Campaign in Italian East Africa - overview

[Jason Pipes]

In light of some recent discussion here on the German Motorized Company in Italian East Africa (Compagnia AutoCarrata Tedesca), I thought this information culled from the archives of the old Feldgrau forum would make interesting reading. (and yes, the archives are still going to be reopened for all to search.)

This was originally posted by Allen Milcic and will be posted as a permanent article on feldgrau.com along with additional detailed information on the above mentioned Compagnia AutoCarrata Tedesca.

Despite the fact that a majority of Italian officers in WW2 were sub-standard, the commander in East Africa - Duke D'Aosta, was a very good, intelligent, young leader. At his disposal, to defend East Africa, he had 288,000 men, 200,000 of these were colonial troops (Eritreans being very trustworthy, Somalis semi-trustworthy, and Ethiopians of dubious trustworthiness).

In the begining of the campaign, the Italians went on the offensive, at first suprising the British in Sudan and Kenya, but making only small gains. This action, however, proved to be only a feint, as D'Aosta then struck British Somaliland. For this offensive, the Italians (led by Major-General DeSimone) gathered 23 battalions of Eritreans and Somalis, 2 battalions of Blackshirts, 1 battalion of Sardinian Grenadiers, plus artillery, some tanks, and horse cavalry in support. The Italians moved forward well, harassed only by sniper fire from the British Somaliland Camel Corps. At the same time, the Italian "Harar" Division attacked Somaliland through the Tug Argan Pass, and after 3 days punched their way through it. British Somaliland was now evacuated by sea. 465 Italian troops died and 1530 were wounded in this offensive.

In the Sudan, meanwhile, the Italian 2nd Colonial Division was fighting off attacks by British Indian troops. This would continue for the next 5 monts.

Despite these early successes, D'Aosta knew his situation was grim. He did not have the resources for a major offensive, and he new that his troops had only fought against outnumbered, 2nd and 3rd rate British troops. It was only a matter of time before the British decided to send some "real" troops to the theater, and crush him. However, D'Aosta decided that he would fight as long and hard as possible, and if he could tie down a major Allied force for several months, his defeat would not be in vain.

D'Aosta now divided his command into 4 sectors. Major-General DeSimone would hold Somaliland with 10 colonial brigades. General Guglielmo Nasi would protect western Ethiopia with 4 colonial brigades. General Frusci, with 3 colonial divisions, 6 colonial brigades and 5 Blackshirt Battalions would defend Eritrea and Gondar. The 4th sector was central Ethiopia, which the Duke would hold himself with his best troops - the "Africa" Colonial Division, and the all Italian "Savoia" Grenadier Division.

The first British counter-attack happened in December, 1940, when the Indian 10th Brigade re-took Gallabat, in Sudan, from the Italian 27th Colonial Battalion. However, when the Indians attempted to follow-up this action by crossing into Ethiopia, they were defeated at Metemma by colonial troops and Blackshirts under Lt.Col. Castagnola.

After this embarassment, the British built up their troops in the Sudan. They formed a Corps, consisting of 2 Indian Divisions (the 4th and 5th Divisions). These divisions were actually 1/3 Indian, 1/3 Gurkha, and 1/3 British infantry, with the artillery, technical positions and officer corps being mostly British.

On January 18, 1941, the British moved forward, only to find Kassala, in Italian occupied Sudan, abandoned by the Italians. The Italians had fallen back to Keru in Eritrea, and the Indian divisions attacked them here. The goal of this offensive was to take the Italian naval base at Massawa.

Keru was quickly surrounded, however, the Italian 41st (Eritrean) Colonial Brigade managed to break out and withdraw to Agordat. 900 Italians and colonial troops were lost at Keru, however.

At Agordat, the retreating Eritreans and Italians joined the garrison, that consisted of the 4th Colonial Division, a battalion of Blackshirts, some artillery and rear-echalon units, as well as 150 German seamen, that had been trapped in East Africa. All told, 12,000 men would defend Agordat.

The town was quickly surrounded, and after 3 days of fighting, the garrison commander ordered a break-out, finding his position untenable. The break-out was successful, but most of the Italian heavy equipment had to be left behind.

At the same time, the Indian 5rh Division was attacking Barentu, that was defended by 6,000 men of the 2nd Colonial Division. Here, too, a break-out was possible; and the 2 retreating columns of remnants now converged on Keren, where they joined the Italian 11th Grenadier Regiment of the Savoia Division in its defense.

On February 3rd, the Allies attacked Keren. Attached to the 4th Indian Division was a Palestinian Commando Detachment. The Italians and their colonial troops fought well, and all attacks were beat off.

Not as successful were the Italians in Somalia, where, at Afmadu, the Italian Somaliland troops deserted en-masse in the face of an attack by the British 12th (Black) African Division. Further attacks by the British 24th Gold Coast Brigade and the 1st South African (White) Division crossed the Jaba River and took Gobaen and Kismayu. A counter-attack by the Italians floundered when most of the Italian Somali troops refused to fight, or simply disappeared. Allied warships and airforce assisted the offensive with bombing, to which the Italians had no reply. Mogadishu was abandoned on the 25th of February, and the italians conceded all of Somalia, attempting to form a defensive line a Jijiga, Ethiopia.

This defensive line was manned by mostly Ethiopians and Italians, as the Somali colonial troops had, for all intents and purposes, seized to exist. On March 18, Nigerian infantry, supported by British artillery, attacked the line, and within a few days had pushed the Italians back to the Babile Pass.

D'Aosta's army was now quickly disappearing, as not only were the colonial troops deserting in droves, the Italian troops were disappearing too. Some of these italians were colonists whose homes were in Africa, and whose wives and children were being threatened by marauding native deserters - they deserted in order to go home and protect their families.

By the 24th of march, the Allies had breached the Babile Pass, and by the 26th had crossed the Bisidimo River.

The Italians abandoned Harar and retreated to Dire Dawa. South African troops entering the city had to protect Italian civilians from rioting Ethiopians.

The town of Keren had held out until the 27th of March, when a massive tank attack finally broke the back of the stubborn Eritrean and Italian defenders. The town had held-out for 57 days, and had inflicted casualties of 3,835 on the Allies. The bulk of the defenders did not surrender, however, but broke out and retreated southwards, towards Massawa and Asmara, chased by the 4th and 5th Indian Divisions, and a Free French Brigade.

On April 1, 1941, Asmara fell to Free French Foreign Legion troops.

On April 5, 1941, D'Aosta declared the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, to be open, and withdrew to Dessye.

On April 8, 1941, Massawa fell to Indian troops.

The Italian East Africa Fleet attempted to escape, but after losing 4 Destroyers to air attacks, Admiral Bonetti surendered his remaining ships.

On April 18, 1941, D'Aosta formed a defensive line at Kombolchia with his reliable, Eritrean "Africa" Division. A first attack by South African troops was repelled, but a counter-attack by the Eritreans was a disaster. Over the course of the next few days, the Italians held out against massed attacks by South African troops and Ethiopians, that were now fighting on the British side. By sheer weight of numbers, the stubborn defenders were overwhelmed, and forced to retreat yet again.

D'Aosta's survivors gathered at Amba Alagi. They numbered only 7,000 men, and 40 artillery pieces.

On April 29, 1941, these remnants came under attack by Allied forces, including Ethiopians now fighting against the Italians, that outnumbered the defenders 5 to 1. However, D'Aosta's men fought bravely, and held out for 3 weeks. During the siege, several italian outposts were overrun by swarms of Ehtiopians, who then noisily tortured any captured Italians to death. On May 19, 1941, D'Aosta surendered his immediate command to the British (400 Eritreans and 4,400 Italians). However, this was not the end of the campaign, as this surrender did not include any italian troops resisting elsewhere.

Other Italian troops surrendered as follows:

-the Italian 21st, 25th and 101st Colonial Divisions (Somali), under Generals Baccari and Liberati, surrender at Soddu, Ethiopia, at the end of May, 1941;

-the Italian 24th Colonial Division surrenders at Jimmu in early July, 1941;

-General Gazzera, with a mobile column of 5,000 Italians and 2,000 Ethiopians, surrenders to a Belgian Congolese unit and a Nigerian Brigade at Demli on July 3, 1941;

-at Addis Dera, Colonel Maraventano and 5,000 men, mostly colonial troops, is surrounded by tens of thousands of fanatical Ethiopian tribesman, joined by deserting Ethiopian colonial troops. Many italians were literally sliced to pieces by the tribesmen. The saving grace for Maraventano was the arrival of a Sudanese battalion, led by a British officer. Upon guaranteeing prisoner safety, Maraventano's troops surrender to this unit;

-Italian garrisons at Kulkaber, Debra Tabor, Chilga, and Wolchefit Pass all surrender between June and November, 1941. The garrisons at Wolchefit Pass and Kulkaber had fought specially well till their capitulation, causing well over 1,000 Allied casualties each, and giving up only after running out of food;

-On November 27, General Nasi orders the immediate surrender of all remaining Italian units in East Africa. He had held up for over 6 months since taking command from Duke D'Aosta, outnumbered 3 and even 4 to 1.

In conclusion, General Duke D'Aosta, and his worthy second in command, General Nasi, had known the outcome of the war in east Africa ever since it began, however, like true soldiers, they fought on for 17 months, tying down no less than 6 divisions, that the Allies could have desperately used elsewhere. One can only imagine what could have become of the Italian Army, had the leadership of these officers been the norm, rather than the exception.

[Sam H.]

Thanks for posting ... or re-posting that information. It was very informative. First good narrative I've seen on the East African campaign.

[Enrico Cernuschi]

I regret to read some mistakes about the Italian war in AOI (Italian East Africa during the 1940-1941 campaing, not to mention the next two years of resistence by many thousands of men and women, Italian, Eritreans and Ethiopians; ref. Enrico Cernuschi, La resistenza sconosciuta in Africa Orientale, Rivista Storica, dicembre 1994. Available by Rivista Italiana Difesa, RID in the web).

1) It's difficoult to understand what's mean "sub standard officier". The level of the Regio Esercito officiers and petty officiers was a modest one, I agree: too many six mounthes machine made junior officers, too many old, dismissed officiers of the last World War without the necessary experience but only, sometimes, a gallant past as young lieutenents twenty years ago which is not the best credit for a sudden major or Lt. Colonel, Staff generals at H.Q. quite debatable but, in AOI, there wes, instead, quite an high proportion of professionals and the consequences, as is possible to read in the digest at the origin of this mine, were clear as the complessive performance was better than in the Mediterranean. As a matter of fact professionals only coul led the native troops of the Regio Corpo Truppe Coloniali; it was a difficoult job not fit for amateurs.
2) The history of the German Company in AOI is fully described in the following article: Piero Crociani, A.O.I. 1940; un reparto tedesco nel regio Esercito, STORIA militare, May 1995 (You may look for it in the TUTTOSTORIA web).
3) The Italian Destroyers were not escaping but tried to do, with the very last oil available carried from Assab to Massawa by the Oiler Niobe, a last attack against Port Sudan after a previous tentative towards Suez sailing along the Arabia coast.
4) Admiral Bonetti did not surrender his ships. They were scuttled (see, for details, Warship International, n.1/1994). For the history of that forgotten naval campaign see Enrico Cernuschi: La rivalità italiana nel Mar Rosso, STORIA militare, Gennaio 1995 and Febbraio 1995; Enrico Cernuschi La rivalità anglo-italiana nell'oceano indiano, luglio 1996 e agosto 1996.
5) The Division Africa was not an Eritrean unit but an Italian one, formed by colonials who were not yet in the blackshirt Milizia Coloniale.
Best regards EC

[sid guttridge]

The article seems to be written from a desire to put the best possible gloss on the Italian performance in East Africa. However, in doing so it overstates the case by using such terms a "massive tank attack" and "massed attacks by South African troops" to give the impression that the odds were more heavily stacked against the Italians than was in fact the case. In fact, sheer numbers were almost always on their side. There could be no massive tank attacks because the British did not have massive numbers of tanks in the theatre, and I am aware of nothing so crude as massed attacks being launched by the South Africans.

It also misses the point about the attack on British Somaliland (where the British were enormously outnumbered, although this is not mentioned). Italian East Africa's only hope was to attack into Sudan in the hope of meeting up with Italian forces attacking Egypt. By attacking in the opposite direction into British Somaliland the Italians played into British hands. Far from the attack on Sudan being an effective diversion from the attack on British Somaliland, the attack on British Somaliland diverted valuable Italian resources from the far more vital Sudan front, where the Italian advance made little progress.

Looking more widely, the Italian performance in East Africa in 1940-41 does not look particularly poor by comparison with the British in Malaya and the Americans in the Philipines in 1941-42. However, it should not be built up into an epic it was not, either.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Enrico Cernuschi]

Sid is right. A) The only front where is possible to speak about massed attacks with the aide of armoured units (modest on the European scale, quite important in that theatre of war, is along the Giuba river, Somaliland. There the Italian cordon line, without any other strong point along the flat and desert Ogaden region before the Marda Pass, 800 miles far, was broken, at least, by the West and East Africa brigades employed in Great War style (by the way I'm looking for since many yeras datas about the casualties suffered by the 11st and 12th african Divisions; I was able to find onle the losses a f t e r the Giuba fightings, a circumstance I consider a bit suspect, indeed) on February 1941. Once the hole was punctured all was lost on the southern front. B) No Suadanese campaign was possible on summer 1940. The rainy season statrs there in May and ends in September. During the "Habub" time the very idea to cross the region from Cassala (which was conquered by the Italian Native Cavarly in July 1940 like a Wild West operation bt the 7th Cavarly) to atbara, not to mention Khartoum, was a logistic absurdity. In October Rome had asked an offensive towards Port Sudan but the 5th Indian Division had yet arrived in September and so only a raid by a "banda" (irregoular group) led by Colonel Rolle was accomplished in the Sudanese region. It had a certain propaganda and deterrent effect, according some British sources, but no strategical consequence, of course. C) I agree that to speak about epic in 1940 is not a good test option. The mountain Cheren fighting (after the professionally very bad led evacuation of Cassala, in January 1941, which was paid with the lost of quite all the Italian heavy weapons available in AOI) the Navy shoestring activity, the Regia Aereonautica local Command correct, strategical decision not to split her forces (a wisdom which would be impossible to detect in the 1940-1941 Italian leadership in Rome) and the romantic enterprises of many pilots and crew according the Great War legends and themes, many episodes of forgotten garrisons which remember very much the Fort Henry ones wrote by Fenimore Cooper in The last of the Mohicans ( not a too much different war, after all), the last Gondar struggle and the following resistence against the British (again a romance reference: Kidnapped by Robert Louis Stevenson, the English Red fox and Alan Breck Steward, the rebel of Scotland) until the Italian armistice of Sept. 1943 are all episodes which, according my opinion, may deserve not to be forgotten. Best whishes Enrico Cernuschi

[Jason Pipes]

Thanks for the excellent corrections and additions everyone. I will update the article with the provided materials and counter-points before posting to the site (or shortly after).

Keep up the great discussion on this excellent topic!

[sid guttridge]

Hi Enrico,

Thanks for correcting me about the practicalities of attacking into the Sudan.

Amongst the remarkable events was the sinking of the British destroyer Khartoum by surface gunfire from the Italian submarine Torricelli on 23 June 1940. There seems to be some controversy as to whether the destroyer was lost due to a direct hit or due to technical failure in its own torpedos but, nevertheless, it was definitely lost during the action. If Torricelli did sink the Khartoum, then it is an event unique in naval history.

Another quirk was an attempted Italian raid from Ethiopia on British oil fields in the Gulf States. Navigation was difficult over the featureless desert and nearby Saudi Arabian oil wells were attacked by mistake. Nevertheless, it forced the British to take air defence of the Gulf oil fields much more seriously.

Finally, the only recorded tactical use of gas during the war occurred when the Italians used it in early 1940 in a last attempt to finish off Ethiopian resistance before they themselves entered the conflict in June.

So, quite an interesting theatre.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Enrico Cernuschi]

Hello Sid, your comment about the little raid performed by 5 S.82 started from Rodi Island on 18th Oct. 1940 and landing, after 4.200 km ant 15 hours at Zula, Eritrea, it's quite an interesting one. According the Italian sources the target (oil raphineries in Barhain Is.) was achieved; damages were, of course, modest, but the stategical point (to oblige the British to disperde their forces in such an eccentric position too) and political (to induce USA to mettle themselves directly in the Middle East theatre to protect their own petrol interest in wiev of a future, common Mediterranean peace where the natural, common interest between the complementary Italian and U.S. economics, could, at least, expel the local British dominance and the correlate, infamous "Imperial preference and tariff" estabilished in Ottawa in 1932) were both achieved (as a matter of fact a US military mission was detached to the Barhein is. yet in 1940 (with the utmost Colonial and india offices displeasure) as a consequence of the thus proved British inabilty to protect the local oil fields; in July 1942 the "Emergency" plan settled at Washington and signed by a shaken Churchill victim of Toburuk sudden fall opened the M.E. doors (Iran and, in prospective, Palestine, see the Biltmore meeting) to USA at the very modest price of 100 Sherman and some self propelled howitzers batteries; in Oct. 1942, then, U.S. marines landed at least in the Barhain Is to stay). As you say that were actually bombed Saudi Arabians oli weels instead (may you quote the source, please) the soundness of this guerra parallela (co belligerant, more than allies of the German in wiew of an Italian booty in M.E. and Balkans) could be confirmed more and more. Nex time, Enrico

[sid guttridge]

Hi Enrico,

Whilst I generally agree with some of the consequences you outline, (specifically the diversion of aircraft and AA artillery defensive resources to the oil fields at a time when they could have been better used in Egypt), I think you much overstate the case that one of the Italian intentions was to induce the Americans to meddle in the Middle East. How would that be to Italy's advantage? It would simply make a clash between the two countries more likely.

I would also dispute that the raid "proved British inability to protect the local oil fields". The raid was never repeated and, as far as I am aware no other attack was made by Germans, Italians or Japanese on the Gulf oil fields. This tends to indicate that British attempts to protect the oil fields (largely by keeping the main battlefront out of range), were effective.

I am afraid that I cannot give you a specific source for the information that the Italian air raid actually struck nearby Saudi Arabian wells. I can tell you that I acquired the information in 1994-5 in the British Library in London and that there is a good chance that it was in a book by Christopher Shores, as I was reading a lot of his work on the Italians in the Mediterranean air war at the time. Next time I am up in the British Library I will follow it up for you. However, I would say that, while Italian sources are much more likely to be accurate about where the raid took off and landed, British sources are more likely to be accurate as to what was actually hit.

The final point is that it doesn't matter much in the wider scheme of things whether Saudi or Gulf oil targets were struck, as the impact on the British was the same. They were forced to take the defence of the oil fields more seriously, wherever the bombs landed. The raid may not have inflicted much physical damage but it paid for itself many times over by forcing the further dispersal of scarce British resources. It was therefore a definite Italian success.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Enrico Cernuschi]

Ciao Sid. I see we both agree about the strategical consequences of that raid on the Persian Gulf. It'interesting to consider too that only Italy tried to fight on that basin (not mentioning, of vourse, the short Iranian - British conflict fought on August 1941) sending there the unfortunate submarine Galvani in June 1940 and projecting, in 1942, a lone sortie by the prototype of the big Float plane Cant Z 511 which would had to carry a group of seven frog men with a motor boat and a SLC (the so called Human torpedo "pig" underwater assault craft) to attack the Allied tankers at Bander Abbas; this last enterprise was not tried maily as a consequence of the excellent infiltration work the I.S. was able to performe within the Stato Maggiore (staff) della Regia Aeronautica before, during and still twenty years after the war. About the coincidence of interests between Italy and USA against the British dominance let me remeber you the White House meeting about the next Italian mainmise of Greece, scheduled in may 1939 for the next September, occured on June 1939 between the President Roosevelt and the Count Vittorio Cini to probe the real US different attitudines of the president and of the American establishment, the great help assured by the States during the Ethiopian crisis on 1935 and 1936, the Italian dependence from the US aircraft industry and NACA since 1933 until 1941, the RCA T800 valves (triods) granted in 1937 which were the core both of the Italian radar RDT (then Folaga), EC3 bis and EC3 ter Gufo and of the contemporany (and equivalent) metric set CXAM, not to mention dozens of other, interesting points. The Italian economical powers had really envisaged in winter 1937-1938 a profitable partenership with their US collegues, active against the British interests in Italy and along the Mediterranean shores since 1926, forecasting an Italian influence on Greece, Egypt (with the correlate Sudanese appendix) and Iraq while the Yanks wolud be able, at least, to estabilish that new state in Palestine they were speaking about since 1917 and to grant the final contol of the M.E. oil resources. It was quite a coherent scheme (where the rumorous adn bombastic Mussolini's themes and enterprises had really a little importance) followed step by step until the partial US new Far East policy decided in May 1941 and confirmed three mounths later at Argentia. It's interesting to consider, too, that the Bahrein raid was an idea promoted by Ettore Muti, a celebrate Italian flyer and the Secretary of the Fascist Party in 1940, who led himself the mission. This same man (a notable one, indeed) was in touch, in Trieste, since the first Thirties, with the local Patroleum main enterprise (The Aquila SA), a S.O. emanation since the end of the XIX Century and is said he had some important oil interest which, after his death and the end of the World War, become - following the same, a.m. scheme - the most important Italian Petroleum society and the most important US oil enterprises partner in the Mediterranean and M.E. I admit this may seem a bit dispervise from the origilal AOi theme but I think that to think about USA and Italy (a very minor partner, of course) as the "good guys", since 1933 or, even, 1926, of the Mediterranean contest against the "bad" ones (UK, the brilliant second France and the eternal Germany in a prospect of common blood league before the Hitler "accident" -but the secret Fuhrer dream was not a Garter order, according Main Kampf? ) may drive to some very interesting (and actual) conclusion. Bye EC

[tigre]

Hello to all ; after a while, a little complement.....................

Fort Gallabat - November 1940.

Fort Gallabat, a post on the border between Abyssinia and Sudan, was conquered by the Italians in the middle of that year. In early November, however, British and Indian troops launched an attack against it. The post changed hands several times but finally on November 7, it remained in British hands and the Italians withdrew in the direction of Metemma.

Source: https://www.ebay.com/itm/353478152975

Cheers. Raúl M .