116th Panzer Division in the Ardennes

[Rosselsprung]

I looked at the Feldgrau unit histories page for the 116th Panzer Division, and all it said for its role in the Ardenne was that it spearheaded the southern prong of the offensive. I'd like to know which units it engaged and any successes/failures that it had. Any info would be greatly appreciated.

[Rosselsprung]

Anyone know? I'd greatly appreciate any info.

[Prosper Vandenbroucke]

Hello Rosselsprung,
I just know that the 116th Panzerdivision was in the Samrée-La Roche-Hotton-Erezée aerea during the Ardennes Offensive.
The strongest advance of some of their regiments was the city of Hotton. The 116th Pzd never cross the Ourthe river in this town and their march to the Meuse river was stopped there.
You will found some information about this division in the link here below.
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... 16PD-R.htm

Kindly regards from Belgium
Prosper

P.S. Apoliges for my poor english, because it's my school english and that is far away

[Jerry]

The 116 PzD and 560 VgD were part of the LVIII Pz Korps of the 5th Pz Armee. The 116th's initial attack was against the USA 112/28 ID at Lutzkampen. On Dec 17 they captured a bridge over the Our River at Ouren but it was too damaged to support heavy equipment so the panzer regiment was forced to retrace their steps and cross the Our at Dasburg. Having reassembled at Heinersheid on the 18th the division spearhead captured Bertone on the 19th, however the Ourthe River bridge there had been destroyed so they withdrew to Houffalize and continued west on the north side of the Ourthe and captured Samree in the evening of the 20th. On the 21st the 116th ctrossed the Soy-Hotten road but their attack on Hotten was repulsed so they were ordered to once again retrace the steps and return to La Roche where they were to cross to the south side of the Ourthe and continue westward. For the next several days the division was completly worn down in continuous combat against the USA 84 ID in the Verdenne/Marenne area and went over to the defensive by the end of the month.

I hope this info is of some help to you Rosselsprung.

Jerry

[Rosselsprung]

Thanks very much to both of you. When reading through, I'm surprised to find that the division was grouped along with 560 VGD in a corps. Did the division have much success against the US 28th and 112 ID's?

[Jerry]

Hi Rosselsprung,

I think the intention was that the 560 VGD would penetrate the enemy's front and then the 116th would exploit thru the thus created gap into the depth of the enemy's rear area while the VGD division secured the breach in the front and the rear area.

112/28 ID referes to the 112 Infantry Regiment of the US 28th Infantry Division. The US 28 ID, composed of the 109, 111, and 112 Infantry Regiments, was holding a wide front in the "quite" Ardennes in December '44 and licking it's wounds after having been heavily engaged and suffering severe losses in the Hürtgen Forest. On December 16 the 28 ID was struck by no less than 3 Panzer Divisions, the 116 PzD, the 2 PzD, and Panzer Lehr, and was eventually penetrated by all three. The 116th expolited thru the enemy's rear area as described above until meeting the relatively fresh US 84 ID in the Marche - La Roche area the day before Christmas 1944, and then renewing their aquaintenance with the allied ground attack air forces that decimated all armored units at the German spearhead as the weather cleared on Christmas day.

Jerry

[Rosselsprung]

Hi again Jerry,

I thought the 116th PD had engaged the US 28th ID in the Hurtgen Forest and not the Ardennes. Weren't both divisions involved in the German counterattack to capture the city of Schmidt?

I'm rather surprised that the division was able to penetrate that far when the terrain was not ideal for tanks, fuel was probably short, and that the American infantry units had given such fierce resistance. But I assume that the combination of being understrength, undersupplied, and poorly supported by the 560 VGD against a relatively fresh division which had air support was responsible for halting the 116th PD.

[Grunt]

Hi all,

does anybody know what was the artillery equipment of the 116th Panzerdivision? I mean was it self-propelled, or towed artillery? As this division was formed from the former 116. PzGrenDiv, former 16.InfDiv (mot) I wonder if the equipment was upgraded to support faster movement?

(the reason I ask for is that I did some research on my dead grandfathers fate and I am quite 95% sure he served in the 16.InfDiv, later 16.InfDiv (mot), later 116.PzGrenDiv, later 116.PzDiv - he was forward observer in the artillery, but a picture from 1944 shows him suddenly in a black tank crew uniform...)

[Simon H]

I thought the 116th PD had engaged the US 28th ID in the Hurtgen Forest and not the Ardennes. Weren't both divisions involved in the German counterattack to capture the city of Schmidt?

The Aufklarungs Regt of the 116th Division saw action against the 112th Inf Regt, 28th ID whilst that unit engaged in the attack on Kommerscheidt/schmidt, as you rightly point out - hindering the MSR of the 112th along the Kall Trail. The rest of the 116th was preparing for Wacht am Rhien.

Best wishes
Simon

[Rich]

Hi all,

does anybody know what was the artillery equipment of the 116th Panzerdivision? I mean was it self-propelled, or towed artillery? As this division was formed from the former 116. PzGrenDiv, former 16.InfDiv (mot) I wonder if the equipment was upgraded to support faster movement?

(the reason I ask for is that I did some research on my dead grandfathers fate and I am quite 95% sure he served in the 16.InfDiv, later 16.InfDiv (mot), later 116.PzGrenDiv, later 116.PzDiv - he was forward observer in the artillery, but a picture from 1944 shows him suddenly in a black tank crew uniform...)

The artillery compliment of 116. Pz.Div. was Pz.Art. Regt. 146, consisting of I. Abtl. (1.-3. Bttr.), II. Abtl. (4.-6. Bttr.), II. Abtl. (7.-9. Bttr.), and the Regimentsstab. Nominally the I. Abtl. was self-propelled, but it is unclear what equipment they had as of the start of the offensive (I have been unable to find the 1 December Gliderung chart). However, we do know that 4 Wespe and 4 Hummel were en route to the regiment as of 10 December, that 1 Wespe and 1 Hummel were lost between 16 and 27 December, and that as of 1 January 1. Bttr. had 4 towed 10.5cm le.FH, 2. Bttr. had 2 Wespe and 4 Hummel, and 3. Bttr. had 4 Hummel. That would imply that sometime after 10 December the division had 9 Hummel and 3 Wespe, versus the 12 Wespe and 6 Hummel the organization called for, an odd situation to say the least. It also does not explain what happened to the 1 other Wespe en route on 10 December.

BTW, the division was never a "Panzergrenadier" division, it was formed from 16. Inf.-Div. (mot.) The division was initially established 24 April with 7,500 men from 16. Inf.-Div. (mot.), another 2,000 convalescents and men of the division returning from leave, 1,000 Volksliste III (ethnic Germans) recruits, and 3,000 men from a training unit, 179. Res.-Inf.-Div. I./Pz.Art.Regt. 146 was formed in June 1944 at Posen and initially was organized as:

I. Abtl.
Kdr.: Major Wilhelm Sandkuhl
1. Bttr. (six 10.5cm le.FH (Sfl.) Wespe each)
2. Bttr. (five 10.5cm le.FH (Sfl.) Wespe each)
3. Bttr. (one 15cm s.FH (Sfl.) Hummel)

Another Wespe and 5 more Hummel were received by 1 July.

Hope that helps.

[Rich]

Hi again Jerry,

I thought the 116th PD had engaged the US 28th ID in the Hurtgen Forest and not the Ardennes. Weren't both divisions involved in the German counterattack to capture the city of Schmidt?

Elements of 116. Panzer were engaged against the 112th Infantry of the 28th Division at Schmidt and Kommerscheidt and by coincidence again along the Our River during the opening of the Ardennes Campaign.

I'm rather surprised that the division was able to penetrate that far when the terrain was not ideal for tanks, fuel was probably short, and that the American infantry units had given such fierce resistance. But I assume that the combination of being understrength, undersupplied, and poorly supported by the 560 VGD against a relatively fresh division which had air support was responsible for halting the 116th PD.

Fuel supplies had been carefully hoarded and collected so that at the beginning of the offensive all units had at least 1 VS of Otto and diesel, sufficient in theory for a 100 kilometer advance over good terrain (of course Joachen Pieper famously tested that assumption and found that 50 kilometers was about the best that could be expected in the Ardennes).

Nor was the 116. Panzer really otherwise "poorly supplied" according to the division commanders report of 1 December the important shortages were:

1. Winter clothing for the infantry of the Panzergrenadier regiments.
2. Command tanks for the Panzer Regiment.
3. Junior leaders for the Panzergrenadier regiments, the Panzeraufklarungs Abteilung and the Pionier Batallion.
4. Only 50 percent of the basic load of the heavy charges in the artillery are available. This is a shortage that needs to be remedied.

Finally, the 116. Panzer was not "supported" by the 560. Inf.-Div., either well or poorly. Rather, the 116. supported the 560. and in the process suffered significant losses. Nor was the 28th Division anything but "relatively fresh." In its actions at Kommerscheidt and Schmidt it had lost a total of 3,539 battle casualties and 1,167 sick and injured, just in the period 2-13 November, through the end of November casualties had exceeded 7,000 to all causes, leaving the division in very poor shape by the time it moved to the Ardennes. Given that most of those casualties in November were incurred among the roughly 7,500 infantrymen in the division, it can be seen that virtually all of the infantry as of 16 December were replacements and returned convalescents, with a small cadre of experienced men. And few of the casualties incurred by the 116. Panzer and 560. Infanterie in the first few days against the 112th Infantry could have been caused by "air support" since AFAIK none were flown in support of the 112th between 16-18 December, which is the period in question.

In fact, the heavy losses to the panzers of 116. Pz.Div. were caused almost entirely by just a dozen well-sited and well-manned US 3" guns of C Company, 630th TD Battalion. Accurate fire from the much-maligned towed guns inflicted numerous losses on the Germans.

Of course though, it was not the resistance of the 112th Infantry that "halted" the advance, since the 112th was eventually forced to withdraw. It was the US 84th Infantry Division that eventually halted the 116. Panzer, far to the west, during the Christmas "turning of the tide."

Hope that clarifies things a bit for you.

[Grunt]

Rich,

very worthy information, thank you very much.

[Grunt]

BTW, the division was never a "Panzergrenadier" division, it was formed from 16. Inf.-Div. (mot.)

From the unit history homepage I see that the 16.ID (mot) was renamed as 16.PzGrenDiv on 23.06.1943 before it was afterwards reformed as 116.PzDiv

In 1940 the 16.ID was divided and formed the 16.PzDiv and the 16.ID (mot)

[Rich]

BTW, the division was never a "Panzergrenadier" division, it was formed from 16. Inf.-Div. (mot.)

From the unit history homepage I see that the 16.ID (mot) was renamed as 16.PzGrenDiv on 23.06.1943 before it was afterwards reformed as 116.PzDiv

In 1940 the 16.ID was divided and formed the 16.PzDiv and the 16.ID (mot)

Very good, you made me double check. But it is more interesting than that, there appears to be some contradiction in the record. 16. Inf.-Div. (mot) was actually retitiled as the 16. Panzergrenadier Div. on 23 June 1943, but evidently without any changes in organization. It is then noted that it was actually organized from the 16. Inf.-Div. as a Panzergrenadier Division in October 1943, before being effectively destroyed in Russia in March 1944. The 116. Panzer Division then began forming on 28 March from the remnants of 16. Panzergrenadier Division and 179. Reserve-Panzer Division, with an official organization date of 24 April 1944.

Thanks for the correction.

[Roger Griffiths]

PzAR146 1Dec44/1Jan45 from 116PD's Monthly Zustandsberichte

I - 1/1 2cm Flak
1 - 6/4 10,5cm
2 - 2W, 4H/2W, 4H
3 - 5/4 Hummel

II - 3/3 2cm Flak
4 - 6/6 10,5cm
6 - 6/5 10,5cm

III - 3/3 2cm Flak
7 - 4/5 10,5cm K18
8 - 4/4 15cm sFH18
9 - 4/4 15cm sFH18

Roger