Thanks for the book tip John, very much appreciated.
I believe Moltke (younger) and Schlieffen were following the guidance of Moltke (elder) in regard to the planning of operations beyond the initial contact from the Aufmarsch:
"Tactical victory formed the center of Moltke's vision of war. He saw strategy--a "free, practical, artistic activity
"--as a "system of expedients" designed to establish, as far as possible, the conditions for tactical success. Strategy must remain flexible to take advantage of unexpected opportunities
and to react to unpredictable factors like "weather, illnesses, railway accidents, misunderstandings, and disappointments
." Attempting to carry a war plan beyond the opening engagement he considered the greatest of follies, for the first clash of arms brought only new opportunities and necessities to attacker and defender alike. Nonetheless, staff officers should spare no effort in planning for as many contingencies as possible."
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/para ... hevarr.htm
I believe the underlined portion to be the key to the deviation of Moltke from Schlieffen's original concept. I read the campaign of 1914 to demonstrate that Moltke anticipated incorrectly that there would be an opportunity to execute a double envelopment and thus reduced the right wing and placed an unnecessary number of corps on the left which ultimately proved ineffective against the French fortifications as forseen by Schlieffen and was a critical strategic error.