I'm not sure what your post is aiming for.
If I had to guess, I'd say he's questioning why Great Britain and France
supported Russia when the facts of Sarajevo suggest Paris and London should
have backed Vienna instead.
Under such circumstances, it is my belief that calling it 'ultimatum' is
Agreed to an extent. The "flashpoint" demand was no.6. It was the answer
to this that the Austrian minister went directly to on the 25th of July, and finding rejection, immediately broke relations. If no.6 and perhaps no.7 had been worded
cooperatively, then it cannot be stated with certainty the minister would
have left Belgrade at that point.
Besides assassination of Archduke, Serbian backed terrorists have done
little else to Austria at this point.
Terrorism is not a baseball game. There is no "3 strikes" rule.
Generally, the Austrian note erred in making too many demands up front. The
Austrians could have made only two initially - no. 6 and no. 7, with a
statement included that there would be follow-up issues that would be
addressed when these had been dealt with satisfactorily.
eliminate from public instruction in Serbia, both as regards the teaching
body and the methods of instruction, all that serves or might serve to
foment propaganda against Austria-Hungary;
Basically a request that Vienna will have control over Serbian education
system. And Serbia accepts this? How devious of them.
The Serbian education system promoted propaganda aimed at undermining
Austro-Hungarian sovereignty, and generally created an environment favorable to
separatist and terrorist activity. The Austrian demand did not amount to
"control" of the Serbian education system. Rather, they specified that
Serbia would dismiss officials identified by Austria as radicalizing or
poisoning the atmosphere in Bosnia. The Austrians did not demand the right
of appointment (which would have been required for "control"), nor the right
to dismiss in cases where the official was not linked to agitating
activities. It might be argued that Austria would have exercised this
clause with excessive zeal, but this is speculation.
remove from the military service and the administration in general all
officers guilty of propaganda against Austria-Hungary, names of which
Austria-Hungary reserved the right to provide;
Therefore, Imperial government has the right to dismiss EVERY Serbian
officer it chooses? In a small country such as Serbia, decimating officers
corps would equal termination of it's army as a fighting force. What state
in the world would accept this? Yet Serbia does, with reservations
The "reservations" you speak of negated the original demand, making the
Serbian acceptance meaningless. With respect to the background of the Austrian Point no.4, by the admission of the Serbian government itself its army's officers corps was out of control
. The Chief of Intelligence was plotting against the elected
government and conducting terrorist attacks on the soil of neighboring
states. Note that the Serbian army had knowingly appointed to this
important position a ruthless criminal who had led an attack that brutally
murdered the royal couple, then chopped their bodies to pieces. I'm not
certain how its done in Serbia, but suffice it to say that here in Canada if
that little tidbit is on your resume you're not going to get the job.
The direction of the Austrian demand was both straightforward and on solid
foundation; Serbia was either unable
to police its own army.
Which was the case is irrelevent; Austrian officials were essential in the process of
seeing Serbia maintain its duty to international law and order. As with
demand no.3 above, it may be argued that Austria could have abused a Serbian
concession and gone further than addressing psychopathic criminal elements such as
the Apis crowd. As with no. 3 above, it is rebutted that Serbia could have accepted
these demands unconditionally while Russia, acting as Serbia's guardian,
simultaneously issued a note of its own to Vienna specifying that Austria's
activities in support of no.3 and no.4 must not exceed the stated
accept the collaboration in Serbia of organs of the Austro-Hungarian
government in the suppression of the subversive movement directed against
the territorial integrity of the monarchy;
Austria demands Serbia to allow security forces of a foreign power to
operate on it's territory, against such a vaguely defined threat. Yet Serbia
Serbia did not accept this demand, as the reservation of "good neighborly
can not be defined and therefore constituted an open-ended method
to reject any practical methods of cooperation. That the term was inserted
for the purpose of evasion is confirmed by the fact that in the original
Serbian draft reply, "good neighborly relations" was originally assigned as
the method to dodging point no. 6. After Russian support was sent to Belgrade,
this answer was shifted from no.6 to no.5, with no. 6 being rejected outright
Also note the Austrian demand was clarified within days as meaning the
establishment a bureau analogous in composition and operating method to that
of the identical Russian one in Paris. Since it would be inaccurate
to suggest that France and Russia were trampling on one another's
sovereignty, so too it is questionable to suppose that Austrian demand no.5
would have done so.
begin a judicial inquiry against the accessories to the plot of June 28th
who are on Serbian territory, with organs delegated by the Austro-Hungarian
government participating in the investigation;
Beyond just allowing Austrian police into Serbia (as stated in article 5.),
Vienna now demands that this police be allowed to operate without
restrictions on a territory of a sovereign state? Would Austria EVER accept
Serbian police to operate on it's territory, having the right to arrest it's
The Austrian demand was to participate in the investigation and the
collection of evidence. This cannot be construed as giving the Austrian
police the right to make arrests on Serbian soil - that condition was not specified.
The Austrian rebuttal to the Serbian reply stated both that the Serbian
government, perhaps deliberately, misconstrued a clearly worded demand and
that in 1914 there were "numberless" legal precedents whereby police forces
cooperated in such joint investigations.
Austrian refusal to even debate any of these issues, despite the fact that
Kaiser Wilhelm II saw the reply as:
"A brilliant solution--and in barely 48 hours! This is more than could have
been expected. A great moral victory for Vienna; but with it every pretext
for war falls to the ground, and [the Ambassador] Giesl had better have
stayed quietly at Belgrade. On this document, I should never have given
orders for mobilisation.
You neglected to include the part where the Kaiser also
goes on to state that the
Austrians must take Belgrade to make certain that the Serbs (whose
reputation for honesty proceeded them) cooperated fully in carrying out the
means that it was not interested in Serbian reply to begin with, and coined
the 'demarche' in such a way that it could not be accepted.
There is plenty of evidence that Vienna hoped the note would not be
accepted. There is also evidence that Serbia would not have accepted it, given
that no. 6 had already been presented to Serbia as a friendly suggestion at the end of
June, and was violently
rejected at that time both in Belgrade and St.
Petersburg. Berchtold stated on or about the 19th of July that Serbia could have accepted the demands. That is, that the note as presented was not quite as definitive as you'd have one believe. As the original poster indicated, that Serbia did, in the original draft reply, accept all but one point without condition.
Question - if the note "couldn't" be accepted, then why did the original
Serbian draft answer accept 9 out of 10 demands without condition?
Actual texts so one can judge whether Serbia's response was unreasonable.
The Austrian rebuttal to the Serbian reply is necessary to judge just how accommodating was the Serbian reply. It is not yet posted here.