French/British double standard
-
Anti-lemming
- New Member
- Posts: 18
- Joined: Wed Oct 13, 2004 10:56 pm
French/British double standard
France and the U.K. guaranteed the safety of Poland prior to the outbreak of WWII. A secret clause of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was the division of Poland. When Germany invaded Poland, France and the U.K. declared war on Germany. When the U.S.S.R. invaded Poland, neither France nor the U.K. declared war on the U.S.S.R. I am very curious as to what the official mainstream historians' excuse for this is.
-
sid guttridge
- on "time out"
- Posts: 8055
- Joined: Thu Oct 10, 2002 4:54 am
And what about the French?
Sorry Sid, with all due respect, but thats your usual legalistic view popping up here. Something like the wording of a treaty is hardly a resson for strategic decisions on a grand scale, it may be a pretext at best. The world is a bit more complex than that.
My view is this:
France and Britain had counted for the war against Nazi Germany on Soviet assistance.
They it would be easy to achieve this, since the "Soviet Bolshevism" was the declared arch-enemy of the Nazis.
Well, now, on September the 1st 1939 Nazi Germany invaded Poland. On September the 3rd France and Britain declared war on Germany. From this day on French and British diplomats tried to convince the Sovietunion to partake in a war against Germany (considering the comparative number of people killed by both systems in 1939...Stalin perhaps a thousand times more, and that is no exaggeration, that shows how important morals were to them. Meaning: no important at all). I think they did this because they still had no idea that the invasion of Poland was an joined Nazi-Soviet Operation. I do not know when exactly they learned of this, but it became clear to all on September the 17th, when the Red Army invaded Poland.
And now the French/British were pretty buggered, because the Western military felt not fit enough to leave the safety of the Maginot-line to attack Germany. This resulted in the "phony war" or "Sitzkrieg" as the Germans called it: for half a year scarcely anything happened, no one made a move. The next best idea the Western allies came up with, was to try a repetition of the WWI blockade of Germany. It had caused the death of nearly 800.000 civilians back then, so it was possible that something like this could bring Hitler into trouble. But Hitler did counter an embargo of any effectiveness succesfully with the occupation of Denmark and Norway in spring 1940. Shortly after that, the West Campaign brought about the defeat of France.
During the time of the phony war, Hitler was in a precarious situation. The thread of Soviet aggressionhung like a Damokles sword over him. He, too, had miscalculated: he had not expected the French/British declaration of war against Germany, which was now wedged in between two blocs, one at war with it, and one that could begin aggression anytime.
Stalin on the other side was in a great situation. He always wanted to have the regions of the Tzar Empire back, that had been lost since 1917. Until now he had always feared that France, Germany and Britian could team up against him if he tried something here...now they were at war with each other, so he used that opportunity to conquer Estonia, Lattvia, Lithuania and to attack Finland.
To largely ignore this Soviet aggression (there was a bit support towards Finland) was of course "double standard" by France and Britain. But what could they do? To take on the Sovietunion as punishment, they needed Germany on their side (oh, Hitler would have loved that), but they had declared war against Hitler. So they had pretty well outmaneuvered themselves.
Somehow, I suspect that Stalin was laughing alot during this time.
Sorry Sid, with all due respect, but thats your usual legalistic view popping up here. Something like the wording of a treaty is hardly a resson for strategic decisions on a grand scale, it may be a pretext at best. The world is a bit more complex than that.
My view is this:
France and Britain had counted for the war against Nazi Germany on Soviet assistance.
They it would be easy to achieve this, since the "Soviet Bolshevism" was the declared arch-enemy of the Nazis.
Well, now, on September the 1st 1939 Nazi Germany invaded Poland. On September the 3rd France and Britain declared war on Germany. From this day on French and British diplomats tried to convince the Sovietunion to partake in a war against Germany (considering the comparative number of people killed by both systems in 1939...Stalin perhaps a thousand times more, and that is no exaggeration, that shows how important morals were to them. Meaning: no important at all). I think they did this because they still had no idea that the invasion of Poland was an joined Nazi-Soviet Operation. I do not know when exactly they learned of this, but it became clear to all on September the 17th, when the Red Army invaded Poland.
And now the French/British were pretty buggered, because the Western military felt not fit enough to leave the safety of the Maginot-line to attack Germany. This resulted in the "phony war" or "Sitzkrieg" as the Germans called it: for half a year scarcely anything happened, no one made a move. The next best idea the Western allies came up with, was to try a repetition of the WWI blockade of Germany. It had caused the death of nearly 800.000 civilians back then, so it was possible that something like this could bring Hitler into trouble. But Hitler did counter an embargo of any effectiveness succesfully with the occupation of Denmark and Norway in spring 1940. Shortly after that, the West Campaign brought about the defeat of France.
During the time of the phony war, Hitler was in a precarious situation. The thread of Soviet aggressionhung like a Damokles sword over him. He, too, had miscalculated: he had not expected the French/British declaration of war against Germany, which was now wedged in between two blocs, one at war with it, and one that could begin aggression anytime.
Stalin on the other side was in a great situation. He always wanted to have the regions of the Tzar Empire back, that had been lost since 1917. Until now he had always feared that France, Germany and Britian could team up against him if he tried something here...now they were at war with each other, so he used that opportunity to conquer Estonia, Lattvia, Lithuania and to attack Finland.
To largely ignore this Soviet aggression (there was a bit support towards Finland) was of course "double standard" by France and Britain. But what could they do? To take on the Sovietunion as punishment, they needed Germany on their side (oh, Hitler would have loved that), but they had declared war against Hitler. So they had pretty well outmaneuvered themselves.
Somehow, I suspect that Stalin was laughing alot during this time.
Last edited by Kitsune on Mon Dec 27, 2004 11:53 am, edited 4 times in total.
"Tell my mother I died for my country. I did what I thought was best."
John Wilkes Booth
April 12, 1865
John Wilkes Booth
April 12, 1865
-
Rolf Steiner
- Associate
- Posts: 819
- Joined: Tue Apr 13, 2004 3:06 pm
- Location: London
there's a lot on this subject in Norman Davies' book 'Rising 44' - have only got part way through it at the moment, but goes into quite a lot of detail on allied compromise on Poland. Hell, I don't envy anyone in that country at that point in history!
"And I will show you where the Iron Crosses grow!"
I think there are several, but completely different reasons why GB & Fr did declare war on Germany but not on the SU. First of all, the Treaty with Poland was to deterre Germany, not the SU. Besides the "legalistic" point sid mentioned, it is only normal that GB and Fr did not want to create another enemy, with Germany being "enough enemy for one war".
The deterrence intended by the Treaty failed on 01.Sept 1939, not several weeks later when the Soviets joined the invasion. At this point, Poland was already lost. No declaration of war could bring it back.
Also I think that GB&F were really surprised when SU joint on Germany´s side. Remember the Molotov-Ribbentrop treaty (or to be precise, its amendment regarding the partition of Poland) was top secret, Communism and Fascism were considered born enemies, and Germany had opposed the Russian invasion of Finland (as most european states did).
The next point, already mentioned: GB&F looked in the future and realized they would need Russia as an ally against Germany. They expected Germany to turn against the russians sooner or later and they got right.
Last point, this is maybe a little "macchiavelli"-approach: Poland was not worth it in their eyes. Neither GB nor France had a real interest in the existence of Poland. It was considered useful as a second front against Germany to tie down some German troops, but when the polish Army was destroyed in only four weeks, it had failed to serve this way and there was no "hard" reason to declare war on the SU for a Poland already non-existant. I think this opinion is bolstered by the sacrifice of Poland to satisfy Soviet wishes later in the war.
The deterrence intended by the Treaty failed on 01.Sept 1939, not several weeks later when the Soviets joined the invasion. At this point, Poland was already lost. No declaration of war could bring it back.
Also I think that GB&F were really surprised when SU joint on Germany´s side. Remember the Molotov-Ribbentrop treaty (or to be precise, its amendment regarding the partition of Poland) was top secret, Communism and Fascism were considered born enemies, and Germany had opposed the Russian invasion of Finland (as most european states did).
The next point, already mentioned: GB&F looked in the future and realized they would need Russia as an ally against Germany. They expected Germany to turn against the russians sooner or later and they got right.
Last point, this is maybe a little "macchiavelli"-approach: Poland was not worth it in their eyes. Neither GB nor France had a real interest in the existence of Poland. It was considered useful as a second front against Germany to tie down some German troops, but when the polish Army was destroyed in only four weeks, it had failed to serve this way and there was no "hard" reason to declare war on the SU for a Poland already non-existant. I think this opinion is bolstered by the sacrifice of Poland to satisfy Soviet wishes later in the war.
Pedites pugnas decernent
-
sid guttridge
- on "time out"
- Posts: 8055
- Joined: Thu Oct 10, 2002 4:54 am
Hi Guys,
Legalistic or not, Britain (and I presume France) was under no obligation to declare war on the USSR, whereas it was on Germany.
A look at inter-war Poland's history might help explain why a blanket guarantee to Poland against all its neighbours was inadvisable.
1) Poland had a dispute with the Czechs over Tesin/Teschen. It occupied the area shortly after the Munich Crisis.
2) Poland had a dispute with the Slovaks over several border territories, all of which it occupied shortly after Munich.
3) Poland had ambitions on Ruthenia, because it was a source of Ukrainian nationalism that threatened neighbouring Polish Galicia, where the population was also largely Ukrainian. It sent guerrillas into the area after Munich.
4) Poland had a dispute with Lithuania over Vilnius. Vilnius was the medieval Lithuanian capital but was now a largely Polish city. Indeed, extreme Polish nationalists had ambitions on the whole of Lithuania.
5) After WWI Britain had proposed the Curzon Line as Poland's Eastern border as to the East of this Poles were in a minority almost everywhere except the Vilinius region. However, the Poles had won a far more easterly frontier after their defeat of the Red Army in the early 1920s. As a result, more of the population of inter-war Eastern Poland was Ukrainian and Belarusian than Polish.
Between the wars the Polish Army in the area had aspects of an occupation force. Most non-Polish conscripts from the area did their military service in Polish-populated Western Poland, whereas the divisions in Eastern Poland were packed with more reliable ethnic Poles.
According to the 1930/31 Polish census, the area the USSR annexed in 1939 contained more Ukrainians and Belarusians than Poles. (This is not to say that the Ukrainians, in particular, wanted to be in either Poland or the USSR. Most wanted an independent Ukraine. It is their grandchildren who most strongly supported the Orange opposition in the recent Ukrainian election).
In short, Poland came with a lot of baggage.
6) And what of the other neighbour, Romania? Romania was the ONLY country with a defensive alliance with Poland specifically against the USSR. A few days before the Red Army attacked Poland on 17 September 1939, the Polish Government had released Romania from this obligation in return for safe passage for itself and its army across the border if need arose.
If Poland released the only country with a defensive alliance against the USSR from its obligations before 17 September, why would anyone expect countries with no such obligation to go to war with the USSR on Poland's behalf AFTER 17 September?
Cheers,
Sid.
Legalistic or not, Britain (and I presume France) was under no obligation to declare war on the USSR, whereas it was on Germany.
A look at inter-war Poland's history might help explain why a blanket guarantee to Poland against all its neighbours was inadvisable.
1) Poland had a dispute with the Czechs over Tesin/Teschen. It occupied the area shortly after the Munich Crisis.
2) Poland had a dispute with the Slovaks over several border territories, all of which it occupied shortly after Munich.
3) Poland had ambitions on Ruthenia, because it was a source of Ukrainian nationalism that threatened neighbouring Polish Galicia, where the population was also largely Ukrainian. It sent guerrillas into the area after Munich.
4) Poland had a dispute with Lithuania over Vilnius. Vilnius was the medieval Lithuanian capital but was now a largely Polish city. Indeed, extreme Polish nationalists had ambitions on the whole of Lithuania.
5) After WWI Britain had proposed the Curzon Line as Poland's Eastern border as to the East of this Poles were in a minority almost everywhere except the Vilinius region. However, the Poles had won a far more easterly frontier after their defeat of the Red Army in the early 1920s. As a result, more of the population of inter-war Eastern Poland was Ukrainian and Belarusian than Polish.
Between the wars the Polish Army in the area had aspects of an occupation force. Most non-Polish conscripts from the area did their military service in Polish-populated Western Poland, whereas the divisions in Eastern Poland were packed with more reliable ethnic Poles.
According to the 1930/31 Polish census, the area the USSR annexed in 1939 contained more Ukrainians and Belarusians than Poles. (This is not to say that the Ukrainians, in particular, wanted to be in either Poland or the USSR. Most wanted an independent Ukraine. It is their grandchildren who most strongly supported the Orange opposition in the recent Ukrainian election).
In short, Poland came with a lot of baggage.
6) And what of the other neighbour, Romania? Romania was the ONLY country with a defensive alliance with Poland specifically against the USSR. A few days before the Red Army attacked Poland on 17 September 1939, the Polish Government had released Romania from this obligation in return for safe passage for itself and its army across the border if need arose.
If Poland released the only country with a defensive alliance against the USSR from its obligations before 17 September, why would anyone expect countries with no such obligation to go to war with the USSR on Poland's behalf AFTER 17 September?
Cheers,
Sid.
-
amateaurhistorian
- New Member
- Posts: 2
- Joined: Sat Dec 25, 2004 11:30 am
Reply.
Grunt is pretty much correct. The trouble is people keep getting the issues confused. The issue was German expansion - not the independance of Poland. The allies saw Germany as a rival to them, fearing that German control of eastern Europe would make Germany an economic power too difficult to compete with. This explains why the Polish treaty made it clear in a secret clause that it was directed exclusively against Germany. The allies also knew full well Poland couldn't hold out, nor they did intend to help the Poles. The treaty with Poland was mainly designed to deter Hitler as the allies still hoped to avoid war. When Hitler defied the allies by invading Poland they were faced with two difficult choices. Either do nothing and lose all credibility, in effect giving the green light for unlimited eastern expansion for Germany, or fighting a war they were unprepared for. When the allies opted for the second choice they faced more problems. The treaty with Poland promised an offensive within 15 days along with bombing attacks. The French were the ones who made these promises but had never intended to act on them as they feared German reprisals. The promises, along with the treaty itself, was simply designed to bolster Polish impudence. Now faced with war the allies adopted a defensive strategy. The idea was that while Poland held up Germany they would have time to moblize and prepare their defences. After Germany beat Poland she would hurl herself against the maginot and and finally be destroyed. However, as we all know, events didn't work out that way. The German offensive was much quicker then aticipated and Russia's joining in was a complete surprise. The allies however had begun building up their forces and waited for the German attack which they confidently expected to fail. In hindsight then it can be seen that if the allies had been better prepared they might have been able to launch an offensive against Germany while she was fighting Poland. This could have altered the war significantly. Stalin almost certainly would have been detered and Germany would have suffered a serious setback. As it was Germany almost won.
-
sid guttridge
- on "time out"
- Posts: 8055
- Joined: Thu Oct 10, 2002 4:54 am
Hi AmHist.,
I think your reasoning has some sense.
However, I think it overlooks the practical difficulties facing the French.
The original, longstanding French plan had been to fight a cheap defensive war from the Magnot line for a couple of years whilst British forces were built up, their own army switched from a defensive to offensive posture and Germany was weakened by blockade. Their guarantee to Poland in mid 1939 to undertake almost immediate offensive action therefore rendered all French planning and military investment since 1927 obsolete and there was insufficient time to significantly change the chatacter of the French Army by September 1939. It could still launch a very powerful WWI style offensive, but it could not make the sweeping advances that the Germans achieved in 1939-40.
Furthermore, nobody expected Poland to fall so rapidly. Fifteen days after France declared war was 18 September. At that date Warsaw was already surrounded, most of the Polish Army had been annihilated or very severely defeated, the Soviet Union was occupying Eastern Poland and the Polish government fled that night to Romania. (I think that the French guarantee was tied to full French mobilisation, not delaration of war, which would have brought the date back to 15 September, but this would not have significantly improved the Polish military situation, which was already catastrophic.)
There was still a window of opportunity for the French to make important local gains up to the Rhine before the bulk of German forces returned from Poland, but, in the absence of any significant British support, France faced the prospect of carrying alone the war from unprepared positions against a Germany with nearly twice the population and a significantly superior air force. Furthermore, France then had no true armoured divsions of its own, its "motorised" infantry divisions had little organic transport and its Serie B infantry divisions were not fit for offensive operations.
These discussions also beg the question of whether the absence of a guaranteed French offensive within 15 days would have made any difference to Polish attitudes and actions. Is there any evidence that Poland would have conceded to Hitler's demands over Danzig and the "Corridor" in the absence of the promise of a French offensive within 15 days and avoided war? Is there any evidence that Hitler would have accepted such a Polish concession? Is there any evidence that the forward Polish military deployments that proved so fatal would not have been made and a more cohesive defence put up further east?
The Poles made a number of diplomatic and military errors of their own that contributed to their early collapse. One can't help but wonder whether they attach too much significance to the French failure to launch an offensive within the promised 15 days.
Cheers,
Sid.
I think your reasoning has some sense.
However, I think it overlooks the practical difficulties facing the French.
The original, longstanding French plan had been to fight a cheap defensive war from the Magnot line for a couple of years whilst British forces were built up, their own army switched from a defensive to offensive posture and Germany was weakened by blockade. Their guarantee to Poland in mid 1939 to undertake almost immediate offensive action therefore rendered all French planning and military investment since 1927 obsolete and there was insufficient time to significantly change the chatacter of the French Army by September 1939. It could still launch a very powerful WWI style offensive, but it could not make the sweeping advances that the Germans achieved in 1939-40.
Furthermore, nobody expected Poland to fall so rapidly. Fifteen days after France declared war was 18 September. At that date Warsaw was already surrounded, most of the Polish Army had been annihilated or very severely defeated, the Soviet Union was occupying Eastern Poland and the Polish government fled that night to Romania. (I think that the French guarantee was tied to full French mobilisation, not delaration of war, which would have brought the date back to 15 September, but this would not have significantly improved the Polish military situation, which was already catastrophic.)
There was still a window of opportunity for the French to make important local gains up to the Rhine before the bulk of German forces returned from Poland, but, in the absence of any significant British support, France faced the prospect of carrying alone the war from unprepared positions against a Germany with nearly twice the population and a significantly superior air force. Furthermore, France then had no true armoured divsions of its own, its "motorised" infantry divisions had little organic transport and its Serie B infantry divisions were not fit for offensive operations.
These discussions also beg the question of whether the absence of a guaranteed French offensive within 15 days would have made any difference to Polish attitudes and actions. Is there any evidence that Poland would have conceded to Hitler's demands over Danzig and the "Corridor" in the absence of the promise of a French offensive within 15 days and avoided war? Is there any evidence that Hitler would have accepted such a Polish concession? Is there any evidence that the forward Polish military deployments that proved so fatal would not have been made and a more cohesive defence put up further east?
The Poles made a number of diplomatic and military errors of their own that contributed to their early collapse. One can't help but wonder whether they attach too much significance to the French failure to launch an offensive within the promised 15 days.
Cheers,
Sid.
