British Close supprt tanks.

[phylo_roadking]

Yes, the 2pdr HE ammo chestnut comes up sooner or later EVERYWHERE

[Gerry Chester]

Problem was - they were still thinking in terms of a 1918-style breakthrough battle after a period of static warfare. The NEW form of armoured warfare hadn't yet made it's real appearance in Poland...

Hi Phylo,

If Churchill written his 6-point memoranda to in 1941 to Sir Edward Bridges, et al, no doubt you would be correct. However, the memo was written in 1943 having received positive reports on "his" tank's performance in Tunisia. Some weeks earlier the PM had conveyed his thoughts to his senior generals. General Alexander heeded them, regrettably Montgomery did not. Prior to the final stages of the campaign, in a signal to Alexander verging on impertinence he wrote, as recorded by General Sir William Jackson:

"I suggest a decision is required as to who plays the major part in the final assaults on the enemy's last positions, There seems to be two alternatives:
A. Eighth Army does it. In this case I must move forward using all my divisions and face up to a real battle on the Enfidaville position. In this case I would have to have at my disposal all the resources in Northern Tunisia.
B. First Army does it. In this case I could sit tight and merely exert pressure. On no account must we split our effort and launch two or more thrusts none of which can be sustained. Presumably you will decide if it is to be A or B."

Alexander's response was short and very much to the point.
"Main effort in the next phase will be by First Army. Preparations already well advanced for attack earliest date 22 April. Most suitable area for deployment armour is in the plain west of Tunis so require 7 Armoured Div and 1 Armoured C Regt to join IX Corps [1st Army] from you as early as can be arranged, Hope you can develop maximum pressure against Enfidaville position to fit in with First Army attack." 8


Capture of the enemy occupied Longstop Hill, dominating the Medjerda Valley and the road to Tunis, was a prerequisite to the implementation of Alexander's 1943 plan of assault, summarised as follows:


"Two infantry divisions - 4th British and 4th Indian - will attack side by side at 3 am on 6 May on a very narrow 3,000 yard front astride the Medjez-Tunis road. They will be supported by 650 guns with about 350 rounds per gun and by every aircraft the Tactical Air Forces can sensibly use. The 25th Army Tank Brigade in Churchills will give them close tank support and Scorpions will be available to help breach the minefields. As soon as adequate breaches have been made the two British armoured divisions - 6th and 7th - will pass through heading at speed for Tunis." 1
Longstop Hill, having been cleared of the enemy by 78th Division, supported by Churchills of the North Irish Horse:
"At 0430 hours on 6th May the big attack started. The 4th British Division was on the right and 4th Indian Division, supported by 142nd R.A.C., with N.I.H. C squadron vice their A squadron, and 145th R.A.C., were on the left. 145th R.A.C., supported 5th Indian Brigade and 142nd R.A.C. the 7th Indian Brigade. C Squadron N.I.H. passed through the Gab Gab Gap and moved forward to an assembly area. By 0600 hours the first phase of the attack had proved successful and 142nd R.A.C. pushed through the Gap at about 0800 hours. C Squadron N.I.H., whose role was to protect the left flank, formed up behind Souissi but the advance was slightly delayed by the infantry, who were late. By 1000 hours 7th Indian Infantry Brigade were on their first objective and immediately afterwards they pushed right on to Aoud Zriga. During this action C Squadron captured six 88 mm. anti-tank guns, two of whose crews did not fire a shot.
As C Squadron reached the final objective the leading elements of 7th Armoured Division were starting to pass through the hole which had been punched. At the same time 6th Armoured were streaming through on the right. The timing of the whole operation was extraordinarily good and the work of the artillery against enemy anti-tank guns extremely effective and splendidly executed. Only five enemy tanks were seen and they were engaged as they moved away from the final objective which was immediately converted into a firm base by our infantry and anti-tank guns." 2

General B.G. Horrocks:
"By mid-day we were through the crust and the tanks were grinding their way forward down the valley towards Tunis. It was a most inspiring sight to see these two well-trained and experienced armoured divisions being used for the role for which armoured divisions were specifically designed—to exploit a break-through deep into the enemy's heart. They worked like efficient machines, aircraft, guns, tanks, infantry and vehicles each fitting into the jigsaw of battle in its proper place. 3

Shermans demonstrated in Africa and Italy its potential to be an excellent tank in battle, certainly, the appellations "Ronson Lighter" and "Tommy Cooker" would not have been given to the US built tank if it had been properly deployed. In actions both big and small, for which they were best suited, Shermans did well and performed magnificently.


1. The Battle for North Africa, 1940-43, Page 480. Jackson, W.G.F.
2. Extract from North Irish Horse Battle Report.
3. A Full Life, Page 170. Horrocks, R.G.

[phylo_roadking]

Gerry, you're quite correct, but I was speaking a bit more generally given the 1938 date as well. Churchill is quite right ...in the sense that this is how one particular element of a battle would go. But I note he's still thinking in terms of a "cavalry"- supported breakout using "the lighter vehicles", caught in the classic dead-end of thinking of Cruiser tanks as armoured cavalry...whereas as you can see the best breakthrough force is a balanced and supported armoured division. He did have a tendency to TRY to micromanage at times when he THOUGHT he knew what he was talking about LOL - which the more successful generals ignored "in the field" with a nod to Clausewitz

[phylo_roadking]

Just had a question on all this I was about to ask...answered in advance by something I've just read in Alan Clark's The Fall of Crete; I've always wondered how far up the chain of command did this distinction between Cruiser and Infantry tanks go, for the purposes of planning and Command and Control, until the two design streams began to merge again later in the war...

The answer appears to be - ALL the way to the top. The main impetus behind Churchill's planning and execution of Operation Tiger, the diversion of convoy WS7 directly across the Med from Gibraltar to Egypt in one run - was Wavell's telegram to Churchill of 20th April, 1941 -

"the best I can hope for by the end of the month is one cruiser regiment less one squadron, and one "I" tank regiment less one squadron, to assist defence of (Mersa) Matruh. During May I may get another thirty or forty cruisers out of the workshops to make another weak unit, and some "I" tanks which will probably be required for the close defence of Alexandria against possible raids - there are only two regiments of cruiser tanks in sight for Egypt by the end of May, and no reserves to replace casualties."

...so right at the top, Wavell as GOC HQME was in effect telling the Prime Minister he was reckoning his types separately, and giving differing responsibilities and roles to them