Hi 4444,
Danzig WAS Poland's only port. You are correct that Danzig was a Free City between the wars. However, its ±400,000 population and civil administration was almost entirely German, even under the Free City. During Poland's war with the USSR Danzig's German dockers had refused to unload arms and ammunition for the Poles. The only other alternative ports were in Germany. In September 1939 Danzig even attacked Gdynia with its forces - it was them that entered the port on 14 September. Thus, as I posted, the Poles built Gdynia almost from scratch between the wars to avoid being reliant on German ports.
I hope you are not going to come up with a list of obscure fishing villages as "ports" or Hela as the last Polish "port" to fall?
Warsaw WAS surrounded by 18 September. I have in front of me a Polish map from an official Polish military atlas for the campaign. It is dated 16 September 1939. Just to the east of Warsaw between the Rivers Vistula and the Narew it lists from north to south, the German 32nd, 217th, 61st and 11th infantry divisions as attacking the city and XXI Corps, 23rd, 12th and 1st Infantry Divisions as driving east from it. Warsaw looks pretty surrounded to me.
As I understand it, your proposition was that the French would launch their all out assault on 12 September and that this was when your alternative would begin to diverge from the reality. Whether we are talking about a Poland v Germany war or an Allies v. Germany war, Poland was presumably still "done in" by September 6-9. Could you clarify exactly when your alternative is meant to diverge from the reality? We may be talking at cross purposes.
Nope, I don't want evidence of what never happened. I want what I aked for: "evidence that things which never happened were likely to have happened." There is no profit for anyone in engaging in complete fantasy discussions.
What have the timings of Stalin's actions against the Baltic States in 1940 got to do with our discussion about the likelihood of the French succeeding in a major offensive in September 1939. Merely because you possess a piece of knowledge doesn't make it relevant to this discussion.
Your original contention was threefold: That French had a "cream" of sixty divisions and that the Germans opposed this cream only with "3rd rate German units" behind a West Wall that "existed mostly on paper". I consider all three points misleading.
Firstly, it presumes that the vast majority of the French Army was "cream". As I have pointed, this was from the case. If you look at your list of divisions you will find that all those numbered higher than 51 were Series B formations designated "not for immediate use".
Secondly, a third of the German forces in the west were Welle 1 active divisions of as good a quality as any in the world. On the actual front between Luxemburg and the Rhine where the French were due to attack, three quarters of the German divisions were Active Welle 1 formations and the remainder were Welle 2 - equivalent to French Series A divisions.
Thirdly, the West Wall, while hardly the Maginot Line, was much more than a paper exercise. It had around 10,000 prepared positions by September 1938 and more by a year later. (I forgot to mention the partly prepared positions on the River Main dating from 1934-35, which you can add to the list of potential obstacles.)
I will just break off to post this and will be back.
Cheers,
Sid.
Could France have stoped Germany?
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sid guttridge
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sid guttridge
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Hi 4444,
I have just been checking out Hel.
As I suspected, its claim to being a port rested on some inshore fishing boats and as a stop off point for day-tripping tourist paddle wheelers from Gdynia. It was a partly restricted area after 1936 and I couldn't find anything about it having international connections at all. In the loose sense that it had a small harbour like many a tourist resort, Hel might be described as a port, but it was incapable of servicing the Polish fleet or offering any practical of reception point for foreign troops.
So, my substantive point remains. Hel offered no viable access to the outside world. Only Gdynia had that capacity.
Any other contenders?
Cheers,
Sid.
I have just been checking out Hel.
As I suspected, its claim to being a port rested on some inshore fishing boats and as a stop off point for day-tripping tourist paddle wheelers from Gdynia. It was a partly restricted area after 1936 and I couldn't find anything about it having international connections at all. In the loose sense that it had a small harbour like many a tourist resort, Hel might be described as a port, but it was incapable of servicing the Polish fleet or offering any practical of reception point for foreign troops.
So, my substantive point remains. Hel offered no viable access to the outside world. Only Gdynia had that capacity.
Any other contenders?
Cheers,
Sid.
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sid guttridge
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HI 4444,
Let's see if I can reconstruct my lost post of yesterday.
Where is the "trick" in discounting the offensive value of French Series B infantry divisions and Fortified Sectors?
The Series B infantry divisions were designated "Not for immediate use" and were weak in defence, let alone attack, in 1940. They could hardly have been better in September 1939.
And are you suggesting that the Fortified Sectors could have dragged their sections of the Maginot Line forward into the Rhineland? They were effectively immobile. Nor were they equivalent to a light division. The French "legere" infantry divisions were emergency formations created in extremis in May-June 1940.
While it is possible to discount the offensive value of the French Series B infantry divisions, they did have some limited defensive value. The same is true of German 200-series infantry divisions. Thus, with the French on the offensive, their Series-B divisions were not a factor, but the German 200 series divisions might have been, especially behind a major natural obstacle like the Rhine. (Of course, had the Germans been attacking, the reverse would have been the case.)
I think you are double counting some Active infantry divisions. The Active infantry divisions I have were numbered 10, 11, 13, 14, 19, 21, 23, 36, 42 and 43. Your figures imply that there were 22 (30 minus eight Active North African and Colonial divisions). Have you numbers for the missing 12 divisions?
[I would suggest that your 30 active infantry divisions in metropolitan France might be a mistake for the total of all Active metropolitan, colonial and north African infantry divisions (18), motorised infantry divisions (7), cavalry divisions (3) and DLMs (2).]
You will be delighted to hear that your OB agrees with a map on p.345 of "Vojna Polska" by Moczulski that I possess.
However, the map indicates that not all the divisions shown in the OB were on the German border. 1 Army Group was actually opposite the Belgian border.
Not even all 2 Army Group is shown opposite the German border. 5th Colonial, 26th, 36th Infantry Divisions were opposite Luxembourg, while 58th Infantry and 2nd Cavalry divisions were facing Switzerland.
In addition, 8th Army on the Upper Rhine was facing two major natural obstacles - the Rhine and the Black Forest, that disqualified the area as a point of attack.
Actually opposite the area of the German border vulnerable to attack, (between Luxembourg and the Rhine) in mid September the three French armies appear to have had 24 divisions in position, (two of which were Series B - 56th and 70th). Of the remaining 22, one was cavalry and three were motorised infantry. However, there were no armoured divisions and the motorised infantry divisions were divided up one per army. There appears to have been nothing ressembling a "schwerpunkt" on the German model.
I must again cut this short.
I have never contended that the German defences in the West could stop a French offensive. However, they were stronger than you suggest, while the French were weaker and unprepared for deep advances on the Blitzkrieg model. I therefore don't think that they were likely to get across the Rhine in strength before significant German forces returned from victory in Poland.
This has been a valuable exercise, as it has forced me to order some notes I took many years ago.
Cheers,
Sid.
Let's see if I can reconstruct my lost post of yesterday.
Where is the "trick" in discounting the offensive value of French Series B infantry divisions and Fortified Sectors?
The Series B infantry divisions were designated "Not for immediate use" and were weak in defence, let alone attack, in 1940. They could hardly have been better in September 1939.
And are you suggesting that the Fortified Sectors could have dragged their sections of the Maginot Line forward into the Rhineland? They were effectively immobile. Nor were they equivalent to a light division. The French "legere" infantry divisions were emergency formations created in extremis in May-June 1940.
While it is possible to discount the offensive value of the French Series B infantry divisions, they did have some limited defensive value. The same is true of German 200-series infantry divisions. Thus, with the French on the offensive, their Series-B divisions were not a factor, but the German 200 series divisions might have been, especially behind a major natural obstacle like the Rhine. (Of course, had the Germans been attacking, the reverse would have been the case.)
I think you are double counting some Active infantry divisions. The Active infantry divisions I have were numbered 10, 11, 13, 14, 19, 21, 23, 36, 42 and 43. Your figures imply that there were 22 (30 minus eight Active North African and Colonial divisions). Have you numbers for the missing 12 divisions?
[I would suggest that your 30 active infantry divisions in metropolitan France might be a mistake for the total of all Active metropolitan, colonial and north African infantry divisions (18), motorised infantry divisions (7), cavalry divisions (3) and DLMs (2).]
You will be delighted to hear that your OB agrees with a map on p.345 of "Vojna Polska" by Moczulski that I possess.
However, the map indicates that not all the divisions shown in the OB were on the German border. 1 Army Group was actually opposite the Belgian border.
Not even all 2 Army Group is shown opposite the German border. 5th Colonial, 26th, 36th Infantry Divisions were opposite Luxembourg, while 58th Infantry and 2nd Cavalry divisions were facing Switzerland.
In addition, 8th Army on the Upper Rhine was facing two major natural obstacles - the Rhine and the Black Forest, that disqualified the area as a point of attack.
Actually opposite the area of the German border vulnerable to attack, (between Luxembourg and the Rhine) in mid September the three French armies appear to have had 24 divisions in position, (two of which were Series B - 56th and 70th). Of the remaining 22, one was cavalry and three were motorised infantry. However, there were no armoured divisions and the motorised infantry divisions were divided up one per army. There appears to have been nothing ressembling a "schwerpunkt" on the German model.
I must again cut this short.
I have never contended that the German defences in the West could stop a French offensive. However, they were stronger than you suggest, while the French were weaker and unprepared for deep advances on the Blitzkrieg model. I therefore don't think that they were likely to get across the Rhine in strength before significant German forces returned from victory in Poland.
This has been a valuable exercise, as it has forced me to order some notes I took many years ago.
Cheers,
Sid.
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sid guttridge
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Hi 4444,
A couple of corrections have been given to me.
1) In addition to the 10 Active infantry divisions, there were apparently three Active mountain divisions. However, as two of them were on the Italian Front this doesn't make much difference to calculations for the border with Germany.
2) Apparently French motorised infantry divisions did not have organic motor transport for many of their troops. For this they relied on vehicles from a central army pool. Thus they were not like the German motorised infantry divisions, which had organic transport and were presumably tactically more cohesive as a result.
In 1939 the Italians had divisions of both sorts. They had two motorised infantry divisions with organic transport and several "autrasportabile" (autotransportable) infantry divisions which used vehicles allocated from a central army MT pool.
Cheers,
Sid.
A couple of corrections have been given to me.
1) In addition to the 10 Active infantry divisions, there were apparently three Active mountain divisions. However, as two of them were on the Italian Front this doesn't make much difference to calculations for the border with Germany.
2) Apparently French motorised infantry divisions did not have organic motor transport for many of their troops. For this they relied on vehicles from a central army pool. Thus they were not like the German motorised infantry divisions, which had organic transport and were presumably tactically more cohesive as a result.
In 1939 the Italians had divisions of both sorts. They had two motorised infantry divisions with organic transport and several "autrasportabile" (autotransportable) infantry divisions which used vehicles allocated from a central army MT pool.
Cheers,
Sid.
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sid guttridge
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Hi Guys,
There is a good site on the Polish Navy (http://www.polish-navy.org/) which gives some details on Hel.
"Just before the war there were built some fortifications..... naval depots, workshops and running repairs, such as a floating dock."
Thus 4444 is right to claim Hel as a port.
However, it could not be used as a base because the Luftwaffe sank anything that approached it. Not even submarines could use it. By 17 September four Polish submarines were interned in neutral harbours and the remainder were in flight to Britain because they had no bases.
There was also the fishing village of Jastarnia which some Polish minesweepers used. However, they were bombed and sunk on 14 September.
Cheers,
Sid.
There is a good site on the Polish Navy (http://www.polish-navy.org/) which gives some details on Hel.
"Just before the war there were built some fortifications..... naval depots, workshops and running repairs, such as a floating dock."
Thus 4444 is right to claim Hel as a port.
However, it could not be used as a base because the Luftwaffe sank anything that approached it. Not even submarines could use it. By 17 September four Polish submarines were interned in neutral harbours and the remainder were in flight to Britain because they had no bases.
There was also the fishing village of Jastarnia which some Polish minesweepers used. However, they were bombed and sunk on 14 September.
Cheers,
Sid.
Sid,
Whenever you make a blunder due to your loose, misleading, obscure wording (I do not dare to suspect ignorance), than you refine your statement so that the definiton is narrowed in a very particular way, namely to fit your allegations.
You write “German ports” – but what you actually mean is “port cities with mostly German ethnic population”.
You write “port” – but what you actually mean is “port with international traffic connections”.
You write “surrounded” – but what you actually mean is “with enemy troops meeting East of it”.
Please let me give you a rule which should generally improve communication: if you mean something specific, write it. Otherwise you will keep writing fairy tales.
Danzig was not a German port, as you have falsely alleged. It was a separate state. The fact that the city of Danzig had predominantly German population does not change it. Gdynia was not Poland’s only port, as you have falsely alleged. The fact that Gdynia was Poland’s only commercial port with international traffic connections does not change it. And, Hela, by the way, “obscure fishing port” as you would like to see it, was headquarters of the Navy and the naval military base, see http://www.polish-navy.org. As as to “no viable access to the outside world” suggest you compare the human traffic Hela handled in 1945. Warsaw was not surrounded on Sep 18, as you have falsely alleged, because it was in contact with remnants of 2 armies fleeing from the Bzura battlefied (by the way, what “official Polish military atlas” do you mean? Do the Poles have “official” and “unofficial” history? Could you please give an accurate reference?). The fact that German units might have met East of Warsaw does not change it.
**
Now, back to the hypothetical French offensive of mid-September 1939 (which is not my proposal, by the way). Whether it would have saved Poland, I do not know (apologies for repeating myself, apparently you have to do it to ensure the message gets through). For sure, it would have made the Germans withdraw a material portion of their troops from the East, and this in consequence would have changed the balance of powers there. It could have also led to serious political implications on the Soviet side; the cases I have quoted and which you call irrelevant prove beyond any doubt that Stalin was very closely tailoring his actions to developments in the West.
Whether it would have saved France, I have little doubt. The French army did actually deploy their best against the Germans, and if had really intended a decisive offensive, it would have been in position to deploy even more (which is not to say that all 66 divisions were 66 Legion Etrangere divisions as you falsely attribute to me, and regardless of the Series B component, which by the way you are changing post-by-post according to your liking). The German army was in an absolute numerical minority, deprived of panzer and air cover; out of this minority, only a fraction were first-rate units; out of these first-rate units, only a fraction were complete. Moreover, the overwhelming French advantage was unlikely to change at least until mid-October. The Western Wall was only partially completed, with ammunition just for 72 hours of combat, and German commanders fully aware that they were up to “mission impossible”.
Despite this, you keep claiming that France, the country considered the second military power and ranked among largest economic powers in the world, was unable to prepare an offensive which would have trashed a handful of second-rate, incomplete German divisons, sparsely scattered along an incomplete Western Wall. I presume that apart from Gdynia having been Poland’s only port, this is another of these things that you are “absolutely sure of”?
Whenever you make a blunder due to your loose, misleading, obscure wording (I do not dare to suspect ignorance), than you refine your statement so that the definiton is narrowed in a very particular way, namely to fit your allegations.
You write “German ports” – but what you actually mean is “port cities with mostly German ethnic population”.
You write “port” – but what you actually mean is “port with international traffic connections”.
You write “surrounded” – but what you actually mean is “with enemy troops meeting East of it”.
Please let me give you a rule which should generally improve communication: if you mean something specific, write it. Otherwise you will keep writing fairy tales.
Danzig was not a German port, as you have falsely alleged. It was a separate state. The fact that the city of Danzig had predominantly German population does not change it. Gdynia was not Poland’s only port, as you have falsely alleged. The fact that Gdynia was Poland’s only commercial port with international traffic connections does not change it. And, Hela, by the way, “obscure fishing port” as you would like to see it, was headquarters of the Navy and the naval military base, see http://www.polish-navy.org. As as to “no viable access to the outside world” suggest you compare the human traffic Hela handled in 1945. Warsaw was not surrounded on Sep 18, as you have falsely alleged, because it was in contact with remnants of 2 armies fleeing from the Bzura battlefied (by the way, what “official Polish military atlas” do you mean? Do the Poles have “official” and “unofficial” history? Could you please give an accurate reference?). The fact that German units might have met East of Warsaw does not change it.
**
Now, back to the hypothetical French offensive of mid-September 1939 (which is not my proposal, by the way). Whether it would have saved Poland, I do not know (apologies for repeating myself, apparently you have to do it to ensure the message gets through). For sure, it would have made the Germans withdraw a material portion of their troops from the East, and this in consequence would have changed the balance of powers there. It could have also led to serious political implications on the Soviet side; the cases I have quoted and which you call irrelevant prove beyond any doubt that Stalin was very closely tailoring his actions to developments in the West.
Whether it would have saved France, I have little doubt. The French army did actually deploy their best against the Germans, and if had really intended a decisive offensive, it would have been in position to deploy even more (which is not to say that all 66 divisions were 66 Legion Etrangere divisions as you falsely attribute to me, and regardless of the Series B component, which by the way you are changing post-by-post according to your liking). The German army was in an absolute numerical minority, deprived of panzer and air cover; out of this minority, only a fraction were first-rate units; out of these first-rate units, only a fraction were complete. Moreover, the overwhelming French advantage was unlikely to change at least until mid-October. The Western Wall was only partially completed, with ammunition just for 72 hours of combat, and German commanders fully aware that they were up to “mission impossible”.
Despite this, you keep claiming that France, the country considered the second military power and ranked among largest economic powers in the world, was unable to prepare an offensive which would have trashed a handful of second-rate, incomplete German divisons, sparsely scattered along an incomplete Western Wall. I presume that apart from Gdynia having been Poland’s only port, this is another of these things that you are “absolutely sure of”?
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sid guttridge
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Hi 4444,
I am off on holiday within the hour so this won't be a complete reply.
Of course I am on occasions guilty of sloppy and imprecise phraseology. Such things inevitably occur because we have limited space on Feldgrau. It is therefore necessary to refine what one means if challenged. This is right, not wrong. I would recommend it to you.
There is also the question of whether your proposed modifications, even if correct, substantially alter the substance of what I wrote.
I was perfectly aware of Danzig's Free City status. However, it was still an almost entirely German port. Almost nobody else lived there.
However one looks at it, Danzig was still the only port of any significance in Poland. A floating dock in Hela and fishing quays in a couple of other places won't change that.
I don't know why you keep pressing the Warsaw issue. If the official Polish ministry of defence atlas shows Warsaw surrounded by 16 September, why do you think you know better?
The fact that Hela handled refugees in 1945 is irrelevant. Open beaches can handle refugees if the situation is desperate enough - and it was.
The main Polish naval base was on the north shore of Danzig harbour.
Nope. I never wrote that Hela was "an obscure fishing port".
Must go,
Sid
However,
I am off on holiday within the hour so this won't be a complete reply.
Of course I am on occasions guilty of sloppy and imprecise phraseology. Such things inevitably occur because we have limited space on Feldgrau. It is therefore necessary to refine what one means if challenged. This is right, not wrong. I would recommend it to you.
There is also the question of whether your proposed modifications, even if correct, substantially alter the substance of what I wrote.
I was perfectly aware of Danzig's Free City status. However, it was still an almost entirely German port. Almost nobody else lived there.
However one looks at it, Danzig was still the only port of any significance in Poland. A floating dock in Hela and fishing quays in a couple of other places won't change that.
I don't know why you keep pressing the Warsaw issue. If the official Polish ministry of defence atlas shows Warsaw surrounded by 16 September, why do you think you know better?
The fact that Hela handled refugees in 1945 is irrelevant. Open beaches can handle refugees if the situation is desperate enough - and it was.
The main Polish naval base was on the north shore of Danzig harbour.
Nope. I never wrote that Hela was "an obscure fishing port".
Must go,
Sid
However,
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Richard Hargreaves
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Could the French have stopped the Germans?
Interesting question... My guess is probably not as the will for victory on the German side was seemingly stronger.John W. Howard wrote:Could the French have defeated the Germans? I do not think so, but I think they could have inflicted many more casualties than they did, and perhaps held out a little longer. Hope this is of some use. Best wishes.
However, the Battle of the Gembloux Gap sheds some very interesting light on the campaign. I've studied it at length from the official documents and personal accounts. The Germans were making very little headway against the core of the BEF/French Army and only took the field after the collapse at Sedan. Which goes to show that had Fall Gelb been launched in the autumn of 1939 before the change of plan it would have been bloody. My guess is that the Allies would have been pushed back, possibly decisively, but that the Germans would have suffered grievous losses.
No-one who speaks German could be an evil man
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sid guttridge
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Hi 4444,
Back from holiday. To continue.
Strange as it may seem, yes, almost every country has "official" and "unofficial" histories and Poland is no exception. The official Polish military atlas of the 1939 campaign to which I referred is:
"Wojna Obrona Polski 1939." published by the Wojskowy Instytut Historyczny, Warsaw, 1995. (ISBN 838626831X).
The fact that some fleeing remnants of the Bzura forces trickled into Warsaw does not alter the fact that German forces had surrounded the city before 18 September. The Bzura refugees were not arriving as a relief for Warsaw, but in search of refuge.
Considering that we are discussing a hypothetical situation, I think you are adopting an unsustainably definite tone in some matters. I don't think we can say anything "for sure" about French, German, Polish or Soviet intentions in these hypothetical circumstances. We can only deal in balances of probability.
Wow! I am continually amazed at some of the things I am supposed to have written. i.e. ".....which is not to say that all 66 divisions were 66 Legion Etranger Divisions as you falsely attribute to me....." Firstly, I have never, at any point in this thread, mentioned the Legion Etrangere, and, secondly, no such Legion Etrangere Divisions existed. Please don't invent my posts. They probably contain quite enough inaccuracies without you creating new ones!
I am unclear on one part of your last post. Are you suggesting that the French were in a position to employ even more than 66 divisions in an offensive capacity? If so, as we already know that the Series-B divsions and fortification troops had almost no offensive capacity, could you detail which these extra divisions with offensive capacity were?
Nope. I am not changing my post-by-post account of the Series-B divisions according to my liking. I am clarifying the situation according to the emerging facts. This, I would suggest, is a thoroughly good thing. When I first mentioned the French Series-B divisions on 26 November, it was with a qualification: "IF I REMEMBER RIGHTLY, they were numbered from 60 up." As it happens, I did not "remember rightly", and they were, in fact, numbered from 50 up. I am sorry if this clarification further undermines your proposition about French offensive potential, but I could hardly cover it up, could I?
Nope. It is not true that, of the German "first rate units" in the West (presumably the twelve or so Welle 1 infantry divisions?) "only a fraction were complete". In fact they were all up to strength. It was the 200-series infantry divisions that had shortages. It should also be pointed out that the "fraction" of the German divisions in the West made up of Welle 1 divisions was about a third and that they made up almost all the frontline formations on the only practicable French line of advance between the Luxembourg border and the Rhine.
Nope. Your final paragraph not only doesn't reflect what I have written, but it doesn't even agree with your own previous paragraph. When did the "first rate units" in your previous paragraph become the "second rate units" of your final paragraph?
I think your political points about Stalin's opportunism might have some merit, but they seem to be premised on over optimistic views of Polish powers of resistance and French offensive potential.
Cheers,
Sid.
P.S. As a matter of interest, what were the four Polish ports other than Gdynia which you mentioned earlier?
Back from holiday. To continue.
Strange as it may seem, yes, almost every country has "official" and "unofficial" histories and Poland is no exception. The official Polish military atlas of the 1939 campaign to which I referred is:
"Wojna Obrona Polski 1939." published by the Wojskowy Instytut Historyczny, Warsaw, 1995. (ISBN 838626831X).
The fact that some fleeing remnants of the Bzura forces trickled into Warsaw does not alter the fact that German forces had surrounded the city before 18 September. The Bzura refugees were not arriving as a relief for Warsaw, but in search of refuge.
Considering that we are discussing a hypothetical situation, I think you are adopting an unsustainably definite tone in some matters. I don't think we can say anything "for sure" about French, German, Polish or Soviet intentions in these hypothetical circumstances. We can only deal in balances of probability.
Wow! I am continually amazed at some of the things I am supposed to have written. i.e. ".....which is not to say that all 66 divisions were 66 Legion Etranger Divisions as you falsely attribute to me....." Firstly, I have never, at any point in this thread, mentioned the Legion Etrangere, and, secondly, no such Legion Etrangere Divisions existed. Please don't invent my posts. They probably contain quite enough inaccuracies without you creating new ones!
I am unclear on one part of your last post. Are you suggesting that the French were in a position to employ even more than 66 divisions in an offensive capacity? If so, as we already know that the Series-B divsions and fortification troops had almost no offensive capacity, could you detail which these extra divisions with offensive capacity were?
Nope. I am not changing my post-by-post account of the Series-B divisions according to my liking. I am clarifying the situation according to the emerging facts. This, I would suggest, is a thoroughly good thing. When I first mentioned the French Series-B divisions on 26 November, it was with a qualification: "IF I REMEMBER RIGHTLY, they were numbered from 60 up." As it happens, I did not "remember rightly", and they were, in fact, numbered from 50 up. I am sorry if this clarification further undermines your proposition about French offensive potential, but I could hardly cover it up, could I?
Nope. It is not true that, of the German "first rate units" in the West (presumably the twelve or so Welle 1 infantry divisions?) "only a fraction were complete". In fact they were all up to strength. It was the 200-series infantry divisions that had shortages. It should also be pointed out that the "fraction" of the German divisions in the West made up of Welle 1 divisions was about a third and that they made up almost all the frontline formations on the only practicable French line of advance between the Luxembourg border and the Rhine.
Nope. Your final paragraph not only doesn't reflect what I have written, but it doesn't even agree with your own previous paragraph. When did the "first rate units" in your previous paragraph become the "second rate units" of your final paragraph?
I think your political points about Stalin's opportunism might have some merit, but they seem to be premised on over optimistic views of Polish powers of resistance and French offensive potential.
Cheers,
Sid.
P.S. As a matter of interest, what were the four Polish ports other than Gdynia which you mentioned earlier?
First of all the Gynia port had no communication with the rest of the country, so it didn't matter if it was fighting or not. On the other hand Germans couldn't use the Danzig port because it was in the range of fire of Polish battery at Hel.
As for the French, we can't know if they could start full scale offensive in the middle of september. But they could make the Germans think they are going to start an offensive. How? Using artillery(they had some good rail guns) to make holes in german lines. Starting many small scale attacks to make the Germans use their supplies and for reconaissance.
Bomb roads, bridges, rail stations to cut the suply lines.
This would probably stop Stalin from invaiding Poland and give the Polish army a chance to reorgenize.
You must also remember that in 1939 Hitler wasn't fully supported by the German generals.
As for the French, we can't know if they could start full scale offensive in the middle of september. But they could make the Germans think they are going to start an offensive. How? Using artillery(they had some good rail guns) to make holes in german lines. Starting many small scale attacks to make the Germans use their supplies and for reconaissance.
Bomb roads, bridges, rail stations to cut the suply lines.
This would probably stop Stalin from invaiding Poland and give the Polish army a chance to reorgenize.
You must also remember that in 1939 Hitler wasn't fully supported by the German generals.
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sid guttridge
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Hi Menel,
You are correct. Gdynia and Hela were cut of from the rest of Poland by the third or fourth day of the war (at about the same date as the UK and France declared war) and so were of little practicable use to the rump of Poland after that.
Furthermore, the majority of major Polish surface warships (all destroyers) had escaped to Britain even before the outbreak of war. The one remaining destroyer moved from Gdynia to Hela at the outbreak of war but was sunk by the Luftwaffe almost immediately, at about the same time as the British and French declared war. Therefore, from about the time that the Anglo-French entered the war neither Gdynia nor Hela were much use as ports. The minesweepers also abandoned Gdynia and Hela for Jastarnia, where they were sunk by the Luftwaffe on 14 September. Polish submarines lay in wait around the Bay of Danzig until Gdynia fell on 14 September and then made either for neutral ports or Britain, not for Hela.
The French did harass the Germans as you suggest and even launched the corps-sized Sarre/Saar local offensive, but these did not draw off any German forces from Poland.
The French were definitely capable of launching a large attack by two or three armies by 12-13 September and had specific plans at least to clear the west bank of the Rhine. However, they didn't seem to have had the capacity to launch a rapid Blitzkrieg-type offensive that would have been decisive in the five days before Stalin entered Eastern Poland. For example, they didn't have a single armoured division and their motorised infantry divisions did not have their own organic transport like the Germans.
As I see it, the problem is not that the French couldn't have launched a considerable assault, but that it was unlikely to be militarily decisive quickly enough to change the outcome in Poland. It might have had political repercussions on Stalin or the German General Staff, but if it wasn't immediately militarily decisive I don't see it altering their actions much either.
Cheers,
Sid.
You are correct. Gdynia and Hela were cut of from the rest of Poland by the third or fourth day of the war (at about the same date as the UK and France declared war) and so were of little practicable use to the rump of Poland after that.
Furthermore, the majority of major Polish surface warships (all destroyers) had escaped to Britain even before the outbreak of war. The one remaining destroyer moved from Gdynia to Hela at the outbreak of war but was sunk by the Luftwaffe almost immediately, at about the same time as the British and French declared war. Therefore, from about the time that the Anglo-French entered the war neither Gdynia nor Hela were much use as ports. The minesweepers also abandoned Gdynia and Hela for Jastarnia, where they were sunk by the Luftwaffe on 14 September. Polish submarines lay in wait around the Bay of Danzig until Gdynia fell on 14 September and then made either for neutral ports or Britain, not for Hela.
The French did harass the Germans as you suggest and even launched the corps-sized Sarre/Saar local offensive, but these did not draw off any German forces from Poland.
The French were definitely capable of launching a large attack by two or three armies by 12-13 September and had specific plans at least to clear the west bank of the Rhine. However, they didn't seem to have had the capacity to launch a rapid Blitzkrieg-type offensive that would have been decisive in the five days before Stalin entered Eastern Poland. For example, they didn't have a single armoured division and their motorised infantry divisions did not have their own organic transport like the Germans.
As I see it, the problem is not that the French couldn't have launched a considerable assault, but that it was unlikely to be militarily decisive quickly enough to change the outcome in Poland. It might have had political repercussions on Stalin or the German General Staff, but if it wasn't immediately militarily decisive I don't see it altering their actions much either.
Cheers,
Sid.
It's Hel, not Hela. In the port of Hel two bgig ship were sunk by the Luftwaffe on 3rd of September : "Wicher" and "Gryf"(a minesweeper about size of a destroyer). Olso two Polish submarines escaped to Britain.
All arguments about French military weakness is only looking for excuses for wrong political decisions.
And it was all that was needed.The French were definitely capable of launching a large attack by two or three armies by 12-13 September and had specific plans at least to clear the west bank of the Rhine.
If the main target was Ruhra region they would't need any armoured divisions. They would need havy armoured tanks supporting infantry and this is exactly what they had.However, they didn't seem to have had the capacity to launch a rapid Blitzkrieg-type offensive that would have been decisive in the five days before Stalin entered Eastern Poland. For example, they didn't have a single armoured division and their motorised infantry divisions did not have their own organic transport like the Germans.
All arguments about French military weakness is only looking for excuses for wrong political decisions.
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sid guttridge
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Hi Menel,
If the French target was the Ruhr region, then they had to break the resistance of twelve first rate German divisions and twice as many others, breach the Siegfried Line, advance some 300 kilometres, cross the Rhine and capture the most built-up area in Germany. Furthermore, they had to do this between the 12 September and the point that the Polish Government and High Command ordered their armed forces to flee Poland for neutral borders on 18 September. This was simply impracticable with the sort of army they possessed.
It is certainly true that the French made political commitments they did not keep. However, they were based on the premise that Poland would not be over run with such extraordinary speed. Nobody, not least the Poles, anticipated that.
Furthermore, if one reads the details of the Fuhrer Order for the attack on Poland (see Hugh Trevor-Roper's book), it is specifically stated that the consideration that would release German forces from Poland for the West was whether the Polish Army was still able to hold a cohesive front. Absolutely no mention was made of pressure on the Western front being a factor. The Germans were apparently prepared to accept losses on the Western Front as the price needed to finish off Poland.
Cheers,
Sid.
If the French target was the Ruhr region, then they had to break the resistance of twelve first rate German divisions and twice as many others, breach the Siegfried Line, advance some 300 kilometres, cross the Rhine and capture the most built-up area in Germany. Furthermore, they had to do this between the 12 September and the point that the Polish Government and High Command ordered their armed forces to flee Poland for neutral borders on 18 September. This was simply impracticable with the sort of army they possessed.
It is certainly true that the French made political commitments they did not keep. However, they were based on the premise that Poland would not be over run with such extraordinary speed. Nobody, not least the Poles, anticipated that.
Furthermore, if one reads the details of the Fuhrer Order for the attack on Poland (see Hugh Trevor-Roper's book), it is specifically stated that the consideration that would release German forces from Poland for the West was whether the Polish Army was still able to hold a cohesive front. Absolutely no mention was made of pressure on the Western front being a factor. The Germans were apparently prepared to accept losses on the Western Front as the price needed to finish off Poland.
Cheers,
Sid.
false. First rate divisions were in Poland at that time. These in the West were not only not first-rate, but also incompletesid guttridge wrote:If the French target was the Ruhr region, then they had to break the resistance of twelve first rate German divisions
most of them incompletesid guttridge wrote:and twice as many others
incomplete and poorly mannedsid guttridge wrote:breach the Siegfried Line
correct. Covering such distance in an undefended area takes a motorised unit a few days.sid guttridge wrote:advance some 300 kilometres
the Roman army had no major problem with that already.sid guttridge wrote:cross the Rhine
so what? Are buildings better soldiers than trees?sid guttridge wrote:and capture the most built-up area in Germany
The date of Polish command escaping to Romania is irrelevant. What matters is a day when the Germans could have shifted a substantial fraction of their troops from the East to the West.sid guttridge wrote:Furthermore, they had to do this between the 12 September and the point that the Polish Government and High Command ordered their armed forces to flee Poland for neutral borders on 18 September
Yes it was very much practicable, of course if the French HQ had ever intended to mount such an offensive. The problem is the French HQ had probably never really intended this and have never really prepared for this.sid guttridge wrote:This was simply impracticable with the sort of army they possessed