Maps for Seelöwe

[Leandros]

You tell me...

Sep. 15th – He115 obtains a torpedo hit on a 5.000 tons merchant
Oct. 20th - He115’s from 3./506 Gruppe reports 3 merchants sunk
Nov. 11th – Merchant hit by air-launched torpedo – blew up
Nov. 14th – Merchant hit by air-launched torpedo – result inconclusive
Nov. 15th – Torpedo hit on ammunition ship – blew up
Nov. 18th – 8.000 tons ship hit by torpedo

Further up the thread you were told that the air-dropped torpedoes available to the Germans were relatively slowmoving...and just by chance their successes (AFTER the putative Sealion date!) are all against equally slow-moving merchant shipping?

Where are the necessary successes against fastmoving destroyer-class naval vessels? Necessary that is to demonstrate that such a tactic would be as effective as you say against the RN, rather than the Merchant Navy??? Ships fast enough to manouver to turn into/avoid incoming torpedoes AND heavily-protected with AA?

First of all, PR - I haven't said anything on how effective the German torpedo-bombers would be against the RN..... ...Secondly, it is not by chance that their targets were mainly merchants. That was the German priority, just as for the U-boats and the regular bomber squadrons. Therefore, this is no real yardstick on what concentrated attacks by torpedo-planes and bombers would result in. My point with the He115's and M35's is the same, to place them in the common equation, something very few have done. Mind you, The He59's and Arado 95's of the Küstenfliegers could also carry torpedoes. Why should these be less effective than, say, the British Swordfish. They flew as fast, long and carried as much load.

So far the dicussions on Seelöwe have gone on much like this:

The U-boats couldn't stop the RN alone, so the invasion couldn't succeed
The minefields couldn't stop the RN alone, so the invasion couldn't succeed
The German coastal artillery couldn't stop the RN alone, so the invasion couldn't succeed,
The 20 S-boats couldn't stop the RN alone, so the invasion couldn't succeed,
The 24 large minesweepers (19 M35's + 5 M16's) couldn't stop the RN alone, so the invasion couldn't succeed
The 30 R-boats couldn't stop the RN alone, so the invasion couldn't succeed
The 9 large destroyers (the 9th arrived in Brest on the 27th) couldn't stop the RN alone, so the invasion couldn't succeed
The 20 light destroyers (T-boote) couldn't stop the RN alone, so the invasion couldn't succeed
The dozens of Patrol Boats (Vorpostenboote) couldn't stop the RN alone, so the invasion couldn't succeed
The 25 adapted artillery ships couldn't stop the RN alone, so the invasion couldn't succeed
The Luftwaffe couldn't stop the RN alone, so the invasion couldn't succeed
The Küstenfliegers couldn't stop the RN, so the invasion couldn't succeed
The Herbstreise escorts (about 20 fighting ships) couldn't stop the RN alone, so the invasion couldn't succeed

You all get my point...?

[Rich]

Further up the thread you were told...

Phylo, I'm sorry I stirred the pot. Sadly, it's damnably obvious that nothing has changed over the course of four years - it's yet more evidence that the Internet has allowed robdabism to take the place of logic and reason. Now we have He-59s and Ar-95s joining the ranks of the He-115 in carrying all those F5s. I guess the battle over torpedo allocation in January didn't really happen and that they were just everywhere? Have fun...

Cheers!

[lwd]

...
So far the dicussions on Seelöwe have gone on much like this:

The U-boats couldn't stop the RN alone, so the invasion couldn't succeed
The minefields couldn't stop the RN alone, so the invasion couldn't succeed
The German coastal artillery couldn't stop the RN alone, so the invasion couldn't succeed,
The 20 S-boats couldn't stop the RN alone, so the invasion couldn't succeed,
The 24 large minesweepers (19 M35's + 5 M16's) couldn't stop the RN alone, so the invasion couldn't succeed
The 30 R-boats couldn't stop the RN alone, so the invasion couldn't succeed
The 9 large destroyers (the 9th arrived in Brest on the 27th) couldn't stop the RN alone, so the invasion couldn't succeed
The 20 light destroyers (T-boote) couldn't stop the RN alone, so the invasion couldn't succeed
The dozens of Patrol Boats (Vorpostenboote) couldn't stop the RN alone, so the invasion couldn't succeed
The 25 adapted artillery ships couldn't stop the RN alone, so the invasion couldn't succeed
The Luftwaffe couldn't stop the RN alone, so the invasion couldn't succeed
The Küstenfliegers couldn't stop the RN, so the invasion couldn't succeed
The Herbstreise escorts (about 20 fighting ships) couldn't stop the RN alone, so the invasion couldn't succeed

You all get my point...?

That you can create multiple strawmen in a single post? Anyone can do that. The argument of course has been that even all together that force is simply inadequate to prevent the RN from savaging the invasion force.

[Leandros]

That you can create multiple strawmen in a single post? Anyone can do that. The argument of course has been that even all together that force is simply inadequate to prevent the RN from savaging the invasion force.

You are totally entitled to your own opinion..... ....

Fred

[lwd]

When one looks at the forces involved it's hard to justify any other.

[phylo_roadking]

For information -

I have outlined the situation for the FJ's in Holland like this in my book:

"When describing the happenings in Holland in 1940 it is quite usual to mix up the 7th Fliegerdivision and the 22nd Infantry Division. The latter was moved by transport planes and landed directly, in the first wave, on several Dutch airfields. The Dutch were able to inflict significant losses on the 22nd Division since they had studied the German operations in Norway and reinforced the defense of their airfields. Several hundred members of the division were captured and transported over to England as prisoners. The parachute division, however, suffered only minor losses (only a part of it was used, actually) of approximately 180 killed, wounded or missing. It was therefore in good shape for Sea Lion later in the fall. All information also points to the fact that the 22nd Division was fully operational in September, as it was given a complete infantry regiment as reinforcement. This is of interest because it was disposed as the strategic reserve for the 16th Army and later was transformed into the XI Fliegerkorps with the 7th Fliegerdivision. It was earmarked to operate together with the paratrooper units. Otherwise, during the campaign in Norway the Germans had already shown that they could easily compromise on normal procedures since many mountaineers (gebirgsjägers) were dropped by parachute in the Narvik area following rude parachute training."

...it's worth noting that Fred's information - incidently rather embarassingly gleaned from British tertiary sources, not German primary sources - has been shown to be wrong to a quite suprising degree...
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 0#p1614881

The 7th Flieger Division only comprised one nearly complete 1st Regiment, a two battalion 'strong' second regiment and a few non-airborne divisional units like PAK, signals, etc., which all originated from regular infantry with exception of half a company airborne Sanitäter. The Hocke outfit was a composite taskforce, around an airborne nucleus, comprising many non-airborne engineers and (other) specialists. Its losses were modest indeed. No way that the 7th Flieger Division comprised 7,000 airbornes before the invasion in the west. The total number of available airbornes (april/may 1940) was no more than around 4,500 to begin with (7.FD, incl. Hocke), including Ersatz and including airbornes without jumpschool module.

The figures that UK vet 'Farrar Hockley' apparently came up with, are beloney. He obviously had not a clue (or you mis-quoted him), like many UK/USA based authors, regardless of their profession. I have never seen accurate UK/USA figures on the German airborne/airlanding ops in the Netherlands in 1940, like they still have to cover up one of many Monty blunders like Market Garden, which was a copy-cat operation of the 1940 German landings in the Netherlands.

The losses of FJR.1 (incl. one Ersatz Kp) alone already hit around 750 men dead and wounded incl. a few POW's taken into the UK. The losses of FJR.2, that only comprised two battalions, where (relatively seen) even higher. Almost the entire 1st Battalion (FJR2) was lost [KIA/WIA/POW] in the battles around the Hague and 6./FJR.2 suffered about half its strength in losses at Valkenburg. The balance of II./FJR.2, that had landed at Waalhaven (south of Rotterdam) saw no battle, since it remained in reserve. Particularly the bad losses at Ypenburg (the Hague area) bore heavy on I./FJR.2. Most of the survivors were so unlucky to be taken to Ymuiden seaport and being shipped to the UK on the 13th and 14th of May 1940. In the Summer of 1940 FJR.2 had to be rebuilt entirely, whereas the building scheme for 7.FD had been that by then three full Jäger Regiments would have existed to fill the first German airborne division.

Sources: To begin with, the Namentliche Verlustmeldungen of FJR.1 and FJR.2, although much 'cleaned'. For example the Verlustliste of FJR1 (including the Ersatz Kompanie Moll) goes to 1,125 men. The sick and (recovered) MIA are deducted from that list to take out impurity

.

[Leandros]

You are mentioning September, October... If there was ever an excellent moment to invade Great Britain, it was in June or July.

unfortunately....

1/ that wasn't the plan; even for the mid-September jumpoff or "three-day readiness order" the shipping wasn't gathered or ready; when Halder visited the Channel Ports at the start of September, the KM had repaired NONE of the heavy cranes etc. that they said were "necessary" for loading shipping, and various harbour basins were still full of sunken ships. The FJ wasn't ready for most of the time...even the September date was dubious for them due to a general lack in parachute silk, a lack of trained dispatchers due to the losses in Holland, the general loss of about 3/5s of the LW's Ju52s,etc. Even Goering's first date for starting the "true" (the LW's) Battle of Britain was originally only the 5th of August (delayed to the 12th for the first heavy raids due to the weather) - he didn't even START planning it until the 19th of July IIRC..

The shipping was ready. Since this is mentioned by Halder (he refers to the navy) you are taking things out of context. Having read Halder you should also know that the crane question was not seen as a problem by the port masters.

[phylo_roadking]

Having read Halder you should also know that the crane question was not seen as a problem by the port masters.

Woop de doo. They weren't the ones responsible for the operation timetable....

And how did they view the Basins full of sunken wrecks???