04, 2004 8:06 am

Schultz wrote:I am a little bit confused. Several times a week there´s shows on German TV here that tell the people that the Wehrmacht (not the SS!) committed unbelievable atrocities during the war on the eastern front.

I was wondering about the evidence for this. I´ve tried for several weeks now to find specific evidence. It´s easy to find stuff about Oradour sur Glane or Wormhoudt. But why didn´t I find any SPECIFIC evidence about crimes on the eastern front? No city-names, no units - nothing!
he says (not the SS)
Thanks Sid
Schultz

Mr. Schultz,

Please find below links to the web site where you will find plenty of evidence, verified by the Nuernberg Tribunal about German war crimes in Russia.

http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/genocide/wehrmacht.htm
http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/genocide/USSR.htm
http://katardat.org/marxuniv/2002-SUWW2 ... lties.html
http://katardat.org/marxuniv/2002-SUWW2 ... -Kovno.jpg
http://katardat.org/marxuniv/2002-SUWW2 ... anen02.jpg

The Wehrmacht, the Holocaust, and War Crimes
[Please see the note concerning the provenance of files in this presentation]

Order #21 Signed by Keitel Concerning Jurisdiction of Miitary, SS, and Police Forces During Barbarossa, 13 March 1941
Fuhrer Decree on Disciplining of German Troops and Handling of Resistance in District Area "Barbarossa", 13 May 1941
Heydrich Directives Concerning Handling of USSR Prisoners of War, 28 June 1941/July 1941
Hitler's Order of the Day to Troops on the Eastern Front, October 2, 1941
Keitel Order Concerning Ruthless Suppression of Resistance in Occupied USSR, 16 September 1941
The copy reproduced of this document is dated 16 September 1941. The date given in the collation of the list of documents, Vol. 8 of the series, p.816, is 16 December 1941
Statement by the Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Molotov, on German Attrocities in Occupied USSR, 1941
Rosenberg Letter to Keitel Concerning Maltreatment of USSR Prisoners of War, 28 February 1942
Combatting Single Parachutists, Keitel Order, 4 August 1942
Fuehrer Order Concerning Handling of Commandos, 18 October 1942
Memorandum by Brautigam Concerning Conditions in Occupied Areas of the USSR 25 October 1942
Kugel Erlass ("Bullet Decree"), 4 March 1944
Decree stipulating that escaped POWs are to be handed over to the SD for handling. They were then sent to Mauthausen Concentration Camp where they were executed.
A Short Historical Consideration of German War Guilt, by Alfred Jodl, 6 September 1945
The Origins of the Directives of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, by Wilhelm Keitel, 15 September 1945
The Position and Powers of the Chief of the OKW, by Wilhelm Keitel, 9 October 1946
Notes by Keitel Concerning Actions of German Armed Forces During the War and in Occupied Territory 19 October 1945
These notes were prepared by Wilhelm Keitel, Chief of the High Command of the German Armed Forces, OKW, for the Chief of Investigation before the Nurnberg Tribunal, Mr. Dodd. They are noteworthy for the accounts advanced to justify those policies classified by the Allied powers as war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Affidavit of Generaloberst Franz Halder 22 November, 1945
This affidavit is of interest in connection with the decisions relating to the Anschluss, the invasions of Czechoslovakia, Poland and France, the approach of the OKW to the neutrality of Belgium and Holland, the reasons for the attack on the USSR, and details concerning the Commissar Order and the handling of USSR POWs.
Affidavit of Otto Ohlendorf, 20 November 1945
Ohlendorf was a senior officer in the RSHA, an early Nazi Party member (1925) and, most importantly, the commander of Einsatzgruppe D, which was one of four special purpose Action Groups charged with the extermination of Jews, Commissars, Partisans and other "undesirable" segments of the USSR populace.
Political Way by Otto Ohlendorf, 20 November 1945
Otto Ohlendorf, commander of Einsatzgruppe D, expounds his views on Fascism and National Socialism:
"These principles advocated, as the foremost goal of National Socialism, to develop the best characteristics of the people and to form them into a community of equality and to furnish the best possible spiritual and moral existence for the individuals of the people."
Testimony of Erwin Lahousen before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 30 November 1945
Trial of General Von Mackensen and General Maelzer. United Nations War Crimes Commission, 1949
Trial of Albert Kesserling. United Nations War Crimes Commission. 1949
The Dreierwalde Case. Trial of Karl Amberger. United Nations War Crimes Commission, 1947
Trial of Carl Bauer, Ernst Schrameck, Herbert Falten. United Nations War Crimes Commission. 1949
Affidavit of Erwin Lahousen, 21 January 1946
Lahousen served in the Abwehr, the intelligence service of the OKW, between 1938 and 1943. He was one of Canaris' section chiefs and represented him at various conferences with senior OKW officers. His affidavit, provided to investigating officers for the Nuremberg Tribunal of the Major German War Criminals, provides information concerning plans for the destruction of elites in Poland and the killings of Russian POWs, and the attitude of senior OKW officers to them, particularly Keitel and Reinecke. Only those portions of the affidavit relating to policies pursued respecting the populations of occupied countries and war crimes are reproduced here.
German Crimes Against Soviet Prisoners-of-War in Poland. Central Commission for the Investigation of German Crimes in Poland. 1946
Nuremberg Charges
Hans Frank (Governor-General of non-annexed occupied Poland)
Alfred Jodl
Ernst Kaltenbrunner (Chief of the RSHA 1943-1945)
Wilhelm Keitel
Alfred Rosenberg
Artur Seyss-Inquart Part I, Part II, Part III, Part IV
Julius Streicher
The General Staff and High Command of the Armed Forces Part I, Part II, Part III, Part IV, Part V
The SS, Part I, Part II, Part III, Part IV, Part V
The Geheime Staatspolizei (GESTAPO) and Sicherheitsdienst (SD) Part I, Part II, Part III, Part IV, Part V, Part VI
Nuremberg Judgments
Frank, Goering, Jodl, Kaltenbrunner, Keitel, Rosenberg, Saukel, Streicher
Other Relevant Files
Book Reviews: Warfare, Third Reich
Documents Relating to the Holocaust, War Crimes and Genocide
Occupation Country Policies
Poland
USSR
Occupation Country Policies
USSR
[Please see the note concerning the provenance of files in this presentation]
Order #21 Signed by Keitel Concerning Jurisdiction of Miitary, SS, and Police Forces During Barbarossa, 13 March 1941
Fuhrer Decree on Disciplining of German Troops and Handling of Resistance in District Area "Barbarossa", 13 May 1941
Communication from the Commissar for White Ruthenia, Kube, to Rosenberg, Concerning Appropriation of Cultural Objects by the SS and the Wehrmacht, 29 September 1941
Secret Field Marshal v.Reichenau Order Concerning Conduct of Troops in the Eastern Territories. Dated 10 October, 1941
Correspondence and Report Concerning the Aktion of Police Battalion 11 in Sluzk, 27 October 1941
Molotov's Note on German Atrocities in Occupied Soviet Territory, 7 January 1942
Rosenberg Letter to Keitel Concerning Maltreatment of USSR Prisoners of War, 28 February 1942
Reinecke Order Concerning Treatment of Soviet Prisoners of War, March 24, 1942
A Short Historical Consideration of German War Guilt, by Alfred Jodl, 6 September 1945
Memorandum by Brautigam Concerning Conditions in Occupied Areas of the USSR 25 October 1942
Affidavit of Otto Ohlendorf, 20 November 1945
Ohlendorf was a senior officer in the RSHA, an early Nazi Party member (1925) and, most importantly, the commander of Einsatzgruppe D, which was one of four special purpose Action Groups charged with the extermination of Jews, Commissars, Partisans and other "undesirable" segments of the USSR populace.
Political Way by Otto Ohlendorf, 20 November 1945
Otto Ohlendorf, commander of Einsatzgruppe D, expounds his views on Fascism and National Socialism:
"These principles advocated, as the foremost goal of National Socialism, to develop the best characteristics of the people and to form them into a community of equality and to furnish the best possible spiritual and moral existence for the individuals of the people."
Testimony of Erwin Lahousen before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 30 November 1945
Affidavit of Erwin Lahousen, 21 January 1946
Lahousen served in the Abwehr, the intelligence service of the OKW, between 1938 and 1943. He was one of Canaris' section chiefs and represented him at various conferences with senior OKW officers. His affidavit, provided to investigating officers for the Nuremberg Tribunal of the Major German War Criminals, provides information concerning plans for the destruction of elites in Poland and the killings of Russian POWs, and the attitude of senior OKW officers to them, particularly Keitel and Reinecke. Only those portions of the affidavit relating to policies pursued respecting the populations of occupied countries and war crimes are reproduced here.
Alfred Rosenberg (Nuremberg Tribunal Charges, 1945)
German Crimes Against Soviet Prisoners-of-War in Poland. Central Commission for the Investigation of German Crimes in Poland. 1946
Nuremberg Charges
The General Staff and High Command of the Armed Forces Part I, Part II, Part III, Part IV, Part V
Order #21Signed By Keitel Concerning Jurisdiction of
Military, SS, and Police Forces During Barbarossa
TOP SECRET
Top Secret
Only thru officer
OKW
Armed Forces Operational Staff
Section L (IV/ Qu)
44125/ 41 Top Secret
Fuehrer Hq, 13 March 1941
5 copies, 4th copy
Subject: Armed Forces Operational Staff/ Section L( I) #33408/ 40. Top Secret. 18 December 1940
Directives for Special Areas to Order #21 (Case Barbarossa)
I. Area of operations and executive power
1. The authorization to issue orders and the regulations regarding supply for an area of operations within the armed forces shall be set up by the High Command of the Armed Forces in East Prussia and in the General Gouvernement at the latest four weeks before operations are started. The proposal by the High Command of the Army (OKH) is being made in time, after an agreement with the Commander of the Luftwaffe (Ob. d. L.) has been reached.
It is not contemplated to declare East Prussia and the General Gouvernement an area of operations. However, in accordance with the unpublished Fuehrer orders from 19 and 21 October 1939, the Supreme Commander of the Army shall be authorized to take all measures necessary for the execution of his military aim and for the safeguarding of the troops. He may transfer his authority onto the Supreme Commander of the Army Groups and Armies. Orders of that kind have priority over all orders issued by civilian agencies.
2. The Russian territory which is to be occupied shall be divided up into individual states with governments of their own, according to special orders, as soon as military operations are concluded. From this the following is inferred:
a. The area of operations, created through the advance of the Army beyond the frontiers of the Reich and the neighboring countries is to be limited in depth as far as possible. The Supreme Commander of the Army has the right to exercise the executive power in this area, and may transfer his authority onto the Supreme Commanders of the Army Groups and Armies.
b. In the area of operations, the Reichsfuehrer SS is, on behalf of the Fuehrer, entrusted with special tasks for the preparation of the political administration, tasks which result from the struggle which has to be carried out between two opposing political systems. Within the realm of these tasks, the Reichsfuehrer SS shall act independently and under his own responsibility. The executive power invested in the Supreme Commander of the Army (OKH) and in agencies determined by him shall not be affected by this. It is the responsibility of the Reichsfuehrer SS that through the execution of his tasks military operations shall not be disturbed. Details shall be arranged directly through the OKH with the Reichsfuehrer SS.
c. As soon as the area of operations has reached sufficient depth, it is to be limited in the rear. The newly occupied territory in the rear of the area of operations is to be given its own political administration. For the present, it is to be divided, according to its genealogic basis and to the positions of the Army Groups, into North (Baltic countries), Center (White Russia) and South (Ukraine). In these territories the political administration is taken care of by Commissioners of the Reich who receive their orders from the Fuehrer.
3. For the execution of all military tasks within the areas under the political administration in the rear of the area of operations, commanding officers who are responsible to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (OKW) shall be in command. The commanding officer is the supreme representative of the Armed Forces in the respective areas and the bearer of the military sovereign rights. He has the tasks of a Territorial Commander and the rights of a supreme Army Commander or a Commanding General. In this capacity he is responsible primarily for the following tasks:
a. Close cooperation with the Commissioner of the Reich in order to support him in his political task.
b. Exploitation of the country and securing its economic values for use by German industry (see par. 4).
c. Exploitation of the country for the supply of the troops according to the needs of the OKH.
d. Military security of the whole area, mainly airports, routes of supply and supply-dumps against revolt, sabotage and enemy paratroops.
e. Traffic regulations.
f. Billeting for armed forces, police and organizations, and for PW's inasmuch as they remain in the administrative areas.
The commanding officer has the right, as opposed to the civilian agencies, to issue orders which are necessary for the execution of the military tasks. His orders supersede all others, also those of the commissioners of the Reich.
Service directives, mobilization orders and directives on the distribution of the necessary forces shall be issued separately.
The time for the assumption of command by the commanding officers will be ordered as soon as the military situation shall allow a change in the command without disrupting military operations. Until such time, the agencies set up by the OKH remain in office, operating according to the principles valid for the commanding officers.
4. The Fuehrer has entrusted the uniform direction of the administration of economy in the area of operations and in the territories of political administration to the Reich Marshal who has delegated the Chief of the "Wi Rue Amt" with the execution of the task. Special orders on that will come from the OKW/ Wi Rue Amt.
5. The majority of the Police Forces shall be under the jurisdiction of the Commissioners of the Reich. Requests for the employment of police forces in the area of operations on the part of the OKH are to be made as early as possible to the OKW/ Armed Forces Operational Staff/ Section Defense.
6. The behavior of the troops towards the population and the tasks of the military courts shall be separately regulated, and commanded.
II. Personnel, Supply and Communication Traffic:
7. Special orders shall be issued by the OKW Armed Forces Operational Staff for the measures necessary before the beginning of operations for the restriction of travel, delivery of goods and communications to Russia.
8. As soon as operations begin, the German-Soviet Russian frontier and at a later stage the border at the rear of the area of operations will be closed by the OKH for any and all non-military traffic with the exception of the police organizations to be deployed by the Reichsfuehrer SS on the Fuehrer's orders. Billeting and feeding of these organizations will be taken care of by the OKH-Gen. Qu. who may for this purpose request from the Reichsfuehrer SS the assignment of liaison officers.
The border shall remain closed also for leading personalities of the highest government agencies and agencies of the Party. The OKW/ Armed Forces Operational Staff shall inform the highest government and Party agencies of this fact. The Supreme Commander of the Army and the agencies under him shall decide on exceptions.
Except for the special regulations appIying to the police organizations of the Reichsfuehrer SS, applications for entrance-permits must be submitted to the Supreme Commander of the Army exclusively.
III. Regulations regarding Rumania, Slovakia, Hungary and Finland.
9. The necessary arrangements with these countries shall be made by the OKW, together with the Foreign Office, and according to the wishes of the respective high commands. In case it should become necessary during the course of the operations to grant special rights, applications for this purpose are to be submitted to the OKW.
10. Police measures for the protection of the troops are permitted, independently from the granting of special rights. Further orders in this shall be issued later.
11. Special orders shall be issued at a later date for the territories of these countries, on the following subjects:
Procurement of food and feed.
Housing and machinery.
Purchase and the shipment of merchandise. Procurement of funds and wage-control.
Salaries.
Request for indemnity-payments.
Postal and telegraph services.
Traffic.
Jurisdiction.
Requests of units of the Armed Forces and agencies of the OKW from the respective governments regarding these subjects, are to be submitted to the OKW/ Armed Forces Operational Staff/ Section Defense not later than 27 March 1941.
IV. Directives regarding Sweden.
12. Since Sweden can only become a transient-area for troops, no special authority is to be granted the commander of the German troops. However, he is entitled and compelled to secure the immediate protection of RR-transports against sabotage and attacks.
The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces
Signed : KEITEL
Distribution:
OKH-1st copy.
OKM-2nd copy.
R. d. L. u. O. K. L.-3rd copy.
Armed Forces Operational Staff-4th copy.
Section L-5th copy.

Best Regards from Russia,

Schultz · Post by **Schultz** » Sat Dec 04, 2004 9:52 am

Neato all the regs now if you can answer the posters question without going on about the SS.

Schultz

Christoph Awender · Post by **Christoph Awender** » Sat Dec 04, 2004 10:43 am

Schultz wrote:Neato all the regs now if you can answer the posters question without going on about the SS.

Schultz

Even in this thread we discussed several warcrimes of Heer units. Did you look through it?

\Christoph

Igorn · Post by **Igorn** » Sat Dec 04, 2004 10:56 am

Schultz wrote:Neato all the regs now if you can answer the posters question without going on about the SS. Schultz

Mr. Schulz,

Here we go.

The General Staff and High Command
of the Armed Forces
The Nuremberg Charges
Part III
Part I
Part II
Part IV
Part V

(b) War Crimes on the Eastern Front.
The order of October 1942 with respect to the murdering of captured commandos operated chiefly in the Western theater of war, against British and American commando troops. This was natural since Germany occupied almost the entire Western coast of Europe from 1940 until the last year of the war, and during that period land fighting in Western Europe was largely limited to commando operations. The Mediterranean Theater likewise lent itself to this type of warfare.
On the Eastern Front, where there was large-scale land fighting in Poland and the Soviet Union from 1941 on, the German forces were fighting amongst a hostile population and had to face extensive partisan activities behind their lines. It will be shown that the activities of the German Armed Forces against partisans and other elements of the population became a vehicle for carrying out Nazi political and racial policies, and a cloak for the ruthless and barbaric massacre of Jews and of numerous segments of the Slavic population which were regarded by the Nazis as undesirable. It was the policy of the German Armed Forces to behave with the utmost severity to the civilian population of the occupied territories, and to conduct its military operations, particularly against partisans, so as to further these Nazi policies. It will be shown that the German Armed Forces supported, assisted, and acted in cooperation with the SS Groups which were especially charged with antipartisan activities. Members of the General Staff and High Command Group ordered, directed, encouraged, and were fully aware of these criminal policies and activities.
It is not proposed to make a full or even partial showing of war crimes committed by the Nazis on the Eastern Front; evidence of those crimes are to be presented by the Soviet delegation. Evidence concerning the activities of the SS, SD, and Gestapo will be discussed only to the extent necessary to clarify the relations between these organizations and the German Armed Forces and to demonstrate their close collaboration in the occupied territories of Eastern Europe.
These policies of ruthless severity to the civilian population of the occupied Eastern territories were determined upon and made official for the German Armed Forces even before the invasion of the Soviet Union took place. An order by Hitler, dated 13 May 1941, and signed by Keitel as Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (C-50) provided :
"Order "Concerning the exercise of martial jurisdiction and PROCEDURE IN THE AREA 'Barbarossa' and special military measures.
"The application of martial law aims in the first place at maintaining discipline.
"The fact that the operational areas in the East are so far-flung, the battle strategy which this necessitates, and the peculiar qualities of the enemy, confront the courts-martial with problems which, being short-staffed, they cannot solve while hostilities are in progress, and until some degree of pacification has been achieved in the conquered areas, unless jurisdiction is confined, in the first instance, to its main task.
"This is possible only if the troops take ruthless action themselves against any threat from the enemy population.
"For these reasons I herewith issue the following order effective for the area 'Barbarossa' (area of operations, army rear area, and area of political administration).
"I. Treatment of offences committed by Enemy Civilians.
"1. Until further notice the military courts and the courts-martial will not be competent for crimes committed by enemy civilians.
"2. Guerillas should be disposed of ruthlessly by the mililtary, whether they are fighting or in flight.
"3. Likewise all other attacks by enemy civilians on the Armed Forces, its members and employees, are to be suppressed at once by the military, using the most extreme methods, until the assailants are destroyed.
"4. Where such measures have been neglected or were not at first possible, persons suspected of criminal action will be brought at once before an officer. This officer will decide whether they are to be shot.
"On the orders of an officer with the powers of at least a Battalion Commander, collective despotic measures will be taken without delay against localities from which cunning or malicious .attacks are made on the Armed Forces, if circumstances do not permit of a quick identification of individual offenders.
"5. It is expressly forbidden to keep suspects in custody in order to hand them over to the courts after the reinstatement of civil courts.
"6. The C-in-Cs of the Army Groups may by agreement with the competent Naval and Air Force Commanders reintroduce military jurisdiction for civilians, in areas which are sufficiently settled.
"For the area of the 'Political Administration' this order will be given by the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
"II. Treatment of offences committed against inhabitants by members of the Armed Forces and its employees.
"1. With regard to offences committed against enemy civilians by members of the Wehrmacht and its employees prosecution is not obligatory even where the deed is at the same time a military crime or offence.
"2. When judging such offences, it must be borne in mind, whatever the circumstances, that the collapse of Germany in 1918, the subsequent sufferings of the German people and the fight against National Socialism which cost the blood of innumerable supporters of the movement, were caused primarily by Bolshevik influence and that no German has forgotten this fact.
"3. Therefore the judicial authority will decide in such cases whether a disciplinary penalty is indicated, or whether legal measures are necessary. In the case of offences against inhabitants it will order a court martial only if maintenance of discipline or security of the Forces call for such a measure. This applies for instance to serious offences originating in lack of self control in sexual matters, or in a criminal disposition, and to those which indicate that the troops are threatening to get out of hand. Offences which have resulted in senseless destruction of billets or stores or other captured material to the disadvantage of our Forces should as a rule be judged no less severely.
"The order to institute proceedings requires in every single case the signature of the Judicial Authority.
"4. Extreme caution is indicated in assessing the credibility of statements made by enemy civilians.
"III. Responsibility of the Military Commanders.
"Within their sphere of competence Military Commanders are personally responsible for seeing that:
"1. Every commissioned officer of the units under their command is instructed promptly and in the most emphatic manner on principles set out under 1 above.
"2. Their legal advisers are notified promptly of these instructions and of verbal information in which the political intentions of the High Command were explained to C-in-Cs.
"3. Only those court sentences are confirmed which are in accordance with the political intentions of the High Command.
"IV. Security.
Once the camouflage is lifted this decree will be treated as "Most Secret":
"By order "Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
" (signed) Keitel" (C-50)
Less than three months after the invasion of the Soviet Union, these instructions were amplified and made even more drastic. An order dated 16 September 1941 and signed by Keitel, was widely distributed (C-148). This order was of general application in all theaters of war, but was clearly of primary importance for the Eastern Front :
"Subject: Communist Insurrection in occupied territories.
"1. Since the beginning of the campaign against Soviet Russia, Communist insurrection movements have broken out everywhere in the areas occupied by Germany. The type of action taken is growing from propaganda measures and attacks on individual members of the Armed Forces, into open rebellion and widespread guerilla warfare.
"It can be seen that this is a mass movement centrally directed by Moscow, who is also responsible for the apparently trivial isolated incidents in areas which up to now have been otherwise quiet.
"In view of the many political and economic crises in the occupied areas, it must, moreover, be anticipated, that nationalist and other circles will make full use of this opportunity of making difficulties for the German occupying forces by associating themselves with the Communist insurrection.
"This creates an increasing danger to the German war effort, which shows itself chiefly in general insecurity for the occupying troops, and has already led to the withdrawal of forces to the main centers of disturbance.
"2. The measures taken up to now to deal with general insurrection movement have proved inadequate. The Fuehrer has now given orders that we take action everywhere with the most drastic means in order to crush the movement in the shortest possible time.
"Only this course, which has, always been followed successfully throughout the history of the extension of influence of great peoples, can restore order.
"3. Action taken in this matter should be in accordance with the following general directions:
"a. It should be inferred, in every case of resistance to the German occupying Forces, no matter what the individual circumstances, that it is of Communist origin.
"b. In order to nip these machinations in the bud, the most drastic measures should be taken immediately on the first indication, so that the authority of the occupying Forces may be maintained, and further spreading prevented. In this connection it should be remembered that a human life in unsettled countries frequently counts for nothing and a deterrent effect can be attained only by unusual severity. The death penalty for 50-100 Communists should generally be regarded in these cases as suitable atonement for one German soldier's life. The way in which sentence is carried out should still further increase the deterrent effect.
"The reverse course of action, that of imposing relatively lenient penalties, and of being content, for purposes of deterrence, with the threat of more severe measures, does not accord with these principles and should therefore not be followed."
* * * * * * *
"4. The Commanding Officers in the occupied territories are seeing to it that these principles are made known without delay to al1 military establishments concerned in dealing with Communist measures of insurrection."
" [Indecipherable initial]
"Keitel" (C-148)
The German military leaders took up, sponsored, and instructed their troops to practice the racial policies of the Nazis. On 10 October 1941 a directive was issued by Field Marshal von Reichenau, the Commander-in-Chief (Oberbefehlshaber) of the German 8th Army, then operating on the Eastern Front (UK-81). Reichenau (who died in 1942) was therefore a member of the group, and here is what he had to say:
"Subject: Conduct of Troops in Eastern Territories.
"Regarding the conduct of troops towards the bolshevistic system, vague ideas are still prevalent in many cases. The most essential aim of war against the Jewish-bolshevistic system is a complete destruction of their means of power and the elimination of Asiatic influence from the European culture. In this connection the troops are facing tasks which exceed the one-sided routine of soldiering. The soldier in the eastern territories is not merely a fighter according to the rules of the art of war but also a bearer of ruthless national ideology and the avenger of bestialities which have been in-flicted upon German and racially related nations.
"Therefore the soldier must have full understanding for the necessity of a severe but just revenge on subhuman Jewry. The Army has to aim at another purpose, i. e., the annihilation of revolts in hinterland which, as experience proves, have always been caused. by Jews.
"The combatting of the enemy behind the front line is still not being taken seriously enough. Treacherous, cruel partisans and unnatural women are still being made prisoners of war and guerilla fighters dressed partly in uniforms or plain clothes and vagabonds are still being treated as proper soldiers, and sent to prisoner of war camps. In fact, captured Russian officers talk even mockingly about Soviet agents moving openly about the roads and very often eating at German field kitchens. Such an attitude of the troops can only be explained by complete thoughtlessness, so it is now high time for the commanders to clarify the meaning of the present struggle.
"The feeding of the natives and of prisoners of war who are not working for the Armed Forces from Army kitchens is an equally misunderstood humanitarian act as is the giving of cigarettes and bread. Things which the people at home can spare under great sacrifices and things which are being brought by the Command to the front under great difficulties, should not be given to the enemy by the soldier not even if they originate from booty. It is an important part of our supply.
"When retreating the Soviets have often set buildings on fire. The troops should be interested in extinguishing of fires only as far as it is necessary to secure sufficient numbers of billets. Otherwise the disappearance of symbols of the former bolshevistic rule even in the form of buildings is part of the struggle of destruction. Neither historic nor artistic considerations are of any importance in the eastern territories. The command issues the necessary directives for the securing of raw materials and plants, essential for war economy. The complete disarming of the civil population in the rear of the fighting troops is imperative considering the long and vulnerable lines of communications. Where possible, captured weapons and ammunition should be stored and guarded. Should this be impossible because of the situation of the battle so the weapons and ammunition will be rendered useless. If isolated partisans are found using firearms in the rear of the army drastic measures are to be taken. These measures will be extended to that part of the male population who were in a position to hinder or report the attacks. The indifference of numerous apparently anti-Soviet elements which originates from a 'wait and see' attitude, must give way to a clear decision for active collaboration. If not, no one can complain about being judges and treated a member of the Soviet System.
"The fear of the German countermeasures must be stronger than the threats of the wandering bolshevistic remnants. Being far from all political considerations of the future the soldier has to fulfill two tasks :
"1. Cormplete annihilation of the false bolshevistic doctrine of the Soviet State and its armed forces.
"2. The pitiless extermination of foreign treachery and cruelty and thus the protection of the lives of military personnel in Russia.
"This is the only way to fulfill our historic task to liberate the German people once for ever from the Asiatic-Jewish danger.
"Commander-in-Chief
" (Signed) von Reichenau
"Field Marshal." (UK-81)

Immediately preceding Reichenau's order is a memorandum, dated 28 October 1941, which shows that Reichenau's order met with Hitler's approval and was thereafter circulated by order of the Commander-in-Chief of the German Army. It is also clear that Reichenau's order was thereafter circulated down to divisional level, and was received by the 12th Infantry Division on 27 November 1941. (UK-81)
These being the directives and policies prescribed by the German military leaders, it is no wonder that the Wehrmacht joined in the monstrous behavior of the SS and SD on the Eastern Front. Units (known as Einsatzgruppen) were formed by the SIPO and SD and sent out to operate in and behind the operational areas on the Eastern Front, in order to combat partisans and to "cleanse" and "pacify" the civilian population.
In a directive dated 19 March 1943, the Commanding Officer of one of these units praised and justified such activities as the shooting of Hungarian Jews, the shooting of children, and the total burning down of villages (3012-PS). The officer directed that in order not to obstruct the procuring of slave labor for the German armament industry, "as a rule no more children will be shot" (3012-PS).
A report covering the work of the Einsatzgruppen in the. German occupied territories of the Soviet Union during the month of October 1941 disregards every vestige of decency (R-102). It states cynically that, in the Baltic areas,
"spontaneous demonstrations against Jewry followed by pogroms on the part of the population against the remaining Jews have not been recorded, on account of the lack of adequate indoctrination" (R-l 02).
This report shows clearly that "pacification" and "anti-partisan activity" are mere code words for "extermination of Jews and Slavs" just as much as "Weserubung" was a code word for the invasion and subjugation of Norway and Denmark.
Source: Nazi Conspiracy and Aggresion. Vol. II. USGPO, Washington, 1946, pp.316-400
[Note: The characters in brackets, eg, (2233-N-PS) refer to the official document numbers included in the series Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. A list of legal references and documents relating to the General Staff and High Command appears on pages 400-415. For information on the referencing of Internet sources see Chapter 4 of S D Stein Learning, Teaching and Researching on the Internet. Addison Wesley Longman 1999-published Nov.1998]
Error Submission Form
The General Staff and High Command
of the Armed Forces
The Nuremberg Charges
Part IV
Part I
Part II
Part III
Part V
War Crimes on the Eastern Front (part ii)
Documents quoted earlier show that the German Army was operating under similar policies and directives. It only remains to show that, in these practices, the Army and the SS worked hand in glove. The report describing the destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto (1061-PS) stresses the close cooperation between the SS and the Army:
"The longer the resistance lasted, the tougher the men of the Waffen SS, Police and Wehrmacht became; they fulfilled their duty indefatigably in faithful comradeship and stood together as models and examples of soldiers. Their duty hours often lasted from early morning until late at night. At night, search patrols with rags wound round their feet remained at the heels of the Jews and gave them no respite. Not infrequently they caught and killed Jews who used the night hours for supplementing their stores from abandoned dugouts and for contacting neighboring groups or exchanging news with them." (1061-PS)
To the same general effect is a report dated 5 June 1943 by the German General Commissioner for Minsk (R-185). This report describes an anti-partisan operation in which 4,500 "enemies" were killed, 5,000 suspected partisans were killed, and 59 Germans were killed. The cooperation in this adventure by the German Army is shown in the following excerpt :
"The above mentioned figures show, that we have to count with a strong annihilation of the population. The fact that only 492 rifles were found on the 4,500 enemy dead, demonstrates that the numerous peasants from the country were also among the enemy dead. The battalion Direwanger is particularly known to have destroyed numerous human lives. Among the 5,000 partisan suspects who were shot, are numerous women and children.
"Units of the troops [Wehrmannschaften] also took part in the action, by order of SS Lt. General [Obergruppenfuehrer] von dem Bach. SA Colonel [Standartenfuehrer] Kunze led the troops [Wehrmannschaften] , who included also 90 members of my authority and of the district-commissarate Minsk-Stadt. Our men returned yesterday from the action without any losses. I refuse the use of officials and Reich-Employees of the General Commissarate in the rear areas. The men who work for me have not been classified as essential, after all in order to fight the partisans actively in the place of the Armed Forces and the Police.
"Of the troops [ Wehrmannschaften], one railroad employee had been wounded (shot through the lung). The political effect of this large scale action on the peaceful population had been disastrous, because of the numerous executions of women and children. The town BEGOMIE was cleared by the Armed Forces and the Police in December. The population of Begomie was predominantly favorable to us. Begomie, which has been fortified as a strong point by the partisans, has been destroyed by German Air Attacks during the fight ing." (R-135)
The SS Obergruppenfuehrer von dem Bach referred to in this quotation is mentioned in Himmler's speech to a gathering of SS generals at Posen on 4 October 1943 (1919-PS). In this speech Himmler announced the appointment of von dem Bach to be Chief of all anti-partisan units :
"In the meantime I have also set up the department of Chief of the Anti-partisan Units" [Bandenkampf-Verbunde]. Our comrade SS-Obergruppenfuehrer von dem Bach is Chief of the anti-partisan units. I considered it necessary for the Reichsfuehrer SS to be in authoritative command in all these battles, for I am convinced that we are best in a position to take action against this enemy struggle, which is a decidedly political one. Except where the units which had been supplied and which we had formed for this purpose were taken from us to fill in gaps at the front, we have been very successf ul.
"It is notable that, by setting up this department we have gained (p. 58) for the SS in turn a division, a corps, an army, and the next step, which is the High Command of an army or even of a group-if you wish to call it that." (1919-PS)
The report of Einsatzgruppe A, (L-180) covering the period up to 15 October 1941, makes clear beyond doubt the participation of the German military leaders and Armed Forces in these extermination policies :
"Action-Group A, after preparing their vehicles for action, proceeded to their area of concentration as ordered on 23 June 1941, the second day of the campaign in the East. Army Group North consisting of the 16th and 18th Armies and Panzer-Group 4 had left the day before. Our task was to hurriedly establish personal contact with the commanders of the Armies and with the commander of the army of the rear area. It must be stressed from the beginning that cooperation with the Armed Forces was generally good, in some cases, for instance with Panzer-Group 4 under Col. Gen. Hoeppner, it was very close, almost cordial. Misunderstandings which cropped up with some authorities in the first days, were cleared up mainly through personal discussions."
* * * * * * *
"Similarly, native anti-Semitic forces were induced to start pogroms against Jews during the first hours after capture, though this inducement proved to be very difficult. Following out orders, the Security Police was determined to solve the Jewish question with all possible means and most decisively. But it. was desirable that the Security Police should not put in an immediate appearance, at least in the beginning, since the extraordinarily harsh measures were apt to stir even German circles. It had to be shown to the World that the native population itself took the first action by way of natural reaction against the suppression by Jews during several decades and against the terror exercised by the Communists during the preceding period."
* * * * * * *
"After the failure of purely military activities such as the placing of sentries and combing through the newly occupied territories with whole divisions, even the Armed Forces had to look out for new methods. The Action-Group undertook to search for new methods. Soon therefore the Armed Forces adopted the experiences of the Security Police and their methods of combatting the partisans. For details I refer to the numerous reports concerning the struggle against the partisans."
* * * * * * *
"1. Instigation of self-cleansing actions.
"Considering that the population of the Baltic countries had suffered very heavily under the government of Bolshevism and Jewry while they were incorporated in the USSR, it was to be expected that after the liberation from that foreign government, they (i. e., the population themselves) would render harmless most of the enemies left behind after the retreat of the Red Army. It was the duty of the Security Police to set in motion these self-cleansing movements and to direct them into the correct channels in order to accomplish the purpose of the cleansing operations as quickly as possible. It was no less important in view of the future to establish the unshakable and provable fact that the liberated population themselves took the most severe measures against the Bolshevist and Jewish enemy quite on their own, so that the direction by German authorities could not be found out.
"In Lithouania this was achieved for the first time by partisan activities in Kowno. To our surprise it was not easy at first to set in motion an extensive pogrom against Jews. KLIMATIS, the leader of the partisan unit, mentioned above, who was used for this purpose primarily, succeeded in starting a pogrom on the basis of advice given to him by a small advanced detachment acting in Kowno, and in such a way that no German order or German instigation was noticed from the outside. During the first pogrom in the night from 25. to 26.6 the Lithouanian partisans did away with more than 1,500 Jews, set fire to several Synagogues or destroyed them by other means and burned down a Jewish dwelling district consisting of about 60 houses. During the following nights about 2,300 Jews were made harmless in a similar way. In other parts of Lithouania similar actions followed the example of Kowno, though smaller and extending to the Communists who had been left behind.
"These self-cleansing actions went smoothly because the Army authorities who had been informed showed understanding for this procedure. From the beginning it was obvious that only the first days after the occupation would offer the opportunity for carrying out pogroms. After the disarmament of the partisans the self-cleansing actions ceased necessarily.
"It proved much more difficult to set in motion similar cleansing actions in Latvia. Essentially the reason was that the whole of the national stratum of leaders had been assassinated or destroyed by the Soviets, especially in Riga. It was possible though through similar influences on the Latvian auxiliary to set in motion a pogrom against Jews also in Riga. During this pogrom all synagogues were destroyed and about 400 Jews were killed. As the population of Riga quieted down quickly, further pogroms were not convenient."
* * * * * * *
"5. Other jobs of the Security Police.
"1. Occasionally the conditions prevailing in the lunatic asylums necessitated operations of the Security Police. Many institutions had been robbed by the retreating Russians of their whole food supply. Often the guard and nursing personnel had fled. The inmates of several institutions broke out and became a danger to the general security ; therefore
in Aglona (Lithouania).........................544 lunatics
in Mariampol (Lithouania)....................1O9 lunatics and
in Magutowo (near Luga)..................... 95 lunatics
were liquidated."
* * * * * * *
"When it was decided to extend the German operations to Leningrad and also to extend the activities of Action Group A to this town, I gave orders on 18 July 1941 to parts of Action Detachments 2 and 3 and to the Staff of the Group to advance to Novosselje, in order to prepare these activities and to be able to advance as early as possible into the area around Leningrad and into the city itself. The advance of the forces of Action Group A which were intended to be used for Leningrad, was effected in agreement with and on the express wish of Panzer-Group 4."
* * * * * * *
"Action detachment of Action Group A of the Security Police participated from the beginning in the fight against the nuisance created by partisans. Close collaboration with the Armed Forces and the exchange of experiences which were collected in the fight against partisans, brought about a thorough knowledge of the origin, organization, strength, equipment and system used by the Red partisans as time went on." (L-180).
Certain affidavits, furnished by responsible officials in both the Wehrmacht and the SS, fill in much of the background for the documents quoted above. An affidavit (3710-PS) by Walter Schellenberg who, at the time under discussion, was an important official in the RSHA, states:
"In the middle of, May 1941, as far as I remember, the Chief of Amt 4 of the RSHA (SS-Brigadefuehrer Mueller), in the name of the Chief of the RSHA (SS-Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich), held discussions with the Generalquartiermeister of the Army (General Wagner) about questions connected with 'the operations of the SIP0 and SD within the bounds of the Field Army during the imminent campaign against Russia. Wagner could come to no agreement with Mueller and therefore asked Heydrich to send another representa-tive. I was at that time Chief of Section E in Amt 4 of the RSHA under Chief of Amt Mueller and was sent by Heydrich to Wagner because of my experience in matters of protocol for the purpose of drawing up the final agreement. According to the instructions given to me, I was supposed to make sure that this agreement would provide that the responsible headquarters in the Army would be firmly obligated to give complete support to all activities of the Combat Groups and Combat Commandos of the SIP0 and SD. I discussed the problem of this mutual relationship in great detail with Wagner. In accordance with this discussion I then presented him with the completed draft of an agreement, which met with his full approval. This draft of an agreement was the basis for a final discussion between Wagner and Heydrich towards the end of May 1941.
"The contents of this agreement, as far as I remember, were substantially as follows. Its basis was the Fuehrer's command, mentioned at the very beginning of the agreement, that the SIPO and SD should operate within the combat elements of the Field Army, with the mission of utterly smashing all resistance in conquered front-line areas as well as in conquered rear supply zones by every means and as quickly as possible. The various areas were then set down in which the SIPO and SD were to be active and operating. The individual Combat Groups were then assigned to the army groups which were to take part in the campaign and the individual Combat Commandos to the respective armies which were to take part in the campaign.
"The Combat Groups and Combat Commandos were to operate in detail:
"1. In front-line areas: in complete subordination to the Field Army, tactically, functionally and administratively;
"2. In rear operational areas: in merely administrative subordination to the Field Army, but under command and functional control of the RSHA;
"3. In rear Army areas: arrangement as in 2;
"4. In areas of the civil administration in the East: same as in the Reich.
"The tactical and functional authority and responsibility of front-line headquarters of the Field Army over the Combat Commandos found no limitation in the agreement and therefore needed no further clarification.
"The agreement made it clear that the administrative subordination embraced not only disciplinary subordination but also the obligation for rear headquarters of the Field Army to support the Combat Groups and Combat Commandos in matters of supply (gasoline, rations, etc.) as well as in the use of the communications network.
"This agreement was signed by Heydrich and Wagner in my presence. Wagner signed it either 'acting for' or 'by order of' the OKH.
"After Wagner and Heydrich had affixed their signatures, both of them asked me to leave the room for half an hour. Just while leaving I heard how they both wanted to discuss in complete privacy the Fuehrer's command, which was apparently known in advance by each of them personally, and implications. After the half hour was over I was called in once more just to say goodbye.
"Today I read the 'Operational and Situational Report No. 6 of the Combat Groups of the SIPO and SD in the USSR (covering the period from 1 to 31 October 1941),' as well as the 'Comprehensive Report of Combat Group A up to 15 October 1941.' The whole substance of these reports shows that the prime mission of the Combat Groups and Combat Commandos of the SIPO and SD was to undertake and carry out mass executions of Jews, Communists and other elements of resistance. It is also clear from the above-cited 'Comprehensive Report,' which embraces no more than the first four months of these operations, that the cooperation of the respective Oberbefehlshabers with Combat Group A was 'in general good and in individual instances, for instance that of Panzergruppe 4 under Colonel General Hoeppner, very close, in fact almost cordial' (page 1). From an inclosure to this same report, bearing the title 'Summary of the Number of Executed Persons, ' particularly from the figures arranged according to the successively conquered areas, it is evident that the SIPO and SD operated in front-line areas so as fully to carry out their prime function of conducting mass executions of all elements of resistance even from the very beginning of the advance against Russia. I acknowledge the reliability and authenticity of both of the above cited reports. Therefore I must today express my firm conviction that the Oberbefehlshabers of the army groups and armies which were to take part in the Russian campaign were accurately informed through the normal OKH channels of communication about the extensive future mission of the Combat Groups and Combat Commandos of the SIPO and SD as including planned mass executions of Jews, Communists and all other elements of resistance.
"In the beginning o f June 1941 all of the Ic counter-intelligence officers, and, as far as I remember, all of the Ic officers of all army groups, armies, army corps and some of the divisions which were to take part in the coming Russian campaign were called in by Wagner, together with Heydrich and the Chief of the Amt for Counter-Intelligence Abroad in the OKW (Admiral Canaris) for a general conference in the OKW Building at Berlin. The responsible leaders of the Combat Groups and Combat Commandos of the SIPO and SD were for the most part likewise present. I was also there. The essential substance and purpose of this meeting was to outline the military strategy against Russia and to announce the above-mentioned details of the written agreement, reached by Wagner and Heydrich.
"This group of Ic counter-intelligence officers and Ic officers remained at Berlin a few days longer and was carefully instructed in several additional conferences, at which I was not present, about further details of the coming Russian campaign. I assume that these discussions were concerned with the exact delineation of the Fuehrer's command 'to smash utterly all resistance in occupied areas by every means and as quickly as possible,' including even planned mass executions of all elements of resistance. Otherwise the cooperation between the Field Army and the Combat Groups, which in the above-cited documents is clearly revealed as existing but a few weeks thereafter, could not in my opinion have been forthcoming. In any event there is hardly any reason to doubt that these Ic counter-intelligence officers, immediately upon their return from Berlin, accurately informed their own superiors, including all Oberbefehlshabers of the army groups and armies which were to march against Russia, about the full extent of the agreement."
" (signed) Walter Schellenberg
"26. XI. 45" (3710-PS)
Source: Nazi Conspiracy and Aggresion. Vol. II. USGPO, Washington, 1946, pp.316-400
[Note: The characters in brackets, eg, (2233-N-PS) refer to the official document numbers included in the series Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. A list of legal references and documents relating to the General Staff and High Command appears on pages 400-415. For information on the referencing of Internet sources see Chapter 4 of S D Stein Learning, Teaching and Researching on the Internet. Addison Wesley Longman 1999-published Nov.1998]
Error Submission Form
The General Staff and High Command
of the Armed Forces
The Nuremberg Charges
Part V
Part I
Part II
Part III
Part IV
War Crimes on the Eastern Front (part iii)
Conclusion
Another affidavit which sheds light on the relations between the Wehrmacht and the SS at the top level with respect to anti-partisan warfare (3711-PS) is sworn to by Wilhelm Scheidt, a retired captain of the German Army who worked in the War History Section of OKW from 1941 to 1945:
"I, Wilhelm Scheidt, belonged to the War History Section of the OKW from the year 1941 to 1945.
"Concerning the question of partisan warfare I state that I remember the following from my knowledge of the documents of the Operations Staff of the OKW as well as from my conversations in the Fuehrer's headquarters with Generalmajor Walter Scherff, the Fuehrer's appointee for the compilation of the history of the war.
"Counterpartisan warfare was originally a responsibility of Reichsfuehrer-SS Heinrich Himmler, who sent police forces to handle this matter.
"In the years 1942 and 1943 however counter-partisan warfare developed to such an extent that the Operations Staff of the OKW had to give it particular attention. In the Army Operations Section of the Operations Staff of the OKW a specific officer was assigned the development of counter-partisan warfare as his special job. It proved necessary to conduct extensive operations against the partisans with Wehrmacht troops in Russian as well as Yugoslavian territory. Partisan operations for a long while threatened to cut off the lines of communication and transport routes that were necessary to support the German Wehrmacht. For instance, a monthly report concerning the attacks on the railroad lines in occupied Russia revealed that in the Russian area alone from 800 to 1,000 attacks occurred each month during that period, causing among other things, the loss of from 200 to 300 locomotives.
"It was a well-known fact that partisan warfare was conducted with cruelty on both sides. It was also well-known that reprisals were inflicted on hostages and communities whose inhabitants were suspected of being partisans or of supporting them. It is beyond question that these facts must have been known to the leading officers in the Operations Staff of the OKW and in the Army's General Staff. It was further well-known that Hitler believed that the only successful method of conducting counter-partisan warfare was to employ cruel punishments as deterrents.
"I remember that at the time of the Polish revolt in Warsaw, SS-Gruppenfuehrer Fegelein reported to Generaloberst Guderian and Jodl about the atrocities of the Russian SS-Brigade Kaminski, which fought on the German side."
"( Signed) Wilhelm Scheidt
"Retired Captain of the Reserve" (3711-PS)
The foregoing documents show the arrangements which were made between the OKW, OKH and Himmler's headquarters with respect to anti-partisan warfare. They show conclusively that the plans and arrangements were made jointly, and that the High Command of the Armed Forces was not only fully aware of but an active participant in these plans. The same is true of the field commanders. General Roettiger, who attained the rank of General of Panzer Troops (the equivalent of a Lt. General in the American Army), has made three statements (3713-PS, 3714-PS). Roettiger was Chief of Staff of the German 4th Army, and later of Army Group Center, on the Eastern Front during the period of which he speaks:
"As Chief of Staff of the 4th Army from May 1942 to June 1943, to which was later added the area of the 9th Army, I. often had occasion to concern myself officially with antipartisan warfare. During these operations the troops received orders from the highest authority, as for example even the OKH, to use the harshest methods. These operations were carried out by troops of the Army Group and of the Army, as for example security battalions.
"At the beginning, in accordance with orders which were issued through official channels, only a few prisoners were taken. In accordance with orders, Jews, political commissars and agents were delivered up to the SD.
"The number of enemy dead mentioned in official reports was very high in comparison with our own losses. From the documents which have been shown to me I have now come to realize that the order from highest authorities for the harshest conduct of the antipartisan war can have been intended to make possible a ruthless liquidation of Jews and other undesirable elements by using for this purpose the military struggle of the army against the partisans." (3713-PS)
Roettiger's second statement reads :
"Supplementary to my above declaration I declare :
"As I stated orally on 28 November, my then Commander-in-Chief of the Fourth Army instructed his troops many times not to wage war against the partisans more severely than was required at the time by the position. This struggle should only be pushed to the annihilation of the enemy after all attempts to bring about a surrender failed. Apart from humanitarian reasons we necessarily had an interest in taking prisoners since very many of them could very well be used as members of native volunteer units against the partisans.
"Alongside the necessary active combatting of partisans there was propaganda directed at the partisans and also at the population with the object, by peaceful means, of causing them to give up partisan activities. For instance, in this way the women too were continually urged to get their men back from the forests or to keep them by other means from joining the partisans. And this propaganda had good results. In the spring of 1943 the area of the 4th Army was as good as cleared of partisans. Only on its boundaries and then from time to time were partisans in evidence at times when they crossed into the area of the 4th Army from neighboring areas. The army was obliged on this account on the orders of the Army Group to give up security forces to the neighboring army to the south.
"( signed) Roettiger" (3713-PS)
Roettiger's third statement reads:
"During my period of service in 1942/ 3 as chief of staff of the 4th Army of the Central Army Group, SD units were attached in the beginning, apparently for the purpose of counter- intelligence activity in front-line areas. It was clear that these SD units were causing great disturbances among the local civilian population with the result that my commanding officer therefore asked the commander-in-chief of the army group, Field Marshal von Kluge, to order the SD units to clear out of the front-line areas, which took place immediately. The reason for this first and foremost was that the excesses of the SD units by way of execution of Jews and other persons assumed such proportions as to threaten the security of the Army in its combat areas because of the aroused civilian populace. Although in general the special tasks of the SD units were well known and appeared to be carried out with the knowledge of the highest military authorities, we opposed these methods as far as possible, because of the danger which existed for our troops.
"( Signed) Roettiger" (3714-PS)
An extract from the War Diary of the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operational Staff (Warlimont), dated 14 March 1943, deals with the problem of shipping off suspected partisans to concentration camps in Germany (1786-PS). It appears clearly from this extract that the Army was chiefly concerned with preserving a sufficient severity of treatment for suspected partisans, without at the same time obstructing the procurement of labor from the occupied territories:
"The General Quartermaster [General Quartiermeister] together with the Economic Staff (East) [ Wirtschaftsstab Ost] has proposed that the deportees should be sent either to prison camps or to 'training centres in their own area, ' and that deportation to Germany should take place only when the deportees are on probation and in less serious cases.
"In view of the Armed Forces Operations Staff [Wchrmacht-fuehrungstab] this proposal does not take sufficient account of the severity required and leads to a comparison with the treatment meted out to the 'peaceful population' which has been called upon to work. He recommends therefore transportation to concentration camps in Germany which have already been introduced by the Reichsfuehrer SS for his sphere and which he is prepared to introduce for the Armed Forces [Wehrmacht] in the case of an extension to the province of the latter.The High Command of the Armed Forces [Oberkommando der Wehrmacht] therefore orders that partisan helpers and suspects who are not to be executed should be handed over to the competent Higher SS and Police Leader [Hoehrer SS und Polizeifuehrer] and orders that the difference between 'punitive work' and 'work in Germany' is to be made clear to the population." (1786-PS)
A final group of four affidavits show that the SD Einsatzgruppen on the Eastern Front operated under the command and with the necessary support of the Wehrmacht, and that the nature of their activities were fully known to the Wehrmacht. The first of these is a statement (3715-PS) by Ernst Rode, who was an SS Brigadefuehrer and Generalmajor of the Police, and was head of Himmler's personal command staff from 1943 to 1945:
STATEMENT
"I, Ernst Rode, was formerly chief of the Command Staff of the Reichsfuehrer-SS, having taken over this position in the spring of 1943 as successor to former SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Kurt Knoblauch. My last rank was Generalmajor of Police and of the Waffen-SS. My function was to furnish forces necessary for antipartisan warfare to the higher SS and police leaders and to guarantee the support of army forces. This took place through personal discussions. with the leading officers of the Operations Staff of the OKW and OKH, namely with General Warlimont, General von Buttlar, Generaloberst Guderian, Generaloberst Zeitzler, General Heusinger, later General Wenk, Colonel Graf Kielmannsegg and Colonel v. Bonin. Since anti-partisan warfare also was under the sole command of the respective Army commander-in-chief in operational areas (for instance in the Central Army Group under Field Marshal Kluge and later Busch) and since police troops for the most part could not be spared from the Reichscommissariates, the direction of this warfare lay practically always entirely in the hands of the army. In the same way orders were issued not by Himmler but by the OKH. SS and police troops transferred to operational areas from the Reichscommissariates to support the army groups were likewise under the latter's command. Such transfers often resulted in harm to anti-partisan warfare in the Reichscommissariates. According to a specific agreement between Himmler and the OKH, the direction of individual operations lay in the hands of the troop leader who commanded the largest troop contingent. It was therefore possible that an army general could have SS and police under him, and on the other hand that army troops could be placed under a general of the SS and police. Anti-partisan warfare in operational areas could never be ordered by Himmler. I could merely request the OKH to order it, until 1944 mostly through the intervention of Generalquartiermeister Wagner or through State Secretary Ganzenmueller. The OKH then issued corresponding orders to the army groups concerned, for compliance.
"The severity and cruelty with which the intrinsically diabolical partisan warfare was conducted by the Russians had already resulted in Draconian laws being issued by Hitler for its conduct. These orders, which were passed on to the troops through the OKW and OKH, were equally applicable to army troops as well as to those of the SS and police. There was absolutely no difference in the manner in which these two components carried on this warfare. Army soldiers were exactly as embittered against the enemy as those of the SS and police. As a result of this embitterment orders were ruthlessly carried out by both components, a thing which was also quite in keeping with Himmler's desires or intentions. As proof of this the order of the OKW and OKH can be adduced, which directed that all captured partisans, for instance such as Jews, agents, and political commissars, should without delay be handed over by the troops to the SD for special treatment. This order also contained the provision that in anti-partisan warfare no prisoners except the above named be taken. That anti-partisan warfare was carried on by army troops mercilessly and to every extreme I know as the result of discussions with army troop leaders, for instance with General Herzog, Commander of the XXXVIII Army Corps and with his chief of staff, Colonel Pamberg in the General Staff, both of whom support my opinion. Today it is clear to me that anti-partisan warfare gradually became an excuse for the systematic annihilation of Jewry and Slavism.
"(Signed) Ernst Rode" (3715-PS)
Another and shorter statement by Rode reads:
"As far as I know, the SD Combat Groups with the individual army groups were completely subordinate to them, that is to say tactically as well as in every other way. The commanders- in-chief were therefore thoroughly cognizant of the missions and operational methods of these units. They approved of these missions and operational methods because apparently they never opposed them. The fact that prisoners, such as Jews, agents and commissars, who were handed over to the SD underwent the same cruel death, as victims of so-called 'purifications,' is a proof that the executions had their approval. This also corresponded with what the highest political and military authorities wanted. Frequent mention of these methods were naturally made in my presence at the OKW and OKH, and they were condemned by most SS and police officers, just as they were condemned by most army officers. On such occasions I always pointed out that it would have been quite within the scope of the authority of the commanders- in-chief of army groups to oppose such methods. I am of the firm conviction that an energetic and unified protest by all field marshals would have resulted in a change of these missions and methods. If they should, ever assert that they would then have been succeeded by even more ruthless commanders-in-chief, this, in my opinion, would be a foolish and even cowardly dodge.
"(Signed) Ernst Rode" (3716-PS)
In an affidavit by Colonel Bogislav von Bonin, who at the beginning of the Russian campaign was a staff officer with the 17th Panzer Division, the following statement is made:
"At the beginning of the Russian campaign I was the first General Staff officer of the 17th Panzer Division which had the mission of driving across the Bug north of Brest-Litovsk. Shortly before the beginning of the attack my division received through channels from the OKW a written order of the Fuehrer. This order directed that Russian commissars be shot upon capture, without judicial process, immediately and ruthlessly. This order extended to all units of the Eastern Army. Although the order was supposed to be relayed to companies, the Commanding General of the XXXVII Panzer Corps (General of Panzer Troops Lemelsen) forbade its being passed on to the troops because it appeared unacceptable to him from military and moral points of view.
" (Signed) Bogislav v. Bonin "Colonel" (3718-PS)
Finally an affidavit (3717-PS) by Heusinger, who was a Generalleutnant in the German Army, and who from 1940 to 1944 was Chief of the Operations Section at OKH, states as follows:
"1. From the beginning of the war in 1939 until autumn 1940 I was Ia of the Operations Section of the OKH, and from autumn 1940 until 20 July 1944 I was chief of that section.
"When Hitler took over supreme command of the Army, he gave to the chief of the General Staff of the Army the function of advising him on all operational matters in the Russian theater.
"This made the chief of the General Staff of the Army responsible for all matters in the operational areas in the east, while the OKW was responsible for all matters outside the operational areas, for instance, all troops (security units, SS units, police) stationed in the Reichscommissariates.
"All police and SS units in the Reichscommissariates were also subordinate to the Reichsfuehrer-SS. When it was necessary to transfer such units into operational areas, this had to be done by order of the chief of the OKW. On the other hand, corresponding transfers from the front to the rear were ordered by the OKW with the concurrence of the chief of the General Staff of the Army.
"The high SS and police leaders normally had command of operations against partisans. If stronger army units were committed together with the SS and police units within operational areas, a high commander of the army could be designated commander of the operation.
"During anti-partisan operations within operational areas all forces committed for these operations were under the command of the respective commander-in-chief of the army group.
"2. Directives as to the manner and methods of carrying on counter-partisan operations were issued by the OKW (Keitel) to the OKH upon orders from Hitler and after consultation with Himmler. The OKH was responsible merely for the transmission of these orders to army groups, for instance such orders as those concerning the treatment to be accorded to commissars and communists, those concerning the manner of prosecuting by courts martial army personnel who had committed offenses against the population, as well as those establishing the basic principles governing reprisals against the inhabitants.
"3. The detailed working out of all matters involving the treatment of the local populace as well as anti-partisan warfare in operational areas, in pursuance of orders from the OKW, was the responsibility of the Generalquartiermeister of the OKH.
"4. It had always been my personal opinion that the treatment of the civilian population and the methods of anti-partisan warfare in operational areas presented the highest po litical and military leaders with a welcomed opportunity of carrying out their plans, namely the systematic extermination of Slavism and Jewry. Entirely independent of this, I. always regarded these cruel methods as military insanity, because they only helped to make combat against the enemy unnecessarily more difficult.
"(Signed) Heusinger "Generalleutnant." (3717-PS)
(At this point, Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski was called upon for oral'testimony. His testimony on direct examination was sub-stantially to the same effect as his affidavit 3712-PS.)
(c) Responsibility of the Group for War Crimes and Crimes Against Humunity: Counts 3 and 4 of the Indictment.
The foregoing evidence against the General Staff and High Command Group is such that no German soldier can view it with anything but shame. The German High Command developed and applied a policy of terror against commandos and paratroopers, in violation of the Hague and Geneva Conventions, on the Western Front. On the Eastern Front it descended to savagery. In advance of the attack against the Soviet Union, the High Command ordered the troops to take "ruthless action", left it to the discretion of any officer to decide whether suspected civilians shouId be immediately shot, and empowered any officer with the powers of a Battalion Commander to take "collective despotic measures" against localities. Offenses committed against civilians by German soldiers, however, were not required to be prosecuted, and prosecution was suggested only where desirable in order to maintain discipline ,and security from a military standpoint.
Soon after the invasion of the Soviet Union, German troops were told by the OKW that "a human life in unsettled countries frequently counts for nothing" and were encouraged to observe a punitive ratio of 50 to 100 Communists for one German soldier. German troops were told that they were to take "revenge on sub-human Jewry" and that they were not merely soldiers but "bearers of ruthless national ideology and avengers of bestialities". The High Command and the chief lieutenants of Himmler jointly planned the establishment of the Einsatzgruppen, the behavior of which has been shown in detail. These groups when in operational areas were under the command of the German Army, and German soldiers joined in their savagery. The Einsatzgruppen were completely dependent upon the Armed Forces for supplies with which to carry out their atrocities. The practices employed against the civilian population and against partisans were well known to all high ranking German officers on the Eastern Front. No doubt some of them disapproved of what was going on. Nonetheless, the full support of the military leaders continued to be given to these activities.
The record is clear that the General Staff and High Command Group, including the defendants, who were members of the Group and numerous other members ordered, directed, and participated in war crimes and crimes against humanity as specified in counts 3 and 4 of the Indictment.
C. Conclusion.
The world must bear in mind that the German High Command is not an evanescent thing, the creature of a decade of unrest, or a school of thought or tradition which is shattered or utterly discredited. The German High Command and military tradition have in the past achieved victory and survived defeat. They have met with triumph and disaster, and have survived through a singular durability not unmixed with stupidity. An eminent American statesman and diplomat, Mr. Sumner Welles, has written (" The Time for Decision", 1944, pp. 261-262) that:
"* * * the authority to which the German people have so often and so disastrously responded was not in reality the German Emperor of yesterday, or the Hitler of to-day, but the German General Staff.
"It will be said that this insistence that the German General Staff has been the driving force in German policy is a dangerous oversimplification. I am not disposed to minimize the importance of other factors in German history. They all have their place. But I am convinced that each of them has played its part only in so far as it was permitted to do so by the real master of the German race, namely, German militarism, personified in, and channelled through, the German General Staff ."
* * * * *
"Whether their ostensible ruler is the Kaiser, or Hindenburg, or Adolf Hitler, the continuing loyalty of the bulk of the population is given to that military force controlled and guided by the German General Staff. To the German people, the army to-day, as in the past, is the instrument by which German domination will be brought about. Generations of Germans may pass. The nation may undergo defeat after defeat. But if the rest of the world permits it, the German General Staff will continue making its plans for the future."
The German General Staff and High Command is indicted not now at the bar of history, but on specific charges of crimes against International Law and the dictates of the conscience of mankind as embodied in the Charter. The picture that emerges from the evidence is that of a group of men with great powers for good or ill who chose the latter; who deliberately set out to arm Germany to the point where the German will could be imposed on the rest of the world; and who gladly joined with the most evil forces at work in Germany. "Hitler produced the results which all of us warmly desired", Blomberg and Blaskowitz say, and that is obviously the truth. The converse is no less clear; the military leaders furnished Hitler with the means and might which were necessary to his mere survival, to say nothing of the accomplishment of those purposes which seem to the world so ludicrously impossible in 1932 and so fearfully imminent in 1942.
It was said above that the German militarists were inept as well as persistent. Helpless as Hitler would have been without them, he succeeded in mastering them. The generals and the Nazis were allies in 1933. But it was not enough for the Nazis that the generals should be voluntary allies ; Hitler wanted them permanently and completely under his control. Devoid of political skill or principle, the generals lacked the mentality or morality to resist. On the day of the death of President Hindenburg in August 1934, the German officers swore a new oath. Their previous oath had been to the Fatherland; now it was to a man, Adolf Hitler. It was not until 18 days later that the law requiring this change was passed. A year later the Nazi emblem became part of their uniform and the Nazi flag their standard. By a clever process of infiltration into key positions, Hitler seized control of the entire military machine.
No doubt these generals will ask what they could have done about it. It will be said that they were helpless, and that to protect their jobs and families and their own lives they had to follow Hitler's decisions. No doubt this became true. But the generals were a key factor in Hitler's rise to complete power and a partner in his criminal aggressive designs. It is always difficult and dangerous to withdraw from a criminal conspiracy. Never has it been suggested that a conspirator may claim mercy on the ground that his fellow conspirators threatened him with harm should he withdraw from the plot. In many respects the spectacle which the German General Staff and High Command group presents today is the most degrading of all the groups and organizations charged in the Indictment. The bearers of a tradition not devoid of valour and honour, they emerge from this war stained both by criminality and ineptitude. Attracted by the militaristic and aggressive Nazi policies, the German generals found themselves drawn into adventures of a scope they had not foreseen. From crimes in which almost all of them participated willingly and approvingly were born others in which they participated because they were too ineffective to alter the governing Nazi policies, and because they had to continue collaboration to save their own skins.
Having joined the partnership, the General Staff and High Command group planned and carried through manifold acts of aggression which turned Europe into a charnel-house, and caused the Armed Forces to be used for foul practices foully executed of terror, pillage, murder and wholesale slaughter. Let no one be heard to say that the military uniform shall be their cloak, or that they may find sanctuary by pleading membership in the profession to which they are an eternal disgrace.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 829-PS
Source: Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. III. USGPO, Washington, 1946, p.p.597-599
Keitel Order Concerning Ruthless Suppression of any
Resistance in Occupied USSR
TOP SECRET
COPY
The Chief of the OKW
WFST. / Abt. L (IV/Qu)
Nr. 002060/ 41 g. Kdos.
F. H. Qu., 16 September 1941
40 copies, 32nd copy
Subject: Communist insurrection in the occupied territories.
1. Since the campaign against Soviet Russia started there have been communist insurrections everywhere in the territories occupied by Germany. The actions range from propaganda and assaults against single members of the armed forces to open revolt and spreading guerilla warfare.
It should be noted that this is a mass movement which is centrally directed from Moscow and to which also the single and seemingly trifling incidents are to be ascribed occurring in areas which have been quiet so far.
Due to the manifold political and economic tensions in the occupied territories we must also expect nationalistic and other groups to take advantage of the situation and to instigate difficulties for the German occupation troops by joining the communist insurrection.
This way an increasing danger for the German conduct of the war arises which becomes apparent first by generally unsafe conditions for the occupation troops and already has led to troops being, detached to the main centers of the unrest.
2. Previous measures to counteract this general communist insurrection have proved inadequate. The Fuehrer has now ordered that everywhere the most drastic means are to be employed in order to quench the movement within the shortest time possible. Only in this manner which has always been employed successfully by great nations in the history of their conquests quiet can be restored.
3. The following directives are to be observed:
a. In each case of revolt against the German occupation force Communist sources are to be su

Igorn · Post by **Igorn** » Sat Dec 04, 2004 11:25 am

Mr. Schulz,

If you are still not convinced and need more facts here they are:

SOME NOTEWORTHY WAR CRIMINALS
III. GENERALS AND SENIOR OFFICERS
(i) Generals convicted in Case No. 7 (Balkan Generals) in the “ Subsequent Proceedings,” which closed at Nuremberg on 19th February, 1948.
General Wilhelm LIST: . . . . . . . . . Life imprisonment
General Lothar RENDULIC: . . . . . .20 years imprisonment
Lt.-General Walter KUNTZE: . . . . . Life imprisonment
Lt.-General Helmuth FELMY: . . . . . 15 years imprisonment
Lt.-General Hubert LANZ: . . . . . . . . . 7 years imprisonment Lt. General ERNST DEHNER . . . . . .
Lt.-General Ernst von LEYSER: . . . .10 years imprisonment
Lt.-General Wilhelm SPEIDEL: . . . . .20 years imprisonment
Field Marshal von WEICHS, a defendant, was withdrawn from the trial on account of illness. Lt.-General Franz BOEHME, another defendant, committed suicide 30.547.
(ii) Generals arraigned in Case No. 12 (the 13 Generals’ trial) in the “ Subsequent Proceedings,” which opened at Nuremberg on 5th February, 1948. (Still proceeding at time of writing.)
General Wilhelm von LEEB:
General Hugo SPERRLE:
General Georg von KUECHLER:
General Johannes BLASKOWITZ: Committed suicide 5th February, 1948.
General Hermann HOTH:
General Hans REINHARDT:
General Hans von SALMUTH:
General Karl HOLLIDT: :
General Karl von ROQUES:
General Hermann REINECKE:
General Walter WARLIMONT:
General Otto WOEHLER:
General Rudolf LEHMANN:
Admiral SCHNIEWIND.
General ANDRAE:

Former Commander-in-Chief in Crete. Tried by a Greek court at Athens and sentenced to life imprisonment.
General Nicola BELLOMO :
Italian Army. Tried by a British court at Bari in Italy, for killing escaped British officers, prisoners of war, after recapture; sentenced to death 28.7.45; shot on 11.9.45.
Lieut.-General Friedrich BERNHARDT:
Ex-Commander of the German Second Tank Army. Sentenced to death by a U.S.S.R. tribunal at Bryansk on 29.12.45, for atrocities in the Bryansk area, and hanged on that day.
p.525
General Bruno BRAUER:
Former Governor of Crete. Tried by a Greek military court at Athens. Accused of being responsible for the deaths of some 3,000 persons in Crete during the German occupation, also for murders and massacres; systematic terrorism, deportations, pillage, wanton destruction and torture and ill-treatment of civilians. Sentenced to death 9.12.46; shot on 20.5.47.
Lieut.-General Karl BURCKHARDT:
Ex-Commander of the Rear of Sixth Army. Sentenced to death in January, 1946, by a U.S.S.R. tribunal for atrocities committed in the Ukraine, and hanged on the same day.
Major General Peter CRASEMANN:
Former Commander of 26 Panzer Division in Italy. Tried in April, 1947, by a British War Crimes court at Padua for mass executions of Italian inhabitants; sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment.
General DANCKELMANN:
Former Commander-in-chief in Serbia. Tried by a Yugoslav court at Belgrade,! 31.10.47, and sentenced to death.
Major General Karl von DEWITZ KREBS:
Tried by a Russian court at Kishinev in December, 1947, and sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment.
General “Sepp" DIETRICH:
Waffen SS. Tried by United States court at Dachau May-July, 1946, for murders of civilians and prisoners of war, in the battle of the Ardennes, winter of 1944-45 (the Malmedy massacre), and sentenced to life imprisonment 11.7.46.
Lieut.-General van DITFURT:
Ex-Commandant of Kursk. Sentenced to death on 3.2.46 by a U.S.S.R. tribunal at Riga for atrocities committed in that district, and hanged on the same day.
General Anton DOSTLER:
Former Commander of the 75th German Army Corps. Charged with ordering the summary execution of two officers and 13 enlisted men of the U.S. Forces captured by his troops during a military operation. Tried by a U.S. military court at Caserta, Italy. Found guilty and sentenced to death 12.10.45. Sentence confirmed. Executed 1.12.45.
Kapitanleutnant Heinz ECK, of the German Navy: Ex-Commander of U-Boat 852. Tried by a mixed British and Greek war crimes court at Hamburg 17-20.10.45 for killing survivors of the crew of the steamship “ Peleus.” Found guilty and sentenced to death 20.10.45; sentence confirmed. Executed 23.11.45.
Major General ERMANNSDORF (? ERDMANNSDORF):
Sentenced to death in January, 1946, by a U.S.S.R. tribunal for atrocities committed in Byelorussia; hanged on 6.2.46.
General Nikolaus von FALKENHORST:
Former Commander-in-Chief in Norway. Tried by Mixed British-Norwegian court at Brunswick for handing over captured members of Commandos to the SS. for execution; sentenced to death 2.8.46 (sentence commuted to 20 years’ imprisonment 3.12.46).
General FOEKETHALMY-ZEIDNER:
Former Commander of Fifth Hungarian Army. Tried by a Yugoslav military court for the Novisad massacres, Sentenced to death 31.10.46; executed 5.11.46.
p.526
General Hans FORTNER:
Former Commander of 718th Division. Tried by a Yugoslav military court at Belgrade as responsible for murders of Yugoslav civilians. Sentenced to death on 16.2.47; hanged on 27.2.47.
General Kurt GALLENKAMP:
Tried by British military court at Wuppertal in March, 1947, for murders of British parachutists (the “ Poitiers ” case); sentenced to be hanged 25.3.47. Sentence commuted to life imprisonment.
Major General Hans GRAVENSTEIN:
Commander of the 373rd (Tiger) Division. Sentenced to death by a Yugoslav court at Belgrade, 1.4.47.
General Adolf HAMANN (? AMANN):
Ex-Governor of Orel area. Sentenced to death by a U.S.S.R. tribunal at Bryansk 26.12.46 for atrocities in the Bryansk area; hanged the same day.
General Kurt HERZOG:
Tried by a Russian court at Novgorod in December, 1947, and sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment.
Lieut.-General Hans von HESSLIN:
Sentenced to death by a Yugoslav war crimes court at Ljubljana on 27.7.47. General JAENECKE:
Tried by a Russian court at Sevastopol25.11.47 and sentenced to 25 years imprisonment.
Ex-Marshal Albert KESSELRING:
Tried by a British court at Venice for being concerned in the massacre of 335 Italians in the Ardeatine caves and other war crimes; sentenced to death on 7.5.47. Sentence commuted to life imprisonment 4.7.47.
General Josef KNEBLER:
Former Commander of 118th Division. Tried by a Yugoslav military court at Belgrade for atrocities against civilian population; sentenced to death on 16.2.47; hanged on 27.2.47.
General Herbert KOESTLIN:
Former Chief of Staff 80th Corps. Tried by a British military court at Wuppertal, together with General Gallenkamp (q.v.) for murders of British parachutists (the “ Poitiers ” case); sentenced to life imprisonment 25.3.47 (confirmed 14.5.47).
Brig.-General Fritz KRAEMER:
Waffen SS; Chief of Staff of Sixth Panzer Army; former acting Commander of 12th SS. Division. Tried by a U.S. war crimes court at Dachau, together with General Sepp DIETRICH (q.v.), for murders of U.S. prisoners of war and civil inhabitants (the Malmedy massacre) in the winter of 194445, and sentenced 11.7.46.
General Ludwig KUEBLER:
Tried by a Yugoslav court at Ljubljana, 27.7.47, and sentenced to death.
General KUEPPER:
Ex-Commandant of Saldas. Sentenced to death on 3.2.46 by a U.S.S.R. tribunal at Riga for atrocities committed in that district; hanged on the same day.
General Alexander von LOEHR:
Former Commander of 12th Army in the Balkans; Commander-in-Chief South-East. Tried by a Yugoslav military court at Belgrade in February, 1947, as responsible for mass murders of Yugoslav civil inhabitants; sentenced to death 16.2.47; shot 27.2.47.
p.527
General Albert LONCAR:
Former Military Governor of Belgrade. Tried, together with General von Loehr (q.v.) by a Yugoslav military court at Belgrade in February, 1947, for atrocities against the Yugoslav civil population. Sentenced to death on 16.2.47; hanged on 27.2.47.
Lieut.-General Hartwig LUDWIGER:
Ex-commander of the 104th Jaeger Regiment. Sentenced to death by a Yugoslav court at Belgrade, on 1.4.47.
General Eberhard von MACKENSEN:
Tried by British war crimes court in Rome, as responsible for the massacre, by way of reprisals, of over 300 Italian civilians in the Ardeatine Caves, near Rome. Sentenced to death by shooting on 30.11.46. (Sentence commuted to life imprisonment 4.7.47.)
General Kurt MAELZER:
Tried by a U.S. military court at Florence, Italy, and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment on 14.9.46 (7 years remitted), for parading U.S. prisoners of war through the streets of Rome. General MAELZER was also tried by a British court and sentenced to death on 30.11.46, together with General von Mackensen (q.v.), for complicity in the Ardeatine Caves massacre. Sentence confirmed, but death penalty commuted to life imprisonment (4.7.47).
Brigadier-General Kurt MEYER:
Former Commander of the 12th SS. Panzer Division. Tried by a Canadian military court at Aurich for inciting his troops to refuse quarter to Canadian soldiers captured in battle. Sentenced to death 28.12.45 (commuted to life imprisonment 15.1.46.)
Air Marshal Erhard MILCH:
Tried by the U.S. No. II Court at Nuremberg, January-April, 1947, for deportations, enslavements and criminal medical experiments on human beings (Crimes against Humanity); sentenced to life imprisonment 17.4.47.
Karl MOEHLE:
Former Commander of 5th U-Boat Flotilla. Tried by a British court at Hamburg in October, 1946, accused of ordering U-Boat commanders to kill survivors of torpedoed ships; sentenced to five years’ imprisonment 16.10.46.
Lieut.-General DEJON von MOTETON:
Ex-Commandant of Liepaja. Sentenced to death on 3.2.46 by a U.S.S.R. war crimes tribunal at Riga for atrocities committed in that district; hanged on the same day.
General Friedrich MUELLER:
Former Military Governor of Crete. Tried by a Greek military court at Athens for massacres of hostages by way of reprisals in Crete; sentenced to death 9.12.46; shot on 20.5.47.
General NEIDHOLT:
Former Commander of 369th Division in the Balkans. Tried by a Yugoslav military court at Belgrade, together with General Lohr (q.v.), for massacres of Yugoslav civil inhabitants and other atrocities; sentenced to death 16.2.47; hanged 27.2.47.
Major-General Karl von OBERKAMP:
Former Commander of Prinz Eugen Division. Tried by a Yugoslav military court at Belgrade on 27.3.47 for massacres of civilians. Sentenced to death and executed 1.4.47.
Lieut.-General OCHSNER:
I Tried by a Russian court at Bobrinsk, 3.11.47 and sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment.
p.528
Major-General PAUL:
Chief of the Rear of the 4th German Army. Sentenced to death on 3.2.46 by a U.S.S.R. tribunal at Riga for atrocities committed in that district; hanged on the same day.
General Hermann PRIESS:
Commanding 1st Panzer Corps. Tried by a U.S. war crimes court at Dachau, May-July, 1946, together with General Sepp Dietrich (q.v.), for murders of Belgian civilians and U.S. prisoners of war in the winter of 1944-45 (massacre of Malmedy). Sentenced 1 I .7.46.
General von RAPPARD:
Ex-Commandant of Veliki Luki. Sentenced to death on 31.1.46 by a U.S.S.R. tribunal of the Leningrad Area for atrocities committed in the Veliki Luki region; hanged on the same day.
Major-General Heinrich REMLINGER:
Ex-Commandant at Pskov. Sentenced to death by a U.S.S.R. tribunal at Leningrad for atrocities in that province. Hanged 5.1.46.
Lieut.-General RICHERT:
Tried in January, 1946, by a U.S.S.R. tribunal at Minsk for atrocities committed in Byelorussia; sentenced to death; hanged on 6.2.46.
Hellmuth von RUCKTESCHELL:
Commander of raider “ Schiff 21.” Sentenced to 10 years imprisonment (commuted to 7 years’) by a British war crimes court in Germany, 215.47.
Lieut-General RUFF:
Ex-Commandant of Riga. Tried by a U.S.S.R. tribunal at Riga for atrocities committed in that district; sentenced to death on 3.2.46, and hanged on the same day.
Major-General Josef RUPPRECHT:
Tried by a Russian court at Novgorod in December, 1947, and sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment.
General SCHATOW (? SCHARTOW):
Tried by a Russian court at Poltava and sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment, 25.11.47.
General August SCHMIDT:
Former Commander of the Waffen SS. Prinz Eugen Division No. 7. Tried in February, 1947, together with General LOEHR (q.v.) by a Yugoslav military court at Belgrade, for atrocities against the Yugoslav civil popula-tion; sentenced to death on 16.2.47, and hanged on 27.2.47.
General August SCHMIDT:
Ex-commandant of Luftgau VI. Sentenced to life imprisonment by a British military court in November, 1947, in connection with the transmission of orders for the killing of Allied airmen.
General SEEGERS:
Former Commander-in-Chief of Alsace. Tried by a British military court at Wuppertal in connection with murders of British and French parachutists; sentenced to three years’ imprisonment on 11.7.46. Sentence confirmed 4.1.47.
Lieut-General Max SIMON:
Former Commander of 16 SS Division in Italy. Tried by a British military court at Padua on six charges of massacres of Italian civilians; sentenced to death 26.6.47.
p.529
General Otto von STULPNAGEL:
Ex-Governor of Greater Paris. Committed suicide in prison in Paris, 6th February, 1948, to avoid trial.
General Ferenc SZOMBATHELY:
Former Hungarian Chief of Staff. Tried by a Yugoslav military court for the Novi Sad massacres. Sentenced to death 31.10.46; executed 5.11.46.
Major-General von TSCHAMMER und OSTEN:
Sentenced to death in January, 1946, by a U.S.S.R. tribunal at Kiev for atrocities committed in the Ukraine; hanged on the same day.
Major-General WERTHER:
Ex-Commander of the Coastal district. Sentenced to death on 3.2.46 by a U.S.S.R. tribunal at Riga for atrocities committed in that district; hanged on the same day.
Lieut.-General Hermann WINKLER:
Ex-Commandant of Nikolayev. Sentenced to death on 17.1.46 by a U.S.S.R. tribunal at Nikolayev for atrocities committed in that region; hanged ,on the same day.
Major-General K. WOLF.
Tried in March, 1947, by a British military court at Brunswick (" the Blechammer case “) for exposing British prisoners of war to air raids; sentenced on 25.3.47 to seven years’ imprisonment. (Sentence confirmed 24.5.47.)
Source: United Nations War Crimes Commission. Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals. Volume VIII, 1949
CASE No. 47
THE HOSTAGES TRIAL
TRIAL OF WILHELM LIST AND OTHERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG
Part I
Part I Part II Part III Part IV Part V Part VI
Introduction
Outline of the Proceedings
The Accused and the Indictment
The Evidence Before the Tribunal
List
Kuntze

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8TH JULY, 1947, TO 19TH FEBRUARY, 1948 The accused were all former high-ranking German army officers and they were charged with responsibility for offences committed by troops under their command during the occupation of Greece, Yugoslavia, Albania and Norway, these offences being mainly so-called reprisal killings, purportedly taken in an attempt to maintain order in the occupied territories in the face of guerrilla opposition, or wanton destruction of property not justified by military necessity. The accused were charged with having thus committed war crimes and crimes against humanity.
One defendant committed suicide before the arraignment, and a second became too ill for trial against him to be continued. Of the remaining accused, two were found not guilty and eight guilty on various counts. Sentences imposed ranged from imprisonment for life to imprisonment for seven years. In its judgment the Tribunal dealt with a number of legal issues, including the legality of the killing of hostages and reprisal prisoners, the extent of responsibility of commanders for offences committed by their troops and the degree of effectiveness of the plea of superior orders.
A. OUTLINE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
1. THE ACCUSED AND THE INDICTMENT
The persons against whom the Indictment in this trial was drafted were the following: Wilhelm List, Maximilian von Weichs, Lothar Rendulic, Walter Kuntze, Hermann Foertsch, Franz Boehme, Helmuth Felmy, Hubert Lanz, Ernst Dehner, Ernst von Leyser, Wilhelm Speidel, and Kurt von Geitner.
The defendant Franz Boehme committed suicide prior to the arraignment ’ of the defendants, and the Tribunal ordered his name to be stricken from the list of defendants contained in the indictment. The defendant Maximillian von Weichs became ill during the course of the trial and, after it had been conclusively ascertained that he was physically unfit to appear in court before the conclusion of the trial, his motion that the proceedings be suspended as to him was sustained. The Tribunal ruled that “ This
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holding is without prejudice to a future trial of this defendant on the charges herein made against him if and when his physical condition permits.”
The defendants were accused of offences alleged to have been committed by them while acting in various military capacities. The Indictment drawn up against them was a relatively lengthy one, and may be summarised in the following words taken from the Judgment of the Tribunal :
“ In this case, the United States of America prosecutes each of the defendants on one or more of four counts of an indictment charging that each and all of said defendants unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly committed war crimes and crimes against humanity as such crimes are defined in Article II of Control Council Law No. 10. They are charged ‘with being principals in and accessories to the murder of thousands of persons from the civilian population of Greece, Yugoslavia, Norway and Albania between September 1939 and May 1945 by the use of troops of the German Armed Forces under the command of and acting pursuant to orders issued, distributed and executed by the defendants at bar. It is further charged that these defendants participated in a deliberate scheme of terrorism and intimidation wholly unwarranted and unjustified by military necessity by the murder, ill-treatment and deportation to slave labour of prisoners of war and members of the civilian populations in territories occupied by the German Armed Forces, by plundering and pillaging public and private property, and wantonly destroying cities, towns and villages for which there was no military necessity. . . .
“ Reduced to a minimum of words, these four counts charge :
“ 1. That defendants were principals or accessories to the murder of hundreds of thousands of persons from the civilian population of Greece, Yugoslavia and Albania by troops of the German Armed Forces ; that attacks by lawfully constituted enemy military forces and attacks by unknown persons, against German troops and installations, were followed by executions of large numbers of the civilian population by hanging or shooting without benefit of investigation or trial ; that thousands of non-combatants, arbitrarily designated as ‘ partisans,’ ‘ Communists,’ ‘ Communist suspects,’ ‘ bandit suspects ’ were terrorised, tortured and murdered in retaliation for such attacks by lawfully constituted enemy military forces and attacks by unknown persons ; and that defendants issued, distributed and executed orders for the execution of 100 ‘ hostages ’ in retaliation for each German soldier killed and fifty ‘ hostages.’ in retaliation for each German soldier wounded.
“ 2. That defendants were principals or accessories to the plundering and looting of public and private property, the wanton destruction of cities, towns and villages, frequently together with the murder of the inhabitants thereof, and the commission of other acts of devastation not warranted by military necessity, in the occupied territories of Greece: Yugoslavia, Albania and Norway, by troops of the German Armed Forces acting at the direction and order of these defendants ; that defendants ordered troops under their command to burn, level and destroy entire villages and towns and
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thereby making thousands of peaceful non-combatants homeless and destitute, thereby causing untold suffering, misery and death to large numbers of innocent civilians without any recognised military necessity for so doing.
“ 3. That defendants were principals or accessories to the drafting, distribution and execution of illegal orders to the troops of the German Armed Forces which commanded that enemy troops be refused quarter and be denied the status and rights of prisoners of war and surrendered members of enemy forces be summarily executed ; that defendants illegally ordered that regular members of the national armies of Greece, Yugoslavia and Italy be designated as ‘partisans,’ ‘ rebels,’ ‘ communists ’ and ‘ bandits,’ and that relatives of members of such national armies be held responsible for such members’ acts of warfare, resulting in the murder and ill-treatment of thousands of soldiers, prisoners of war and their non-combatant relatives.
“ 4. That defendants were principals or accessories to the murder, torture, and systematic terrorisation, imprisonment in concentration camps, forced labour on military installations, and deportation to slave labour, of the civilian populations of Greece, Yugoslavia and Albania by troops of the German Armed Forces acting pursuant to the orders of the defendants ; that large numbers of citizens-democrats, nationalists, Jews and Gypsies-were seized, thrown into concentration camps, beaten, tortured, ill-treated and murdered while other citizens were forcibly conscripted for labour in the Reich and occupied territories.
“ The acts charged in each of the four counts are alleged to have been committed wilfully, knowingly and unlawfully and constitute violations of international conventions, the Hague Regulations, 1907, the laws and customs of war, the general principles of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws of all civilised nations, the internal penal laws of the countries in which such crimes were committed, and were declared, recognised and defined as crimes by Article II of Control Council Law No. 10 adopted by the representatives of the United States of America, Great Britain, the Republic of France and the Soviet Union.”
The accused pleaded not guilty.
2. THE EVIDENCE BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL
The Tribunal made the following remarks concerning the evidence placed before it :
“ The evidence in this case recites a record of killing and destruction seldom exceeded in modern history. . . . It is the determination of the connection of the defendants with the acts charged and the responsibility which attaches to them therefore, rather than the commission of the acts, that poses the chief issue to be here decided.”
The Tribunal continued :
“ The record is replete with testimony and exhibits which have been offered and received in evidence without foundation as to their
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authenticity and, in many cases where it is secondary in character, without proof of the usual conditions precedent to the admission of such evidence. This is in accordance with the provisions of Article VII, Ordinance No. 7, Military Government, Germany (Footnote 1: See Vol. III of these Reports, pp. 114 and 118. In general, for the United States law and practice on war crime trials, see that volume, pp. 103-20.), which provides ' The tribunals shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure, and shall admit any evidence which they deem to have probative value. Without limiting the foregoing general rules, the following shall be deemed admissible if they appear to the tribunal to contain information of probative value relating to the charges, affidavits, depositions, interrogations, and other statements, diaries, letters, the records, findings, statements and judgments of the military tribunals and the reviewing and confirming authorities of any of the United Nations, and copies of any document or other secondary evidence of the contents of any document, if the original is not readily available or cannot be produced without delay. The tribunal shall afford the opposing party such opportunity to question the authenticity or probative value of such evidence as in the opinion of the tribunal the ends of justice require.' This Tribunal is of the opinion that this rule applies to the competency of evidence only and does not have the effect of giving weight and credibility to such evidence as a matter of law. It is still within the province of the Tribunal to test it by the usual rules of law governing the evaluation of evidence. Any other interpretation would seriously affect the right of the defendants to a fair and impartial trial. The interpretation thus given and consistently announced throughout the trial by this Tribunal is not an idle gesture to be announced as a theory and ignored in practice-it is a substantive right composing one of the essential elements of a fair and impartial adjudication.
“ The trial was conducted in two languages, English and German, and consumed 117 trial days. The prosecution offered 678 exhibits and the defendants 1025 that were received in evidence. The transcript of the evidence taken consists of 9,556 pages. A careful consideration of this mass of evidence and its subsequent reduction into concise conclusions of fact, is one of the major tasks of the tribunal.
“ The prosecution has produced oral and documentary evidence to sustain the charges of the indictment. The documents consist mostly of orders, reports and war diaries which were captured by the Allied Armies at the time of the German collapse. Some of it is fragmentary and consequently not complete. Where excerpts of such documents were received in evidence, we have consistently required the production of the whole document whenever the Defence so demanded. The Tribunal and its administrative officials have made every effort to secure all known and available evidence. The Prosecution has repeatedly assured the tribunal that all available evidence, whether favourable or otherwise, has been produced pursuant to the Tribunal’s orders.
“ The reports offered consist generally of those made or received by the defendants and unit commanders in their chain of command.
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By the general term ‘ orders ’ is meant primarily the orders, directives and instructions received by them or sent by them by virtue of their position. By war diaries is meant the records of events of the various units which were commanded by these defendants, such war diaries being kept by the commanding officer or under his direction. This evidence, together with the oral testimony of witnesses appearing at the trial provides the basis of the prosecution’s case.
“ The Defence produced much oral testimony including that of the defendants themselves. Hundreds of affidavits were received under the rules of the tribunal. All affidavits were received subject to a motion to strike if the affiants were not produced for cross-examination in open court upon demand of the opposite party made in open court.”
The following paragraphs contain a summary of the evidence relating to the individual accused :
(1) List
List, was Commander-in-Chief of the Twelfth Army during the German invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece, and, in addition thereto, in June 1941, became the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast, a position which he retained until illness compelled his temporary retirement from active service on 15th October, 1941. In the latter position he was the supreme representative of the Wehrmacht in the Balkans and exercised executive authority in the territory occupied by German troops. Among the duties assigned to him was the safeguarding of the unified defence of those parts of Serbia and Greece, including the Greek Islands, which were occupied by German troops, against attacks and unrest. The defendant Foertsch, who had become Chief of Staff of the Twelfth Army on 10th May, 1941, continued as Chief of Staff to the defendant List in his new capacity as Wehrmacht Commander Southeast.
The evidence showed that, soon after the occupation by German forces of Yugoslavia and Greece, resistance on the part of Yugoslav and Greek guerrillas began, in the course of which German prisoners captured by the resistance forces were tortured, mutilated and killed, and the German military position threatened. Attacks on German troops and acts of sabotage against transportation and communication lines progressively increased throughout the summer of 1941 and even at this early date the shooting of innocent members of the population was commenced as a means of suppressing resistance.
By 5th September, 1941, the resistance movement had developed further and the defendant List issued an order on the subject of its suppression. In this order, he said in part : “ In regard to the above the following aspects are to be taken into consideration :
Ruthless and immediate measures against the insurgents, against their accomplices and their families. (Hanging, burning down of villages involved, seizure of more hostages, deportation of relatives, etc., into concentration camps.)”
On 16th September, 1941, Hitler, in a personally signed order, charged the defendant List with the task of suppressing the insurgent movement in
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the Southeast. This resulted in the commissioning of General Franz Boehme with the handling of military affairs in Serbia and in the transfer of the entire executive power in Serbia to him. This delegation of authority was done on the recommendation and request of the defendant List to whom Boehme remained subordinate. Boehme was shown to have issued orders, dated 25th September and 10th October, 1941, to the units under his command in which he ordered that “ the whole population ” of Serbia must be hit severely ; and that “ In all commands in Serbia all Communists, male residents suspicious as such, all Jews, a certain number of nationalistic and democratically inclined residents are to be arrested as hostages, by means of sudden actions,” and “ If losses of German soldiers or Volksdeutsche occur, the territorial competent commanders up to the regiment commanders are to decree the shooting of arrestees according to the following quotas : (a) For each killed or murdered German soldier or Volksdeutsche (men, women or children) one hundred prisoners or hostages, (b) For each wounded German soldier or Volksdeutsche 50 prisoners or hostages.”
On 16th September, 1941, Fieldmarshal Keitel, Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces, issued a directive pertaining to the suppression of the insurgent movement in occupied territories, which List caused to be distributed to his subordinate commanders. This order stated :
“ Measures taken up to now to counteract this general communist insurgent movement have proven themselves to be inadequate. The Führer now has ordered that severest means are to be employed in order to break down this movement in the shortest time possible. Only in this manner, which has always been applied successfully in the history of the extension of power of great peoples can quiet be restored.
“ The following directives are to be applied here : (a) Each incident of insurrection against the German Wehrmacht, regardless of individual circumstances, must be assumed to be of communist origin. (b) In order to stop these intrigues at their inception, severest measures are to be applied immediately at the first appearance, in order to demonstrate the authority of the occupying power, and in order to prevent further, progress. One must keep in mind that a human life frequently counts for naught in the affected countries and a deterring effect can only be achieved by unusual severity. In such a case the death penalty for 50 to 100 communists must in general be deemed appropriate as retaliation for the life of a German soldier. The manner of execution must increase the deterrent effect. The reverse procedure-to proceed at first with relatively easy punishment and to be satisfied with the threat of measures of increased severity as a deterrent does not correspond with these principles and is not to be applied.”
On 4th October, 1941, the defendant List directed the following order to General Bader, one of the Generals under his command :
“ The male population of the territories to be mopped up of bandits is to be handled according to the following points of view :
“ Men who take part in combat are to be judged by court martial.
“ Men in the insurgent territories who were not encountered in battle, are to be examined and- -.
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“ If a former participation in combat can be proven of them to be judged by court martial.
“ If they are only suspected of having taken part in combat, of having offered the bandits support of any sort, or of having acted against the Wehrmacht in any way, to be held in a special collecting camp. They are to serve as hostages in the event that bandits appear, or anything against the Wehrmacht is undertaken in the territory mopped up or in their home localities, and in such cases they are to be shot.”
After the issuance of the foregoing orders, the shooting of innocent members of the population increased and a large number of reprisals against the population were carried out on the basis of the 100 to 1 order. Among the evidence appeared facts relating to a reprisal shooting at a village near Topola, to which the Tribunal made reference in its judgment.(Footnote 1: See pp. 65-6) This instance of shooting was carried out by the orders of General Boehme issued on 4th October, 1941, and on 9th October, 1941. General Boehme informed the defendant List as follows : “ Execution by shooting of about 2,000 Communists and Jews in reprisal for 22 murdered of the Second Battalion of the 421st Army Signal Communication Regiment in progress.” Several reports of reprisal shootings were also made to List by the Security Police and S.D.
There was no evidence, however, that the “ Commissar Order” of 6th June, 1941, requiring the killing of all captured Commissars was issued, distributed or executed in the occupied territory under the command of List while he held the position of Armed Forces Commander Southeast, or that List was in any way responsible for the killing of Commissars merely because they were such. The evidence sustained the contentions of List that he never himself signed an order for the killing of hostages or other inhabitants, or fixed a ratio determining the number of persons to be put to death for each German soldier killed or wounded, and that many of these executions were carried out by units of the S.S., the S.D., and local police units which were not tactically subordinated to him. That he was not in accord with many of the orders of the High Command of the Armed Forces with reference to the pacification of Yugoslavia and Greece was also shown. That his appeals for more troops for the subjugation of the growing resistance movement were met with counter-directives and orders by Hitler and Keitel to accomplish it by a campaign of terrorism and intimidation of the population was also established.
(ii) Kuntze
On or about 24th October, 1941, the defendant Kuntze was appointed Deputy Wehrmacht Commander Southeast and Commander-in-Chief of the 12th Army. It was evident from the record that the appointment was intended as a temporary one for the period of the illness of Fieldmarshal List. He assumed the command on his arrival in the Balkans on 27th October, 1941. He was superseded by General Alexander Liehr in
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June 1942 but remained in the position until the arrival of General Loehr on 8th August, 1942.(Footnote 1: In its Judgment the Tribunal pointed out that October, 1941 “ exceeded all previous monthly records in killing innocent members of the population in reprisal for the criminal acts of unknown persons,” and added : “ It seems highly improbable that Kuntze could step into the command in the Southeast in the midst of the carrying out and reporting of ’ these reprisal actions without gaining knowledge and approval.”.) Reports made to the defendant Kuntze, which were shown in the evidence, revealed that on 29th October, 1941,76 persons were shot in reprisal in Serbia ; on 2nd November, 1941, 125 persons were shot to death at Valjevo ; and on 27th November, 1941, 265 Communists were shot as a reprisal measure at Valjevo. Under date of 31st October, 1941, the Commanding General in Serbia, General Boehme, recapitulated the shootings in Serbia in a report to Kuntze as follows : “ Shootings : 405 hostages in Belgrade (total up to now in Belgrade, 4,750). 90 Communists in Camp Sebac. 2,300 hostages in Kragujevac. 1,700 hostages in Kraljevo.” In a similar report under date of 30th November, 1941, General Boehme reported to Kuntze as follows : “ Shot as hostages (total) 534 (500 of these by Serbian Auxiliary Police).” Many other similar shootings were shown to have taken place.
In a directive of 19th March, 1942, Kuntze made the following order :
“ The more unequivocal and the harder reprisal measures are applied from the beginning the less it will become necessary to apply them at a later date. No false sentimentalities! It is preferable that 50 suspects are liquidated than one German soldier lose his life. Villages with Communist Administration are to be destroyed and men are to be taken along as hostages. If it is not possible to produce the people who have participated in any way in the insurrection or to seize them, reprisal measures of a general kind may be deemed advisable, for instance, the shooting to death of all male inhabitants from the nearest villages, according to a definite ratio (for instance, one German dead-100 Serbs, one German wounded-50 Serbs).” Further shootings of large numbers of reprisal prisoners and hostages were reported to Kuntze after the issuance of this directive.
Although he was advised of these killings of innocent persons in reprisal for the actions of bands or unknown members of the population, Kuntze not only failed to take steps to prevent their recurrence but urged more severe action upon his subordinate commanders. In many cases persons were shot in reprisal who were being held in collecting camps without there being any connection whatever with the crime committed, actual, geographical or otherwise. Reprisal orders were not grounded on judicial findings.
Evidence brought relating to the alleged ill-treatment of Jews and other racial groups within the area commanded by the defendant Kuntze during the time he was Deputy Wehrmacht Commander Southeast proved the collection of Jews in concentration camps and the killing of one large group of Jews and Gypsies shortly after the defendant assumed command in the Southeast by units that were subordinate to him. The record did not show that the defendant ordered the shooting of Jews or their transfer to a collecting camp. The evidence did show, however, that he received reports that units subordinate to him carried out the shooting of a large
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group of Jews and Gypsies. He had knowledge that troops subordinate to him were collecting and transporting Jews to collecting camps, and it was not shown that the defendant acted to stop such practices. There was evidence that the offences proved against Kuntze were ordered by his superiors and that, like List, he was impeded by the operations within his area of command of organizations receiving their orders direct from Berlin.
Source: United Nations War Crimes Commission. Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals. Volume VIII, 1949
CASE No. 47
THE HOSTAGES TRIAL
TRIAL OF WILHELM LIST AND OTHERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG
Part II
Part I Part II Part III Part IV Part V Part VI
The Evidence Before the Tribunal
Foertsch
von Geitner
Rendulic
Dehner
von Leyser
Felmy
Lanz
Speidel
The Judgment of the Tribunal
The General Nature and Sources of International Law
The Plea of Superior Orders
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(iii) Foertsch
The whole period of Foertsch’s stay in the Southeast was in the capacity of Chief of Staff of the Army Group commanding the territory.
The Chief of Staff was in charge of the various departments of the staff and was the first advisor of the Commander-in-Chief. It was his duty to provide all basic information for decisions by the Commander-in-Chief and was responsible for the channelling of all reports and orders. He had no troop command authority. Neither did he have any control over the legal department which was directly subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief. As Chief of Staff he was authorised to sign orders on behalf of the Commander-in-Chief when they did not contain any fundamental decision and did not require the exercise of judgment by the subordinate to whom they were directed.
Furthermore, the accused was on leave at the time of the issuing of List’s order of 5th September, 1941, the distribution of the Keitel Order of 16th September, 1941, and the appointment of Lieutenant-General Boehme as Commander of Military Operations in Serbia.
It was the testimony of Foertsch that the Keitel Order of 16th September, 1941, fixing reprisal ratios from 50 up to 100 to 1, was the basic order under which reprisal measures were carried out in the Southeast. On the other hand the evidence showed many reprisal measures to have been executed prior to the Keitel order, on the reports of which appeared the signature or initials of Foertsch. For all practical purposes, the accused had the same information as the defendants List and Kuntze during their tenures as Wehrmacht Commanders Southeast. He knew of all the incidents described earlier in the outline of evidence dealing with the defendants List and Kuntze. The defendant Foertsch did not, however, participate in any of them. He gave no orders and had no power to do so had he so desired.
He did distribute some of the orders of the OKW, the OKH and of his commanding generals, including Fieldmarshal Keitel’s order of 28th September, 1941, wherein it was ordered that hostages of different political persuasions such as Nationalists, Democrats and Communists be kept available for reprisal purposes and shot in case of attack, and General Kuntze’s order of 19th March, 1942, wherein it was ordered that more severe reprisals be taken in accordance with a definite ratio “ for instance, 1 German dead-100 Serbs, 1 German wounded-50 Serbs.”
The Commando Order of 18th October, 1942, was distributed by Army Group E commanded by General Alexander Loehr and of which Foertsch was then Chief of Staff. Foertsch stated that he considered this order unlawful in that it called for the commission of offences and crimes under International Law but that he assumed that the issuing of the order was an
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answer to similar actions by the enemy in contravention of International Law. It was not shown that the defendant knew that this order was in fact carried out in the territory in which he served. (Footnote 1: According to the Tribunal’s judgment, “ By this order, issued by Hitler in person, all sabotage troops generally referred to as commandos, were to be shot immediately upon capture.” A text of the Order is reproduced in Vol. I of these Reports, pp. 32-3. )
(iv) von Geitner
During the entire period of his service in the Balkans, the defendant von Geitner served only as a chief of staff to the Commanding General in Serbia or to the Military Commander in Serbia and Military Commander in Southeast. His duties generally concerned operations, supplies, training and organization of troops.
The evidence showed that von Geitner initialed or signed orders issued by his commanding general for the shooting of hostages and reprisal prisoners.(Footnote 2: These orders were deemed by the Tribunal to be “ unlawful when viewed in the light of the applicable international law.") Applications for permission to take reprisal action were referred by the commanding general to a special legal officer who worked on them and submitted the result to the commander. The commander then made the decision and delivered a text to the defendant von Geitner for preparation and approval as to form. The order then was sent on its way through regular channels by von Geitner. No doubt existed that such an order was that of the military commander and that the defendant von Geitner lacked the authority to issue such an order on his own initiative. The accused claimed that the approval of the form of such orders was the full extent of his participation in the issuing and distributing of reprisal orders.
(v ) Rendulic
The defendant Rendulic became Commander-in-Chief of the Second Panzer Army on 26th August, 1943, and remained in the position until June 1944. In July 1944 he became the Commander-in-Chief of the Twentieth Mountain Army, a position which he held until January 1945. In December 1944 he became the Armed Forces Commander North in addition to that of Commander-in-Chief of the Twentieth Mountain Army. In January 1945 he became Commander-in-Chief of Army Group North, a position which he held until March 1945.
At the time he assumed command of the Second Panzer Army, the head-quarters of the army was in Croatia and its principal task was the guarding of the coast against enemy attacks and the suppression of band warfare in the occupied area. The Italians also had several army corps stationed in the immediately adjacent territory. The danger of the collapse of the Italian government and the possibility that the Italians might thereafter fight on the side of the Allies was a constant threat at the time of his assumption of the command of the Second Panzer Army.
The Hitler order of 16th September, 1941, providing for the killing of 100 reprisal prisoners for each German soldier shot, had been distributed to the troops in the Southeast and, in many. instances, carried out before
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the defendant Rendulic assumed command of the Second Panzer Army. The accused did not attempt to suppress illegal reprisal actions, but instead on 15th September, 1943, he issued an order which in part stated : " Attacks on German members of the Wehrmacht and damages to war-important installations are to be answered in every case by the shooting or hanging of hostages and the destruction of surrounding villages, which later is to take place-if possible-after the arrest of the male population which is capable of bearing arms. Only then will the population inform the German authorities if bandits collect so as to avoid reprisal measures.
“ Unless in individual cases different orders are issued the rule for reprisal measures is : 1 German killed, 50 hostages ; 1 German wounded, 25 hostages shot or hanged. Kidnapping of a German will be considered equal to killing a German if the kidnapped person does not return within a definite period. According to the severity of the attack a hundred hostages will be hanged or shot for each attack against war-essential installations. These reprisal measures are to be executed if the culprit is not caught within 40 hours.”
The reports of the corps commanders subordinate to the defendant revealed that many acts of reprisals were taken in fact against the population by the 173rd and 187th Reserve Divisions for attacks upon troops and military installations. The defendant made no attempt to secure additional details of the killings or to apprehend the guilty. Public proclamations upon the taking of hostages were not made. Previous notice was not given the public that reprisals by shooting would be taken if unlawful acts were repeated. Court-martial proceedings were not held. Hostages, reprisal prisoners and partisans were killed without any semblance of a judicial hearing. There was no requirement that hostages or reprisal prisoners killed should be connected with the offence committed, either passively, or actively, or by proximity.
The accused’s order of 15th September, 1943, was as he maintained, consistent with the orders of Hitler and Keitel and the record did not indicate that he ever issued an order directing the killing of a specific number of hostages or reprisal prisoners as retaliation for any particular offence. The issuance of such orders was delegated to divisional commanders, whose activities were known to him through reports. He acquiesced in them and took no steps to shape the hostage and reprisal practices in conformity with the usages and practices of war.
The evidence further showed that on 3rd September, 1943, Italy surrendered unconditionally to the Allies. The surrender was announced publicly on 8th September, 1943. The defendant testified that this event was anticipated by him as well as the possibility that Italy would become an enemy of the Germans. His testimony was to the effect that the German Army, in performing its task of guarding the coast to prevent an Allied landing, could not tolerate the presence of hostile Italians in these coastal areas. Holding these definite views of the necessities of the situation, the defendant set about removing the Italians from the coastal areas by making them prisoners of war. He forced General D’Almazzo, Commander of the Italian IXth Army, to sign an armistice with him ; the former had no orders to do this. The accused then received Führer Orders directing that the
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officers of all Italian units who had co-operated with insurgents or permitted their arms to fall into the hands of insurgents, were to be shot and that the officers of resisting units who continued their resistance after receipt of a short ultimatum, were also to be shot. The record disclosed that the defendant Rendulic was insistent that his corps commanders carry out these orders “ without any scruples.” Several Italian officers were subsequently shot ; for instance, certain officers of the Bergamo Division of the IXth Army, which had resisted the Germans at Split, were executed after summary court-martial proceedings.
The defendant was also shown to have passed on to troops subordinate to him the Führer Order of 6th June, 1941, providing that all Commissars captured must be shot, when he was in command of the 52nd Infantry Division on the Russian Front. He admitted that the legality and correctness of this order was discussed in army circles and that it was generally considered illegal. He testified that he considered the order as a reprisal measure, the purpose of which was unknown to him. (Footnote l: See p.46, note 2)
There was evidence that, during the retreat of the German troops under Rendulic from Finnmark, much physical destruction was carried out on the latter’s orders in an attempt to extricate the former from a strategically perilous situation arising out of the withdrawal from the war of Finland.
(vi) Dehner
The defendant Dehner was assigned as the commander of the LXIXth Reserve Corps in the last days of August 1943. He held this command until 15th March, 1944. The corps was stationed in Northern Croatia and occupied about one-third of that country. The chief task of this corps was to suppress the guerrilla bands operating in the territory and particularly to guard the Zagreb-Belgrade railroad and the communication lines in the assigned area.
The 173rd and 187th Reserve Divisions, which have been mentioned above in the section setting out the evidence relating to the defendant Rendulic, were directly subordinated to Dehner. (Footnote 2: See p.44) Numerous other and similar offences were committed by troops under his command and the defendant appeared to have made no effort to require reports showing that hostages and reprisal prisoners were shot in accordance with International Law. The defendant attempted to excuse his indifference to these killings by saying that they were the responsibility of the division commanders. Dehner had knowledge of the offences; on the other hand, there was evidence of attempts on his part to correct certain irregularities connected with the taking of reprisals ; for example in an order of 19th December, 1943, his corps headquarters stated : “ Measures of the unit have repeatedly frustrated propaganda for the enemy as planned by the unit leadership. It must not happen that bandits who arrive at the unit with leaflets asking them to desert and which should be valid as passes, are shot out of hand. This makes any propaganda effort in this direction nonsensical. . . .”
p.46
(vii) von Leyser
The defendant von Leyser was appointed to command the XXIst Mountain Corps on 1st August, 1944, and continued in the position until April 1945. Immediately previous thereto he had been in command of the XVth Mountain Corps, a position which he had held since 1st November, 1943. Other former assignments were his command of the 269th Infantry Division In Russia in 1941 and his command of the XXVIth Corps in Russia in 1942.
There was evidence that innocent members of the civilian populations were killed in reprisal for attacks on troops and acts of sabotage committed by unknown persons by troops subordinate to the defendant von Leyser, who admitted that he knew of many such killings. He denied that he ever issued an order to carry out any specific reprisal measure, and contended that this was the responsibility of divisional commanders in conjunction with Croatian government authorities. The record disclosed, however, that on 10th August, 1944, the defendant issued an order containing the following :“ In case of repeated attacks in a certain road sector, Communist hostages are to be taken from the villages of the immediate vicinity, who are to be sentenced in case of new attacks. A connection between these Communists and the bandits may be assumed to exist in every case." (Footnote 1: Of this order the Tribunal said : “ This order is, of course, not lawful. Reprisals taken against a certain race, class or group irrespective of the circumstances of each case, sounds more like vengeance than an attempt to deter further criminal acts by the population. An assumption of guilt on the part of a particular race, class or group of people in all cases also contravenes established rules. This is a matter which a judicial proceeding should determine from available evidence.”)
Shortly after taking command of the XVth Corps, the defendant formulated a plan for the evacuation of the male population between the ages of 15 and 55 from the area between Una and Korana. This territory was supposed to contain about 7,000 to 8,000 men who were partly equipped with arms procured from the Italians. The area had been under the temporary control of the bands to such an extent that the Croat government had complained of its inability to conscript men for military-service from the area: It was planned to crush the bands and evacuate the men and turn them over to the Croatian government for use as soldiers and compulsory labour. The operation was designated as Operation “ Panther ” and was so referred to in the German Army reports. On 6th December, 1943, the Second Panzer Army approved Operation “ Panther.” The operation was carried out but only 96 men fit for military service were captured. The defendant attempted to justify his action by asserting that the primary purpose of the Operation “ Panther ” was the suppression of the bands, that the operation was purely a tactical one so far as he was concerned and that the disposition of the captured population fit for military service was for the decision of the Croatian government and not his concern.
The evidence also showed that the 269th Infantry Division, commanded by the defendant von Leyser in Russia, killed Commissars pursuant to the Commissar Order.(Footnote 2: The Tribunal said : “ This was a criminal order and all killings committed pursuant to it were likewise criminal. We find the defendant guilty on this charge.” The charge referred to was said to be one of “ issuing the Commissar order of 6th June, 194l,.and causing the same to be carried out while he was in command of the 269th Infantry Division in Russia in 1941.” It would appear from an examination of the Indictment, and of the Tribunal’s summary thereof, that allegations regarding offences committed in Russia would, technically, fall outside its terms.)
p.47
(viii) Felmy
The defendant Felmy was appointed Commander Southern Greece at about the middle of June 1941, and continued in the position until August 1942. During this period he had three battalions of security and police troops subordinate to him. On 10th May, 1943 the defendant became commander of the LXVIIIth Corps and continued in that position until the corps withdrew from Greece, an operation which was completed on 22nd October, 1944. In addition thereto on 9th September, 1943, he assumed command of Army Group Southern Greece. He had subordinate to him the 1st Panzer Division, 117th Rifle Division, and a number of fortress battalions. Until the collapse of Italy, two Italian divisions were subordinate to him. The defendant admitted having ordered reprisal measures but denied that they were unlawful. Many other reprisal actions on the part of his troops were brought to his notice in reports made to him.
The evidence showed that the accused received and passed on an order of General Loehr, Commander-in-Chief Southeast, dated 10th August, 1943, which stated in part : “ In territories infested by the bandits, in which surprise attacks have been carried out, the arrest of hostages from all strata of the population remains a successful means of intimidation. Furthermore, it may be necessary, to seize the entire male population, in so far as it does not have to be shot or hung on account of participation in or support of the bandits, and in so far as it is incapable of work, and bring it to the prisoner collecting points for further transport into the Reich. Surprise attacks on German soldiers, damage to German property must be retaliated in every case with shooting or hanging of hostages, destruction of the surrounding localities, etc. Only then will the population announce to the German offices the collections of the bandits, in order to remain protected from reprisal measures.” The defendant also received and passed on the order regarding reprisal measures issued by General Loehr, deputising for Field Marshal von Weichs as Commander-in-Chief Southeast, under date of 22nd December, 1943, an order which has been previously quoted in this opinion. It says in part : “ Reprisal quotas are not fixed. The orders previously decreed concerning them are to be rescinded. The extent of the reprisal measures is to be established in advance in each individual case. . . . The procedure, of carrying out reprisal measures after a surprise attack or an act of sabotage at random on persons and dwellings, in the vicinity, close to the scene of the deed, shakes the confidence in the justice of the occupying power and also drives the loyal part of the population into the woods. This form of execution of reprisal measures is accordingly forbidden, If, I however, the investigation on the spot reveals concealed collaboration or a conscientiously passive attitude of certain persons concerning the perpetrators then these persons above all are to be shot as bandit helpers and their dwellings destroyed. . . . Such persons are co-responsible first of all who recognise Communism.”
The evidence showed many separate reprisal actions by troops subordinate to this defendant. In many instances there was no connection between the inhabitants shot and the offence committed. Reprisals were taken against special groups, such as “ Communists ” and “ bandit suspects ”
p.48
without any relationship to the offence being established. Reprisal prisoners were taken from hostage camps generally and at points distant from the place where the offences occurred. It was also shown that in many reprisal actions destruction of property accompanied the mass shootings.
(ix) Lanz
The defendant Lanz was appointed to command the XXIInd Mountain Corps on 25th August, 1943, and actually assumed the position on 9th September, 1943.
On 3rd October, 1943, the defendant issued an order reading in part as follows : “ On account of the repeated cable sabotage in the area of Arta, 10 distinguished citizens (Greeks) from Arta, 10 distinguished citizens (Greeks) from Filipias, are to be arrested and kept as hostages. The population is to be notified that for every further cable sabotage 10 of these 40 hostages will be shot to death.”
The defendant denied that any of these hostages were shot and there was no evidence to the contrary. On the other hand, there was proof of many reprisal actions, of the same general type as those already described, having been committed by troops under the accused’s command and with his knowledge and acquiescence.
There was also evidence that a number of Italian officers, whose troops had resisted German requests to surrender with their arms, were shot on the orders of Lanz. It was shown, however, that Lanz acted under orders from Hitler and that, by resisting a previous order, he reduced the number of persons whom he was required to have executed.
(x) Speidel
The defendant Speidel assumed the position of Military Commander Southern Greece in early October 1942, and remained in the position until September 1943. From September 1943 until May 1944 he occupied the position of Military Commander Greece.
That the Military Commander Greece could control the reprisal and hostage practice through the various sub-area headquarters which were subordinate to him was borne out by the testimony of the defendant himself and charts prepared by him. Nevertheless, there was evidence of numerous separate instances of reprisal killings by troops under his command and with his knowledge, the victims often having no connection with any offences committed against the German armed forces and having lived in other districts, and often no court-martial proceedings having been held.
3. THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIBUNAL
In addition to summarising the evidence which had been placed before it, the Tribunal in its judgment dealt with a number of legal matters, as follows :
p.49
(i) The General Nature and the Sources of International Law (Footnote 1: The reader may find it of interest to compare the Tribunal's remarks on these matters with some observations of the Tribunal which conducted the Justice Trial, which are set out in Vol. VI of this series, pp. 34-8)
It seemed to the Tribunal advisable “ to briefly state the general nature of International Law and the sources from which its principles can be ascertained.” It added, however, that :
“ No attempt will be here made to give an all inclusive definition of International Law, in fact, there is justification for the assertion that it ought not to be circumscribed by strict definition in order that it may have ample room for growth. Any system of law that is obviously subject to growth by the crystallisation of generally prevailing custom and practice into law under the impact of common acceptance or consent, must not be confined within the limits of formal pronouncement or complete unanimity. For our purposes it is sufficient to say that International Law consists of the principles which control or govern relations between nations and their nationals. It is much more important to consider the sources from which these principles may be determined.”
The judgment then continued :
“ The sources of International Law which are usually enumerated are : (1) customs and practices accepted by civilised nations generally, (2) treaties, conventions and other forms of interstate agreements, (3) the decisions of international tribunals, (4) the decisions of national tribunals dealing with international questions, (5) the opinions of qualified text writers, and (6) diplomatic papers. These sources provide a frame upon which a system of International Law can be built but they cannot be deemed a complete legal system in themselves. Any system of jurisprudence, if it is to be effective, must be given an opportunity to grow and expand to meet changed conditions. The codification of principles is a helpful means of simplification, but it must not be treated as adding rigidity where resiliency is essential. To place the principles of International Law in a formalistic strait-jacket would ultimately destroy any effectiveness that it has acquired.
“ The tendency has been to apply the term ‘ customs and practices accepted by civilised nations generally’, as it is used in International Law, to the laws of war only. But the principle has no such restricted meaning. It applies as well to fundamental principles of justice which have been accepted and adopted by civilised nations generally. In determining whether such a fundamental rule of justice is entitled to be declared a principle of International Law, an examination of the municipal laws of states in the family of nations will reveal the answer. If it is found to have been accepted generally as a fundamental rule of justice by most nations in their municipal law, its declaration as a rule of International Law would seem to be fully justified. There is convincing evidence that this not only is but has been the rule. The rules applied in criminal trials regarding burden of proof, presumption of innocence, and the right of a defendant to appear personally to defend himsel

Igorn · Post by **Igorn** » Sat Dec 04, 2004 11:46 am

Mr. Schulz,

Some more information for you from http://www.gendercide.org

Case Study:
Soviet Prisoners-of-War
(POWs), 1941-42

Summary

In a mere eight months of 1941-42, the invading German armies killed an estimated 2.8 million Soviet prisoners-of-war through starvation, exposure, and summary execution. This little-known gendercide vies with the genocide in Rwanda as the most concentrated mass killing in human history.

The background

Nazi forces invaded Soviet Russia on June 22, 1941, in the biggest military operation the world had ever seen. Hitler's "Operation Barbarossa" aimed to overthrow the Communist regime of Joseph Stalin (see the case-study of Stalin's Purges) and to impose a brutal system of slavery and colonial exploitation on the Soviet masses. The Soviet armies had been decimated by the prewar purges in their ranks, and they crumbled in the face of the Nazi onslaught. In the first few months of the war, the Nazis rounded up Soviet conscript troops in a series of huge encirclements around Minsk, Smolensk, Bryansk, and Kiev. By the time the brutal Russian winter descended, millions of Soviet POWs were dying in captivity, penned behind barbed wire with no protection from the elements, being executed en masse by the German Army (Wehrmacht), or being transported to Germany for extermination by the hundreds of thousands.

R.J. Rummel writes that prisoners-of-war through history have received "particularly lethal treatment ... If their lives were spared they were often sent to work as slaves in mines, on galley ships, in swamps, or at other labor that killed them off rapidly. The Mongols used their prisoners in the front ranks when attacking fortified cities and towns, and forced them to fill in moats or prepare catapults close to the dangerous walls. If not turned into slaves, prisoners of war were often simply killed, captured garrisons massacred." (Rummel, Death by Government, p. 67.) The young Soviet men who fell into German hands during these terrible years could expect treatment even more barbaric than the historical standard. As Slavs, they were considered "Untermenschen" -- subhumans -- by the Germans. As far as Nazi forces were concerned, the laws of war did not apply.

As an aside, it should not be assumed that the "POW" designation referred to men who had, in fact, seen military service. Nazi policy in the occupied areas was very explicit: "Men between the ages of 15 and 65 were to be treated as POWs ... [and] taken to POW camps." The 18th Panzer Division studied by Omer Bartov had "orders to arrest all men of military age and send them to the rear" (Bartov, The Eastern Front, p. 110). This rapidly became a euphemism for mass murder by execution, starvation, and exposure. Even those conscripted into formal military service had little opportunity to see battle: as noted, the majority of prisoners in these early phases of Operation Barbarossa surrendered en masse after being rounded up in huge encirclements.

The gendercide

Soviet prisoners-of-war jammed into
one of the open-air POW camps, summer 1941.
"Testimony is eloquent and prolific on the abandonment of entire divisions under the open sky," writes Alexander Dallin of the fate of these Soviet POWs. "Epidemics and epidemic diseases decimated the camps. Beatings and abuse by the guards were commonplace. Millions spent weeks without food or shelter. Carloads of prisoners were dead when they arrived at their destination. Casualty figures varied considerably but almost nowhere amounted to less than 30 percent in the winter of 1941-42, and sometimes went as high as 95 per cent" (Bartov, The Eastern Front, p. 110).

Many of the captured Soviet men were forced to walk "hundreds of kilometers" to their designated places of detention. Colonel Erwin Lahousen, a German foreign intelligence officer, wrote in October 1941 that "The columns of Russian prisoners of war moving on the roads make an idiotic impression like herds of animals. The guard details ... can only maintain some semblance of order ... by using physical force. Because of the physical exertion of the marches, the meager diet and poor conditions in the quarters in individual camps, prisoners of war often break down, are then carried by their fellow-soldiers [see the photo at the beginning of this document] or are left lying. The 6th Army has given orders that all prisoners of war who break down are to be executed. Unfortunately, this is done on the road, even in towns ..." (Quoted in The Hamburg Institute for Social Research, The German Army and Genocide: Crimes Against War Prisoners, Jews, and Other Civilians, 1939-1944 [New York: The New Press, 1999], pp. 100, 142.)

Conditions in the prison camps themselves were similarly atrocious. "There were no barracks or permanent housing. The camps were simply open areas fenced off with barbed wire. The prisoners had to lie in the sun, then in mud, and in the fall -- with temperatures as low as minus 30 degreees centigrade -- faced the possibility of freezing to death." (The German Army and Genocide, p. 142.) A Hungarian tank officer who visited one enclosure described it as follows: "Behind wire there were tens of thousands of Russian prisoners. Many were on the point of expiring. Few could stand on their feet. Their faces were dried up and their eyes sunk deep into their sockets. Hundreds were dying every day, and those who had any strength left dumped them in a vast pit" (Werth, Russia At War, pp. 635-36). Cannibalism was rife, and deliberate, according to Dallin: "German policy had caused, or at the very least had tolerated, the degradation of the prisoners -- and then held it up to its own people as something to be reviled, as something typical of a sub-human who could never be like Western man" (Dallin, German Rule in Russia, p. 415).

In his epic masterpiece The Gulag Archipelago, Alexander Solzhenitsyn describes the scene in one POW camp, with "the evening mist hoverng above a swampy meadow encircled by barbed wire; a multitude of bonfires; and, around the bonfires, beings who had once been Russian officers but had now become beastlike creatures who gnawed the bones of dead horses, who baked patties from potato rinds, who smoked manure and were all swarming with lice. Not all these two-legged creatures had died as yet. Not all of them had lost the capacity for intelligible speech, and one could see in the crimson reflections of the bonfires how a belated understanding was dawning on those faces which were descending to the Neanderthal." (Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago [Harper & Row, 1973], p. 218.)

Mass death through starvation was anticipated well in advance by Nazi military planners. "Daily rations amounted to only one-fourth of what a normal person needed to survive. These meager rations resulted from the decision reached before the campaign, i.e. that providing food for the Wehrmacht and for Germany had the highest priority. 'As a result, millions of people will surely starve,' was the terse conclusion formulated at a conference of German State Secretaries in Berlin in May 1941." (The German Army and Genocide, p. 142.)

Soviet prisoner-of-war killed in Nazi "medical"
experiments, probably at Auschwitz-Birkenau.
Despite the eventual shift from outright extinction to slave labour, which also swept up hundreds of thousands of Soviet women, "maltreatment continued ... to the very end," with "instances of cruel atrocities ... reported as late as the winter of 1944-5" (Bartov, The Eastern Front, p. 110). "Many [prisoners] were shot," writes Alexander Werth, "many died in concentration camps during the later stages of the war, ... [and] some were even used for vivisectionist and other 'scientific' experiments" (Russia At War, p. 635).

How many died?

Because the targeted group consisted for the most part of soldiers in a bureaucratically-run modern army, the gendercide against Soviet prisoners-of-war is one of the best-documented of these case studies. Daniel Goldhagen, in Hitler's Willing Executioners (p. 290), gives the astonishing figure of "2.8 million young, healthy Soviet POWs" killed by the Germans, "mainly by starvation ... in less than eight months" of 1941-42, before "the decimation of Soviet POWs ... was stopped" and the Germans "began to use them as laborers" (emphasis added). There is good reason to think that this rate of killing exceeds even the worst period of the Holocaust against the Jews, although the total number killed was lower, and the Soviet victims were drawn from a much larger population base. Peter Calvocoressi and Guy Wint write in Total War that "The total number of prisoners taken by the German armies in the USSR was in the region of 5.5 million. Of these the astounding number of 3.5 million or more had been lost by the middle of 1944 and the assumption must be that they were either deliberately killed or done to death by criminal negligence. Nearly two million of them died in camps and close on another million disappeared while in military custody either in the USSR or in rear areas; a further quarter of a million disappeared or died in transit between the front and destinations in the rear; another 473,000 died or were killed in military custody in Germany or Poland." They add that "This slaughter of prisoners cannot be accounted for by the peculiar chaos of the war in the east. ... The true cause was the inhuman policy of the Nazis towards the Russians as a people and the acquiescence of army commanders in attitudes and conditions which amounted to a sentence of death on their prisoners."

These losses must be placed in the context of a war that killed as many as 40 million Russians, including large numbers of non-combatants apart from the POWs. Nonetheless, Alexander Werth writes that "Next to the Jews in Europe, six million of whom perished at the hands of the Germans ... the biggest single German crime was undoubtedly the extermination by hunger, exposure and in other ways of ... Russian war prisoners" (Russia At War, p. 634). Given that the bulk of the gendercide took place in just eight months, it was, together with the genocide in Rwanda, the most concentrated mass slaughter of all time, eclipsing the most exterminatory months of the Jewish holocaust. It was also without doubt the greatest single act of gender-exclusive killing in human history.

An important group of Soviet victims is also left out of these calculations: namely, those soldiers who never even reached captivity after surrendering. According to Ward Churchill, "perhaps as many as a million troops ... were simply executed by Wehrmacht and Waffen SS units rather than being taken prisoner in the first place." (Churchill, A Little Matter of Genocide [City Lights Books, 1997], p. 48.)

In one of the twentieth century's most tragic ironies, the two million or so POWs who survived to be repatriated to the USSR were arrested there en masse on suspicion of collaboration with the Germans. Almost without exception, they were sentenced to long terms in the Soviet death-camps. Gendercide Watch is unaware of any reliable estimates of the number who died there, but the total must have been in the tens if not hundreds of thousands. "In Russian captivity, as in German captivity, the worst lot of all was reserved for the Russians," writes Solzhenitsyn. "... It would appear that during the one thousand one hundred years of Russia's existence as a state there have been, ah, how many foul and terrible deeds! But among them was there ever so multimillioned foul a deed as this: to betray one's own soldiers and proclaim them traitors?" (Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago, p. 240, 256.)

Who was responsible?

Nazi leader Heinrich Himmler inspects
a Soviet POW camp on the eastern front.
The mass killing of the Soviet POWs was a direct expression of "the ideological concepts of the Nazi regime, which strove physically to eliminate the 'Bolshevik Untermenschen'" (Bartov, p. 107). As such, it is the leaders of the Nazi regime, above all Adolf Hitler, who bear the greatest responsibility for inflicting their racist and genocidal vision on the Soviet people, the Jews, and many others. "Though clearly aware of the prisoners' plight," writes Alexander Dallin, "the Nazi authorities adopted a pose of righteous indignation over the behaviour of the sufferers." Nazi leader Hermann Goering joked about cannibalism in the camps, telling a diplomat that "in the camps for Russian prisoners of war, after having eaten everything possible, including the soles of their boots, they have begun to eat each other, and what is more serious, have also eaten a German sentry" (Dallin, German Rule in Russia, p. 415).

But no one man or small group can commit genocide alone. The decision to ignore the laws governing the treatment of prisoners-of-war was also made by tens of thousands of German officers. "Except that some generals at Nuremberg [the war-crimes trials] tried to argue that it was difficult unexpectedly to have to feed so many POWs, there is nothing to show that the Army did anything to oppose the policy of extermination of the Russian war prisoners, at least during the first twelve or eighteen months of the war. More than that: some of these 'gentlemanly' German generals were consciously starving the Russian war prisoners" (Werth, Russia At War, p. 637).

Genocidal actions against the Soviet people, and against Soviet Jews in particular, were carried out by hundreds of thousands of "ordinary Germans" sent to fight on the Eastern Front and implement the Nazi occupation policies. Daniel Goldhagen's book Hitler's Willing Executioners has done much to revive the debate about the role of "ordinary" people in inflicting genocidal atrocities. Ron Rosenbaum's Explaining Hitler surveys the different interpretations of Nazi rule and Hitler's personal evil, and includes a chapter on Goldhagen's work (see "Further Reading").

Best Regards from Russia,

Igorn · Post by **Igorn** » Sat Dec 04, 2004 12:01 pm

Mr. Schulz,

Some more info and photos for you.

http://motlc.wiesenthal.com/gallery/pg0 ... 00222.html
http://motlc.wiesenthal.com/gallery/pg1 ... 18828.html
http://motlc.wiesenthal.com/gallery/pg1 ... 18827.html
http://motlc.wiesenthal.com/gallery/pg1 ... 18829.html
http://motlc.wiesenthal.com/gallery/pg1 ... 19857.html
http://motlc.wiesenthal.com/gallery/pg1 ... 18826.html

Best Regards from Russia,

Schultz · Post by **Schultz** » Sat Dec 04, 2004 4:02 pm

still no specific accounts just warcrimes charges

Schultz

sid guttridge · Post by **sid guttridge** » Sun Dec 05, 2004 6:55 am

Hi Schultz, I would recommend that you look out the works of Dallin, as mentioned by Igorn. Dallin worked for the American Rand Corporation, which was definitely not renowned for its pro-Soviet bias.

Cheers,

Sid.