What if the Bismark returned?

[phylo_roadking]

Which - the moment they received word of Hood/POW sighting the Bismarck - gave them THREE options:-

1/ maintain present course to join what would possibly have been expected to be a longer engagement than what happened (!);

2/ anticpate flight on the part of the Bismarck in the event of her coming off worst and heading into the Greenland-Iceland Gap;

3/ anticipate the Bismarck breaking contact to the West or South-West into the Atlantic, and move to cut her off?

Which way did they turn?

[redcoat]

Which - the moment they received word of Hood/POW sighting the Bismarck - gave them THREE options:-

1/ maintain present course to join what would possibly have been expected to be a longer engagement than what happened (!);

2/ anticpate flight on the part of the Bismarck in the event of her coming off worst and heading into the Greenland-Iceland Gap;

3/ anticipate the Bismarck breaking contact to the West or South-West into the Atlantic, and move to cut her off?

Which way did they turn?

The British didn't lose contact with the Bismarck until the early hours of the 25th, almost 20 hours after the battle, and during that time the Bismarck had headed even further into the Atlantic

[redcoat]

Which - the moment they received word of Hood/POW sighting the Bismarck - gave them THREE
Which way did they turn?

Seeing they didn't lose contact they sailed on a intercept course, and if the Bismarck hadn't shaken off her pursuer's, they would have made contact later on the 25th.

[phylo_roadking]

And that is what I meant - they sailed an intercept course; though they had other alternatives to cover, given Lutjens' various options. So they were maintaining contact and moving in his direction. They had reached the same conclusions as he had as to what to do - 1/follow and sink the POW, 2/ turn back or 3/ go on. And they decided to chase/intercept because to them too, the only really viable one of his options was to go on. Which is the very simple answer at the top of the Thread as to why he didn't pursue the POW, and the question raised later as to why he didn't turn back. For all the reasons discussed above, he made the better decision, and as the RN alsoknew that it was the best option of all those available to him they followed him, committing those resources to the chase.

The only thing that Lutjens didn't know or correctly evaluate in the end...was that he was being "herded" in effect towards the Ark Royal!

The Bismarck chase is an almost textbook-perfect example of naval tactics on all sides, Lutjens included! ALL his decisions were perfect - up until the performance of the Bismarck was degraded - based on the information available to him or that he could extrapolate for himself, and the orders incumbent on him.

The Royal Navy in turn worked up and carried out the perfect plan for locating the proverbial needle in a haystack, usng the Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap as the "tripwire" where if they made contact with the Bismarck, its position was "pinned". And loaded the dice with the Gibraltar battle group.

[redcoat]

And that is what I meant - they sailed an intercept course; though they had other alternatives to cover, given Lutjens' various options. So they were maintaining contact and moving in his direction. They had reached the same conclusions as he had as to what to do - 1/follow and sink the POW, 2/ turn back or 3/ go on. And they decided to chase/intercept because to them too, the only really viable one of his options was to go on. Which is the very simple answer at the top of the Thread as to why he didn't pursue the POW, and the question raised later as to why he didn't turn back.

I don't really understand your train of thought.
They sailed on an intercept course because they knew which way the Bismarck was going, it wouldn't have made sense to have covered the other alternatives when their tracking force was telling them what she was doing.

we For all the reasons discussed above, he made the better decision, and as the RN alsoknew that it was the best option of all those available to him they followed him, committing those resources to the chase.

The only thing that Lutjens didn't know or correctly evaluate in the end...was that he was being "herded" in effect towards the Ark Royal!

He wasn't being herded anywhere, the RN was reacting to his moves

The Bismarck chase is an almost textbook-perfect example of naval tactics on all sides, Lutjens included! ALL his decisions were perfect - up until the performance of the Bismarck was degraded - based on the information available to him or that he could extrapolate for himself, and the orders incumbent on him.

While I agree with Lutjens decision not to pursue the POW. His job was to destroy Allied shipping, any futher combat with the POW could have lead to the Bismarck suffering further damage, damage which the Bismarck could not afford to suffer in an ocean full of RN ships, his decision to send a long radio message to Berlin because he was under the mistaken belief that the RN was still tracking him by radar, cost him his life and those of his men.

The Royal Navy in turn worked up and carried out the perfect plan for locating the proverbial needle in a haystack, usng the Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap as the "tripwire" where if they made contact with the Bismarck, its position was "pinned". And loaded the dice with the Gibraltar battle group.

No, the British lost the Bismarck 20 hours after the battle and she would have got away, apart from the radio message with which the RN re-establised the Bismarcks position.

[phylo_roadking]

RC, re being "herded" I said in effect ; this was not what the RN were intentionally doing, but as events played out its what happened. But thats the benefit of historical observation.

Lutjens was under the impression that he was under radar observation - so moved to open the range and attempt to lose his pursuit - which he actually did; a perfectly normal and correct decision under the circumstances. But to move away from his pursuers meant - for him - putting himself in range of aircraft from Ark Royal, which he could not anticipate.

Regarding the RN's movements in pursuit- what I meant was...they didn't leave a covering force behind them, and didn't move up and behind Bismarck to put themselves directly between her and her possible routes back into the North Sea if she had decided to turn back. They just went straight into the chase because THEY were quite sure of his probable movements...or at least what he WOULDN'T do, which is the point of this thread. It asks why he didn't turn and destroy the POW, and then why he didn't turn back to Norway. The answers are - because he made the eminently practical decisions that he did, and this is confirmed in that they were so practical that the Royal Navy didn't move to cover any other possible options EXCEPT the ones that lay ahead for Lutjens - the Atlantic or the Channel ports.

(Which, lets face it, Lutjens could have been stupid enough to try. A lot of very stupid tactical decisions were made between 1939 and 1945...this wouldn't have been the first or the last.)

[phylo_roadking]

*corrected version of the above, for some reason it wouldnt let me edit*

RC, re being "herded" I said in effect ; this was not what the RN were intentionally doing, but as events played out its what happened. But thats the benefit of historical observation.

Lutjens was under the impression that he was under radar observation - so moved to open the range and attempt to lose his pursuit - which he actually did; a perfectly normal and correct decision under the circumstances. But to move away from his pursuers meant - for him - putting himself in range of aircraft from Ark Royal, which he could not anticipate.

Regarding the RN's movements in pursuit- what I meant was...they didn't leave a covering force behind them, and didn't move up and behind Bismarck to put themselves directly between her and her possible routes back into the North Sea if she had decided to turn back. They just went straight into the chase because THEY were quite sure of his probable movements...or at least what he WOULDN'T do, which is the point of this thread. It asks why he didn't turn and destroy the POW, and then why he didn't turn back to Norway. The answers are - because he made the eminently practical decisions that he did, and this is confirmed in that they were so practical that the Royal Navy didn't move to cover any other possible options EXCEPT the ones that lay ahead for Lutjens - the Atlantic or the Channel ports.

(Which, lets face it, Lutjens could have been stupid enough to try. A lot of very stupid tactical decisions were made between 1939 and 1945...this wouldn't have been the first or the last.)

[redcoat]

*corrected version of the above, for some reason it wouldnt let me edit*

Thanks for the reply


ps, I'm having the same problem with editing as well