Hello to all ; a short story..........................
A Reconnaissance Detachment in Liege.
During the rapid march through Belgium, the detachment had been repeatedly employed as an advance detachment. On the first day of the attack, it was important that the division should reach the valley of the Amblève. The detachment succeeded, in spite of difficulties, in pushing as far as La Gleise, according to orders, and in shoving security ahead in the valley as far as Stoumont.
On the second day of the attack, the division was anxious to capture Remouchamps in a rapid operation and to break into the La Reid position. During the afternoon, after the removal of many barriers, some of which were very difficult to get out of the way, the detachment, which at that time was acting as advance detachment, succeeded in reaching Remouchamps which the enemy abandoned as our men moved in.
After performing a difficult mission of reconnaissance in front of the forts of Embourg and Boncelles, the detachment received orders to push on, as advance detachment for the division, through the as yet uncaptured fortification and advance as far as the Meuse Ourthe sector south of Liege. Our mission was as follows : to prevent forces retreating from the fortifications, especially from Boncelles, and forces which might be coming up as reinforcements for the fortifications from the Liege area, from crossing the Meuse and Ourthe.
During the night the detachment succeeded in slipping between the firing works with almost no casualties and in reaching Dugree and Angleux, suburbs of Liege.
On 14 May, shortly after the arrival of the detachment, a bicycle platoon supported by an antitank gun was ordered to capture the bridge across the Ourthe in the suburb of Chenèe. The bridge was left intact by the Belgians. Late in the afternoon, this small detachment reached the position in Chenèe. The remainder of the detachment did not follow until the late evening, and went as far as Angleux, in order to take over the bridges in this place also, after the Ougrèe sector had been assigned to other units following parts of the division.
The population of Chenèe had never seen any German uniforms. The aversion which they showed us was, therefore, genuine. The bicycle platoon with its antitank gun took up position beside the bridge and in the neighborhood of the Chenèe railway station in circular formation. The cannon commanded the bridge and the roads leading to the Embourg fortress. The one great disadvantage of the position was that all around there were high inhabited houses and factory buildings which offered excellent places of concealment for sharpshooters and guerrilla fighters who had already fired on our men in Ougrèe and Angleux. This had to be endured, however, for it would have been impossible to clear the people out of this mass of buildings and capture them in the approaching darkness, especially with so few men available for the task.
Night settled down on the group in this situation.
Source: Military Review. May 1943.
The detachment was part of the 251. ID right? Cheers. Raúl M .
Liege 1940
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Liege 1940
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
Re: Liege 1940
Hello to all ; a short story..........................
A Reconnaissance Detachment in Liege.
About 2:00 AM, as the moon was just going down, the Belgians brought heavy weapons from the fort and placed them in position. The hills surrounding the railway yards and bridge were especially suited for this purpose. These hills were the continuation of the height further to the south where the Embourg fortress is situated. It was not long, however, until the enemy opened fire. In addition to this, bullets now began coming from open windows and from behind all the corners. Quite a show started and our antitank gun especially_suffered considerably from the enemy. But the little advance detachment replied to the fire in such a lively manner that not a single enemy attack took place. With dawn the trouble came to an end. One man dead in the railway yards and a few wounded was all there was to remind us of the events of the night.
We took advantage of the daylight to improve our position and establish contact with the other security groups at the bridges in Angleux. Since in comparison with its size the detachment had an extremely large area to capture both from the north and from the south-including four bridges over the Ourthe and the Meuse-it was impossible for it to send any reinforcements to the
bridgehead at Chenèe, especially since the main feature of the situation as a whole, as understood by the detachment, was security against enemy approaches from the south while these bridges were located in the northern part of the sector.
Therefore, from the point of view of the weak detachment located at the Chenèe bridgehead, it was a subject for rejoicing when during the day a detachment of engineers of the division engineer detachment arrived to mine the bridge and railway yards. In this situation the second night came on. The detachment was no longer fully acquainted with the general situation
since it was impossible to establish radio contact with the infantry regiment to which at that time the detachment was subordinated. Particularly, the detachment was unaware whether or not Fort Boncelles had been taken. It was not until the late afternoon that reports came in from the reconnaissance troops which led to the false conclusion that the attack scheduled for Fort Boncelles by the division had been a success and that the fortress crew was attempting to work its way back toward Liege. This would cause them to meet with the south front of the detachment. It was not until the next day that the detachment learned that the attack had not yet been made on Fort Boncelles.
The scouting parties also reported the presence of regular Belgian troops who kept firing on them from everywhere in the forest region of Sart Tilman. Therefore the detachment reinforced its southern front, since at about 8:00 PM the report came in that the positions on the west shore of the Ourthe which were formerly unoccupied, were now occupied by the Belgians with antitank and machine guns. But since the detachment forming the bridgehead at Chenèe could not be further weakened, especially since this bridge formed the main connection across the Ourthe between Forts Boncelles and Embourg, the reinforcements for the south front had to be taken from the other groups of the detachment who had occupied the other bridges at Angleux, though hostile scouting troops also continued to appear here.
Source: Military Review. May 1943.
Cheers. Raúl M .
A Reconnaissance Detachment in Liege.
About 2:00 AM, as the moon was just going down, the Belgians brought heavy weapons from the fort and placed them in position. The hills surrounding the railway yards and bridge were especially suited for this purpose. These hills were the continuation of the height further to the south where the Embourg fortress is situated. It was not long, however, until the enemy opened fire. In addition to this, bullets now began coming from open windows and from behind all the corners. Quite a show started and our antitank gun especially_suffered considerably from the enemy. But the little advance detachment replied to the fire in such a lively manner that not a single enemy attack took place. With dawn the trouble came to an end. One man dead in the railway yards and a few wounded was all there was to remind us of the events of the night.
We took advantage of the daylight to improve our position and establish contact with the other security groups at the bridges in Angleux. Since in comparison with its size the detachment had an extremely large area to capture both from the north and from the south-including four bridges over the Ourthe and the Meuse-it was impossible for it to send any reinforcements to the
bridgehead at Chenèe, especially since the main feature of the situation as a whole, as understood by the detachment, was security against enemy approaches from the south while these bridges were located in the northern part of the sector.
Therefore, from the point of view of the weak detachment located at the Chenèe bridgehead, it was a subject for rejoicing when during the day a detachment of engineers of the division engineer detachment arrived to mine the bridge and railway yards. In this situation the second night came on. The detachment was no longer fully acquainted with the general situation
since it was impossible to establish radio contact with the infantry regiment to which at that time the detachment was subordinated. Particularly, the detachment was unaware whether or not Fort Boncelles had been taken. It was not until the late afternoon that reports came in from the reconnaissance troops which led to the false conclusion that the attack scheduled for Fort Boncelles by the division had been a success and that the fortress crew was attempting to work its way back toward Liege. This would cause them to meet with the south front of the detachment. It was not until the next day that the detachment learned that the attack had not yet been made on Fort Boncelles.
The scouting parties also reported the presence of regular Belgian troops who kept firing on them from everywhere in the forest region of Sart Tilman. Therefore the detachment reinforced its southern front, since at about 8:00 PM the report came in that the positions on the west shore of the Ourthe which were formerly unoccupied, were now occupied by the Belgians with antitank and machine guns. But since the detachment forming the bridgehead at Chenèe could not be further weakened, especially since this bridge formed the main connection across the Ourthe between Forts Boncelles and Embourg, the reinforcements for the south front had to be taken from the other groups of the detachment who had occupied the other bridges at Angleux, though hostile scouting troops also continued to appear here.
Source: Military Review. May 1943.
Cheers. Raúl M .
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
Re: Liege 1940
Hello to all ; more.........................
A Reconnaissance Detachment in Liege.
While small enemy forces kept coming in contact with the south front of the detachment throughout the late evening and all night long, they were easily repulsed. Again the enemy opened fire on the bridgehead at Chenèe, though at first the fire appeared to be of no great consequence. It was only at 1:00 a.m. when the artillery fire became stronger at the bridgehead and a plane appeared to be directing this fire by means of parachute flares that it became doubtful whether the attack expected during the night would be against the north or the south front. Taking every known factor into consideration, either appeared to be possible since the enemy might plan to regain possession of the Ourthe and join forces with the troops coming from Fort Boncelles.
A short time later the enemy launched an attack against the bridgehead. On the bridge itself, a side- car motorcycle which had run into a mine was on fire. In the light of these flames, forms could be seen springing up everywhere and moving forward by bounds. The gun fire from the houses became considerably stronger. Besides all this, the steady fire of Belgian antitank guns could be heard, also the fire of machine pistols and artillery. The situation was becoming very critical for the small number of defenders. However, the commander of the bicycle pla- toon, the commander of the antitank platoon, and the commander of the engineer platoon had the situation under control as a result of their exemplary collaboration. With no regard for the heavy fire, they went calmly about their tasks.
These three commanders assisted wherever there was need of their services. The commander of the engineer platoon hurled explosive charges at the enemy when they got dangerously close as if he were engaged in a snowball fight and in this way also took care of the enemy in a few of the nearby houses which were partly wrecked in the ensuing explosions. The fire of the little group of defenders was very effective . The small shells of the antitank gun followed one another through the darkness and the steady clatter of machine guns and rifles did the rest to convince the enemy that it was not easy to break into the bridgehead position in spite of the small number of defenders.
Between 2:00 and 3:00 a.m., however, the situation became extremely critical; and suddenly the defenders of the bridgehead were attacked from the rear, from across the Ourthe. How the enemy appeared there, since the south front was holding, was at first a mystery. It later developed that these attackers were nearly all guerrilla fighters from the houses of Angleux who were now attempting, under cover of the buildings of the factory district, to come in from the northwest and attack the defenders from the rear, across the Chenèe bridge.
Source: Military Review. May 1943.
Cheers. Raúl M .
A Reconnaissance Detachment in Liege.
While small enemy forces kept coming in contact with the south front of the detachment throughout the late evening and all night long, they were easily repulsed. Again the enemy opened fire on the bridgehead at Chenèe, though at first the fire appeared to be of no great consequence. It was only at 1:00 a.m. when the artillery fire became stronger at the bridgehead and a plane appeared to be directing this fire by means of parachute flares that it became doubtful whether the attack expected during the night would be against the north or the south front. Taking every known factor into consideration, either appeared to be possible since the enemy might plan to regain possession of the Ourthe and join forces with the troops coming from Fort Boncelles.
A short time later the enemy launched an attack against the bridgehead. On the bridge itself, a side- car motorcycle which had run into a mine was on fire. In the light of these flames, forms could be seen springing up everywhere and moving forward by bounds. The gun fire from the houses became considerably stronger. Besides all this, the steady fire of Belgian antitank guns could be heard, also the fire of machine pistols and artillery. The situation was becoming very critical for the small number of defenders. However, the commander of the bicycle pla- toon, the commander of the antitank platoon, and the commander of the engineer platoon had the situation under control as a result of their exemplary collaboration. With no regard for the heavy fire, they went calmly about their tasks.
These three commanders assisted wherever there was need of their services. The commander of the engineer platoon hurled explosive charges at the enemy when they got dangerously close as if he were engaged in a snowball fight and in this way also took care of the enemy in a few of the nearby houses which were partly wrecked in the ensuing explosions. The fire of the little group of defenders was very effective . The small shells of the antitank gun followed one another through the darkness and the steady clatter of machine guns and rifles did the rest to convince the enemy that it was not easy to break into the bridgehead position in spite of the small number of defenders.
Between 2:00 and 3:00 a.m., however, the situation became extremely critical; and suddenly the defenders of the bridgehead were attacked from the rear, from across the Ourthe. How the enemy appeared there, since the south front was holding, was at first a mystery. It later developed that these attackers were nearly all guerrilla fighters from the houses of Angleux who were now attempting, under cover of the buildings of the factory district, to come in from the northwest and attack the defenders from the rear, across the Chenèe bridge.
Source: Military Review. May 1943.
Cheers. Raúl M .
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Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
- Prosper Vandenbroucke
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Re: Liege 1940
The Chenée bridge viewed after the war.
https://archives.wallonie.be/ark:/44119 ... 625c97ed87
Re: Liege 1940
Thanks for your complement Prosper . Cheers. Raúl M .
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
Re: Liege 1940
Hello to all ; more.........................
A Reconnaissance Detachment in Liege.
Lieutenant Wirth recognized this be- fore it was too late. He hurriedly swung his antitank gun around and sent explosive shells into the houses near the bridge on the other side. The effects were miraculous. The enemy speedily disappeared. On the basis of information sent by scouting troops which had been dispatched to the south during the night, the detachment commander concluded that there was not much likelihood of an attack from the south and that the Belgians, who were constantly appearing in this area, were probably the scattered remnants of disintegrated Belgian units which withdrew earlier and were now attempting to cooperate with the Liege fortress and its defenses. Not until now was it possible to send an additional cycle platoon to reinforce the bridgehead at Chenèe.
When this platoon arrived at the bridgehead, after a difficult trip through the mine barrier which had now been extended by the engineers to the rear of the bridgehead, the fire of the enemy on the Chenèe bridge was beginning to die down, especially the fire of the hundreds of guerrilla fighters. As day began to dawn, the situation was again fully in hand. The enemy ceased his violent efforts. Except for a few easily repaired injuries due to shells and mine explosions, the bridge was still intact.
Seven dead and numerous wounded men testified to the fact that in this city a small German combat force had fulfilled its mission and performed its duty well in spite of superior enemy forces.
Later on, through the examination of enemy documents, it was discovered by the infantry regiment which relieved the detachment that in the battle which we have described, a reinforced Belgian infantry battalion from Fort d'Embourg as well as hundreds of guerrilla fighters from Chenèe had been engaged, to say nothing of the many stray units on the south front which attacked the rest of the detachment. At the Chenèe bridgehead on the German side not quite 80 soldiers, 4 light machine guns and 2 antitank cannon had been able to hold their own against them.
Source: Military Review. May 1943.
It's all. Cheers. Raúl M .
A Reconnaissance Detachment in Liege.
Lieutenant Wirth recognized this be- fore it was too late. He hurriedly swung his antitank gun around and sent explosive shells into the houses near the bridge on the other side. The effects were miraculous. The enemy speedily disappeared. On the basis of information sent by scouting troops which had been dispatched to the south during the night, the detachment commander concluded that there was not much likelihood of an attack from the south and that the Belgians, who were constantly appearing in this area, were probably the scattered remnants of disintegrated Belgian units which withdrew earlier and were now attempting to cooperate with the Liege fortress and its defenses. Not until now was it possible to send an additional cycle platoon to reinforce the bridgehead at Chenèe.
When this platoon arrived at the bridgehead, after a difficult trip through the mine barrier which had now been extended by the engineers to the rear of the bridgehead, the fire of the enemy on the Chenèe bridge was beginning to die down, especially the fire of the hundreds of guerrilla fighters. As day began to dawn, the situation was again fully in hand. The enemy ceased his violent efforts. Except for a few easily repaired injuries due to shells and mine explosions, the bridge was still intact.
Seven dead and numerous wounded men testified to the fact that in this city a small German combat force had fulfilled its mission and performed its duty well in spite of superior enemy forces.
Later on, through the examination of enemy documents, it was discovered by the infantry regiment which relieved the detachment that in the battle which we have described, a reinforced Belgian infantry battalion from Fort d'Embourg as well as hundreds of guerrilla fighters from Chenèe had been engaged, to say nothing of the many stray units on the south front which attacked the rest of the detachment. At the Chenèe bridgehead on the German side not quite 80 soldiers, 4 light machine guns and 2 antitank cannon had been able to hold their own against them.
Source: Military Review. May 1943.
It's all. Cheers. Raúl M .
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
- Prosper Vandenbroucke
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Re: Liege 1940
Hi Raul,
There were no guerrilla fighters in 1940 in the Liège area, it seems to me that they were units of the "Troupes d'intervalles" who tried to reach the regular Belgian Field Army.
It's possible that I am wrong, but....?
There were no guerrilla fighters in 1940 in the Liège area, it seems to me that they were units of the "Troupes d'intervalles" who tried to reach the regular Belgian Field Army.
It's possible that I am wrong, but....?
Re: Liege 1940
Hello Prosper ; yes I think you're right. May be there were "franc tireurs", some stragglers from the forts and why not even armed civilians. Cheers. Raúl M .
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
- Prosper Vandenbroucke
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- Joined: Wed Oct 23, 2002 12:01 pm
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Re: Liege 1940
I don't think about armed civilians. German troops saw "Franc - tireurs" everywhere in 1940, souvenirs of the Great War in 14-18, I think.
Kindly regards from Belgium.