Royal marines support group on D-DAY and afterwards

[Eduard]

The Royal marines support group consisted of about 80 centaur tanks armed with the 95mm gun and a few shermans as command vehicles.

They were considered as artillery support and were used as such during the aproach to the beaches. They were earmarked to land at the same time as the DD, AVRES and CRABS and provide direct fire support on the beaches.

The configuration of their LST's in order to be able to fire durig the approach made the ships top heavy and a bit unseaworthy and had lots of difficulties to land. In fact I've read somewhere that only about 20 did land in time and about 25 did land afterwards. The rest were either unable to land because the LST's were damaged or simply sunk.

This group is difficult to trace during the landings and afterwards...

They were around about a week and the came back to Britain.

Does anybody know anything about their involvement on D-day and the next days?

Thanks

Eduard

[Rich]

Does anybody know anything about their involvement on D-day and the next days?

Thanks

Eduard

Each troop consisted of four Centaur tanks and one Sherman OP tank

SWORD Beach:
5th Royal Marine Independent Armoured Support Battery
R, S, T, and V Troops
Of 16 Centaur and four Sherman OP tanks, eight Centaur and two Sherman tanks on four LCT landed on QUEEN RED at H-Hour, but 4 (Centaur or Sherman?) were drowned. Four Centaur on two LCT landed on QUEEN WHITE at H+30. One LCT with two Centaur and one Sherman landed D+1 and one LCT with two Centaur and one Sherman returned to England.

JUNO Beach:
2nd Royal Marine Armoured Support Regiment
26 Centaur and 7 Sherman tanks on 13 LCT were landed on D-Day, one troop (2 LCT with 4 Centaur and 1 Sherman) at H+10 and the others at H+120. One troop (2 LCT with 4 Centaur and 1 Sherman) landed D+1 and 2 Centaur (1 LCT) returned to the UK.
Of eight LCT, one broke down and was abandoned.
Of eight LCT, one broke down and sank with the loss of all vehicles.
4th Battery (N, O, P, and Q Troops)
3rd Battery (J, K, L, and M Troops)

GOLD Beach:
1st Royal Marine Armoured Support Regiment
1st Battery (A, B, C, and D Troop)
2nd Battery (E, F, G, and H Troop)
Of 16 LCT (A), at H+6 three landed with 6 Centaur and 1 Sherman, 2 LCT on JIG and 1 on KING. Two Centaurs broke down and the Sherman was hit and burned. Four more LCT (A) arrived between D and D+2, four returned to England and the fate of five was unknown.

Hope that helps.

[nigelfe]

The units remained in action in Normandy until about mid-August. When they were withdawn. The Canadians grabbed a few of the Centaurs, about a battery's worth and used them for another week or two.

[Eduard]

But for the action of 2 centaurs in Juno that fought in Langres: one being minned and the other expend all its ammunition triyng to make a hole in a wall in order the troops coud enter a set of fortified buildings.

I have not found any other mention of their activities after landing or the next days.

You know wich purpose were the shermans for?

Eduard

[Rich]

You know wich purpose were the shermans for?

Eduard

They were observation post vehicles. It is important to remember that the concept was to use the RM Centaur units as artillery not as tanks. The Sherman OP was designed to identify targets and correct fire missions onto them. In fact, as originally conceived the Centaurs were simply going to be engineless hulls in LCT (A) that would fire as they approached the beach and which would then fire from the beached landing craft. Then some smart boy asked if it wasn't something of a waste to leave a few dozen LCT on the beach when they were in such short supply, so the reather sensible decision was made to leave the engines in the Centaur so they could be used as SP artillery.

[Eduard]

Then I understand the Shermans where OP vehicles without gun, just machineguns.

I think it makes sense to use the "limited" mobility of the tanks to liberate the LCT's for other tasks. And to take what profit you could of the added firepower they provided to the troops.

Not taking in account other limitations I would have sent them all to the 6th airborne area to add their weight to the artillery there and some kind of armoured support if necessary.

About 80 guns would be a welcome support.

eduard

[nigelfe]

What leads to the conclusion that RM Shermans were gunless? Some OP tanks had dummy guns others had 'real' armament. It actually depended on the comms fit and the tank involved. Basically OP tanks were comd & control tks (as used by tk sqn HQs etc, ) but with extras that meant there was no space for the gun. This did not apply to all types of tks used as OPs, some had more space than others.

Of course the 95mm Centaurs were a bit limited as artillery, my understanding is that their max range was about the same as 3.7 inch How, ie a lot less than 25-pdr (and 105mm), even the SP version which had less range than the towed. I don't think 6 Abn were left short of arty, their abn FOU could call on whatever was in range, they were not limited to the div's airlanding light regt. 63 Medium Regt started landing on D Day as the lead element of the lead AGRA. I'd also suspect that parties from the COBU accompanied the cdos that headed to the flanks to join 6 Abn, so that made naval gunfire available as well.

Incidentally the main part of the run-in fireplan was by the 105mm SPs of the 10 UK and Cdn field regts (total 240 guns)

[Eduard]

As far as I read, the fire support during the run inn, the same than the aerial bombardment ad most of the naval support was innefective.

The beach defences were almost unnafected and the SP fire landed not in target.

The real killers of the defences were the DD tanks, and infantry. Helped by the crabs and Avres.

[nigelfe]

Effectiveness is a measure of achievement of what they were required to do.

I suspect calling it ineffective is based on the assumption that it was supposed to 'destroy' the defenders. This, of course, is a wrong assumption and may reflect a lack of understanding of British firepower doctrine. There was, of course, no chance that 105 or 95mm fire was going to do any serious damage to the defence structures of the Atlantic Wall.

The run in firepower was actually described as 'drenching' or 'saturation' fire. It was based on operations analysis from all theatres (and 'fratricide incidents and German attacks on UK). Its purpose was to 'neutralise' the defences - ie keep their heads down and hopefully keep them down for a bit after it stopped and so delay their deployment to battle positions. If you want it was an early example of 'shock and awe'.

Part of the problem over the UK and Cdn beaches was the low cloud base that severely limited the medium bombers, who were another element in the drenching fire equation. This cloud base was not a problem on the US beaches where it was higher and did not hinder the USAAF.

Given the methods of firing SP guns from landing craft, basically keep the boat headed towards the coast and change the elevation at intervals determined by the Coventry Clock, its timings being based on naval navigation, a far thing from artillery survey, I think its almost a miracle that they hit France at all.