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Now the Seydlitz;she was herself heavily damaged by hits from ten 15-inch, one 13.5-inch, and ten 12-inch heavy shells, and took on 3,000 tons of water. One 15-inch shell struck Derfflinger's "D" turret and detonated inside, killing most of the turret crew, rendering it useless. One 15-inch shell from Revenge penetrated Derfflinger's "C" barbette, knocking it out of action. She nevertheless was able to limp home, and the resulting repairs took her out of commission for four months. This was the highest amount of hits on a ship not sunk at the Battle of Jutland;
Given the notable vulnerability of battlecruisers as a class - leaving aside the problem that the BRITISH battlecruisers were far worse LOL - the older-but updated Seydlitz took greater damage from the same number of hits and took longer to repair than the Derfflinger, which absorbed greater damage but remained afloat and made it to dock under her own steam...AND took a marginally shorter time to repair. AND she was a harder hitter in the battle itself.Seydlitz was heavily damaged herself, being hit by twenty-one heavy shells and one torpedo and suffering 98 men killed and 55 injured. She shipped over 5,000 tons of water, reducing her freeboard to almost nothing, but made it back to the Jade Estuary, where she was deliberately beached...Thereafter, Seydlitz was extensively lightened by removing as much equipment from her as possible, including her guns, and refloated so that she could limp into port. She was immediately taken in hand for repairs - a process that took five months to complete - and was back in service with the High Seas Fleet in November, 1916. She would serve as Hipper's flagship for most of the rest of the war
andThe pursuit of Goeben and Breslau began on 1 August when the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, ordered the British Mediterranean Fleet, commanded by Admiral Sir Berkley Milne, to shadow the German ships and prevent them from disrupting the transport of French troops from Algeria to France. Souchon managed to slip away from his pursuers while returning to Messina. Unclear orders to Milne that he was to avoid engagement with a superior force (intended to refer to the Austrian fleet) inhibited him from attempting to interfere with Souchon's squadron.
Souchon was intent on taking his ships to Constantinople, a course the British did not anticipate, and when he emerged from the Straits of Messina heading east, only the "Town" class light cruiser HMS Gloucester was in a position to pursue. On 7 August, Gloucester engaged Breslau and Goeben, despite being outgunned, in an attempt to delay their escape. The engagement ended without any hits being scored and Gloucester resumed tailing the German ships until ordered to disengage.
Souchon had a trouble-free passage through the Aegean Sea, replenishing coal on 9 August, and anchored at the Dardanelles on 10 August. After several days of diplomatic negotiations, Goeben and Breslau passed through the mine barriers guarding the Straits and were conducted to Constantinople where on 16 August they became ships of the Turkish navy in a diplomatic manoeuvre that assisted in bringing the Ottoman Empire into the war on the side of the Central Powers.
The term "Court Martial" can often be misleading - as it is in THIS caseNear the western coast of Greece, the pursuit of the Goeben and the Breslau was taken up by four more British ships, led by Milne's second-in-command, Admiral Sir Ernest Charles Thomas Troubridge. Troubridge's ships were smaller and slower than the Goeben, they were also outgunned. Troubridge and his gunnery officer determined they could not intercept the German ships before daylight. They concluded that the enemy battlecruiser's superior speed and range would allow it to maintain enough distance to pick off Toubridge's ships at leisure before they could ever get close enough to engage effectively
He made a sound decision in combat conditions, and when HE asked for a judicial review by the only mechanism available in the Royal Navy - his actions were vindicated. What happened afterwards - given that vindication - to Milne and Troubridge was definitely the sh1tty end of the stick, and was simple payback for the arrival of the Goeben and Breslau bringing Turkey into the war on the enemy side.The escape of the Goeben and the Breslau effectively ended the careers of British admirals Milne and Troubridge. Milne served out the rest of the war without commission on half-pay, while Troubridge was assigned to land-based duties below his rank for the remainder of the war. Only the captain of the Gloucester received commendation, for having at least exchanged gun fire with the fleeing Germans.
Troubridge was granted his request for a review of his actions. The review found no fault, but Troubridge was still never given another command at sea. Troubridge later served with professionalism in the difficult post of naval attache to the Serbs, who faced a considerable "brown-water" threat from Austrian gunboats on the Danube River
I'll deal with this bit first LOL The Bismark Sortie didn't cause disruption...it caused dispersal. By the start of WWII it was quite clear that apart from the Mediterranean, where it was possible the British could end up fighting the Italians - the Home fleet's role was to prevent the breakout of German commerce raiders. What else in real terms did the KM consist of??? A handful of badly-handling destroyers that exited stage left off Narvik, a hanful of WWI and before light cruisers...and the Panzerschiffe. There was aboslutely NO way this mixed bag of ships could field anything more than a battlegroup-sized balanced force at one time, leaving one or more classes fatally vulnerable in the fleet mix...Remember too, please, the disruption that the Bismarck sortie in WWII caused to the Royal Navy and the number of ships deployed to sink her! I assume that the British wouldn't have sent a single ship out alone after a German Battlecruiser, or, if they did, they might well have lost that ship....
The disposition of guns is Seydlitz is, to use the most diplomatic term, not very rational. Actually I would use other terms...Commissar D, the Evil wrote:Most modern shipologists (I just made that term up for this thread!) regard the Derfflinger class as the ultimate WWI class of WWI battlecruisers. Personally, I don't agree, as S.M.S. Seydlitz seems to me to be just as survivable a design. What are your thoughts?
Problem A - calculate how many days such huge beast will burn its finite load of fuel, without any hope to refuel anywhere.Commissar D, the Evil wrote:Supposing that each Battlecruiser, with a fast consort, were sent out to raid the sea lanes
In their shoes, I won't.Commissar D, the Evil wrote:I don't see how the British could have used less than two battlecruisers to attack one Seydlitz or Derfflinger.
The balance between GF & HSF 'with' or 'without' BCs is more or less the same. Your scenario is true only if HSF manages to perfectly coordinate the movements so that the two fleets meet when most German BCs are returning but most British BCs are lost in the ocean. Very unlikely.Commissar D, the Evil wrote:This may have been enough of an edge to enable the Hugh Seas Fleet to make a successful sortie against a weakened Royal Navy
Well Davide, I can't resist this one, would you care to elaborate?P.S. the reason behind me being cold toward Tirpitz's toys, is that I'm deeply convinced the existence of those toys was the one and only reason why Germany didn't win WW1 before Christmas (or, the one and only reason why Germany lost WW1).
The point looks obvious, if one thinks about costs.Commissar D, the Evil wrote:Uh gee Davide, should I take the rest of your post in the same vein?
I hope you didn't suppose Tirpitz's toys were given to him by Santa Claus...
Yes, precisely.The point looks obvious