British World War I Tanks

First World War 1914-1918 from the German perspective.

Moderator: sniper1shot

User avatar
tigre
Patron
Posts: 6070
Joined: Sun Apr 10, 2005 5:42 pm
Location: Argentina

Re: British World War I Tanks

Post by tigre » Sat Dec 19, 2015 4:38 am

Hello to all :D; a little more................................

TANKS AND ANTITANK DEFENSE DURING THE WORLD WAR.

While the fight for Fontaine was going on, the British 40th Division attacked Bourlon with its 121st Brigade from the west and with its 119th Brigade through the Bourlon Woods. Each brigade was supported by tanks. The 119th Brigade reached the north edge of the woods taking a large number of prisoners. One German battalion had 407 missing. The infantry of the 121st Brigade was stopped west of the Bourlon Woods by an artillery barrage, but the tanks penetrated the German position. A panic, which began in the German lines, subsided when a tank was struck and set on fire by the artillery in sight of everyone. Antiaircraft artillery took part in the antitank defense. But in the afternoon tanks pushed into Bourlon, principally through the gap west of the Bourlon Woods. Then five battalions of German artillery went into action north of the village to prevent the debouchment of about ten tanks! A small part of this artillery would have sufficed if single pieces had been pushed forward in time.

On 24 November there was no fighting in which tanks came into evidence. At 1:15 PM the Germans received a report that 30 tanks and strong cavalry elements were assembled in the area between Graincourt, Anneux, and the main road, Captain von Richthofen took off with a group of 30 airplanes to attack the tanks, but the group sighted hostile airplanes of which 39 were engaged, so there was neither time nor opportunity to attack the tanks. A German counterattack on this day in which artillery platoons followed closely behind the infantry for antitank defense, retook Bourlon.

No important fighting took place on the 25th and 26th. The German 3d Guard Division now held the front from west of BourIon, along the south edge of BourIon, and along the east edge of the Bourlon Woods. The 119th Division extended from Fontaine to La Folie Woods inclusive. Each division had three platoons of artillery emplaced along their front as antitank guns.

On 27 November the British attacked Fontaine and to the west thereof with the Guard and 62d Divisions. Both divisions were supported by large numbers of tanks.

The Germans were expecting the attack, and beginning at 7:15 AM, they fired several interdiction concentrations. Shortly thereafter the British put down a heavy barrage, and forty-five minutes later they launched their attack.

Source: TANKS AND ANTITANK DEFENSE DURING THE WORLD WAR. ["Kampfwagen und Abwehr wahrend des Weltkrieges." Sanct Christophorus, October 1936.] Abstracted by Lieutenant Colonel S.J. Heidner, Infantry. RML. June 1937.

Cheers. Raúl M 8).

Feliz Navidad - Feliz Natal - Frohe Weihnachten - Joyeux Noël - Merry Christmas - Wesołych Świąt!. :up:
Attachments
image040.jpg
British Mark IV tank destroyed during the fighting in the forests ....................................... .
PHOTO - SOLDATEN - 1.WK - PANZER - ZERSTÖRTER PANZER - 036
image040.jpg (35.45 KiB) Viewed 1264 times
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.

User avatar
tigre
Patron
Posts: 6070
Joined: Sun Apr 10, 2005 5:42 pm
Location: Argentina

Re: British World War I Tanks

Post by tigre » Thu Dec 24, 2015 3:51 am

Hello to all :D; a little more................................

TANKS AND ANTITANK DEFENSE DURING THE WORLD WAR.

The area about Fontaine was so clouded with smoke that observation became difficult. South of Fontaine the British attack was stopped. Between Fontaine and the Bourlon Woods, tanks broke through the front of the 9th Grenadiers of the German 3d Guard Division, and this time infantry of the British Guard Division followed. Tanks and elements of the British Guards turned to the left and attacked the Grenadiers from the rear. The Grenadiers broke, and it was due only to the heavy smoke that a large number of them were able to escape capture.

Other British Guards, supported by tanks, turned to the south and entered Fontaine. The guns set up for antitank defense in the village were soon put out of action. One tank blocked a company in its shelter, and the entire company was taken prisoner.

The German reserve battalions were able to establish a defensive front along the railroad embankment which was attacked weakly only.

In front of Bourlon the German position was penetrated by tanks and the defenders fled to the rear. The tanks were fired on at close range by the antitank guns, and many of them were destroyed. The barricades in the streets of Bourlon restricted the maneuvering of the tanks that entered the village, and two of them were destroyed there with overcharged grenades. In the open, however, such attempts to destroy the tank's failed in spite of the fact that the prospect of capturing tobacco and food was a powerful incentive to the Germans. Since the infantry on this front did not follow the tanks, the tanks soon had to turn back, and so the attack miscarried here.

Five fresh German battalions joined a counterattack at Fontaine which restored the original position. The British had neglected to reform their tanks after the attack to resist the counterattacks which they must have expected. Experience had not yet taught them to do this.

The defenders learned during this battle that both active and passive means of antitank defense must be used, and that guns emplaced for antitank defense must be located immediately in rear of the infantry lines. As on previous occasions, a number of platoons had been held in readiness in rear with teams hitched for antitank defense. These guns invariably arrived too late.

On 30 November a German counteroffensive was begun which, in a short time, regained all the ground that had been lost in the battle of Cambrai, and actually gained some new ground toward the south. The German soldier succeeded without tanks in doing what the British had done with tanks. The exhausted British tanks corps was not used against the German counteroffensive.

The British concluded from the battle at Cambrai that infantry could not advance without accompanying tanks even though leading tanks had broken through the enemy's main position. They also concluded that two types of combat tanks were necessary: a heavy tank, long enough to cross wide trenches, to make the penetration; and a medium fast tank, with a radius of action of over 65 miles, to exploit the success. Besides these various types of tanks, the British also wanted armored cars constructed to be used in cooperation with the cavalry in the open ground beyond the trench systems.

The Germans believed, after this battle, that tanks employed in mass could give decisive results, and immediately gave first priority to the construction of their own tanks. By the end of October 1917, the first German A7V tank was completed.

Source: TANKS AND ANTITANK DEFENSE DURING THE WORLD WAR. ["Kampfwagen und Abwehr wahrend des Weltkrieges." Sanct Christophorus, October 1936.] Abstracted by Lieutenant Colonel S.J. Heidner, Infantry. RML. June 1937.

Cheers. Raúl M 8).

Feliz Navidad - Feliz Natal - Frohe Weihnachten - Joyeux Noël - Merry Christmas - Wesołych Świąt!. :up:
Attachments
image041.jpg
German soldiers next to a disabled British Mk IV tank..................................... ...
Alte Foto-AK Soldaten in Uniform an einem englischen Panzer Tank 1917
image041.jpg (32.22 KiB) Viewed 1254 times
image042.jpg
German soldiers and a destroyed British tank...........................................
Foto-AK Alte Deutsche Soldaten an einem zerstörten englischen Panzer Tank
image042.jpg (37.58 KiB) Viewed 1254 times
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.

User avatar
tigre
Patron
Posts: 6070
Joined: Sun Apr 10, 2005 5:42 pm
Location: Argentina

Re: British World War I Tanks

Post by tigre » Sun Dec 27, 2015 8:30 am

Hello to all :D; a little more........................................

The Battle of Amiens 1918. Prelude.

The results attained by the Entente powers in the fighting about Soissons convinced their commander-in-chief that the time had come to prepar for a general offensive by a warfare of attrition along the entire front. Naturally, the first attack would be in the region of Amiens where the Entente powers themselves were most threatened.

General Foch ordered the British Fourth Army to attack on 8 August to secure the important road and railroad center of Amiens. The line: Morlancourt-Mericourt-Harbonieres-Hangest, was designated as objective. This was later extended to the Chaulnes-Roye railroad. The army had available for the attack the following troops: north of the Somme, the III Corps of three divisions; between the Somme and the Luce, the Australian Corps of four divisions, the Canadian Corps of four divisions, and the Cavalry Corps composed of three cavalry divisions; and south of the Somme the French XXXI Corps of five divisions. The British divisions were supported by 2,068 guns, 360 heavy tanks, 96 new fast Whippet tanks, 16 armored cars, and 408 airplanes. The French Corps had 616 guns, 90 light Renault tanks, and 60 airplanes. Among the British heavy tanks were two battalions of the new Mark V "Star" tanks, especially designed for crossing wide trenches.

Every precaution was taken to keep the preparations for the attack secret from the Germans. The Canadian Corps, which was Great Britain's best attack unit, was not to reach its line of departure until just before the attack. Some Canadian battalions and numerous tank units were moved to the Flanders front to give the impression that an attack would be launched there.

The British had observed that the German successes of March and April had been gained by pushing forward where resistance was weak, without regard to neighboring units, and then reducing the strong centers by envelopment. The British now practiced this maneuver with tanks and infantry working together. Furthermore, profiting from their experiences at Cambrai, the British had the divisions making the main attack rehearse the attack with the tanks that were to support them; they moved the cavalry closer to the front before the attack, and attached medium tanks to it; and they provided for the forward displacement of the artillery to begin as soon as the first rolling barrage would be completed.

The British aviation was called upon to fulfill a number of missions. Before the attack it was to be used to drown the noise of the tanks going into assembly positions. During the attack it was to support the infantry with machine guns and bombs, paying particular attention to German antitank guns. As the attack progressed the aviation was to attack any German reserves moving forward. Finally, airplanes were to cooperate with the tanks in attacking any hostile elements starting a withdrawal.

The British III Corps, the combat efficiency of whose divisions was low, had only a secondary mission. It was to prevent hostile interference from north of the Somme with the British main attack. The Australian and Canadian Corps, assisted by the Cavalry Corps, were to make the main attack.

Heavy artillery fire was to be put down along the entire front of the British Fourth Army at about 5:20 AM. At the same time the infantry and tanks of the British corps were to move forward. The French XIII Corps did not plan on using its tanks until after the German trench system had been captured on account of their limited terrain-crossing ability. The French infantry, therefore, which had to make its first advance without tanks, was to have the benefit of a 45-minute artillery preparation. Hence its attack would start 45 minutes later than that of the British infantry.

Source: TANKS AND ANTITANK DEFENSE DURING THE WORLD WAR. ["Kampfwagen und Abwehr wahrend des Weltkrieges." Sanct Christophorus, October 1936.] Abstracted by Lieutenant Colonel S.J. Heidner, Infantry. RML. June 1937.

Cheers. Raúl M 8).

Feliz Año Nuevo - Happy New Year - feliz Ano Novo - gluckliches Neues Jahr - Bonne Année - Felice Anno Nuovo - Szczęśliwego nowego roku!! :beer:
Attachments
image041.png
German offensives, March-July 1918.....................
image041.png (74.45 KiB) Viewed 1245 times
image043.jpg
British troops passing tanks in a French village close to Amiens following the German Kaiserschlacht offensive on 21 March 1918. ...............................
https://www.pinterest.com/pin/387309636679993228/
image043.jpg (48.77 KiB) Viewed 1245 times
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.

User avatar
tigre
Patron
Posts: 6070
Joined: Sun Apr 10, 2005 5:42 pm
Location: Argentina

Re: British World War I Tanks

Post by tigre » Wed Dec 30, 2015 5:35 am

Hello to all :D; a little more........................................

The Battle of Amiens 1918. Prelude.

Opposite the British Fourth Army, in order from north to south in the German front line, were: one division of the LIV Corps, the XI Corps with three divisions, and the LI Corps with four divisions. Three divisions in reserve were available on this front, and call could be made on neighboring units for three more reserve divisions. These reserve divisions, however, were exhausted, and besides, two of them had left the bulk of their artillery, and one, most of its machine guns and mortars, in position. Furthermore, some of them were just completing their relief so that on the morning of the attack part of their units were still en route to their rest billets. Of the divisions in line, only two were rated as fully fit for battle.

Then too, the morale of the German soldier was beginning to sink. The German high command had given up its plan for an offensive in Flanders, which allowed doubts to arise over the possibility of a final victory. The tank had become the decisive element in the enemy's attacks. The German soldier had to face the fact that with its aid the enemy had twice made great gains without serious losses and had each time taken a great number of prisoners. An effective defense was no longer possible unless means could be found to destroy this new engine of war, and no such means had been produced. From Berlin too came the disquieting news that the usually docile Reichstag had attacked the high command for having had so few tanks built.

But the value of the German soldier can not be considered by itself; it must be compared with that of the soldiers of the opponents. The British and French soldiers had been brought to the verge of destruction by the attacks in the spring. They were recovering only gradually. Of the sixteen divisions taking part in the attack, only the eight Australian and Canadian divisions could be considered entirely fit for combat. Some of the others had been in line as long as the Germans. But the enemy had this tremendous advantage-they believed that a German attack was no longer possible, and could begin now to plan for a final decisive offensive with confidence. They also had the means at hand with which to make their attacks effective and almost without danger to themselves, a means which the Germans had been unable to check in previous battles.

The German troops in front of Amiens had heard the enemy carrying forward ammunition at various places. They thought also they had heard the noises of tanks, but the higher headquarters ridiculed these reports for they had fallen for the British ruse in Flanders. On 6 August, a German aviator observed about 100 tanks moving towards the front. On 7 August, a chance German shell struck a gasoline tank in an orchard near Villers-Bretonneux and ignited it. Their suspicions aroused by this, the Germans shelled the entire orchard and destroyed 25 tanks with all their equipment. But even this chance discovery did not induce the Germans to take proper countermeasures. They were satisfied with the measures previously taken even though these had proven inadequate against recent attacks.

Some outpost companies had been equipped with two 13 mm antitank rifles. In each division sector from two to four field pieces were assigned to antitank defense. Some of these were held in the vicinity of their batteries where they could be pushed forward promptly into open firing positions; the others were held far to the rear, by platoons, with teams hitched. These so-called antitank guns were certainly too far to the rear to be able to go into action in time to protect the infantry zone.

During the night of 7-8 August, the outposts of the German 27th Division heard tank noises. (See Sketch No. 5) When this report was sent to the rear the artillery put down defensive barrages which; were repeated throughout the night. The outposts of the 108th Division discovered British riflemen leaving their own trenches and digging in behind the German wire entanglements. This report also brought down artillery and trench-mortar fire. About 4:30 AM, the German 41st Division made a raid in the vicinity of ViIlers-Bretonneux, but found the British forward trench unoccupied. The Canadians at that point had not yet come forward in order to keep from revealing their presence. The outposts of the 225th Division also recognized tank noises, but failed to get the information back to their artillery in time. It was just there that a timely barrage Could have caught 28 tanks crossing the Luce on their way forward.

A fog which had descended at midnight became more and more dense toward morning. About 5:20 AM, a hurricane of fire suddenly came down on the entire German front. The hail of shells fell on the German front trenches for a few minutes and then moved on to the east. The German batteries were all taken under fire, even those which had been silent for days and which it was thought had not been discovered. In a short time communications were interrupted, and many guns were put out of action.

Source: TANKS AND ANTITANK DEFENSE DURING THE WORLD WAR. ["Kampfwagen und Abwehr wahrend des Weltkrieges." Sanct Christophorus, October 1936.] Abstracted by Lieutenant Colonel S.J. Heidner, Infantry. RML. June 1937.

Cheers. Raúl M 8).

Feliz Año Nuevo - Happy New Year - feliz Ano Novo - gluckliches Neues Jahr - Bonne Année - Felice Anno Nuovo - Szczęśliwego nowego roku!! :beer:
Attachments
image052.png
image052.png (119.46 KiB) Viewed 1237 times
image054.jpg
Men of the 95th Siege Battery RGA loading a 9.2 inch howitzer near Bayencourt during the Battle of Amiens..........................
http://media.iwm.org.uk/iwm/mediaLib/15/media-15547/large.jpg
image054.jpg (49.39 KiB) Viewed 1237 times
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.

User avatar
tigre
Patron
Posts: 6070
Joined: Sun Apr 10, 2005 5:42 pm
Location: Argentina

Re: British World War I Tanks

Post by tigre » Sat Jan 02, 2016 8:24 am

Hello to all :D; a little more........................................

The Battle of Amiens 1918. THE ATTACK NORTH OF THE SOMME. (See Sketch No. 6).

The Somme valley is wide and marshy. The villages of Morlancourt and Sailly were immediately behind the German main line of resistance. In the sector of the German 27th Division there was no tank obstacle other than the village of Morlancourt. The sector of the German 108th Division, on the other hand, was almost completely closed off for tanks by the Malard Woods. The Hecht and Kanal hills are the highest ground north of the Somme, and offer good observation to the south of the river. For this reason the possession of these hills was important to the British in order that their main attack south of the Somme might not be interfered with. The British final objective for the day included the Kanal hill, and from there bent back to the south edge of Morlancourt. An intermediate objective, which was to be reached by 7:20 AM, included the Malard Woods.

The British 12th Division was not to attack Morlancourt directly, but was to pass around and isolate it. This division received no allotment of tanks. The 18th and 58th Divisions were allotted 24 and 12 tanks, respectively. These two divisions assigned the greater part of their tanks to the first wave and the balance to the second. There was no massing of tanks at any point for the attack.

The German 27th and 108th Divisions held their sectors with regiments abreast. The regiments generally had one battalion
on the main line of resistance and the remainder in reserve. The artillery of both divisions was emplaced on the slopes of
the Kanal hill.

The visibility, which had been limited to 20 or 30 yards due to fog, was further reduced by smoke shells when the British barrage came down at 5:20 AM. It became impossible to see pyrotechnic signals.

In the German 108th Division, the right regiment met Its fate first. Its main line of resistance was penetrated seven minutes after the artillery bombardment began. The British assault troops pushed forward recklessly behind their tanks, leaving the mopping-up to the waves that followed. The German reserves were attacked before they could take up a defensive position. By 6:20 AM the British attacked the last reserves of the regiment at the northwest corner of the Malard Woods. A short time later the regimental commander sent forward an officer's patrol to find out what was going on: the regiment had disappeared! A few remnants only drifted back later. The main line of resistance of the middle regiment of the division was also overrun rapidly by tanks and infantry, but the tanks were unable to penetrate the Malard Woods. Two tanks attempting to pass around the woods were destroyed with overcharged hand grenades. The British infantry, losing the support of its tanks, did not get possession of the Malard Woods until 8:20 AM.

The British tank attack against the front of the German 27th Division was delayed until about 6:00 AM, probably by the barrages which the German artillery put down during the night. However, within a half-hour after the attack was launched the German front-line infantry had disappeared. By 7:20 AM the British were on their intermediate objective. These attacks again demonstrated the value of the tank. Only where it was supported by tanks was the British infantry able to make progress.

Source: TANKS AND ANTITANK DEFENSE DURING THE WORLD WAR. ["Kampfwagen und Abwehr wahrend des Weltkrieges." Sanct Christophorus, October 1936.] Abstracted by Lieutenant Colonel S.J. Heidner, Infantry. RML. June 1937.

Cheers. Raúl M 8).
Attachments
image008.png
image008.png (87.21 KiB) Viewed 1228 times
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.

User avatar
tigre
Patron
Posts: 6070
Joined: Sun Apr 10, 2005 5:42 pm
Location: Argentina

Re: British World War I Tanks

Post by tigre » Wed Jan 06, 2016 2:59 am

Hello to all :D; a little more........................................

The Battle of Amiens 1918. THE ATTACK NORTH OF THE SOMME. (See Sketch No. 6).

The German 27th Division had two reserve battalions just to the east of its artillery area, and three more in rest areas farther to the rear. The 108th Division had a reserve battalion east of the Kanal hill and another northeast of Mericourt. These reserves had been alerted at once when the British bombardment commenced. The two battalions of the 27th Division farthest forward were caught in the British barrage and lost heavily. The two reserve battalions of the 108th Division took up a defensive position in front of the division artillery. When the commander of the German LIV Corps became satisfied that the attack did not extend north of Morlancourt, he gathered together all the available division reserves (9 1/2 battalions of infantry and 3 1/2 batteries) and formed a line from the south edge of Morlancourt to the north slope of the Kanal hill where it connected with the two battalions of the 108th DIvision.

Later in the morning as the fog lifted, the artillery observers on the Kanal hill were able to see, south of the Somme, British columns of infantry moving forward, batteries going into position, and a group of tanks. The guns were at once turned on these objectives. The infantry columns were engaged first and dispersed, then four tanks were destroyed, and finally the batteries were successfully engaged. ln spite of this fire from the north bank, the British attacking south of the Somme made such progress that the left flank of the German 108th Division had to be refused. The division abandoned 7 1/2 batteries in this withdrawal.

The British did not press the attack north of the Somme after arriving at their intermediate objective. In the sector of the German 27th Division part of a British battalion pushed forward to the final objective, but was forced to retire by the German artillery. At the end of the day the final objective had not been attained at any point north of the Somme. Nevertheless the British results here were outstanding. Eight German infantry battalions had been practically wiped out, and 7 1/2 German batteries had been abandoned. The full value of the tank must be estimated by comparing this result with that attained by the German 27th Division on 6 August. We see that British troops, not highly rated, were able to overrun German troops rated as "good."

Source: TANKS AND ANTITANK DEFENSE DURING THE WORLD WAR. ["Kampfwagen und Abwehr wahrend des Weltkrieges." Sanct Christophorus, October 1936.] Abstracted by Lieutenant Colonel S.J. Heidner, Infantry. RML. June 1937.

Cheers. Raúl M 8).
Attachments
image061.jpg
British tanks during the offensive...................
http://worldofmaryswedding.library.uvic.ca/images/sized/14.jpg
image061.jpg (35.05 KiB) Viewed 1202 times
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.

User avatar
tigre
Patron
Posts: 6070
Joined: Sun Apr 10, 2005 5:42 pm
Location: Argentina

Re: British World War I Tanks

Post by tigre » Sat Jan 09, 2016 9:01 am

Hello to all :D; a little more........................................

The Battle of Amiens 1918. THE ATTACK SOUTH OF THE SOMME. (See Sketch No. 7).

The terrain between the Somme and the Amiens-Roye highway is characterized by numerous ravines and valleys leading north into the Somme and north and south into the Luce. At many points these ravines constituted tank obstacles. From the Somme south to the sector of the German 41st Division, there were only narrow stretches over which tanks could attack the main line of resistance. Within the sector of the 41st Division, the only tank obstacles were the villages. In the sector of the 117th Division, the woods constituted a tank obstacle, while in that of the 225th Division, the small woods, the Luce, and a deep ravine were all tank obstacles. Only about a quarter of the entire front could be considered suitable for tank attack.

The first objective for the British attack, which was to be reached by about 7:20 AM, was the line: west edge of Cérisy-east edge of Lamotte-east edge of Demuin. Two hours after arriving at the first objective, that is, at about 9:20 AM, the attack was to be carried forward to the second objective which was the line: east edge of Morcourt-west edge of Harbonnieres-north edge of Cayeux-east edge of Mézières. From there the attack was to be pushed to the line: Mericourt-east edge of Harbonnieres-Fresnoy, which was designated as the third objective.

The plan for the Australian Corps was to attack with the 2d and 3d Divisions in the front line. The divisions were to attack with brigades abreast. To each brigade there was assigned a tank company of 12 tanks. The 4th and 5th Divisions were to follow and take up the attack when the leading divisions had arrived upon the first objective. On account of the greater distance over which the divisions of the second wave would have to push the attack, there were given more tanks; the 4th Division received 56, and the 5th Division, 42.

The Canadian Corps was to attack with its 2d, 1st, and 3d Divisions in front line in order from north to south, and its 4th Division in the second wave. The 2d and 1st Divisions were to carry the attack to the final objective, while the 3d Division was to be passed through by the 4th Division on the first objective. Each division received 36 tanks. The 2d and 1st Divisions were to use 12 tanks in the capture of each objective, while the 3d Division was to use its 36 tanks at the start since it had only one objective to take.

On the German side the divisions held their sectors with regiments abreast. In the regimental sectors, one battalion generally held the main line of resistance and the outpost zone, another was held in regimental reserve well forward, while the third was farther to the rear in rest billets. The artillery zone extended west to include the villages of Cérisy, Lamotte, and Demuin. The main line of resistance had been laid out so as to take advantage of commanding ground, and this resulted in the formation of several salients which were vulnerable to flank attacks. The position had not been completely organized anywhere; wire entanglements were not continuous and only a limited number of splinter-proof shelters existed.

Source: TANKS AND ANTITANK DEFENSE DURING THE WORLD WAR. ["Kampfwagen und Abwehr wahrend des Weltkrieges." Sanct Christophorus, October 1936.] Abstracted by Lieutenant Colonel S.J. Heidner, Infantry. RML. June 1937.

Cheers. Raúl M 8).
Attachments
image008.png
image008.png (107.55 KiB) Viewed 1193 times
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.

User avatar
tigre
Patron
Posts: 6070
Joined: Sun Apr 10, 2005 5:42 pm
Location: Argentina

Re: British World War I Tanks

Post by tigre » Wed Jan 13, 2016 9:17 am

Hello to all :D; a little more........................................

The Battle of Amiens 1918. THE ATTACK SOUTH OF THE SOMME. (See Sketch No. 7).

The British put down a heavy barrage at about 5:20 AM which forced the defenders to seek shelter in dugouts and holes. The deafening roar of the bursting shells caused all communications to fail. The outposts were overrun without being able to give the alarm to the troops on the main line of resistance. As the troops on the main line of resistance began to be conscious of what was going on, the command posts and reserves were overrun. On parts of the front the visibility was limited to 10 or 20 paces. All along the front the story was the same. As the hostile barrage moved forward motor noises were heard. At first this was thought to be the noise of low-flying airplanes, and eyes were turned skyward. True, here and there hostile airplanes were combing the trenches laterally with machine guns. Then, suddenly, single tanks appeared. The Germans brought a few machine guns into action, but the tanks could not be stopped. They rolled on uninterruptedly. Directly behind them came infantrymen, who threw incendiary bombs and hand grenades into the German infantry shelters, and then hurried on after the monsters. Where the tanks could not negotiate the terrain, the infantry failed to advance too. When the first wave had passed, the defending infantry reappeared in the organized centers and opened fire. But almost as soon it would be fired on from the rear with cannon and machine guns from two or three tanks which had succeeded in outflanking the resistance, and then the battle was quickly over.

In the Australian Corps, the 3d Division attacked the left regiment of the German 108th Division and most of the front of the German 13th Division. The tanks of this division generally were able to surmount the obstacles offered by the terrain. The leading tank platoons were given the mission of breaking through on a narrow front and then striking at deep objectives. The following platoons had the mission of reducing strong German positions, such as villages and woods, by envelopment. Within a few hours after the attack was launched, this Australian division had overrun the German main line of resistance, the regimental command posts, and the regimental reserves. The German front-line regiments were almost completely lost; only insignificant elements found their way to the rear. The Australian 2d Division attacked the right and center regiments of the German 41st Division. By massing its tanks against the center regiment, the Australian division quickly broke through the main line of resistance there, and then reduced the right regiment by envelopment. Both Australian divisions reached the first objective on scheduled time by 7:20 AM. In two hours, these divisions had overpowered the front-line and reserve battalions, had captured ten batteries, and had conquered a strip of ground from 2 to 3.2 kilometers in depth, measured from the German outpost line.

In the Canadian Corps, the 2d Division launched its entire strength against the left regiment of the German 41st Division. The infantry of this division began the attack without the support of tanks, and was repulsed. Shortly afterward, however, the tanks came into action, and then the German front-line and reserve battalion was sealed. The 1st Division attacked the entire front of the German 117th Division. This Canadian division could only employ tanks on its flanks because of the wooded area in the center of its zone. These woods were not reduced until they had been attacked from the rear by tanks which had enveloped them from both flanks. This delay caused the Canadian 1st Division to arrive on the first objective at 8:15 instead of 7:20 AM. The 3d Canadian Division, which, as was, related above, was to advance only to the first objective, attacked the right and center of the German 225th Division. This division attacked with one brigade north and one south of the Luce. The brigade attacking south of the Luce had attached to it 28 tanks; that is twice as many as were assigned to any other brigade of the first wave. In spite of its large number of tanks the Canadian 3d Division did not arrive on the first objective until 9 :20 AM. This delay was due largely to the fact that the defender had been warned in time by tank noises, and had taken up positions on tank-secure ground. The German artillery on this front put down protective barrages on its own initiative, but the Canadians had passed through before the barrages fell. The Canadian Corps, like the Australian, had destroyed the bulk of the front-line and regimental reserve battalions on its front; it also captured 11 light and 5 medium or heavy batteries, and penetrated the German position to a depth of 4.8 kilometers at the deepest point.

Source: TANKS AND ANTITANK DEFENSE DURING THE WORLD WAR. ["Kampfwagen und Abwehr wahrend des Weltkrieges." Sanct Christophorus, October 1936.] Abstracted by Lieutenant Colonel S.J. Heidner, Infantry. RML. June 1937.

Cheers. Raúl M 8).
Attachments
image017.jpg
A tank breaking through an obstruction on the roadside during the Australian attack at Bayonvillers, France, 8 August 1918.........
http://www.ww1westernfront.gov.au/mont-st-quentin/heath-cemetery/advance-to-morcourt-valley.php#
image017.jpg (56.84 KiB) Viewed 1183 times
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.

User avatar
tigre
Patron
Posts: 6070
Joined: Sun Apr 10, 2005 5:42 pm
Location: Argentina

Re: British World War I Tanks

Post by tigre » Sat Jan 16, 2016 6:31 am

Hello to all :D; a little more........................................

The Battle of Amiens 1918. THE ATTACK SOUTH OF THE SOMME. (See Sketch No. 7).

Advance to the second objective.

Pursuant to orders, the British resumed the attack at 9:20 AM, for the capture of the second objective. They now brought
fresh troops into the battle. Against these the Germanscould only bring their nearest rest battalions. The British attacked as in the first phase, the tank waves moving out ahead, and the infantry following. The fog had now disappeared; and the defender could bring his artillery and machine guns into action. The attacker found himself directly in front of the German batteries which he had not yet captured. These, however, were protected only by a few machine guns.

On the heights southeast of Cérisy, several reserve companies of the German 108th Division, supported by artillery from the north bank of the Somme, held their position until they were outflanked by tanks from the south. In the German 13th Division, a reserve battalion, at about 8:00 AM, had been ordered to occupy a position on the east slope of the ravine southeast of Morcourt. Hostile attack aviation and artillery fire so delayed the march of this battalion that it did not get into position until 9:45 AM. A little later another reserve battalion arrived and extended the position of the first. These two battalions resisted all frontal attacks, but when they were enveloped on both flanks by tanks, the troops fell back in disorder. The retreating infantrymen, were attacked by tanks on the ground and by airplanes from the air, and the two battalions were simply wiped out. The German 41st Division had as reserves: one battalion in the south end of the ravine just mentioned, a half-battalion in the woods just south of the ravine, a battalion (less a company) east of the ravine, and a half-battalion north of Proyart. When the division commander received the report by a carrier pigeon that the main line of resistance had been penetrated in his south regiment, he started the bulk of these reserves towards Bayonvillers. They ran into tanks and fell back in disorder to the east bank of the ravine. A German antiaircraft artillery platoon appeared on the main road at this time and destroyed three tanks. Then British aviators appeared and threw smoke bombs into the ravine. Under cover of the smoke, the tanks enveloped the position which the reserves occupied on the east bank of the ravine, and then all resistance ended. A few energetic leaders, however, did rally enough men to shoot up a British cavalry unit which came up from the south. The German 117th Division had a reserve battalion in Guillaucourt, and two in Harbonnieres. These had been alerted early, and ordered into the draw south of Wiencourt. Their march was delayed by hostile attack aviation and artillery so that they did not get into position until 10:00 AM. They were supported by a battery brought forward from a rest area. The battery was able to put six tanks out of action. With this support, the reserve battalions held until some hostile tanks worked their way through Wiencourt, and enveloped the position from the north, when they feIl back. The German 225th Division attempted a counterattack south of the Luce with its reserves which consisted of only two half-battalions. The division artillery was captured before the counterattack was launched. The action failed, and the elements participating fell back in disorder. By 11:00 AM, the German 225th Division had been almost completely destroyed.

By 12:30 PM, the British were everywhere on their second objective. Most of the tank losses of the day occurred during this phase. This is explained by the fact that during the halt of the British on the first objective, the German batteries which had not been captured moved pieces out in the open where they were able to take the British tanks under direct fire when they resumed their advance.

Source: TANKS AND ANTITANK DEFENSE DURING THE WORLD WAR. ["Kampfwagen und Abwehr wahrend des Weltkrieges." Sanct Christophorus, October 1936.] Abstracted by Lieutenant Colonel S.J. Heidner, Infantry. RML. June 1937.

Cheers. Raúl M 8).
Attachments
image002.jpg
Traffic on the Amiens-Roye Road. German prisoners carry Canadian wounded soldier to the rear..........................
http://www.warmuseum.ca/firstworldwar/objects-and-photos/photographs/battles-and-fighting-photographs/traffic-on-the-amiens-roye-road/?back=158
image002.jpg (33.12 KiB) Viewed 1163 times
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.

User avatar
tigre
Patron
Posts: 6070
Joined: Sun Apr 10, 2005 5:42 pm
Location: Argentina

Re: British World War I Tanks

Post by tigre » Wed Jan 20, 2016 4:11 am

Hello to all :D; a little more........................................

The Battle of Amiens 1918. THE ATTACK SOUTH OF THE SOMME. (See Sketch No. 7).

Advance to the third objective.

The British resumed the attack from the second objective with fresh troops. Even before arriving on the second objective, the Cavalry Corps had passed through the attacking infantry with one division north and one south of the Luce. Sixteen British armored cars now appeared on the scene. They had been towed over the difficult terrain by tanks.

The last reserves of the German XI Corps, two infantry battalions and an improvised artillery battalion, occupied hill 84 north of Proyart. One of the batteries disabled four tanks by direct fire. Then British aviators attacked the battery with machine guns and bombs. The attacking tanks finally succeeded in enveloping the position from the south, and the entire resistance crumbled. Only a few of the Germans got away. The Australians occupied the hill, but did not push their attack farther as they were now on their third objective. The armored cars followed the main road to Foucaucourt, then turned about and milled around in the vicinity of Proyart and Framerville, firing on columns and increasing the panic existing in the services of the rear. The front of the German XI Corps had been definitely penetrated. Aside from some weak elements still resisting at Mericourt, only an open breech faced the Australians. They had only to march forward; an attack was not necessary. But they failed to move; they had gained their day's objective! This halt in the attack permitted the Germans to close the gap with army reserves. By 10:00 PM they occupied a defensive position extending from Méricourt to FramerviIIe with the 107th Division and two-thirds of the 243d Division.

The German LI Corps was more fortunate than the XI. It had as reserves at the beginning of the battle three rest battalions of the 1st Bavarian Division, three of the 192d Division, and the entire 109th Division. The Canadian Corps pushed its attack vigorously with the Cavalry Corps, which had passed through the 1st and 2d Divisions, and the 4th Division, which had passed through the 3d. The six German rest battalions put up stubborn resistance, particularly in the area: Cayeux-Beaucourt. But the results were everywhere the same. The German infantry could resist the hostile infantry and cavalry, but when tanks appeared on the flanks and rear of the German infantrymen, they would give way. The German 109th Division was ordered to the vicinity of Harbonnieres to counterattack and secure the line: Harbonnieres-Cayeaux. The elements of this division had from 2.5 to 17 kilometers to march into position for the counterattack. The leading elements of the division were attacked by British cavalry, tanks, and attack aviation before the division could form for the counterattack, and thus it was compelled to take up a defensive position which extended from Framerville to the southwest. From the German corps to the south, the 1st Reserve Division was sent to the support of the LI Corps. The leading elements of this division arrived in time to participate in the fighting about Beaucourt. But here also tanks turned the scale. The 1st Reserve Division was compelled to fall back to a defensive position. In the meantime the German 119th Division, reserve of the army on the south, also appeared on the scene, and was turned over to the LI Corps. At 6:15 PM, the corps commander ordered this division to counterattack to secure a line generally from Harbonnieres through Caix, but darkness intervened before the action could be launched. However, the division had closed the gap that was forming in the center of the corps.

Source: TANKS AND ANTITANK DEFENSE DURING THE WORLD WAR. ["Kampfwagen und Abwehr wahrend des Weltkrieges." Sanct Christophorus, October 1936.] Abstracted by Lieutenant Colonel S.J. Heidner, Infantry. RML. June 1937.
http://www.ww1westernfront.gov.au/mont- ... valley.php#

Cheers. Raúl M 8).
Attachments
image002.jpg
An armoured car, carrying a French flag, moving toward Péronne east of Lamotte–Warfusée, France, 8 August 1918................................
image002.jpg (46.2 KiB) Viewed 1146 times
image004.jpg
A direct hit at point blank range disabled a British tank, France, 8 August 1918.........................
image004.jpg (40.66 KiB) Viewed 1146 times
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.

User avatar
tigre
Patron
Posts: 6070
Joined: Sun Apr 10, 2005 5:42 pm
Location: Argentina

Re: British World War I Tanks

Post by tigre » Sat Jan 23, 2016 5:11 am

Hello to all :D; a little more, now the French attack........................................

The Battle of Amiens 1918. THE ATTACK OF THE FRENCH XXXI CORPS.

The French XXXI Corps attacked the left regiment of the German 225th Division and the right and center regiments of the 14th Bavarian Division. There were two and two-thirds divisions in the first attack wave on a front of 4 kilometers.

The French 153d Division followed as the second wave. The French started their attack without tanks because their light Renault tanks could not be used until after the German trench system had been conquered. Hence the tanks were all allotted to the 153d Division. Since the infantry had to break through the first resistance without tanks, a 45-minute artillery preparation was planned. The artillery bombardment was to start at the same time as that of the British, but since the British attack followed immediately behind their barrage, the French attack was scheduled to start 45 minutes later than that of the British. The schedule for the French attack was as follows:

5:20 AM-Commencement of the artillery preparation
6:05 AM-Attack jumps off, first objective, the east edge of Granatwald
7:34 to 8:43 AM-Halt on first objective
8:43 AM-.-Attack continued, second objective, west edge of Mezieres
10:05 to 10:45 AM-Halt on the second objective
10:45 AM-Attack continued, third objective, west edge of Resnoy.

Moreuil was not to be attacked from the front until 7:55 AM and, farther to the south, the attack over the Avre was not to begin until 9:20 AM. Thus Moreuil and the Avre position were not to be attacked until the envelopment from the north was beginning to make itself felt.

The French believed that the tank should be used to overcome resistance in villages and woods. They considered it a weapon for attacking objectives which the artillery could not see and therefore could not take under fire.

The French attack moved off as planned at about 6:05 AM. The combat outposts, which had been thoroughly shaken by the heavy barrage, were quickly overrun. As the attacking troops advanced farther, they encountered some heavy German machine guns which had weathered the bombardment, and the attack began to stall. Then a British tank appeared from the Canadian zone to assist the French, but each machine gun had to be fought down singly. The regimental reserves in the Granatwald were blocked by the artillery barrage and could not come to the aid of the front line. So the troops on the main line of resistance and the regimental reserves were attacked and defeated successively. The three rest battalions of the 14th Bavarian Division, which operated farther to the north initially under corps control, reverted to their own division at about 8:50 AM. With these battalions the Bavarian division was able to hold the French generally along the east edge of the Granatwald until the French 153d Division with its tanks appeared. Then the Bavarian battalions fell back, and the battle of that division was quickly over. South of the 14th Bavarian Division, the German 192d Division held its position along the Avre until it was outflanked from the north. Although minus its three rest battalions, which were under corps control at Beaucourt, this division continued a stubborn resistance, especially at Plessier, and at dark it held the general line shown on Sketch No 8.

Source: TANKS AND ANTITANK DEFENSE DURING THE WORLD WAR. ["Kampfwagen und Abwehr wahrend des Weltkrieges." Sanct Christophorus, October 1936.] Abstracted by Lieutenant Colonel S.J. Heidner, Infantry. RML. June 1937.

Cheers. Raúl M 8).
Attachments
image067.jpg
Column of FT-17 tanks on the move. The French call them Mosquitos........................................
http://www.ebay.es/itm/1918-French-Renault-Mosquito-Tanks-Moving-in-Action-6x8-Original-News-Photo-/361268835947
image067.jpg (77.41 KiB) Viewed 1138 times
image069.png
image069.png (85.09 KiB) Viewed 1138 times
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.

User avatar
tigre
Patron
Posts: 6070
Joined: Sun Apr 10, 2005 5:42 pm
Location: Argentina

Re: British World War I Tanks

Post by tigre » Wed Jan 27, 2016 5:46 am

Hello to all :D; last part........................................

The Battle of Amiens 1918.

This day, 8 August, was the "Black Day"; the day that brought the German army its greatest disasters. The British Fourth Army and the French XXXI Corps, with a combined strength of 8 rested and 8 tired infantry divisions and 3 cavalry divisions, accomplished more in less time than had been done before in the War. For the second time, the tank had helped the British not only to gain important terrain by an overwhelming attack, but also to completely wipe out the German garrisons which had been defending it. Seven German divisions were defeated, and two more which had just been taken out of line for reconditioning were forced back into the battle. The Germans lost from 650 to 700 officers, from 26,000 to 27,000 men, and 400 guns. Again for each tank destroyed, four guns were lost.

Although the British cavalry accomplished more in this battle than any other cavalry unit had done during the War, it failed in its mission of pushing forward to the Chaulnes-Roye railroad and thus opening a breach in the German front. The armored cars also failed to accomplish anything decisive or to report any essential information although they drove around for hours beyond the front.

While the British, attacking with 8 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions on a front of 13 kilometers against 4 German divisions, penetrated to a depth of from 7 to 12 kilometers, the French with 5 infantry divisions on a front of 5 kilometers against 2 German divisions, penetrated only to a depth of from 5 to 8.5 kilometers. The British did not push farther because they had reached their third objective; the French were unable to gain. their third objectives. There were several reasons for this. In the first place, the French were too methodical; they arranged for two halts on intermediate objectives. Then too, they employed too many troops for their narrow front, and they made a mistake in attaching all their tanks to the 153d Division. Finally, it must be remembered that the French light Renault tank, with its single weapon, was much inferior to the British tank.

The attack had been planned without making proper provisions against antitank defense measures. Had the Germans taken appropriate counter measures, the results of the battle would have been different. On account of the terrain, the tank attack was canalized initially into definite lanes. Antitank weapons properly placed to protect these lanes would have been very effective. There were no special antitank guns available, but the task could have been performed by the light artillery of the divisions. Finally, the German main line of resistance was too lightly held. It was doctrine that the main line of resistance should be held at all costs, but in all the divisions the infantry fire-power was so dispersed that this could not possibly be carried out.

After the battle of Amiens, the Germans also gave serious consideration to the question of passive antitank defense. Instructions issued on 10 August, called attention to the importance of considering natural tank obstacles such as water, swamps, and steep slopes in the organization of defensive positions. And on 15 August, general headquarters prescribed that not only fire-power, but also mechanical means, especially mine fields and road blocks, must be used to stop tanks. On the same day a tank officer was placed at the disposition of each army group commander to act as technical expert in advising the commander over which terrain hostile tank attacks were most to be expected.

Source: TANKS AND ANTITANK DEFENSE DURING THE WORLD WAR. ["Kampfwagen und Abwehr wahrend des Weltkrieges." Sanct Christophorus, October 1936.] Abstracted by Lieutenant Colonel S.J. Heidner, Infantry. RML. June 1937.

It's all folks. Cheers. Raúl M 8).
Attachments
image060.jpg
British tank amid of the ruins of Bapaume – Battle of Amiens..........................
http://www.army.mod.uk/firstworldwarresources/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2014/06/110748.jpg
image060.jpg (43.7 KiB) Viewed 1125 times
image056.jpg
General Sir Douglas Haig, Commander of the British Expeditionary Force, on horseback, accompanied by a standard bearer, reviewing Canadian troops following the Battle of Amiens.......................
image056.jpg (32.64 KiB) Viewed 1125 times
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.

Post Reply