Posted: Wed May 18, 2005 4:55 am
Hi Vagabond,
Like everyone else, the RAF was operting on theory until it had empirical evidence. The mst easily quantifiable evidence came with the first Italian raid on Barcelona. The Barcelona raid was the key trigger for the mass civil defence programmes begun in its wake across Europe, Britain prominent amongst them.
Handley Page heavy bombers were in development before the creation of an independent RAF in 1918. US strategic bombing in WWII was also not conducted by an independent air force, but by the USArmyAF. There is no necessary correlation between a penchant for strategic bombing and an independent air force.
Are weapons now only to be used if they "seriously affect" the outcome of wars? Surely, legality permitting, weapons only have to "affect" the outcome of the war to justify their use? War is not a handicap race. You throw the lot at the enemy in order to gain the edge. Strategic bombing undoubtedly gave the Allies an edge, even in its less savoury area bombing manifestation.
I don't think anyone would argue that the Allied (then effectively British) strategic bombing campaign in the early war years was ineffective. However, I also don't think anyone would argue that the Anglo-American strategic bomber offensive off 1944-45 was inneffective. The success of the latter was built on lessons learnt in the former. You would appear to be advocated drawing lessons that would have made the 1944-45 successes impossible.
Yup. Aggressive strategies were pursued where possible - over Germany being one area it was possible.
Yup. 10,000+ high velocity anti-aircraft guns were built because they were needed. Had they not been needed then the productive capacity would almost certainly have been used to produce other other high velocity guns needed in other areas. The most obvious demand being for high velocity anti-tank guns on the Eastern Front. 10,000 fewer high velocity anti-aircraft guns in the interior really does mean a similar number of fewer high velocity guns elsewhere.
It is a widely recognised fact that Germany was slow to mobilise for full war production. What is your point? It is also a widely recognised fact that later in the war Germany tried, with success limited buy strategic bombing, to rectify this. Amongst the notable aspects of this was a massive investment in high velocity anti-aircraft guns.
"Rather less significant" is not the same as "insignificant". I take it that you agree that a shortfall of tank production sufficient to re-equip the entire panzerwaffe in 1944 was to some extent "significant"?
German industry clearly wasn't up to the job of producing the necessary weapons in 1944. Panzer divisions had smaller and smaller establishments but were still usually understrength. Production of conventional bombers stopped completely. Captured weaponry was in use all over the place.
Yup. The USAAF's raids were chronologically separated from the early RAF raids. But strategic bombing is strategic bombing. Why is it OK for the US to have a large strategic bomber force in 1944, but not OK for the UK to keep one after 1942? If the USAAF had manned the Lancasters and Halifaxes of 1944, would this have been any better? I think not.
The Schweinfurt raid was not a failure. It was an extremely well chosen target that suffered considerable damage and lost production. Again, you want to abandon a target that the Germans feared would receive more and heavier attention.
Nope. The Blitz did not demonstrate that air assault could not bring about a nation's surrender. It demonstrated only that a particular country could not be brought down by a limited weight of bombs over a limited period.
But surely, the success of largely US raids against oil targets in 1944 compared with the failure of earler, smaller British raids just illustrates that that more strategic bombing was needed, not less>
Must go prematurely, Library closing.
Cheers,
Sid.
Like everyone else, the RAF was operting on theory until it had empirical evidence. The mst easily quantifiable evidence came with the first Italian raid on Barcelona. The Barcelona raid was the key trigger for the mass civil defence programmes begun in its wake across Europe, Britain prominent amongst them.
Handley Page heavy bombers were in development before the creation of an independent RAF in 1918. US strategic bombing in WWII was also not conducted by an independent air force, but by the USArmyAF. There is no necessary correlation between a penchant for strategic bombing and an independent air force.
Are weapons now only to be used if they "seriously affect" the outcome of wars? Surely, legality permitting, weapons only have to "affect" the outcome of the war to justify their use? War is not a handicap race. You throw the lot at the enemy in order to gain the edge. Strategic bombing undoubtedly gave the Allies an edge, even in its less savoury area bombing manifestation.
I don't think anyone would argue that the Allied (then effectively British) strategic bombing campaign in the early war years was ineffective. However, I also don't think anyone would argue that the Anglo-American strategic bomber offensive off 1944-45 was inneffective. The success of the latter was built on lessons learnt in the former. You would appear to be advocated drawing lessons that would have made the 1944-45 successes impossible.
Yup. Aggressive strategies were pursued where possible - over Germany being one area it was possible.
Yup. 10,000+ high velocity anti-aircraft guns were built because they were needed. Had they not been needed then the productive capacity would almost certainly have been used to produce other other high velocity guns needed in other areas. The most obvious demand being for high velocity anti-tank guns on the Eastern Front. 10,000 fewer high velocity anti-aircraft guns in the interior really does mean a similar number of fewer high velocity guns elsewhere.
It is a widely recognised fact that Germany was slow to mobilise for full war production. What is your point? It is also a widely recognised fact that later in the war Germany tried, with success limited buy strategic bombing, to rectify this. Amongst the notable aspects of this was a massive investment in high velocity anti-aircraft guns.
"Rather less significant" is not the same as "insignificant". I take it that you agree that a shortfall of tank production sufficient to re-equip the entire panzerwaffe in 1944 was to some extent "significant"?
German industry clearly wasn't up to the job of producing the necessary weapons in 1944. Panzer divisions had smaller and smaller establishments but were still usually understrength. Production of conventional bombers stopped completely. Captured weaponry was in use all over the place.
Yup. The USAAF's raids were chronologically separated from the early RAF raids. But strategic bombing is strategic bombing. Why is it OK for the US to have a large strategic bomber force in 1944, but not OK for the UK to keep one after 1942? If the USAAF had manned the Lancasters and Halifaxes of 1944, would this have been any better? I think not.
The Schweinfurt raid was not a failure. It was an extremely well chosen target that suffered considerable damage and lost production. Again, you want to abandon a target that the Germans feared would receive more and heavier attention.
Nope. The Blitz did not demonstrate that air assault could not bring about a nation's surrender. It demonstrated only that a particular country could not be brought down by a limited weight of bombs over a limited period.
But surely, the success of largely US raids against oil targets in 1944 compared with the failure of earler, smaller British raids just illustrates that that more strategic bombing was needed, not less>
Must go prematurely, Library closing.
Cheers,
Sid.