Proof that Churchill goaded Hitler into Terror Bombing

[Enrico Cernuschi]

Hello Sid,

your argoument is correct on the logical ground, but not on the field.
Durign the war there were always double standards (No Allied represail, at least, against USSR when she invaded Poland in Sept. 1939 for example).
The general mood of the time was that the air war was not a global one, but a series of different campaigns; this explain (not justifies) the different appreciations for the Polish Campaign, the Low Countries one and the Battle of Britain. This is the rule today too. We accept the principle that to bomb Iraq, Afganistan, Gaza ect. is an usual and legal business; we refuse to conceive the idea that someone could consider retritubion inititives the terrorist attacks.

The real intellectual problem was (and is) the so called "Anglosaxon way to warfare" Sir Basil (Liddel Hart) explained so well in 1937 advocating the retourn, after the crazy World War, of the classic British strategy: no army, but only allies on the continent, naval blockade, famine, starvation ect. with the pleasant novelty of the air raids "Boom" Trenchard had always praised.
As everyone knew about this sort of politics the common knowledge was:
a) the British are very sensible at air attacks
b) they will concentrate their efforts on the Bomber Command

The common opinion on the Continent is so the British leadership was only happy to have the chance to unlash the Bombers after that mere mistake by a pair of LW planes dropping some bombs by error on the huge London Area; it was the only way Britian could hope to fight and win the war (it was all a mistake, of course, as ther's no alternative to land warfare, but HMG accepted this rule grudgingly since Oct. 1943 when the new political situation - the British merchant fleet could not supply the Home islands and comrade Statlin could now sign a peace with Hitler in a single gulp coming back at the old 1941 borders and something more- persuaded them it was no more possible to deny the USA the leadership of the conflict and Overlord become, at least, a serious theme and no more a sort of military monopoly or cluedo for generals and admirals out of business).

Bye

EC

[phylo_roadking]

The remarkable thing is not that the Western Allies were so quick off the mark to bomb German cities, but that they were so slow given that their ally Poland had already been so atacked by the Luftwaffe.

It didn't require any fooling of the Luftwaffe into bombing London in late 1940 to justify similarly bombing German cities. The justification had existed for a whole year - ever since Polish urban areas were "terror bombed" by the Luftwaffe.

Poles are people too

Sid and Enrico - you've forgotten something VERY basic about how the British made war from September 1939 to May 1940 and after....and its got nothing to do with who terror bombed first, or didn't - or the value of Poles or not....

Spetember 1939 to Spring 1940? Slight problem called Chamberlain (d1ck)

[sid guttridge]

Hi Enrico,

There are double standards in war, but the Western Allies not taking retribution against the USSR for its invasion of Eastern Poland in September 1939 is not one of them.

The Anglo-French guarantees to Poland were exclusively against Germany. Poland was not guaranteed against any other of its neighbours.

It should be remembered that Britain was not trigger happy about bombing German cities. It did not do so after September 1939, when the German raids on Polish cities had already initiated such bombing and at a time when the RAF had bases in France from which it could strike Germany easily, whereas the Luftwaffe could then barely reach the UK.

At the time London was first bombed a year late, the advantage in bombing had switched heavily in German favour, because it had bombers based in France as little as 30 miles from the English Coast which could cover the whole UK, whereas British bombers had to fly hundreds of miles to reach western Germany and could not operate over eastern Germany.

I agree with your point that air raids were later seen as the only way the UK could strike back at Germany itself in the middle years of the war, but in 1940 any mutual bombing of cities was likely to be greatly to Britain's disadvantage. You only have to check British and German civilian casualties over the winter of 1940-41 to see that.

As I said before, this discussion is essentially spurious. Britain hadn't needed an excuse to bomb German cities ever since the Luftwaffe had bombed Polish cities in 1939. What is more, in 1940 a policy of tit-for-tat city bombing was very much to the UK's disadvantage.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Enrico Cernuschi]

Hello Sid,

I agree about the fact this debate is quite an unuseful one.
The same Allied choice to close the eyes in front of Comrade Stalin invasion of Poland was yet discussed at will in this forum; the legal term of the British guarantee to Poland are, at best, subtle, but "any leader who consider himself tied by a treaty is an idiot" as stated Hitler in his Mein Kampf and I believe he was right (he had the bad taste to los ethe war, but this is quite an other matter).

I'm unable, anyway, to follow your bombing 1940 argoument.
The real difference was in leadership. The Chamberlain Cabinet in 1939-1940 was puzzled ay the bombing policy and so not claimed his right to bomb at will in Warsaw revenge, but Chuerchill was much more than trigger happy and the Bomber Command begun its sorties on 10 May 1940
dropping its bombs on the Dutch harbour of Waalhaven, near Rotterdam at first by Blenheim and, the following night 10/11 May, with the Wellingtons. That same night the German towns of Geldern, Goch, Aldekerk, Rels and Wesel were attacked by the Whitleys of the 77 and 102nd Squadrons.
On 11/12 night it was the time of Munchen-Gladbach by Whitleys (51, 58, 77 and 102 Sq.) and Hampdens (44, 49, 50, 61, 144).
The Italian towns were bombed by the RAF since 11 June night against the French protests as the Regia Aeronautica had not dropped a single bomb against France and they were trying to avoid such a menace (a further confirmation that the mentality of the time was one of single campaings while the final logic of your statement would be the B 29 pilot dropped an A Bomb on Nagasaky saying something like "And this is for Warsaw, you bastard").

The fact the RAF night raids were much less effective than the LW day and night ones in 1940 is not a proof of a supposed British goodwill, but only their doctrine and tactic was a debatable one. Unfortunatly it improved in 1942.

Bye

EC

[sid guttridge]

Hi Enrico,

No country needed an excuse to bomb the cities of another as it was then not illegal to do so. Britain could have bombed German cities even if Germany wasn't already bombing Warsaw or wherever. (Remember, no German was ever prosecuted for this either.)

The premise of this thread is that it was somehow necessary in September 1940 to contrive a way to get the Germans to bomb London in order to be able to bomb German cities in retaliation. This is an entirely spurious proposition. Firstly it wasn't then illegal to do so and, secondly, if an excuse for such an activity was needed, the Germans had already given it a year earlier.

The cities you mention the RAF bombing on 10/11 and 11/12 May were all border towns on the railway lines the Germans were using to invade the neutral Netherlands. These raids were directly related to ground operations and not random bombings of civilian areas.

I make no claims about British goodwill. My only claim is that the British weren't trigger happy in bombing German cities. They didn't legally need an excuse, the Germans had already given them an excuse anyway, and by the time the RAF began bombing German cities Britain was more vulnerable to German bombing than Germany was to British bombing. The Blitz is evidence of that.

It really is true that Nazi Germany sowed the wind and reaped the whirlwind.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Hop]

That same night the German towns of Geldern, Goch, Aldekerk, Rels and Wesel were attacked by the Whitleys of the 77 and 102nd Squadrons.

It's worth noting that these 5 towns were attacked by a grand total of 9 bombers. The targets, of course, were their road and rail bridges, in order to cut off the German reinforcements to the battle raging a few miles across the border (Geldern is about 5 miles from the Dutch border, Goch 2 miles, etc)

Strangely, the German raids of 10th May are not mentioned, such as the bombing of Antwerp. Or what about the German bombing of Freiburg, which they mistook for Dijon? The fact that dozens of German civilians were killed that day just by the spillover from their own bombing illustrates just how extensive that bombing was.

[Enrico Cernuschi]

Hello Sid,

if I remeber well some LW general was hanged by the Yugolsavs for the Belgrade bombing while other LW officiers like Milch were sentenced to prison for their activity by the Nurnberg judges. Nothing strange. I would put a black ball in the box if I had had the opportunity to trial Bomber Harris.

EC

[Enrico Cernuschi]

The British bombing policy changed from Chamberlain to Churchill and the distances were not a problem as the RAF strategy was to have the Bomber Command planes at home and only the tactical air force on the Continent. The long range British bombers had been conceived since 1935 (and before) to fly directly from UK to their targets. It was the LW that had a short leg (and on 10 May 1940 she was far from Britain at the beginning of a campaign no one could yet state would gain the Channel some weeks later).

Bye

EC

[redcoat]

Hello Sid,

if I remeber well some LW general was hanged by the Yugolsavs for the Belgrade bombing

That was due to the fact that the city of Belgrade had been declared an 'Open City'( undefended) by the Yugoslav government, yet the Luftwaffe commander still ordered the bombing.
No Axis cities which had been declared 'open cities' were ever bombed by the Allies

while other LW officiers like Milch were sentenced to prison for their activity by the Nurnberg judges.

Nothing to do with bombing. It was to do misuse of slave labour and other Nazi policies.

Nothing strange. I would put a black ball in the box if I had had the opportunity to trial Bomber Harris.

EC

The Axis never needed a reason to murder anybody, but fortunately for the world, your side lost.

[redcoat]

. The long range British bombers had been conceived since 1935 (and before) to fly directly from UK to their targets. EC

It would be rather dumb not to design planes with enough range to reach their targets

[Guido A.]

Hello Sid,
if I remeber well some LW general was hanged by the Yugolsavs for the Belgrade bombing

That was due to the fact that the city of Belgrade had been declared an 'Open City'( undefended) by the Yugoslav government, yet the Luftwaffe commander still ordered the bombing.
No Axis cities which had been declared 'open cities' were ever bombed by the Allies

The so-called "open city" of Belgrade was far from being undefended, not to talk about the presence of the higher commands of the Yugoslav armed forces within the city (by the way, the bombardment of Belgrade was the first thing made by the Austrians in WW1: quite an unfortunate city...). You might remember that we had already debated about this here: http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=73365 (my nickname was DrG). Moreover, as I had alredy written, Rome was bombed several times, by Allied bombers, after its declaration of "open city".

I think it's always quite interesting to read Churchill's not so happy reaction to Gen. Badoglio's declaration about Rome's status of "open city": http://www.fpp.co.uk/reviews/Churchill/WSC150843.html .

Guido

[sid guttridge]

Hi Guido,

Belgrade was undefended.

The Yugoslav Army withdrew from it without fighting and the Yugoslav High Command was in the interior, not the capital. German casualties in occupying Belgrade and the land to its north-east were virtually non-existent!

Declaring a city "open" and treating it as such are two different things. I don't know about the specific case of Rome, but it is certain that the Germans did not treat Rome as an Open City after Badoglio's declaration. They had troops in it. (Similarly, they later declared Florence an "Open City" but still moved troops through it. Given that Dresden is often quoted as the "Florence of the North", this has unfortunate conotations for analogists!)

Cheers,

Sid.

[Guido A.]

Hi Guido,
Belgrade was undefended.
The Yugoslav Army withdrew from it without fighting and the Yugoslav High Command was in the interior, not the capital. German casualties in occupying Belgrade and the land to its north-east were virtually non-existent!

Accordind to this study of the US Army (see chapter 9, paragraph I: http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/b ... _260_2.htm) the Yugoslav high command was still in Belgrade during the attack of 6 April 1941, a fact that, per se, makes Belgrade a legitimate military target. Precisely to avoid this problem, the Italian high commands were (at least officially) moved outside Rome in the summer of 1943.
Anyway, as was abundantly underlined by the Allies themselves after Badoglio's declaration of 14 August 1943, the status of "open city" has to be recognized by both the parts: in this case they argued that it is not an unilateral declaration that can force the counterpart to accept it. And, in fact, the Allies never recognized Rome as an "open city", despite the fact that it was quite more entitled to that status than Belgrade.
Thus, given that also the Germans hadn't recognized Belgrade an "open city" I don't see any legal reason (and certainly it isn't a Yugoslav mock trial that should make me change my opinion) to hang Gen. Loehr, while I think that his action (caused by superior orders, anyway) was certainly morally reprehesible.

Guido

[Enrico Cernuschi]

Hello Redcoat,

Guido settled yet the matter of the open cities so it's quite uniseful to debate that argoument except to note that your declaration about Allies never bombing any open city is, at best, an audacious (or, better, unqualified one).

The concept of the RAF long range bombers is still not too much clear in your vision. They were, since the specifics, flying bus whose task was not to deliver bombs on the battlefield, but only to bomb at night big undefended targets (towns). They needed range not to catch their targets (all far from the line) but to avoid any chance to be employed where they could face a real menace. It was a legitmitate policy, of course, based on the serious losses suffered by the British air force in 1918 trying to strafe the German troops who were advancing during the Kaiserslacht after the disaster of gen. Gough Army, but it was a confirmation too the not morale nature of the British strategy during WW II (it's not an opinion of mine, let me suggest you to read Sir John Keegan The face of Battle about the theory which states that to avoid the price of blood may give only phoney victories which do not change the balance of history).

Let me add, at least, a suggestion: some self-control, please.
Your sentence about your side lost is a ridiculous and childish one. To debate about the past is like to claim that Cromwell was a villain or the (inverse) the true heroes were the Royalist or, some times before, Bloody Mary.

Anyway if this may comfort you I can declare that I don't see any valid ground to disown my national side.
We were right, not only in the 1940-1943 season, but during the second leg of the war too (1943-1945) against the same enemy and for the same motives.

To mistake victory with justification is an error a protestant Manichaen Anglosaxon mentality can commit, but not one which lies on more than two thousand years of culture.

Without malice

EC

[Liam]

Navigation is not simple. According to the documentary I was there — the Blitz, London was so black due to light curfews that 20% of the population eventually incurred some kind of accident related injury. Flying over blacked out London would not be the cake walk you imply.

Correct, night navigation was extremely difficult in the vast majority of cases. However, London (like the coastal Baltic cities so popular with Bomber Command in 1942) is very easy to find - particulary on the night in question, which had clear weather conditions reported. Why is it easy to find? Because, there's a great big estuary river going right up the middle of the city. Even the most imcompetent Luftwaffe crew could find and bomb London, which is why it remained an easy target to hit when navigation aids such as Knickebein and X and Y Gerat were jammed.