I had some questions regarding Stalingrad. I have gotten into a heated debate on whether or not the Romanians actually helped the Germans throughout the war and especially at Stalingrad.
I took the example and said that 10,000 strong German soldiers with good equipment, supplies and morale can hold against 20,000 soviet troops. Even if they couldn't then they could retreat to reinforcements to fight on an other day. I believe that adding the 10,000 Romanians making 20,000 Axis vs. 20,000 Soviet troops could actually do more harm. The German center would rely on the Romanians covering the flanks and therefore go further into the city of Stalingrad itself. The Romanians broke so now the 10,000 Romanians will be lost as well as the 10,000 Germans. They will fight for a while, but they have no supplies etc.
Now I know that the numbers were on a larger scale (300,000+ trapped axis troops in Stalingrad), but am I thinking correctly?
Thanks so much for your help!
Romanians in Stalingrad
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sid guttridge
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Hi K98,
The Romanians were a major German asset at Stalingrad. The Romanians held hundreds of kilometers of front that the Germans did not have the troops to occupy. If the Germans had had to occupy the Romanian front with their own troops, they would have had little infantry available for offensive action themselves.
What you may not know is that during October 1942 Romanian troops stood off a number of Soviet attacks north of Stalingrad without German support. Soviet infantry were generally no better than Romanian infantry.
As it is generally reckoned that it requires odds of 3:1 odds in the attackers favour to mount a successful offensive, the Red Army would have to assemble some 30,000 infantrymen to guarantee overwhelming 10,000 Romanian infantrymen. If you look at the odds facing the Romanians at Stalingrad on 19-20 November you will find that the Soviet numerical advantage was approaching this on army fronts and many times higher on the narrow sectors where breakthoughs occurred.
The Romanian Army was the most important ally the German Army had on the main Eastern Front throughout the war. It had little offensive power itself due to lack of mechanisation, but without its support the German southern flank could not have made the advances it did in Southern Ukraine, the Crimea and Caucasus in 1941-42, and could not have held on so long as it did in the same areas in 1943-44.
Cheers,
Sid.
The Romanians were a major German asset at Stalingrad. The Romanians held hundreds of kilometers of front that the Germans did not have the troops to occupy. If the Germans had had to occupy the Romanian front with their own troops, they would have had little infantry available for offensive action themselves.
What you may not know is that during October 1942 Romanian troops stood off a number of Soviet attacks north of Stalingrad without German support. Soviet infantry were generally no better than Romanian infantry.
As it is generally reckoned that it requires odds of 3:1 odds in the attackers favour to mount a successful offensive, the Red Army would have to assemble some 30,000 infantrymen to guarantee overwhelming 10,000 Romanian infantrymen. If you look at the odds facing the Romanians at Stalingrad on 19-20 November you will find that the Soviet numerical advantage was approaching this on army fronts and many times higher on the narrow sectors where breakthoughs occurred.
The Romanian Army was the most important ally the German Army had on the main Eastern Front throughout the war. It had little offensive power itself due to lack of mechanisation, but without its support the German southern flank could not have made the advances it did in Southern Ukraine, the Crimea and Caucasus in 1941-42, and could not have held on so long as it did in the same areas in 1943-44.
Cheers,
Sid.
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George Lepre
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As Sid pointed out, without the Romanian army, the German Southern front couldn't have even advanced to Stalingrad in the first place. Manstein certainly couldn't have conquered the Crimea without Romanian support and it is likely that the Germans alone would have been stopped somewhere in the Odessa region in 1941, they simply didn't have enough own troops to do more.
Romania didn't only provide many divisions for the front, it was also a source of reinforcements for the Germans during difficult periods. Mastein always asked Antonescu for more troops during the Soviet counteroffensives in the Crimea, he knew that additonal Romanian troops would be granted and arrive on the front faster than the German ones. Romanian reinforcements also played an important role in stopping the Soviet Kharkov offensive in early 1942.
It is oftenly believed that Stalingrad was the first time when the Soviets launched a major offensive against a Romanian-held sector. This is not true. The Romanian 3rd Army repulsed heavy attacks in August 1941, when the Soviets tried to break through its front in the Ukraine in order to encircle the German units that have breached the Stalin Line. In September 1941, the 3rd Army was attacked again by two new Soviet armies during the Battle of the Azov Sea, the Soviet attempt to stop Manstein's attempt to break into the Crimea.
The problem at Stalingrad was that for the first time, the Soviets used masses of heavy tanks against the Romanians, who didn't have the anti-tank means to stop them. In the sectors where the Soviets attacked with infantry units, they couldn't breach the Romanian front even after days of heavy bombardment and several assaults. If the Romanians had adequate anti-tank weapons or mobile reserves, it is likely that the Soviet offensive would have been stopped.
Anyway, here is what the Germans themselves said about the battles on the Romanian sectors on the flanks of Stalingrad.
Here are the conclusions of Gen. Hauffe, asked by Hitler to write a report on the operations in the sector of the Romanian 3rd Army: "Overall, the conclusion is that between 19-24 November the Romanian troops have fought bravely, with heroic sacrifices. There were many acts of bravery and many units have distinguished themselves. It was only the unexpected high number of enemy tanks and the fact that Romanians didn't have the weapons to stop them that have allowed enemy breaktroughs and made innefective the counterattack of the German armoured reserve."
General Hans Doerr, the head of the German liaison detachment at the Romanian 4th Army, wrote the following about its operations in November 1942: "From the start of the war in the East, the Romanian army has contributed many troops to the operations. These have fought bravely when attached to German armies and have completed their tasks. If two Romanian armies have been formed in the summer of 1942, this was because the Romanian units attached to various German armies in Podolia, the Donetz Bassin, Crimea and the Caucasus, have fought exceptionally well. The modest Romanian soldiers fought bravely and two Romanian divisions shared the fate of the 6th Army at Stalingrad. The fall of the Romanian fronts in the Don's Bend and the Kalmuk Steppe was the responsability of the German High Command, who, in their arrogant ignorance, gave their allies missions they couldn't possibly fulfill. [Doerr goes on by adding that Antonescu and the Romanian commanders have warned in advance of the massive Soviet buildup in front of the Romanian armies and the impossibility to resist against such an assault but they weren't listened by Hitler and the German high command.]"
Romania didn't only provide many divisions for the front, it was also a source of reinforcements for the Germans during difficult periods. Mastein always asked Antonescu for more troops during the Soviet counteroffensives in the Crimea, he knew that additonal Romanian troops would be granted and arrive on the front faster than the German ones. Romanian reinforcements also played an important role in stopping the Soviet Kharkov offensive in early 1942.
It is oftenly believed that Stalingrad was the first time when the Soviets launched a major offensive against a Romanian-held sector. This is not true. The Romanian 3rd Army repulsed heavy attacks in August 1941, when the Soviets tried to break through its front in the Ukraine in order to encircle the German units that have breached the Stalin Line. In September 1941, the 3rd Army was attacked again by two new Soviet armies during the Battle of the Azov Sea, the Soviet attempt to stop Manstein's attempt to break into the Crimea.
The problem at Stalingrad was that for the first time, the Soviets used masses of heavy tanks against the Romanians, who didn't have the anti-tank means to stop them. In the sectors where the Soviets attacked with infantry units, they couldn't breach the Romanian front even after days of heavy bombardment and several assaults. If the Romanians had adequate anti-tank weapons or mobile reserves, it is likely that the Soviet offensive would have been stopped.
Anyway, here is what the Germans themselves said about the battles on the Romanian sectors on the flanks of Stalingrad.
Here are the conclusions of Gen. Hauffe, asked by Hitler to write a report on the operations in the sector of the Romanian 3rd Army: "Overall, the conclusion is that between 19-24 November the Romanian troops have fought bravely, with heroic sacrifices. There were many acts of bravery and many units have distinguished themselves. It was only the unexpected high number of enemy tanks and the fact that Romanians didn't have the weapons to stop them that have allowed enemy breaktroughs and made innefective the counterattack of the German armoured reserve."
General Hans Doerr, the head of the German liaison detachment at the Romanian 4th Army, wrote the following about its operations in November 1942: "From the start of the war in the East, the Romanian army has contributed many troops to the operations. These have fought bravely when attached to German armies and have completed their tasks. If two Romanian armies have been formed in the summer of 1942, this was because the Romanian units attached to various German armies in Podolia, the Donetz Bassin, Crimea and the Caucasus, have fought exceptionally well. The modest Romanian soldiers fought bravely and two Romanian divisions shared the fate of the 6th Army at Stalingrad. The fall of the Romanian fronts in the Don's Bend and the Kalmuk Steppe was the responsability of the German High Command, who, in their arrogant ignorance, gave their allies missions they couldn't possibly fulfill. [Doerr goes on by adding that Antonescu and the Romanian commanders have warned in advance of the massive Soviet buildup in front of the Romanian armies and the impossibility to resist against such an assault but they weren't listened by Hitler and the German high command.]"
Last edited by dragos03 on Mon Jun 18, 2007 3:56 am, edited 1 time in total.
Stalingrad
Hi, all.
I write elsewhere, I just created an account here to write the following:
The third Romanian Army (W of Stalingrad and from the W to the East):
Dv 7, 11, 9, 14, 5, 6, 13, 1 Cav, Dv 7 Cav.
Reserve: Dv 1 Armored, Dv15, 22 Pz Ger.
HQ Morozovsk
Total 12 Dv defending 170 Km.
Since the Ro divisions had only six battalions and had losses in the previous Russian attacks, the Ro third army could only count as having some 7-8 Divisons.
Before relieving the Italians from this sector, the Ro commander, Petre Dumitrescu demanded that the Ro and Italian troops mount together an attack in order to eliminate the Soviet bridgeheads but the German HQ rejected the plan.
The Soviet forces:
- The SWestern Front and the West wing of the Don Front. They had according to Ro sources 34 Dv, according to later German sources, 41 Dv. Anyway, there were 11 armored brigades and 4 mechanized brigades. Commander: Vasilievski.
Tanks:
- Ger 22 Pz: 24-30 Pz IV; Ro 1 Armored: 24 Pz III + 100 Skoda light tanks
- Soviets: 600+ T34 and KV2.
Ro AT: mainly 37 mm; 75 mm, only 6/Dv.
THe situation of the Ro fourth army, South of Stalingrad was even worse. No, much worse: 5 (five) Dv defended 200 Km of front !
Dv 20, 1, 2, 4, 18. No tanks, no nothing
Soviets: Stalingrad Front, no need to mention it's forces.
The Ro commanders sent countless messages warning about their weak positions and giving details about the Soviet troop building (including info from Soviet deserters) only to be ignored by the OKH.
Conclusion: At Stalingrad, the Soviets had a crushing superiority against the Ro troops, never achieved before by the Russians in that war and only achieved much later against the Germans - in the summer of 1944 on the central front. The outcome was the same.
I write elsewhere, I just created an account here to write the following:
The third Romanian Army (W of Stalingrad and from the W to the East):
Dv 7, 11, 9, 14, 5, 6, 13, 1 Cav, Dv 7 Cav.
Reserve: Dv 1 Armored, Dv15, 22 Pz Ger.
HQ Morozovsk
Total 12 Dv defending 170 Km.
Since the Ro divisions had only six battalions and had losses in the previous Russian attacks, the Ro third army could only count as having some 7-8 Divisons.
Before relieving the Italians from this sector, the Ro commander, Petre Dumitrescu demanded that the Ro and Italian troops mount together an attack in order to eliminate the Soviet bridgeheads but the German HQ rejected the plan.
The Soviet forces:
- The SWestern Front and the West wing of the Don Front. They had according to Ro sources 34 Dv, according to later German sources, 41 Dv. Anyway, there were 11 armored brigades and 4 mechanized brigades. Commander: Vasilievski.
Tanks:
- Ger 22 Pz: 24-30 Pz IV; Ro 1 Armored: 24 Pz III + 100 Skoda light tanks
- Soviets: 600+ T34 and KV2.
Ro AT: mainly 37 mm; 75 mm, only 6/Dv.
THe situation of the Ro fourth army, South of Stalingrad was even worse. No, much worse: 5 (five) Dv defended 200 Km of front !
Dv 20, 1, 2, 4, 18. No tanks, no nothing
Soviets: Stalingrad Front, no need to mention it's forces.
The Ro commanders sent countless messages warning about their weak positions and giving details about the Soviet troop building (including info from Soviet deserters) only to be ignored by the OKH.
Conclusion: At Stalingrad, the Soviets had a crushing superiority against the Ro troops, never achieved before by the Russians in that war and only achieved much later against the Germans - in the summer of 1944 on the central front. The outcome was the same.
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Mansal D
I would add something else here. German memoirs and some history books claim that one of the main causes of the defeat was the poor leadership of the Romanian commanders. This is, in my opinion, a ridiculous excuse for the German's own leadership failures.
General Petre Dumitrescu, the commander of the Romanian 3rd Army, has warned from the start about his army's exposed position and the massive Soviet buildup. His requests for the elimination of Soviet bridgeheads were turned down by the Germans, even when he offered to attack them with his own troops, asking just for some German armored and air support.
Dumitrescu and General Constantin Sanatescu (the commander of one of the Romanian corps) seem to be the only Axis commanders that have realised from the start that the Soviet offensive actually aimed to encircle the 6th Army in Stalingrad. As soon as the Soviet assault started, they asked for the 48th Corps to be immediately employed to contain the southern Soviet breakthrough (the one that eventually reached Kalach), ignoring for the moment the other Soviet penetration to the North. Dumitrescu has already placed an infantry division in reserve in this area, which managed to delay the Soviet advance. If their request would have been followed by the German commanders, this might have been the only chance of the Axis to prevent the disaster, since there is a chance that the Romanian infantry division and the two weak armored divisions of the 48th Corps could have delayed the Soviet pincer long enough for more reinforcements to arrive.
As for the Romanian 4th Army, it was under the command of the German 4th Pz Army (Gen. Hoth) and its Romanian commander (Gen. Constantinescu-Claps) only arrived after its front had been breached.
General Petre Dumitrescu, the commander of the Romanian 3rd Army, has warned from the start about his army's exposed position and the massive Soviet buildup. His requests for the elimination of Soviet bridgeheads were turned down by the Germans, even when he offered to attack them with his own troops, asking just for some German armored and air support.
Dumitrescu and General Constantin Sanatescu (the commander of one of the Romanian corps) seem to be the only Axis commanders that have realised from the start that the Soviet offensive actually aimed to encircle the 6th Army in Stalingrad. As soon as the Soviet assault started, they asked for the 48th Corps to be immediately employed to contain the southern Soviet breakthrough (the one that eventually reached Kalach), ignoring for the moment the other Soviet penetration to the North. Dumitrescu has already placed an infantry division in reserve in this area, which managed to delay the Soviet advance. If their request would have been followed by the German commanders, this might have been the only chance of the Axis to prevent the disaster, since there is a chance that the Romanian infantry division and the two weak armored divisions of the 48th Corps could have delayed the Soviet pincer long enough for more reinforcements to arrive.
As for the Romanian 4th Army, it was under the command of the German 4th Pz Army (Gen. Hoth) and its Romanian commander (Gen. Constantinescu-Claps) only arrived after its front had been breached.
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Mansal D
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Victor Nitu
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dragos,
The 48th Pz Corps was directed initially towards the Southern breakthrough in the sector of the 13th Infantry Division, but as the second one took place to the North in the sector of the 14th Infantry Division it was again redirected to meet the those froces, as they were closer. Unfrotunately for the 48th Panzer Corps, the radio with which the 1st Armored Division could contact the 48th Panzer Corps' HQ was taken out by an Soviet attack on the division's HQ. Thus, the chances for a coordinated action between the two divisions of the corps were close to zero from the beginning. However, the two weak Axis panzer divisions managed to stall the Soviet advance in the North and if further mobile forces would have been made available from the 6th Army in Stalingrad (which had at its disposal several panzer and motorized infantry divisions) the outcome would have been different in some respects.
The 48th Pz Corps was directed initially towards the Southern breakthrough in the sector of the 13th Infantry Division, but as the second one took place to the North in the sector of the 14th Infantry Division it was again redirected to meet the those froces, as they were closer. Unfrotunately for the 48th Panzer Corps, the radio with which the 1st Armored Division could contact the 48th Panzer Corps' HQ was taken out by an Soviet attack on the division's HQ. Thus, the chances for a coordinated action between the two divisions of the corps were close to zero from the beginning. However, the two weak Axis panzer divisions managed to stall the Soviet advance in the North and if further mobile forces would have been made available from the 6th Army in Stalingrad (which had at its disposal several panzer and motorized infantry divisions) the outcome would have been different in some respects.
Hi Victor,
Yes, I know that. However, if the initial order wouldn't have been changed (at Hitler's request, as far as I remember), and the 48th Corps would have opposed only the Southern Soviet breakthrough, maybe the encirclement of the 6th Army could have been avoided. In any case, I just wanted to show that the Romanian field commanders proposed the only plan that had a chance to stop the disaster.
Yes, I know that. However, if the initial order wouldn't have been changed (at Hitler's request, as far as I remember), and the 48th Corps would have opposed only the Southern Soviet breakthrough, maybe the encirclement of the 6th Army could have been avoided. In any case, I just wanted to show that the Romanian field commanders proposed the only plan that had a chance to stop the disaster.
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HeinrichFrey
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