; a point of view on Salla (169. ID)................The Battle of Salla, July 1 to 8, 1941.
The German army, which in the spring of 1941 marched to attack the Soviet Union between the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea and, far away, in northern Finland, certainly did not look at the future events that were gradually emerging with a half-fearful or half-curious expectation, as is typical of newcomers to war. Even when these were new formations, each of the units that gathered here was so populated by veterans of the four previous campaigns of this war that they could be considered experienced and accustomed to it.
The victorious outcome of all previous battles justified strong self-confidence as soldiers. However, this time the feeling of uncertainty and melancholy was even more pronounced than usual on the eve of important events. The disdain for the eastern enemy that was prevalent at the upper level caused many people to shake their heads in skepticism at the lower level. Many of the older officers remembered the remarkable combat performance of the Russians in the First World War; Some people knew the reports of officers who had commanded in the USSR about the rigor of discipline and the harshness of training in the Red Army.
The enormous industrial development experienced by the Soviet Union in recent years was also known. Many serious questions arose for the thinking soldier, as long as the immediate tasks of the day and the need to prepare for the immediate situation gave time for them. To a large extent it was a feeling of resignation in the face of an inevitable fate, which was combined with the will to do the best and especially here.
In addition to the general uncertainty about their future enemy, the German forces, which since the beginning of June were advancing towards Lapland between the Arctic Circle and the Arctic Ocean under the orders of the Army High Command Norwegen, experienced another moment of uncertainty:
The unusual features of the theater of war. The study of the limited literature and maps had only been able to provide a very imperfect image of the landscape. The Finnish economic map, compiled from aerial photographs, not territorial surveys, showed an almost uninterrupted forest area, accessible only by a few roads and trails, and sparsely populated; Where forest signs were missing, moors and swamps were marked, often stretching for kilometers. But what was the landscape like in the vertical direction? Elevation figures were missing and only the Finnish names for "mountain" or "ridge" showed that the terrain must be very mountainous and certainly difficult in sudden transitions between heights and swampy lowlands.
In these circumstances, scans during deployment and consultations with Finnish officers were of particular importance. The latter's skepticism was not encouraging: when asked about the prospects of a campaign in this region, he sometimes responded: "No one has ever waged war here in the summer." It soon became apparent that the landscape had changed too much for the map to be anything more than a guide. Moorland footprints, for example, could indicate either an area of grassland or an impassable swamp.
The forest was sometimes a sparse heather forest, which sometimes would have posed no obstacle even to vehicles, sometimes a tangle of bushes and rocks, often overlapping for miles. It was clear that in such terrain it was necessary to thoroughly review all the usual rules for marching movements and the use of weapons. It was also obvious that the few roads in this country were of crucial importance, and that any reindeer trail leading in a suitable direction could be of the greatest tactical importance.
Source: Die Schlacht um Salla, 1. - 8. July 1941. Generalleutnant a. D. Kurt Dittmar, Kommandeur der 169. Inf.Div. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift: ASMZ, Vol.120 (1954).
Cheers. Raúl M
.