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The Hungarian ambitions were increased with the decreasing capabilities of the Czech Army and Czech politics. Hungary wasn't a real threat to Czechoslovakia until the Germans gained the Munich victory. Hungary was not a real threat to a full Czechoslovakia, because there was no real way of thinking about such an action. Thus, I find the Hungarian invasion into the E Czechoslovakia an oportunistic advance rather than the goal of Hungarian politics.Hungary had wider ambitions than simply regaining ethnically Hungarian border areas of southern Slovakia and Ruthenia it gaine at the First Vienna Award. Hungary actually wanted to regain control of all of Slovakia and Ruthenia. It succeeded in getting the whole of Ruthenia and the eastern end of Slovakia in March 1939. Hungary was therefore a vey real threat to Czechoslovakia. If it had had its way, the latter country would only have consisted of the Czech lands.
... which was none the worse than the Entente giving the same territories to Czechoslovakia. It's the same pattern - just the balance of the forces had changed in 20 years.When Czechoslovakia ceased to exist, parts of the country were, indeed, given to Hungary. However, not by the non-Hungarian inhabitants, but by Germany.
Of course, there was no surprise in this turn of the events. I only pointed out that this had occured and was a victory for the Hungarians. All of this discussion has expanded from pretorian's words "Naturally Czechs even better organized, armored, experienced with high morale than Hungaries (which were weak during all WW2 among Axis alliance)" which both You and I eventually denied and proved wrong.If the Hungarian motorised and cavalry brigades had failed to make progress against the Slovaks in these circumstances, it would have been a miracle. As it was, they achieved their limited goals rapidly and easily saw off a single disorganised Slovak counter-attack.
The terminology Hungarian - German forces may give a wrong impression, as only parts of SS Div Florian Geyer (Gr. Siebenbürgen) and the StuG Abt 1179 (and later the Gr. Kessel) supported the attack. The forces were mainly Hungarian, freshly formed from replacement units and unsuitable for attack. They were not in a better situation as their Romanian counterparts (2. Army lost at the Don, 1. Army in the Carpathians, this army was far from posting the best troops), but managed to play a tactical "draw" here, and had some very good weeks of halting the joint Russian-Romanian attacks at Torda (this time around, supported by real German forces). I agree that the operation was not a success, but it wasn't a fiasco either as the later establishment of a defensive line in Siebenbürgen has its foundations in this battle.The Hungarians made a little ground against the Romanians in Transilvania in 1944 because the entire Romanian field army was on the Eastern Front at the time. Not a single unit of the Romanian field army was facing the Hungarians and the Romanians initially opposed the Hungarians (and Germans) only with training formations. Despite this, the Hungarians and Germans failed to capture a single Carpathian pass before the Red Army joined the Romanian covering forces. The Hungarian-German failure to capture the Carpathian line off the Romanian training formations was a major failure, not success.
Thank you for advice Sid. See you.sid guttridge wrote:Hi Pretorian,
The answers to your questions probably lie in the the book "The Royal Hungarian Army" by Leo Niehorster (Axis Europa Books, New York). Unfortunately my copy is in storage.
However, Niehorster has his own web site and is also a contributor to Feldgrau, so you you should be able to find out directly from him.
They also benefitted from air support provided by Hs-129Bs of the 8th Assault Group and the Ju-87Ds of the 6/3rd Dive Bomber Group, that knocked out most the Hungarian AFVs at Paulis.dragos03 wrote:In the battle of Paulis, Romanian cadets supported by a few captured guns defeated elements from one Hungarian infantry division and one tank division.
- To start off, Rusyns will be reffered as Ukrainians and the region according to the name it has chosen for ITSELF - Carpatho-Ukraine (this was the official title of the area, that you can find on any 1938 map).And what Rusyns? They conceived that without Czechoslovakian protection had no chance to survive, and had 2 possibilities: A) stay home and wait for Hungarians (which never brough them rest), or B) exit fatherland –