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MINOR CAUSES - MAJOR EFFECTS. BEGINNING OF THE AUGUST 1915 GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN.
The landing took place almost as it had been practiced on Lemnos. Four battalions landed dryshod (the British used a new type steel motor boat with a ramp at one end) at, 10:00 PM. The 11th Division, less one of its three brigades, completed its landing, secured a line from Salt Lake southward to the coast, and seized Lala Baba where it emplaced its artillery. The third brigade which was to land along the northern coast of Suvla Bay encountered artillery and small arm fire when it approached the shore; furthermore, 3 cruisers anchored too far to the south. As a result two of the big landing boats struck shoals and the landing was seriously disorganized and delayed. The defending Brussa Gendarmes delivered a very effective fire on the troops landing on its front. This brigade was the one detailed to take Softa Tepe. Its landing was not completed until about 3:30 AM, when one battalion was finally pushe ahead to take the objective, it seized, by mistake, a small elevation in front of Softa Tepe.
Hence, daylight disclosed virtually the entire 11th Division massed on the strip of land between Salt Lake and the bay. Of its 12 battalions, 7 had made no contact with the enemy.
The landing of the 10th Division was subject to several changes in orders. The net result of which was that part of it landed near the Gahsi Baba and another part south of Small Kemikli. The latter, 5 battalions, was attached to the 11th Division by General Stopford. For the attack on the hills east of Salt Lake, the division ordered these battalions to take part in the advance around the lake which caused a mixing units. Before much of an advance could be made, Softa Tepe had to be taken. In accordance with their plans the Turks withdrew when the British advanced and the hill was occupied by 8:40 AM, 7 August. The senior brigade commander ordered a halt and reported his action. There now resulted a series of orders, conferences, counter-orders and misunderstandings which resulted in delaying the attack until 5:30 PM. The hills were finally taken by 7:00 PM,Turkish artillery fire prevented pursuit by the British of the withdrawing Tukish battalion. Contact with the enemy was lost.
By the same time part of the 10th Division had advanced about halfway up the coast toward Edje Liman.
The night passed quietly. Two brigades were withdrawn to the coast. The next day, 8 August, advances on objectives, short of the final objective shown on sketch, were ordered after a council of brigade commanders had convinced the commander of the 11th Division that the troops needed rest. The commander of the forces advancing along the Kiretsch Tepe reported that he could not dislodge the "strong" (we know they consisted of 3 companies and some mountain guns) forces facing him without more artillery support.
The corps commander eventually ordered that attack be made on Tekke Tepe if it was found to be lightly held.
When General Hamilton heard of the inaction ashore, he decided to land to see what the situation actually was. Trouble with the sailors of his ship delayed him so that he did not land until 6:00 PM. The corps commander assured him that all was well, and that the only things needed were rest and more artillery. He was strongly opposed to a night advance. The commander of the 11th Division also argued against a night advance. General Hamilton was ultimately able to have one brigade ordered to advance on Great Anafarta and to extract a promise that at least one battalion would be on Tekke Tepe by daylight of 9 August. These advances did not get under way until about 3:30 AM, 8 August, because messengers were delayed in finding the battalions and getting orders to them.
By this time, however, Turkish forces dispatched to the heights around the plain, were already on their way from Bulair. The delay occasioned by the events mentioned above, enabled the Turks to reach the heights first and thus to rout the British advancing on the Tekke Tepe and Anafarta.
Source: [Kleine Ursachen - Grosze Wirkungen. Beginn der agosto Schlacht 1915 auf Gallipoli.] (II) Mayor General Hans Kannengiesser Pascha. Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles. RML Nº 75. Dec 1939.
It's all folks. Cheers. Raúl M
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.