Hello Reb!
No worries and I am glad I could help out! To tell you the truth the reason why I researched Operation Goodwood in the first place was because I was confused because it seemed like every book I read gave a different account! It really got me wondering.
You have me thinking about a few things as well. The comments about O'Connor. I haven't answered anything about this because I have mainly concentrated on the events of the battles and engagements in my research and haven't looked into a lot of detail about the Generals involved. I have always mainly been interested in the lower ranks; the soldiers, crews, nco's, company grade and field grade officers. The men who do the fighting.
I will do some reading myself and get back to you on this. If I remember correctly, was O'Conner the British General that was captured in North Africa and then later freed by some means? From what I do remember reading, when I have read on the campaigns in North Africa, O'Connor really seemed to be one of the few British Generals who knew how to use armour properly. I have a few days off to do this!
You have been to Aberdeen proving Ground! That must have been excellent! I really wish to go there some day, they have a lot of good things to see there! Heehee, I have only seen pictures.
Cheers,
Wolfkin
Questions about "Goodwood"
Moderator: John W. Howard
Hello Tom!
That looks like one book I wouldn't mind adding to my library! Looks like a lot of good info and for a fair price too! Well, I will have to convert the price to Canadian dollars but it will still be a fair price especially compared to some of the overpriced books that I have seen that do not have anything decent in them. This one looks good!
Cheers,
Wolfkin
That looks like one book I wouldn't mind adding to my library! Looks like a lot of good info and for a fair price too! Well, I will have to convert the price to Canadian dollars but it will still be a fair price especially compared to some of the overpriced books that I have seen that do not have anything decent in them. This one looks good!
Cheers,
Wolfkin
Amateurs limit their study to either Tactics, Strategy or Logistics. Professionals study ALL THREE of these!!!
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militaryhistorywriter
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New Book On Operation GOODWOOD
Dear Board Members,
There is a new book entitled, Operation GOODWOOD: Attack By Three British Armored Divisions-July, 1944 by Ian Daglish which is scheduled to be published in March, 2004 by Casemate in quality softcover. May God Bless-Major Robert A. Lynn, USMCR
There is a new book entitled, Operation GOODWOOD: Attack By Three British Armored Divisions-July, 1944 by Ian Daglish which is scheduled to be published in March, 2004 by Casemate in quality softcover. May God Bless-Major Robert A. Lynn, USMCR
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militaryhistorywriter
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Reply To Reb
Dear Reb,
That is my real name-Major Robert A. Lynn, USMCR. May God Bless and I'm glad I was able to pass that information along about the book.
That is my real name-Major Robert A. Lynn, USMCR. May God Bless and I'm glad I was able to pass that information along about the book.
marines
I see. Question of formatting. It had appeared the way I was reading it that you were concerned for some reason about a marine by that name.
I'll look forward to the book. Not to beat a dead horse but I'm a curious man: does it go into the details about the Brit commanders, in particular O'Connor?
And God bless you too
reb
ps The marine I spoke ove is in the sand box and originally joined up and went for all that stuff after reading some baloney I published years ago about my own experiences. I confess I fret a bit about that.
I'll look forward to the book. Not to beat a dead horse but I'm a curious man: does it go into the details about the Brit commanders, in particular O'Connor?
And God bless you too
reb
ps The marine I spoke ove is in the sand box and originally joined up and went for all that stuff after reading some baloney I published years ago about my own experiences. I confess I fret a bit about that.
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Tom Houlihan
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militaryhistorywriter
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Comment On The Book Entitled Operation GOODWOOD
Dear Reb,
The book is extensive and detailed and does cover EVERYTHING!
May God Bless-Major Robert A. Lynn, USMCR
The book is extensive and detailed and does cover EVERYTHING!
May God Bless-Major Robert A. Lynn, USMCR
Hello Reb!
I am re-reading a few books and paying more attention to Generals this time around. As I said before, I have always been more interested in the troops, nco's and junior officers. So far, it looks like I am correct, O'Connor was indeed captured in North Africa in April 1941 and not freed until the campaign in Italy in 1943.
I need to do more reading to see about his operations in Normandy, then I can give a better informed opinion. The impression that I get so far was that it seems that some of the other Generals were not co-operative and did not give the support that O'Connor required for a successful operation.
For example, apparently O'Connor knew that his armour would meet considerable opposition in the area of the Bourguebus Ridge and asked for Tactical Air Support. Apparently this support was indeed offered but it would have to wait until the afternoon and it was General Dempsey who figured that by then, his armour would have reached the Ridge and the air support would be unnecessary.
This General Dempsey does not seem to be a good character, in my opinion, and I believe that he deserves far more blame than General O'Connor. Dempsey, apparently, was also of the opinion that after his armour crossed the Caen-Vimont railway they would be able to deploy and take the Bourguebus area by storm. He is quoted as saying that he was prepared to "lose two or three hundred tanks" in the operation.
Reading that shocked me I must say! Prepared to lose two to three hundred tanks! What about the crews! I mean playing with men's lives like that is unacceptable! There could have been a way to organize the proper tactical air support and this was the responsibility of General Dempsey, who after all, was the Army Commander.
So, I agree with you about O'Connor. It seems he had to make do with what was available and was forced to operate under the command of an uncooperative and incompetent Army Commander in General Dempsey. But, I will have to read more but so far, this is the impression that I get.
Cheers,
Wolfkin
I am re-reading a few books and paying more attention to Generals this time around. As I said before, I have always been more interested in the troops, nco's and junior officers. So far, it looks like I am correct, O'Connor was indeed captured in North Africa in April 1941 and not freed until the campaign in Italy in 1943.
I need to do more reading to see about his operations in Normandy, then I can give a better informed opinion. The impression that I get so far was that it seems that some of the other Generals were not co-operative and did not give the support that O'Connor required for a successful operation.
For example, apparently O'Connor knew that his armour would meet considerable opposition in the area of the Bourguebus Ridge and asked for Tactical Air Support. Apparently this support was indeed offered but it would have to wait until the afternoon and it was General Dempsey who figured that by then, his armour would have reached the Ridge and the air support would be unnecessary.
This General Dempsey does not seem to be a good character, in my opinion, and I believe that he deserves far more blame than General O'Connor. Dempsey, apparently, was also of the opinion that after his armour crossed the Caen-Vimont railway they would be able to deploy and take the Bourguebus area by storm. He is quoted as saying that he was prepared to "lose two or three hundred tanks" in the operation.
Reading that shocked me I must say! Prepared to lose two to three hundred tanks! What about the crews! I mean playing with men's lives like that is unacceptable! There could have been a way to organize the proper tactical air support and this was the responsibility of General Dempsey, who after all, was the Army Commander.
So, I agree with you about O'Connor. It seems he had to make do with what was available and was forced to operate under the command of an uncooperative and incompetent Army Commander in General Dempsey. But, I will have to read more but so far, this is the impression that I get.
Cheers,
Wolfkin
Amateurs limit their study to either Tactics, Strategy or Logistics. Professionals study ALL THREE of these!!!
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Sebastian Pye
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Wolfkin
I think you are on to something. Monty was under heavy pressure to keep infantry casualties down and would be breaking up divisions to supply replacements in a very short time. He had a good many tank crews and tanks in the pipleline. Kind of rough on them but war is about making tough choices.
Trouble is, Monty had no real idea how to use armour effectively - if he had Rommel would have wiped out after Alamein. I think Goodwood might have been based on the "crumbling" tactic he used at Alamein.
Students of the American War Between the States will be familiar with that tactic - General Grant was big on it. Most folks call it attrition. It helps to have huge resources if you wish to play that game and Monty no longer did. He'd also had it made plain to him by Ike and Churchill that while the US and Brit troops were still relatively equal on the ground that Ike expected Monty to eat the losses. After all, Bradly certainly did - US losses were appalling in that time period - the Grant school of tactics in action.
Monty had no choice - the only rich resource he had was tanks so he repeated his big attack from the latter part of Alamein - I forget which brigade but it was the one attached to 2 NZ Div - at that time he said 100% losses were acceptable. (as a former armour man that chills my bones). So at Goodwood he was only askin' for 50% - a kindler, gentler Monty.
For O'Connor this must have been a nightmare. Dempsey was a light weight and Crerar, well... And Monty's ego must of been influencing him as well - after all, O'Connor had won major victories in the desert without playing the numbers game - there would have probably been no Monty without O'Connor getting captured and Monty was not the type of man to forget that.
Dempsey was I think, mostly a figure head for Monty and would never have asked a question like Model did of Hitler while commanding Ninth Army - 'Am I commanding this army or are you?' Monty meddled a great deal in his subordinate's business but I guess he felt he had to.
Alan Brooke wrote that the first world war had so diminished the talent pool that even if he removed corps and army commanders he had no one to replace them with.
For the record - I believe all in all that Monty did the best job that could be done - I'd rather have had him in command of the US troops than Bradly. They were cut from the same mold but I think Monty was better at it. Monty was no tap dancer but he was playing to win. Either way, the troops lose, but the war is won.
Max Hastings gives us a chilling look at the Allied perspective in Overload. They were in grave danger of being intimidated by the Germans who seemed to move so much faster, fight more aggressively and have better equipment. The allied soldiers were being slaughtered wholesale - attacking dug in forces with good weapons was bleeding them dry. Plus, the allied troops couldn't see the German perspective - they too were losing people at a rate which Rommel and Kluge were using to project the collapse of the front within a month or two.
I think we modern types forget sometimes that the senior Brit and German officers had experienced the slaughter of WWI and were very much afraid it was happening again and desperately, perhaps frantically, looking for alternatives.
Someday I also mean to take a hard look at the air perspective of this Normandy thing. That's a can of worms if there ever was one.
I look forward to hearing what you find out. I'd often wondered if O'Connor could have been the British Guderian / Patton.
cheers
reb
I think you are on to something. Monty was under heavy pressure to keep infantry casualties down and would be breaking up divisions to supply replacements in a very short time. He had a good many tank crews and tanks in the pipleline. Kind of rough on them but war is about making tough choices.
Trouble is, Monty had no real idea how to use armour effectively - if he had Rommel would have wiped out after Alamein. I think Goodwood might have been based on the "crumbling" tactic he used at Alamein.
Students of the American War Between the States will be familiar with that tactic - General Grant was big on it. Most folks call it attrition. It helps to have huge resources if you wish to play that game and Monty no longer did. He'd also had it made plain to him by Ike and Churchill that while the US and Brit troops were still relatively equal on the ground that Ike expected Monty to eat the losses. After all, Bradly certainly did - US losses were appalling in that time period - the Grant school of tactics in action.
Monty had no choice - the only rich resource he had was tanks so he repeated his big attack from the latter part of Alamein - I forget which brigade but it was the one attached to 2 NZ Div - at that time he said 100% losses were acceptable. (as a former armour man that chills my bones). So at Goodwood he was only askin' for 50% - a kindler, gentler Monty.
For O'Connor this must have been a nightmare. Dempsey was a light weight and Crerar, well... And Monty's ego must of been influencing him as well - after all, O'Connor had won major victories in the desert without playing the numbers game - there would have probably been no Monty without O'Connor getting captured and Monty was not the type of man to forget that.
Dempsey was I think, mostly a figure head for Monty and would never have asked a question like Model did of Hitler while commanding Ninth Army - 'Am I commanding this army or are you?' Monty meddled a great deal in his subordinate's business but I guess he felt he had to.
Alan Brooke wrote that the first world war had so diminished the talent pool that even if he removed corps and army commanders he had no one to replace them with.
For the record - I believe all in all that Monty did the best job that could be done - I'd rather have had him in command of the US troops than Bradly. They were cut from the same mold but I think Monty was better at it. Monty was no tap dancer but he was playing to win. Either way, the troops lose, but the war is won.
Max Hastings gives us a chilling look at the Allied perspective in Overload. They were in grave danger of being intimidated by the Germans who seemed to move so much faster, fight more aggressively and have better equipment. The allied soldiers were being slaughtered wholesale - attacking dug in forces with good weapons was bleeding them dry. Plus, the allied troops couldn't see the German perspective - they too were losing people at a rate which Rommel and Kluge were using to project the collapse of the front within a month or two.
I think we modern types forget sometimes that the senior Brit and German officers had experienced the slaughter of WWI and were very much afraid it was happening again and desperately, perhaps frantically, looking for alternatives.
Someday I also mean to take a hard look at the air perspective of this Normandy thing. That's a can of worms if there ever was one.
I look forward to hearing what you find out. I'd often wondered if O'Connor could have been the British Guderian / Patton.
cheers
reb
A bit of further investigation on the fireplan, although I'm still not sure where the guns were and this may be crucial. The inital fireplan was some 4000 yds deep but the ridge position was 3000 yds beyond this. This meant it was untouched. What should have happened, even if no on-call targets had be planned on the ridge, is that either the BCs and FOs with the armd regs should have developed a quick fireplan(s) or the regt comd at bde the same thing to neutralise using HE and smoke. On top of this, experience from Italy could have led to AOPs controlling medium and heavy guns to pick off the German tanks individually. Fireplans could have been very simple, a few stonks (each 525 yds long) along the ridge would have done the trick. If necessary these could have lasted a couple of hours or so of neutralisation with the odd direct hit, after which the tank crews would have been psychologically stuffed (if they hadn't withdrawn) and easily dealt with. The question then is why not?
One answer may be to do with the 25-pdr and restrictions on using charge super, basically after about 40 rds it overheated. It's possible that the 4000 yd inital depth reflected max range ch 3, which would put the ridge out of range to ch super. Of course that still left medium and heavy guns. Another is the question of casualties to OP tanks. That leaves AOPs, assuming medium and heavy guns were in range, the obvious answers are eitehr or a combination of pilots unable to acquire targets due to poor visibility or unable to get close enough due to AA fire.
One answer may be to do with the 25-pdr and restrictions on using charge super, basically after about 40 rds it overheated. It's possible that the 4000 yd inital depth reflected max range ch 3, which would put the ridge out of range to ch super. Of course that still left medium and heavy guns. Another is the question of casualties to OP tanks. That leaves AOPs, assuming medium and heavy guns were in range, the obvious answers are eitehr or a combination of pilots unable to acquire targets due to poor visibility or unable to get close enough due to AA fire.
Again part of the problem. Except for the SP batteries attached to the armoured brigades, the artillery of the three armoured divisions had to cross the Orne to get into position, so faced the same traffic control problems as did the manuever elements of the divisions. So IIRC (have to look at the GOODWOOD ORO report again) the support from 25-pdrs was pretty much initially limited to those of 51 Highland Division, but I think even one of those regiments was supporting 3 ID, rather than the armor. The mediums were in range to support the initial armor attack, but were out of range to fire effectively on the ridge.nigelfe wrote:A bit of further investigation on the fireplan, although I'm still not sure where the guns were and this may be crucial.
On top of that, the availability of firing positions east of the Orne was pretty limited, and highly constricted, which made the German counterbattery fire especially the "mortars" - really Nebelwerfer - so effective that it was a constant complaint of the artillery. Now add in the requirement to get the vast quantaties of ammo forward - again over the same four bridges - and you may begin to see the basic problem.
Thus the air bombardment, used in part to simply reduce the need to manuever the artillery forward.