tank maintenance

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julian
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tank maintenance

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extracts from foreign military studies ww2 manuscript P 40

"Section 2 : the campaigns up to 1941
.........
For the russian campaign in 1941 it was believed that the former principles could be adhered to , namely that the maintenance system was to based chiefly on the installations in Germany. Additional improvements had undoubtedly been made on the basis of what had been learned up to that time.Three large spare parts depots were to be moved up to the army groups on the eastern front. Improved special vehicles, machines and equipment had been developed and introduced for the maintenance and recovery of tanks. In general, however, the command assumed -and the political leaders emphasized this assumption- that the climax of military operations would have been reached by the fall of 1941, that it would be possible for most of the forces to return to Germany before winter, and that the remaining tank units would have opportunity during the winter to withdraw from active service for a long time and to be reconditioned in suitable areas. The course of the campaign was to show that this basic assumption was erroneous.
........
Section 3 : the collapse of the former tank maintenance system in the fall of 1941

After the beginning of the russian campaign , the need for maintenance and thus also the need for spare parts soon increased by leaps and bounds. In addition to the normal wear and tear the damage caused by enemy fire and mines increased considerably as a result of the close-combat fighting practiced by the russians.The climatic conditions of the country(heat and dust as well as severe cold) created new technical problems. The lack of suitable quarters for the installation of workshops within the country and later the unexpected damage caused by the winter, as well as the complete commitmant of all the field units in combat, led to an enormous number of mechanical defects which had to be repaired. Despite the efforts of the field maintenance services the number of tanks which were fit for service were reduced to a dangerously low figure. The supply requirements of the army in all fields (ammunition, engine fuel, hospital trains, etc....) far exceeded expectations . On the other hand , in spite of detailed preparations, it was impossible for the railroad service to furnish the rapidly advancingand far-flung armies with the necessary transport space. Since, as had been expected , the field units captured very little rolling stock, the railroad tracks had to be converted from the wide russian gauge to the standard european gauge. The systematic destruction of railroad bridges and maintenance shops for locomotives by the retreating army was considerable. Transport difficulties became so great that the transport problem presented an additional obstacle, together with the enormous demand for maintenance services made by the troops and the limited resources available in Germany . A fundamental change was necessary. The existing maintenance system had outlived its usefulness.
The maintenance which up to then had been performed in Germany now had to be carried out largely by the field units.
For this purpose the following measures were necessary:
1. The maintenance personnel of the field units had to be greatly reinforced and their efficiency improved .
2. The troops had to be furnished with more effcient maintenance equipment , machines and special equipment, some of these things had to be designed for the first time .
3. Additional and modern maintenance services had to be organised for the purpose of taking over part of the repair work which hitherto had been carried out in Germany .
4. The production of spare parts in Germany had to be increased considerably in order to satisfy the increased demands of the field units.
5. The supply organisation in the field of tank maintenance required a basic change . The supply staffs from the division up to the army groups had to be reinforced with specialists.
6. The decentralisation of the maintenance services -that is what this reorganisation amounted to -required as a result a great number of executives with high technical qualifications to direct the maintenance services of the field units , which had now become more efficient , and to deal expertly with mintenance matters in the staffs.
7.The agencies in Germany , which had hitherto organised the maintenance services , had to transfer these functions in part to the field commands of the field forces, which required a corresponding reorganisation of this command. .........

Section 4 the reorganisation of the tank maintenance system

The above mentioned measures were generally introduced during the period from the fall of 1941 to the summer of 1942.
At the same time, new types of tanks had been designed and the existing models had been improved so that they would be equal or superior to the surprisingly good tanks of the russians. The race for improvements in design , in wchich the british and americans took an increasingly large part, was destined to continue up to the end of the war. Because of the limited capacity of Germany's armament industry, it was simply not possible to scrap older tank models during the war and replace them with better types . The result was that the number of tank types increased and this adversely affected the maintenance services(spare parts, repair machinery, tank recovery equipment, the organisation of new kinds of maintenance services) and the latter also became more and more complicated.
While it was comparatively easy to reinforce personnel and make improvements both with respect to training and material in the maintenance services in the field, some of the abovementioned measures , which went beyond these improvements, met with many obstacles.
As soon as it was realised in the fall of 1941, that the maintenance service in Germany was of hrdly any valure for the field units and that the field units would have to do most of their maintenance work themselves, the fairly large quantity of tank spare parts which had been stored in Germany were quickly shipped to the field units. The spare tank parts which were stored at the permanent repair installations in Geramny now had to be quickly loaded on trains and moved up to the troops. Whereas up to then damaged tanks had been sent to their repair shops and spare parts depots, the procedure was now reversed. In view of the large number of different types of tanks this was no minor task. This new procedure presupposed personnel who were fully acquainted with this work, especially at the headquarters of the field units.However such personnel was not available. The result was, that the trains carrying tank spare parts were dispatched at random to the three army groups at the Eastern front. The outcome of this was that the trains were misdirected, consequently causing great confusion. Thus, for example, the southern army group received spare parts for tanks types they did not possess, but which were urgently required by the northern army group.
This situation had to be remedied at once.
The headquarters of the field forces,therefore ( army headquarters , army group headquarters, Army General Staff Supply and Maintenance branch) had to obtain an exact personal knowledge of the tanks and spare parts required by the individual units in all theatres of operation, since direct cooperation between the front and the zone of interior was no longer possible.The correct understanding and evaluation of these requirements presupposed carefully trained personnel in the staffs and the units which handled these matters.
At the beginning of the war all vehicles of the motorised units were supervised by field officers who possessed a certain knowledge of automotive engineering; they were called 'army mechanisation officers'. The development of mechanisation ,however, required a more and more thorough knowledge of the care of motor vehicles from the technical point of view. Especially now, after the first part of the Eastern campaign , when a maintenance service and a system for procuring spare parts had to be organised as rapidly as possible and with all possible means. In many case, the knowledge of the army mechanisation officers was not sufficient for them to give the troops the necessary technical instructions which were exepcted of a trained specialist. At that time a situation had arisen in the services in which the army mechanisation officer , a man who had been given practical training as a motor transport officer, "commanded" the unit, to be sure, but the specialist( unit engineer, maintenance technical sergeant or shop foreman) was the real soul of the work. A new solution was then found by having the hastily trained army mechanisation officers,whenever necessary, replaced professionally trained engineer officers(officers with college training, graduate engineers), who up to then had been employed almost exclusively in the technical repair shop services as 'unit engineers'. This reorganisation was strongly opposed by the army mechanisation officers, but proved to be the correct solution. In 1942, the corps of automotive engineer officers was basically reorganised. The former army mechanisation officers , the former 'wartime administrative counsellors' of the motor transport transport service, and the former engineer officers were brought together in the officer corps of the 'motor transport troops'.They filled all staff and line positions which required a knowledge of automotive engineering i.e. positions at motor pools, in maintenance companies , spare part depots,etc... and in addition held the position of regimental or batallion motor transport officer in the armored forces. In this connection, an effort was made to give a wider sphere of activity to officers with a college education. Former army mechanisation officers without the proper qualifications were transferred to other service arms.
Up to the end of 1941 there were no motor transport or tank specialists at the headquarters of the chief of army supply administration himself , or at the Arùy Group headquarters. There were not even any army mechanisation experts there. The chief of army supply and administration met this emergency in his own staff by reoganising his office force. A special section designed by the letter "I" was formed for motor vehicle and tank maintenance and placed under an engineer officer.Beginning with the spring of 1942 the Army Group headquarters made similar arrangements.In addition, a field agency of the Berlin Ordnance Inspectorate was set up at the Headquarters of the Chief of army supply and administration for the purpose of establishing close liaison between those two offices......
It was now possible for the first time to attack the problem with respect to material. The most important thing in this respect was to prepare a spare parts index which would give an accurate picture of the various types of tanks in a tank unit , its spare part requirements , and the shipments received by it. This was the only way which made it possible for the chief of army supply and administration to order the right parts in Germany and prevent shipments from being misdirected.
The organisation and operation of the soare parts index required a simple, reliable and fast-working message system;.
Within the area of an Army Group, for example, a special radio wave length was reserved by the tactical command for the tank message service, and this measure at the same time provided the commander in chief immediately with an accurate estimate as to the latest status of his tanks, i.e how many were ready for action and how many were undergoing repairs.
Furthermore, it proved necessary to send requests for spare tank parts directly from the requesting unit by the shortest route to the agency appointed to deliver the parts, instead of through major supply channels.However, since the large number number of requests for spare parts could only be partly satisfied, such parts as were available had to be allocated according to the proposed employment of the individual tank units, as well as for training purposes. Beginning with 1943, task was taken over by the Inspector General of Armored forces, acting with the approval of the chief of Army Supply and administration.
This reorganisation, which was carried out by the Army general staff, made it possible to work rapidly and on a large scale, so that the 1942 offensive in the direction of the Caucasus and lower Volga received adequate support as far as tanks and the tank maintenance service was concerned. The intelligent cooperation between the offices of the Army General staff , especially that of the chief of army supply and administration, the repair installations of the field forces and the maintenance services under the chief of army equipment produced good results. In the course of time the new system had to be improved and supplemented. The limited capacaty of the railway transport service in Russia was the cause of many heated arguments over the few available transport trains between the offices concerned.
During the severe railway crisis in the winter of 1941/1942 it was sometimes hardly possible to get the few available tank part transports onto the rails. When the transport situation gradually improved in the spring of 1942, new difficulties arose. The tank maintenance service now became increasingly a question of material, for now, after the transport crisis had come to an end, it became evident that it was impossible to manufacture as many spare parts as were needed.

Section 5 The manufacture of spare tank parts

Up to the end of the war it was impossible to overcome this new and severe crisis, which was deeply rooted and already had existed prior to the war. It is instructive to examine the causes of this crisis.
When a new type of motor vehicle is introduced, , replacement parts must reach the market at the same time. It is obvious that those parts which are subject to greater wear and tear should be manufactured on a larger scale. Every auto mobile company works according to this rule, since otherwise it would soon lose its customers.This simple rule was not observed in the manufacture of tanks in Germany. This failure, however, was not caused merely by the lack of competitive spirit nor an unwillingness to satisfy the customer , but was also due to technical difficulties. The demands made upon a tank are immeasurably greater than those made upon a private automobile and the wear and tear of individual parts cannot be accurately determined in advance.
Prior to the war , and also for some time during the war, the ordnance inspectorate in the general army office of the army high command was the agency in charge of procuring tanks.The ordnance inspectorate procured army equipment of all kinds both that which was the initial issue of the troops and that which was needed for subsequent supplies. On the basis of the plans for the activation of new troop units which were submitted to the ordnance inspectorate , the latter estimated the requirements for all types of equipment , drew up corresponding procurement plans and forwarded them to the ordnance office. The ordnance office then placed the orders with the corresponding industrial firms.After the equipment had been delivered and accepted by the testing agencies it was stored in ordnance depots and ordnance branch depots. From these the equipment was distributed to the troops , for example to newly activated units in case of mobilisation.The prompt procurement of tank spare parts by the Odnance Inspectorate also came within the scope of this general task.
The spare tank parts lists formed the basis for these requisitions ? Whenever a type of tank was designed the appropriate branch of the Orndnance Inspectorate contacted the manufacturer in charge and dispatched technical officers and technical sergeants to the plant , who immediately began drawing up the spare tank parts lists in collaboration with the designers . the spare tank parts lists were subdivided according to the various parts of the tank: motor , gear, tracks,suspensions, hull, turret, electrical parts,etc ....
Since the spare tank parts lists were of great importance for the troops, they had to be made especially clear(numbering,illustrations,etc...)
The lists had to be understandeable to an ordinary maintenance man.
Great difficulties arose even while the lists were being prepared because of the frequent changes of design in a series during construction.
Nevertheless, in most cases it was possible to bring out the spare tank parts lists simultaneously with the completion of the tanks.
One of the most difficult tasks was to estimate the number of spare parts necessary for the original issue and subsequent supply , because when designing and constructing a new tank no records were as yet available abou t the relative wear and tear of its parts.An estimate first had to be made in collaboration with the manufacturer of the probable wear and tear(worn parts, defects in material,..). The procurement plans were prepared by the Ordnance Inspectorate in the lighjt of these considerations and in consideration of the number of tanks in the series.After the procurement plans were completed, they were forwarded to the Ordnance Office with the request to place orders for the parts with the industrial firm.
From the very begining, the number of spare parts delivered was by no means equal to the actual used. "
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Re: tank maintenance

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manuscript P 40 extract 2
"The Ordnance Inspectorate compiled the orders , the ordnance office placed them and the activation plans were in turn prepared by still other offices. All the efforts of the interested agencies to coordinate the production of of spare tank parts with the production of new tanks were of no avail. Promises were made but only partially kept. Even in peacetime the officers of the Ordnance Inspectorate in charge of procurement viewed the problem of tank repairs in the case of war with great concern. They were, however, unable to gain a hearing. Thus, it happened quite often that spare tank parts did not reach the the tank ordnance offices until the type of tank had undergone so many technical changes that the tanks had to be inactivated because of the lack of spare parts, and consequently , the spare parts no longer fitted, could not be used and simply piled up in the tank ordnance offices.
During the war the lack of spare tank parts was not at first as great as had been feared, because the campaigns in Poland,France and Yougoslavia were only of short duration and there were long intervals of time when the armored forces did not see any action.
The production of tanks increased constantly from the end of the French campaign to the beginning of the Russian campaign, but again this was not accompanied by a corresponding increase in producttion of spare parts. Moreover, the subsequent changes in design of current tank models made it quite difficult to plan the suplly of spare tank parts. Even in the new series and new types which were brought out, the production of spare parts was in no proportion to the actual need. However, one improvement had at least been achieved, namely, that at the beginning of the Eastern campaign the tank units were given a fairly adequate supply of spare parts with their initial issue. However, the deficiencies which had not been noticed up to that time became glaringly apparent in the fall of 1941 , as already mentioned before. The protracted fighting led to an extremely high degree of wear and tear on the tanks which was altogether disproportionate to the production of spare parts.The organisational improvements in the tank maintenance service , which were immediately and energetically introduced at that time, have already been described.
Efforts to bring about the urgently needed increase in the producion of spare tank parts did not have the desired effect. What was the reason this? In march 1940 Hitler appointed a "Reichs minister for armaments and munition". The latter was a civilian and directly responsible to Hitler . Military agencies could make their requests and wishes known to him. The Minister, however,only had to answer to Hitler himself. It was his duties to see to it that military requests(made by the Ordnance office) were fulfilled by the armament industry and if necessary to make use of the appropriate plenary powers to insure their fulfillment. Although the influence of the military ordnance office was somewhat curtailed by this measure it was nevertheless welcomed by the army. However, as the war went on and military requirements were increased, the Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition(later called Armament Ministry)assumed tasks itself which properly required the judgment of military agencies, such as determining the amount of prduction orders to be distributed, and finally the responsability for construction orders for weapons, etc.... This was only possible because Hitler desired to weaken the top-level military command positions for political reasons and because of his hatred for the officer caste of the army.The result was that tensions frequently developed betweehn the military agencies and those of Armament Ministry, particularly since things went finally so far that Hitler and his armament Minister took upon themselves to disregard the responsible military agencies and make arbitrary decisions co,ncerning the development and introduction of new weapons, concerning prduction requirements, and similar matters.
From its very inception the armament ministry was confronted with very complex and difficult tasks.Since Germany was in no position with resect to armament in 1939, to wage a major war , there was an enormous demand for physical equipment in all fields. The expansion of industrial capacity in almost all these fields(ammunition, powder, explosives, weapons, motor vehicles, tanks etc....)had not as yet been even nearly concluded. With the extension of the war, the tank production programs were also steadily expanded. Added to this was the development of new types of tanks as a result of the practical experience gained up to that time.
The production of spare tank parts, however, continued to be neglected. Unfortunately, the Armament Ministry faild to listen to the urgent pleas, which were made both by the Ordnance Office and the Army General Staff (Chief of Army supply and administration) and failed to insist that the armament plants should produce the required number of spare parts. Hitler himself urged that more new new tanks should be produced ; the responsible men in the Armament Ministry failed to realise the importance in spare tank parts in maintaining the fighting power of the troops and spent a disproportinate amount of energy in increasing the production of new tanks, as urged by Hitler. Even the severe crisis in the fall of 1941 at first failed to bring about any fundamental changes in favor of the production of spare tank parts. For the time being the organisational measures of the military agencies, as described above were the only thing which provided any relief for the tank maintenance service.
With the beginning of the great offensive in 1942, in which approximately threefourths of all ther available tanks participated, the expected wear and tear on tank material began again.It was not until then that Hitler and the Atmament Ministry could be induced , to sanction the drastic measures which had been so urgently needed for at least a yeaz in order to increase the production of spare tank parts.However, the damage could no longer be prepared. Up to the end of the war the production of spare tank parts did not reach the necesary volume.Enormous losses in tanks,fighting power, labor,confidence and, last but not least, blood, were the results. Many tactical reverses at the front andmany defeats were caused by this now irrepareable mistake.Meanwhile the Armament Ministry had tightened its control of industrial production and had increased efficiency tremendously in many fields and for this purpose had called upon the country's last , unused resources. However, it now became all the more difficult , in the fall of 1942, to free additional resources for the purpose of increasing the production of spare tank parts. In may 1942, these difficulties had already induced the Armament Ministry to try the following solution: the manufacture of new tanks was slowed down somewhat so that more spare tank parts could be produced.However, the gain of spare parts achieved in this way was in gross disproportion to the drop in the production of new tanks; for evey extra motor, gear, etc.. which was produced by this measure one less new tank was being manufactured. On the other hand, the same number was produced of spare parts which was subject to very little wear and tear , for example, the tank hulls.
Here is another example of a mistaken measure:after a long struggle , the Army finally won with its insistence that more tracks should be produced, since there was a particular shortage of these parts. The tracks were finally manufactured , and after a short time there was a two yeras supply of this highly critical item in stock , but the demand for tracks by the field units decreased considerably at the same time, whereupon the Armament Ministry complained about the foolish demands made by the army. The army in turn complained that production and delivery of this item had not begun after the tanks for which these tracks were needed had already become obsolete.However, it claimed that in spite of its requests the manufacture of these no longer usable tracks had not been discontinued in time.
.....
The following steps were introduced:
1. The establishment of its own spare tank plants, as for example, a factory for transmissions in Passau and a factory for tank engines in Nordhausen . It is obvious that it would have been a very long time before these plants could have been completed and the field units could have benefited from their products. Although it was the only correct one, this measure proved unsatisfactory.When these plants began to produce-much tooo late-the production of new tanks had in the meanwhile been endangered.Enemy air attacks had destroyed the subsidiary plants of the tank factories , so that the products of the spare parts plants had to be utilised for the manufacture of new tanks.
2. The Armament Ministry organised socalled 'order sales' , which at times brought appreciable relief. At these sales individual parts were displayed which were definitely in short supply. Firms which immediately offered to produce such parts without prejudice to any of their own commit ments were given a higher priority. This had the advantage for them, that their workmen were protected against forced employment elsewhere and their manufactoring facilities were insured against requisitioning. In order to estimate the importance of this measure one must know that the Armament Ministry wield dictatorial and despotic powers over manpowerand machines in industry.The first 'order sale' was held on 26 october 1942.
3. Similar results were achieved by a number of projects undertaken by the 'Economic group of machine manufacturers( a cooperative association of machine toolfirms) which -in part by direct cooperation between tank and the machine tool factories- were able to fill the constantly changing gaps in the production requirements for individual parts with the aid of the wide variety of machines in their pool.
For example, a factory was equipped with machine tool which had been released by some other plant so that it was able to manufacture tank transmissions for a tank maintenance plant in its vicinity.
The abvementioned measures brought perceptible relief after 1943. By this time,however,the high tide of the German war effort had long been passed.
.........
Despite these measures, more and more serious mistakes were made in actual practice. Thus for example, a new heavy tank, the Tiger, was sent into action at the front in 1942 although only one additional transmission, one engine,etc... for every tenth tank was manufactured for maintenance purposes. The result was, that almost all the tanks at the front were out of action in a very short time.
In spite of this experience, the same mistake was repeated some time later in the manufacture of the new 'Panther type(43 tons). The tank was not even ready for frontline service when an order was given to manufacture the first series and the tank was put into active use.
Numerous technical defects became apparent at the front, so that the first series of 325 tanks had to be withdrawn from the front and rebuilt. Gearshifts and steering mechanisms in particular, as well as side gears, had to be replaced by improved and newly manufactured units.This work was only made possible by the contruction at short notice of a special reconversion plant in may 1943 covering an area of almost 100.000 square meters at Falkensee near Berlin , and when it was completed,, it was noticed that the engine showed serious defects. A fully serviceable engine was not constructed untill the fall of that year. To be sure, this stupid procedure , which destroyed the confidence of the troops in this new and excellent weapon from the very beginning , was also due in considerable part to pressure from Hitler and his closest associates. The Panther too, was sent to the front with a completely inadequate supply of spare parts. Valuable equipment could not be used at the front because of the lack of the simplest spare parts and deteriorated because repairs were not made in time.
The Armament Ministry tried to minimise the consequences of these mistakes by appointing a "Commissionar of the Armament Ministry for the tank maintenance program" . His work may have brought some temporary relief , but also resulted in an additional weakening of the overall afficiency of the armament industry. Government managementb eliminated personal initiative to great extent and began to overreach itself, thus weakening itss own structure. If the simple rule had been observed that the production of each new tank model had to be simultaneously matched by the production of an adequate number of spare parts, all special programs and alike would have been unnecessary.
In march 1943, the position of Inspector general of the Armored forces was created in the Army High Command.. "
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Re: tank maintenance

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Interesting post. Thanks.
Where did you find this?

Cheers
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The manuscripts written by German officers for the US Army Historical Division can be found on www.fold3.com.
There is a fee to be paid to view and download the images after the free trial period. It is worth it.
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Re: tank maintenance

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Thank you.
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