Hello to all
; the end...........................
German operational mobility in WW II (4º and last part).
Based on their accomplishments, the German ground farces were effective in conducting operational movements in World War II. To summarize, the essence of German Blitztkrieg was the ability to concentrate forces quickly and to strike hard. The responsibility for the concentration and movement of operational forces rested with the German commander. To assist him, heappointed a special traffic control officer, the Stoma, and gave him judicial and executive authority to execute the movement within the given intent. Traffic control was of decisive importance to the movement of operational level forces and march discipline was essential for the speedy and proper concentration of large formations. A traffic echelon to control the march and an engineer echelon to reinforce the route were an established part of these formations.
Careful planning before a movement greatly facilitated traffic control. Time and space requirements were precisely calculated to prevent congestion .and disruption. Prior operational reconnaissance was conducted to obtain needed information and identify critical points that required surveillance and protection. Obstacles were removed and the route reinforced by the engineer echelon and trunk telephone lines were employed by signal personnel to effect communications. Enroute communications were facilitated by messengers and by radio, if listening silence was not imposed. The lack of air superiority made night movements the norm and innovation was encouraged in order to cope with any unforeseen circumstances.
German traffic control was tested during the protracted battles of World War II, especially against the Soviets on the Eastern front. German experience substantiated the fact that the integration of traffic control with engineer, signal, and antiaircraft units was of vital importance to the conduct of operational maneuver. Despite short falls in both men and equipment, the German Army was able to fight outnumbered against the Red Army successfully for years longer than what might have been expected.
40. Department of the Army, DA Pam 20-242, German Armored Traffic Control During
the Russian-campaign (1952), p. 1.
41. Runals, p. 36.
42. TM-E 30-451, p. IV-4 and IV-5.
43. Department of the Army, DA Pam 20-231, Combat in Russian Forests
and Swamps (1951), p. 16.
44. DA Pam 20-242, p. 5.
45. TM-E 30-451, p. VI-26.
46. Miksche, p. 91.
48. DA Pam 20-242, p. 7.
49. TM-E 30-451, pp. 11-100 h IV-5.
50. DA Pam 20-231, p. 16.
51. DA Pam 20-242, pp. 8-9.
52. Center f o r Army Lessons Learned, Combined Arms Training Activity, CALL Bulletin No. 1-87 (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combined Arms Training Activity, April 1987) p. 22.
53. DA Pam 20-231, 14.
54. DA Pam 20-242, pp. 8-9.
55. DA Pam 20-231, p. 14.
56. TM-E 30-451, p. IV-5.
57. Runals, p. 15.
58. TM-E 30-451, p. IV-2.
59. DA Pam 20-231, p. 13.
62. DA Pam 20-231, pp. 13-14.
63. TM-E 30-451, IV-5.
65. Headquarters, Northern Army Group Battlefield Tour-1985-
Offensives-in the Ardennes, December 1944 - January-1945 (Maastricht,
Holland: Headquarters, Northern Army Group, 1985) , p. 6-7.
66. DA Pam 20-242, p. 3.
67. DA Pam 20-231, 15.
Source: THE COMBAT SUPPORT ROLE IN OPERATIONAL MOVEMENTS: ANOTHER STEP IN LEARNING THE ART OF OPERATIONAL MANEUVER. A Monograph by Major Daniel G. Karis Military Police. School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Second Term 88-89.
It's all folks. Cheers. Raúl M
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.