A few question on the Waffen-SS.

[PaulJ]

Yes, why don't we hear more about those "pig-headed" assaults of the nutty Germans? Well, by all means, please direct me to some sources (preferably something reliable) as I can "hear more about that". I also would be very interested as to your source for the "good Canadian infantry" vs. "the pig-headed charges" of the Germans.

Fair enough. First of all, perhaps I should apologize for my language -- I wrote that post Friday evening after a half-bottle of good merlot. In any event -- please see the rather lengthy response below. I think this issue merits a new thread of its own, which I am starting in the Waffen-SS forum.

Late on 8 June, the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade, was the furthermost formation of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, holding a line of villages (PUTOT-EN-BASSIN, BRETTEVILLE L'ORGUEILLEUSE, NORREY-EN-BASSIN) five to six km West of CAEN, roughly along the CAEN-BAYEUX highway. Immediately opposite them was 26 Pz Gren Regt of 12th SS, and to their West was Pz Lehr. At this early stage the Germans were still striving to counter-attack onto the beaches, and late that afternoon, the great Rommel himself arrived at Pz Lehr's headquarters. He approved plans for a major counter-attack by both pz divs, and a smaller attack by elements of 12th SS for that evening, in order to seize a suitable start-line for the subsequent push to the beaches.

The Royal Regina Regiment of the 7th CIB's was holding BRETTEVILLE as a strong-point. A battlegroup of 12th SS was organized to attack them and capture the village, which dominated the proposed start-line for the putative 12th SS - Pz Lehr counter-attack intended for 9 June. The battlegroup consisted of a motorcycle reconnaissance company and two companies of Panthers, with two batteries of self-propelled howitzers in support, the famous Kurt "Panzer Meyer" Meyer himself commanding.

To quote Canadian military historian Terry Copp (Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy, 2003, pp 72-73):

His plan called for a direct attack down the main highway into the village. How tanks with few infantry were to accomplish this was quite unclear. The Panthers, "staggered one behind each other", came under flanking fire from [the battalion's attached A/T guns]. Three Panthers were destroyed before this approach was abandoned. Just before midnight, two Panthers groped their way down the main road into Brettville.

To quote the Regina's war diary:

One [Panther] came opposite battalion headquarters and was struck by a PIAT bomb, fired from behind a stone wall at 15 yards range ... It halted for a moment ... and was struck by a second PIAT. It stopped, turned around and headed out of town. A third PIAT finished it off ... During this incident the second Panther had remained farther up the road. Seeing the fate of its companion it commenced to fire both 75mm and MG wildly down the street like a child in a tantrum doing no damage whatsoever [to the Reginas] except to set fire to the first Panther. Rifleman Lapointe, J.E. with great coolness and determination was instrumental in knocking out the first tank.

Professor Copp takes up the story again:

Meyer now employed his self-propelled artillery and one company of Panthers as a fire base ... [sending] his second Panther company around to the left in an attempt to enter the village from the south. At Cardonville, they encountered Dog Company [of the Reginas] and were soon pounding the Regina company with everything they had. ... The company commander noted: "Tanks without infantry and at night made no sense. They could take ground and batter buildings, cause some casualties and generally terrorize us but without infantry they could not hold what they had captured." Back in Bretteville, the situation was even more frustrating for the Germans. The motorcycle company has suffered heavy losses, and the Panther crews with their limited visibility found night fighting in the streets of Bretteville confusing and pointless.

This night attack of 8-9 June was disastrous for the 12th SS, costing them 152 casualties and six Panthers. Nevertheless, as Professor Copp acerbically noted, this "did not persuade 'Panzer Meyer' that his operational doctrine was flawed. He ordered a new assault concentrating on Norrey" for the next day. This assault faired not better.

And as to my quip about the "good Canadian infantry", let me quote the 12th SS divisional history (Hubert Meyer, The History of the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend, 1992, p 57):

This village [Norrey] together with Bretteville, formed a strong barrier, blocking the attack plans of the Panzerkorps. For this reason, repeated attempts were made to take these positions through a number of attacks. They failed because of insufficient forces, partly because of rushed planning caused by real or imagined time pressures. Last by not least they failed because of the courage of the defenders which was not any less than that of the attackers.

These attacks, for which no reconnaissance had been done before they were ordered, can only be called ill-prepared, clumsy, frontal attacks.

Suggested Further Reading:

Carlo d’Este, Decision in Normandy (London: William Collins
Sons & Co. Ltd., 1983)

John English, The Canadian Army in the Normandy Campaign: A
Failure in High Command (New York: Praeger, 1991)

C.P. Stacey, Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second
World War, Volume III, The Victory Campaign: The Operations in
North-West Europe, 1944-1945 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1966)

Lionel F. Ellis, Victory in the West Vol I The Battle of Normandy,
(London: HMSO, 1962)

J.L. Granatstein and Desmond Morton, Bloody Victory: Canadians
and the D-Day Campaign, 1944 (Toronto: Lester and Orpen Dennys,
1984)

Terry Copp and Robert Vogel, Maple Leaf Route: Caen and Maple
Leaf Route: Falaise (Alma, Ont: Maple Leaf Route, 1983)

[Timo]

Interesting info Paul. Thank you for posting it here.

[sid guttridge]

Hi Guys,

It should be pointed out that from mid 1944 very few German recruits completed full training and the skill of many German troops declined noticeably, even if their numbers did not.

One example of German troops employing crude and ineffectual mass attacks is reportedly during the first German counter-attacks against American paratroops during the Arnhem operation. A German training and replacement division that was manning the West Wall just across the German border had to make these attacks with semi-trained men and was repulsed with heavy losses. This was probably an increasingly common phenomenon on most fronts from about September 1944.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Thomas V.]

Fair enough. First of all, perhaps I should apologize for my language -- I wrote that post Friday evening after a half-bottle of good merlot. In any event -- please see the rather lengthy response below.

I appreciate your reply.

Late on 8 June, the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade, was the furthermost formation of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, holding a line of villages (PUTOT-EN-BASSIN, BRETTEVILLE L'ORGUEILLEUSE, NORREY-EN-BASSIN) five to six km West of CAEN, roughly along the CAEN-BAYEUX highway.

It's Putot-en-Bessin/Norrey-en-Bessin. I also wonder why the scope is suddenly widened up so much beyond that of Putot in your original post. To hide the fact that Putot-en-Bessin was captured with dramatic results for the Winnipeg Rifles, perhaps?

Immediately opposite them was 26 Pz Gren Regt of 12th SS, and to their

This is correct. SS-Pz.Gren.Rgt.26 (Ostubaf. Wilhelm Mohnke) launched an assault against the little Norman villages held by 7th. Can. Brigade.

It was II.Bat./26 (Stubaf. Siebken) which was directed to attacked Putot and eventually encircled the positions of the Royal Winnipeg Rifles (Col. John Meldram). In fact, when one takes a look at the map, Putot was defended by decent circle-formation defences but they were too deep in German held territory. The Panzergrenadiere managed to surround both A, B and C companies and all three ran out of ammuntion. Some survivors of each company found their way back (under the cover of smoke) to Bat.HQ, I assume only D-company and perhaps the support company were left. The Winnipeg Rifles were mauled so badly that they were put, that same day, in Brigade reserve and replaced by another unit. I don't have exact figures at hand but I assume the Rifles lost at least 50% of their strength after Putot.
Brigadier Foster immediatly organised a nightly counter-attack with a Scottish regiment and tanks from the Hussars. The counter-attack was succesful since the German troops in Putot lacked equiment to ward of such a massive attack so the counter-attack was succesful.

Bretteville (III./26) and Norrey-sur-Bessin (I./26, Stubaf. Krause) were never captured despite major combat. Bretteville was virtually taken and the Regina HQ surrounded but the German attack later lost momentum I assume this is what you were trying to say, be it accompagnied with a lot of clumsy argumenation. In sectors other than II./26, losses amounted to 152 killed and 5 Pz.V ,,Panther'' destroyed during combat in the night of 8-9 June. Canadian infantry KIA-number was lower (89).

His plan called for a direct attack down the main highway into the village. How tanks with few infantry were to accomplish this was quite unclear. The Panthers, "staggered one behind each other", came under flanking fire from [the battalion's attached A/T guns]. Three Panthers were destroyed before this approach was abandoned. Just before midnight, two Panthers groped their way down the main road into Brettville.

That's an interesting quote but perhaps I am in the need of glasses, as nowhere do I see any reference being made to "the good Canadians" and/or "the pig-headed Germans".

To quote the Regina's war diary:

I see you have a liking for individual battle-actions which lead to the destruction of German armoured material, but one can hardly perceive the loss of a Pz.V as a "pig-headed" action. If that was so, Monty would have a lot of explaining to do for losing close to 500 tanks in 4 days during ,,Operation Goodwood''.

These attacks, for which no reconnaissance had been done before they were ordered, can only be called ill-prepared, clumsy, frontal attacks.

Perhaps Mr. Paul should actually read what he quotes himself. It's generally considered a good idea to quote sources which actually defend your own point. Hubert Meyer writes: ,,the courage of the defenders which was not any less than that of the attackers''. This is a rather flimsy basis to build a chauvinistic theory of "the better Canadians" vs. "the unsophisticated Germans" on. What Meyer writes is that both the offending and defending party were on equal terms where courage is concerned. At no point does it support any of your insulting rhetoric.

Were the assaults by Mohnke's Regiment hastly and not prepared in depth? Of course they were. It is also true that the SS infantry suffered a relatively high TCAS because they did not scout the nature of the Canadian defence system. But there was no other choice. Rommel knew the Allied troops would not be able to be pushed back if they had gotten the chance to formally dig themselves in in their beach head. Time and massive surprise attacks were of the essence.

In conlusion, you took out one fragment of the battle in Normandy that happened to be an operational setback for the Germans and blew it up completely out of proportion to the point where you think it is justified to use insulting rhetoric towards men who fell in battle. Operational set-backs are legio in Normandy 1944 for any side involved, perhaps you would care to enlighten us with the fate of Task Force Worthington and what those "studpid" (sic), "unsophisticated", "pig-headed" Germans did to this unit and both the Polish Armoured Regiment and the Governor's General's Foot Guards who tried to rescue it. I, however, will wholeheartedly agree that the SS has been overglorified by a lot of writers but the same goes for other units, persons or battles in modern history. However attacking divisions whose combat reputation speaks for itself with false interpretation of facts is unjustified. Both the SS and Canadian troops proved to be fine troops, as Meyer already said.

Personally, I only replied because my friend's brother-in-law fell in action at Putot, he was a Kompaniechef in II./SS-Rgt.26.

[Christoph Awender]

Well, for me this example just proofs that the W-SS was just like all other comparable Wehrmacht formations.
In this combat situation the defender has always an advantage and I wouldn´t see it as proof of superior tactical skill.
On the other side the german units had to gain fast success and had no other chance to push forward without skillfull planed manouvers.
So I would see this as a characteristic engagement which was typical for the situation in Normandie at this time.

We can now list one engagement after the other. I could post many examples where W-SS units failed to achieve their objective, lost many men and material etc...
Also I can list many engagements where Heer units achieved their objectives or not etc...
It is no matter to discuss if the W-SS was more "stupid" than Heer units. Why can´t we all see that there was no difference between some W-SS units and a comparable Heer unit (e.g. 2.Pz.Div., 4.Pz.Div., 1.Pz.Div. etc....)

I, however, will wholeheartedly agree that the SS has been overglorified by a lot of writers but the same goes for other units, persons or battles in modern history. However attacking divisions whose combat reputation speaks for itself with false interpretation of facts is unjustified.

What does this add to the topic that other units, persons or battles in modern history were overglorified as well???
Please tell me exactly what reputation of the 12th SS speaks for itself?? What was in your oppinion so extraordinary that the 12th SS achieved and can you proof that another unit in this position, terrain, situation would have acted worse???

\Christoph

[PaulJ]

you took out one fragment of the battle in Normandy that happened to be an operational setback for the Germans and blew it up completely out of proportion to the point where you think it is justified to use insulting rhetoric towards men who fell in battle.

Well ... no, I won't concede this point. Indeed what I wrote was just "one fragment of the battle in Normandy", but it was not my intention to suggest that it (in particular) proves any more general conclusion. I merely offered it as one illustration. That's what you asked for isn't it, "more about those attacks"? That and a suggested reading list.

That doesn't mean that more general conclusions about relative fighting performance aren't possible. Merely that reaching those more general conclusions has to be a rigorous and comprehensive process. In fact, this is the dominant debate amongst military historians about the battle of Normandy -- how should we assess the relative battle performance of the various armies, in particular the Germans vs the Anglo-Americans. If it makes you feel any better, the general consensus has traditionally been that the Germans were better, as Max Hastings in OVERLORD: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy (London: Michael Joseph, 1984) put it "the German army was the outstanding fighting force of the Second World War, and it could be defeated by Allied soldiers only under the most overwhelmingly favourable conditions" (p 12).

Recently, something of a counter-movement seeking to redress this consensus has emerged. The dean of this school (in Canada) is the Terry Copp who wrote the book I was quoting. (Prof Copp just retired this spring.)

As to some of your more specific points:

It's Putot-en-Bessin/Norrey-en-Bessin.

This, I must confess, hit a nerve with me, because I hate to get details like that wrong. So I went back and checked, and fascinatingly enough, there seem to be variant spellings. Most of my Canadian sources do indeed spell it "BASSIN" with an "A", but "BESSIN" with an "E" seems to be the spelling used by the local French. Interesting, I wonder what the spelling on the British Army topo maps used by the Anglo-Americans in the actual campaign was? My suspicion now is that they spelled it with an "A", which would explain why that spelling has found its way into the (Canadian at least) record. Munich-Muenchen? Anyone in this forum have any insight into this?

I also wonder why the scope is suddenly widened up so much beyond that of Putot in your original post. To hide the fact that Putot-en-Bessin was captured with dramatic results for the Winnipeg Rifles, perhaps?

You've caught me out here. The Winnipegs were indeed forced out of PUTOT, suffering considerable losses in their withdrawal. When I wrote my original post I was thinking of BRETTEVILLE but the name my memory came up with was PUTOT. Apologies, they are at least two km apart. If we want to nit-pick, then for my turn I offer up the following:

...positions of the Royal Winnipeg Rifles (Col. John Meldram)...

Correct officer, wrong rank (at least at that moment). John Meldram was the battalion commander, and as per our practice a lieutenant colonel.

...Brigadier Foster immediatly organised a nightly counter-attack with a Scottish regiment...

Well, it was a Canadian regiment, the Canadian Scottish (Can Scots for short), but maybe that's what you meant.

...This is a rather flimsy basis to build a chauvinistic theory of "the better Canadians"

I never said the Canadians were "better". My original wording was simply "good Canadian infantry battalions", by which I primarily meant "stalwart", which I think that action does show at least that one to be.

As to my quote about "studpid" (sic), "unsophisticated", "pig-headed", well I did make that typo in stupid (as I said, a half bottle of merlot), but I did not ever say that the Germans (or even 12th SS specifically) were those things. The wording of my original post was that they made repeated charges which were those things. My bottom-line in my second, more detailed posting was that those attacks (once again, note that my reference was to their attacks, not themselves) were "ill-prepared, clumsy, frontal attacks."

I stand behind that assessment.

[Thomas V.]

you took out one fragment of the My bottom-line in my second, more detailed posting was that those attacks (once again, note that my reference was to their attacks, not themselves) were "ill-prepared, clumsy, frontal attacks."

I stand behind that assessment.

Well, that's a already more rational approach, but it still has nothing to do with the Waffen-SS as such. You need to keep in mind it was the Rommel-tactique in action of a quick "drive to the beach" in progress here, no time to let them dig in. Any army at any front attacks at some point like this, wether it's lack of skill or lack of time to prepare, as was the case here. In fact the Normandy fighting as a whole was much like Putot-en-Bessin. Very little time to prepare, hasty actions (even Wittmann's famous action was the result of a hasty decision) and that goes for all armies involved in the first fase of the fighting in France. It serves no use picking out one example and use it to attack something. In fact the assault by SS-Pz.Gren.Rgt.26 was even a short-term German victory as it slowed the Canadian advance to Caen, which was supposed to be taken at D+1 (7 june). And there are numerous other examples of Canadians taking "stupid", to use your words, actions. I'm always reminded of Lt.Col. Worthington and the unprecedented slaughter of his TF. Anyhow, below is a link to some other thoughts regarding "pig-headed" Germans at Putot-en-Bessin. It seems even the Canadian veterans themselves think differently.

http://www.cda-cdai.ca/quarterly/quarterly3-3-3.htm

[AAA]

Just a comment about the 12th SS and age in general :

There is a general relation between age and bravery/agression. Child (ie <18) soldiers are generally noted for being brave to the point of fearlessness but tactically inept. Such characterisics have been seen in the fighting in Berlin 1945 (both HJ and other - previously unmilitarized - dispossessed and orphaned children from Eastern Germany) to the recent civil conflicts in central Africa (Liberia, DR Congo, Uganda) as well as with the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka.

Not that the 12th SS was quite that young. However, the fading of agression with age is a general phenomenon noted even in professional military officers, and generals are typically of fairly advanced years.
Given the (both average and extreme low end) ages of the 12th SS soldiers (particularly the extreme relative youth of some leaders - Meyer not least) it would have been remarkable NOT to see fearless/brave, agressive but tactically inept action from them.

[greenhorn]

"There is a general relation between age and bravery/agression. Child (ie <18) soldiers are generally noted for being brave to the point of fearlessness but tactically inept. Such characterisics have been seen in the fighting in Berlin 1945 (both HJ and other - previously unmilitarized - dispossessed and orphaned children from Eastern Germany) to the recent civil conflicts in central Africa (Liberia, DR Congo, Uganda) as well as with the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. "

It's easy to be brave when you doon't know much, haven't lived life, hsven't got any ties........

[PaulJ]

Well, I take AAA's point regarding ages, but it should be appreciated that it was the troops of the 12th SS that were formed by Hitler Youth. They filled out a cadre of experienced officers and senior NCOs, drawn primarily from the 1st SS LAH. And the tactical deftness or ineptness is primarily a function of the expertise of those officers and senior NCOs, not of the men in the ranks.

Now having said that, being wartime those officers and NCOs were (by contemporary standards especially) quite young, early twenties for the most part, later twenties for the more senior ones. Meyer himself was 33 at the time of Normandy -- still what we would consider a young man but hardly a child soldier.

And I just can't help pointing out that Patton was 59 when he turned 3rd Army on a dime and drove it to relieve Bastogne in the Battle of the Bulge.