Maps for Seelöwe

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Re: Maps for Seelöwe

Post by Rich » Tue Jun 14, 2011 7:43 pm

phylo_roadking wrote:Fred...
What fire - from whom - at whom...?.....I can give you details on force compositions for the landing forces at the four beaches. Can you detail the defence for me? I would appreciate that very much.
What sources did you use for the British defences for your book?
Isn't it obvious Phylo? He got the British defenses by ignoring everything that didn't fit into his preconceived notions. I would think after a half dozen threads and God knows how many pages each that were wasted that would have become apparent to anyone by now. :D I would be very curious to know if Newbold is in his bibliography? Or the "details on force compositions for the landing forces" that were already given to him by Gooner1 and others.

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Re: Maps for Seelöwe

Post by Leandros » Wed Jun 15, 2011 5:57 am

lwd wrote:
Leandros wrote:
lwd wrote:That's the first I've seen that that many were modified with drive off ramps. What are your sources for this?
Not many - 3.200! Honestly, lwd - you are discussing Seelöwe without knowing this....? Read my book!
Ah so it's an add for your book?
When I see "modified with drive off ramps" it implies that they are part of the barge not something you have to assemble after it grounds itself. Rather brings to question the quality of your book IMO.
I would like this to be an ad for my book, yes.... :D ....there you shall find it all in context....
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Re: Maps for Seelöwe

Post by Leandros » Wed Jun 15, 2011 6:05 am

Rich wrote:Isn't it obvious Phylo? He got the British defenses by ignoring everything that didn't fit into his preconceived notions. I would think after a half dozen threads and God knows how many pages each that were wasted that would have become apparent to anyone by now. :D I would be very curious to know if Newbold is in his bibliography? Or the "details on force compositions for the landing forces" that were already given to him by Gooner1 and others.

Cheers!
When discussing the reaction of the Royal Navy to an eventual German landing I have also often asked: OK, which Royal Navy units would come - where - and when?

The response is always the same - go personal...... :wink: ....in my book it is all set in proper context.
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Re: Maps for Seelöwe

Post by Leandros » Wed Jun 15, 2011 6:25 am

phylo_roadking wrote:Fred, the Luftwaffe Transportgruppen never EVER mustered 1,000 Ju52s; it COULD theoretically muster that number of "transport" aircraft....but that includes floatplanes, impressed civilian types, Ju90s, FW200A/Bs etc., etc., etc....
I did write transports....
phylo_roadking wrote:And the FJ were geared to using Ju52s, they hadn't as yet worked through any other types - apart from the DFS 230! :D They went through a long period of experimentation in the Spring of '42 in various new types - but in 1940 they were stuck with the Iron Jenny.
Oh, well - the Germans used what they had when they had to - see Narvik. Apart from that, if they didn't have enough Ju's to drop the complete FJ division in one batch, which I don't think they had (things changed all the time), their departure airfields were approx. 30 minutes away.
phylo_roadking wrote:IIRC the defence of the Meuse and Albert crossings concentrated the AA assets of nearly two full divisions; there's a lot more for those divisions hitting the beaches to defend against rather than concentrate their AA assets in one or two places.
In my book I have lined it up like this:

On the morning of May 14, 1940, the AASF performed strikes against road and rail communications in Holland. Some enemy motor transport columns were also attacked, and some 10 sorties were flown against the German pontoon bridges by Sedan without losses or telling results. In the afternoon, however, the enemy had expanded their bridgeheads so that when the AASF tried again the results were disastrously different. Ellis gives us these figures:

76. Wing: 12. Squadron: Five Battles attack enemy columns, four shot down.
142. Squadron: Eight Battles attack bridges – four shot down.
226. Squadron: Six Battles attacking bridges – three shot down.
71. Wing: 105. Squadron: Eleven Battles attack bridges – six shot down.
150. Squadron: Four out of four shot down while attacking bridges.
114. Squadron: One out of two shot down while attacking columns.
139. Squadron: Four of six Blenheims shot down while attacking columns.
75. Wing: 88. Squadron: One of ten shot down while attacking bridges.
103. Squadron: Three of eight lost while attacking bridges.
218. Squadron: Ten out of eleven lost while attacking bridges.

Of these 71 light bombers 56 % went missing. What is a little surprising are the losses suffered while attacking troop columns. That bridges can have static anti-aircraft concentrations placed around them is understandable, but that a column that is stopped or on the move can defend itself so strongly indicates both a high degree of readiness as well as an ample mix of anti-aircraft resources integrated in the mobile forces. Even if the Germans complained internally (as did the British) of a lack of fighter support, they were seemingly little disturbed by the British bombing effort. With such losses it was obvious that the AASF could not continue making attacks like this, and on May 15, 1940, day bombing was greatly reduced. Only four aircraft of 28 dispatched did not return. One might ask if this was because they now attacked a little less aggressively with consequent less bombing accuracy.
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Re: Maps for Seelöwe

Post by phylo_roadking » Wed Jun 15, 2011 11:33 am

Oh, well - the Germans used what they had when they had to - see Narvik.
Not for para drops :wink:
Apart from that, if they didn't have enough Ju's to drop the complete FJ division in one batch, which I don't think they had (things changed all the time), their departure airfields were approx. 30 minutes away
If? Think?

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 3&t=154629 :wink:
What is a little surprising are the losses suffered while attacking troop columns. That bridges can have static anti-aircraft concentrations placed around them is understandable, but that a column that is stopped or on the move can defend itself so strongly indicates both a high degree of readiness as well as an ample mix of anti-aircraft resources integrated in the mobile forces
Might also be worth checking if either RAF type was armoured in any way... :wink:
When discussing the reaction of the Royal Navy to an eventual German landing I have also often asked: OK, which Royal Navy units would come - where - and when?

The response is always the same - go personal...... ....
Or go Brian Lavery :[] :wink:
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Re: Maps for Seelöwe

Post by Rich » Wed Jun 15, 2011 11:47 am

phylo_roadking wrote:
The response is always the same - go personal...... ....
Or go Brian Lavery :[] :wink:
Actually phylo, no, since his response is precisely that which I was referring to in my very non-personal response (given that it wasn't even a response directed at him, but rather at you). His "response" regarding British defenses was a non sequiter/non answer wandering off onto "discussing the reaction of the Royal Navy..." rather than answering the very specific - and simple - question regarding the content of his book - has he utilized the data provided him in various sources or has he gone his usual route of ignoring the data and simply reposting, or in this case self-publishing, his unsupported thoughts about the way he thinks things should have been? If he is incapable of answering that then it doesn't bode too well for the quality of that particular tome. Nor does it reflect well on his attempt to huckster said work onto an unsuspecting readership here and at AHF, given that many of those poor naifs are probably unaware of the substantial body of work that exists rubbishing his assumptions.

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Re: Maps for Seelöwe

Post by Leandros » Wed Jun 15, 2011 12:21 pm

I am sorry to say that you have copied a lot of quite dubious information from your source. I shall just point to a few points:

The FJ's did not have any losses to speak of in Norway. The force dropped at Dombås consisted of one company. Most of these were captured and later released when the fighting was over. I have not seen any information that any Ju52's were shot down on that operation by Norwegian machine gunners. If so, it must have been a negligible number. I would like to know about it.

The other important operation was the taking of Sola airport, Stavanger. The operation was over within a few minutes. That assault was also performed by one company.

The final operation was a company-size putsch from Oslo to Elverum, 150 km. north of Oslo on april 10th in captured buses and trucks to capture the Royal family and the governing institutions. This unit was stopped at Midtskogen and returned to Oslo in the evening loaded with Norwegian prisoners. Losses were negligible. Finally, some were inserted into the Narvik area. We know how it all ended in Narvik.

I have outlined the situation for the FJ's in Holland like this in my book:

"When describing the happenings in Holland in 1940 it is quite usual to mix up the 7th Fliegerdivision and the 22nd Infantry Division. The latter was moved by transport planes and landed directly, in the first wave, on several Dutch airfields. The Dutch were able to inflict significant losses on the 22nd Division since they had studied the German operations in Norway and reinforced the defense of their airfields. Several hundred members of the division were captured and transported over to England as prisoners. The parachute division, however, suffered only minor losses (only a part of it was used, actually) of approximately 180 killed, wounded or missing. It was therefore in good shape for Sea Lion later in the fall. All information also points to the fact that the 22nd Division was fully operational in September, as it was given a complete infantry regiment as reinforcement. This is of interest because it was disposed as the strategic reserve for the 16th Army and later was transformed into the XI Fliegerkorps with the 7th Fliegerdivision. It was earmarked to operate together with the paratrooper units. Otherwise, during the campaign in Norway the Germans had already shown that they could easily compromise on normal procedures since many mountaineers (gebirgsjägers) were dropped by parachute in the Narvik area following rude parachute training."

Finally, the FJ pioneer company that took and held Eben Emael in a glider assault untill relieved, had, I believe, only a few casualties. With other words, the FJ division did not have a great need to compensate for losses after the spring/summer offensives. That they needed more people to fill out their ranks is another matter. The orders I have seen for the FJ operation during Sea Lion are also different than those mentioned by your sources. It is all in my book.... :[] ....

So, here is my question: Did the Germans find their parachute silk in France... :wink: ....?
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Re: Maps for Seelöwe

Post by Leandros » Wed Jun 15, 2011 12:22 pm

Rich wrote:Actually phylo, no, since his response is precisely that which I was referring to in my very non-personal response (given that it wasn't even a response directed at him, but rather at you). His "response" regarding British defenses was a non sequiter/non answer wandering off onto "discussing the reaction of the Royal Navy..." rather than answering the very specific - and simple - question regarding the content of his book - has he utilized the data provided him in various sources or has he gone his usual route of ignoring the data and simply reposting, or in this case self-publishing, his unsupported thoughts about the way he thinks things should have been? If he is incapable of answering that then it doesn't bode too well for the quality of that particular tome. Nor does it reflect well on his attempt to huckster said work onto an unsuspecting readership here and at AHF, given that many of those poor naifs are probably unaware of the substantial body of work that exists rubbishing his assumptions.
Slander is slander whether you direct it towards the one it is about or to somebody else.
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Re: Maps for Seelöwe

Post by Rich » Wed Jun 15, 2011 1:14 pm

Leandros wrote:Slander is slander whether you direct it towards the one it is about or to somebody else.
Sigh...I really hesitate in bothering to address you directly anymore, but what the heck...

No, it is not. It might be libel, but it certainly isn't slander in any form and if it is either then the burden of proof is upon you, not me.

Cheers!

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Re: Maps for Seelöwe

Post by Leandros » Thu Jun 16, 2011 1:28 am

A detail: At one time I was blasted over at ACG for indicating that the 19 available German Type M35 minesweepers could be a nice factor in the defense of an eventual Sea Lion invasion fleet. They were solid little (800 tons) vessels (as minesweepers often are) and used to work together in established flotillas. As the war dragged on their missions were changed more and more to that of an escort vessel for the German coastal traffic, in the Baltic and for the U-boat fleet in the Biscaya. As it were, none were sunk by enemy action untill the summer of '42, then by rocket-carrying Coastal Command aircrafts. It wasn't untill the summer after that one was sunk by enemy naval action - MTB's.

The main reason for dispensing of the M35 was its alleged lack of a fire control system, their gun crews had to fire in "local control". I am not sure how bad that would have been but my further research has found that they actually had an excellent FCS. This was built around the fire control officer's (feuerleiter) position on top of the bridge (can be seen on the pictures). To assist him he had a rangefinder operator with a 3.0 m. rangefinder positioned behind him, the same as used on the '39 Flottenbegleiters (also called the Elbings). This controlled the two 10.5 cm. main guns.

In addition to the main rangefinder there was also a rangefinder position on the aft deck with a fixed-position 1.5 m. rangefinder, earmarked for anti-aircraft work. While some of the M35's were modified during the war, in 1940 all had their two 10.5 cm. guns intact.

My further research has also found that the Germans had an air-launched torpedo capacity in 1940. An often denied fact.

All this is put in context in my book on Operation Sea Lion.
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Re: Maps for Seelöwe

Post by lwd » Thu Jun 16, 2011 4:35 am

Leandros wrote:... I would like this to be an ad for my book, yes.... :D ....there you shall find it all in context....
Actually I won't because I have no intention of buying your book or obtaining it through other means for that matter. The combination of continuous bias and this marketing campaign have convinced me that it's of little value.

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Re: Maps for Seelöwe

Post by lwd » Thu Jun 16, 2011 5:05 am

Leandros wrote:... My further research has also found that the Germans had an air-launched torpedo capacity in 1940. An often denied fact. ...
I'm not sure I've ever seen it denied that they had a capacity. It's the extent of said capacity that's the question. From what I can find the only arial torpedo they had at that point was the F5. Here is what Navweapons has to say about it:
http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WTGER_WWII.htm
The F5 was a low-performance Norwegian Torpedo developed by Schwarzkopf. Dropping speed was 75 knots from 50 - 80 feet (15 to 25 m).
They further note that it had a 2,000 m max range and a speed of 33 knots. Sounds pretty useless against a DD or even a cruiser that can maneuver.
Then looking at: http://books.google.com/books?id=TpJTNm ... rs&f=false
it notes: "Production at the outbreak of the war was about 5 torpedos a month, and as late as October 1939 there were 26 failures in 52 drops in a practice exercise". Furthermore it states: "In the spring of 1940 the naval staff agreed to stop development and production during the war." Now some Italian torpedos were procured at some point but the LW capacity for arial torpedo attacks was certainly quite limited in 1940.

Some additional sources:
http://www.armchairgeneral.com/forums/s ... hp?t=64688
From August as other He 115 torpedo attack units became operational, combat sorties increased though the limited number of torpedoes available was always a problem ( in September the figure was down to 38 at one point)
... Over the next 4 months until the end of the year the Luftwaffe used about 160 airborne torpedoes in operations against British shipping in Northern waters,
http://www.avalanchepress.com/SWWAS_Aircraft_1.php
suggest they had even fewer torpedoes:
The Luftwaffe had 132 torpedoes from 1939 through 1941.
Although this may be due to the KM owning the F5's as it also sates:
The Italian Fiume F5W was used and a copy of a Norwegian torpedo the F5B was eventually deployed.
So it maybe that the 132 are the above which would make them mostly if not totaly post 1940.

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Re: Maps for Seelöwe

Post by lwd » Thu Jun 16, 2011 5:30 am

I also note earlier I questioned the 3,200 modified barges. This is a lot more than I have seen anywhere else. Indeed in this thread:
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... t=sea+lion
you mention 2,400 modified barges.

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Re: Maps for Seelöwe

Post by lwd » Thu Jun 16, 2011 5:34 am

Leandros wrote:... At one time I was blasted over at ACG for indicating that the 19 available German Type M35 minesweepers could be a nice factor in the defense of an eventual Sea Lion invasion fleet. ....
The problem I see with these vessels is much the same as existed with the LW. They were seriously over tasked. They had to be sweeping mines right up to and even during the invasion crossing. They may also have been required to lay mines as part of the mine barriers planed. At the same time they are being used as excorts for the invasion convoys. PLS also note that all of these are rather dangerous assignments.

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Re: Maps for Seelöwe

Post by phylo_roadking » Thu Jun 16, 2011 7:47 am

The FJ's did not have any losses to speak of in Norway. The force dropped at Dombås consisted of one company. Most of these were captured and later released when the fighting was over. I have not seen any information that any Ju52's were shot down on that operation by Norwegian machine gunners. If so, it must have been a negligible number. I would like to know about it.
The 150 Ju52 losses (actually 152 now I've checked) in Norway were nearly 100% due to AA fire :shock: At Dombas Herbert Schmidt's company lost one Ju52 on the approach but many men during the drop....for the Ju52s flew in and the FJ dropped at a level with Norwegian MGs in the surrounding hills....not helped by the Ju52 pilots misguiding their approach height and dropping too low. Only 61 men survived the drop - hale AND wounded....which IIRC was 41% of the nominal company strength of 150...and only 34 survived to surrender five days later, a 77% loss :shock:

Several more Ju52s were shot down on their way out of the Gudbrandsl Valley out of 15 deployed. That makes the losses of aircraft 3-5 out of 15 - hardly negligible.
The other important operation was the taking of Sola airport, Stavanger. The operation was over within a few minutes. That assault was also performed by one company
:shock: The Stavanger-Sola assault lasted two hours; von Brandis' paratroopers were stopped from retreiving any weapons from their drop containers for over half an hour to begin with by defensive fire. And I note you're neglecting the expensive fiasco at Oslo-Fornebu...it was THAT attack that however expensive lasted only half an hour
Otherwise, during the campaign in Norway the Germans had already shown that they could easily compromise on normal procedures since many mountaineers (gebirgsjägers) were dropped by parachute in the Narvik area following rude parachute training."
Many? 1. and 2./Geb.Jg.Rgt.137 - two companies of GBJ 137? That's somewhat less than the entire battalion of FJR 1 that dropped into Narvik on an uncontested "transport" drop. And it amounted to exactly 111 men dropped across two days....when a total of 226 men were due to be dropped; a smidgen under 50%. Hardly a stellar success.
So, here is my question: Did the Germans find their parachute silk in France... ....?
Not enough; instead by 1941 they had gone to a substitute material called "Macoo" that could only survive the stresses of one jump.
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