Rumanian Stalingrad Survivors?

[pzrmeyer2]

`m reading stalins kriegsgefangene.
it`s called stalins pow`s translated in english

can someone please provide more info on this book, ie author, where to find, etc?

thanks.

[sid guttridge]

Hi pzrmeyer,

It is best to check the on-line catalogue of the German national copyright library for full details of any German book. (I think it's the Institut Goethe, but this needs checking.).

Similarly, either the Library of Congress or British Library on-line catalogues will give you details of any English-language book and the Bibliotheque National on-line catalogue will do the same for French-language books.

Cheers,

Sid.

[sid guttridge]

Hi Pzrmeyer,

Correction. You need the on-line search facility of the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Try:

http://dispatch.opac.ddb.de/CHARSET=ISO ... SHW?FRST=1

Cheers,

Sid.

[sniper1shot]

hah. I see another of those heated debates of foreign volunteers

HvM- Are we reading the same thread here? There was no debate...and there still isn't one. Please do not try to start something.

[pzrmeyer2]

Hi Pzrmeyer,

Correction. You need the on-line search facility of the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Try:

http://dispatch.opac.ddb.de/CHARSET=ISO ... SHW?FRST=1

Cheers,

Sid.

Thanks for the information. I'm sorry I did not notice before.

[Athanaric]

hi the.warlord1944,

I recommend you read: "Die Kampfe der Wehrmacht in Rumanien 1944" by Lt-Col. Klaus Schonherr, Deutsche Originalausgabe in: Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweitte Weltkrieg, Band 8 Deutsche Verlag-Anstalt, Munchen. [romanian: Luptele Wehrmachtului in Romania 1944, Editura Militara, Bucuresti 2004]

[Mansal D]

The Romanian units seemed to be not well enough equiped. Out-dated equipment and all created some problems and overall I think in some ways the Romanians caused some of the downfalls in some battles.

[Athanaric]

Below is a letter sent by Marshall antonescu to von Manstein in 9-dec-1942

Are many answers related to romanian-german relationship during batlle from the Don Band and Kalmuk steppe. If you can not find somebody to translate it, may be I'll do!

Domnule Feldmaresal,

Am luat cunostinta cu adanca mahnire de raportul din 3 decembrie 1942, pe care a fost silit sa vi-l adreseze generalul Steflea si tin sa va exprim nemultumirea mea pentru faptele ce vi s-au semnalat cat si pentru incompleta satisfactie ce i s-a acordat. Nu numai ca-mi insusesc in totul cele ce generalul Steflea v-a raportat, dar tin inca de datoria mea, fata de raspunderea istorica pe care o port si fata de contributia militara la razboiul actual al tarii ce conduc, sa adaug urmatoarele:
1. Romania si-a oferit aproape totalitatea fortelor ei armate, cu cele mai de seama cadre, cei mai tineri si mai bine instruiti soldati si cel mai modern material de care am dispus, ca alaturi de armata germana, sa contribuie la zdrobirea bolsevismului, indeplinind astfel un rol european, foarte departat de modestele ei idealuri nationale si politice.
Aceasta jertfa generoasa nu trebuie deci privita ca o obligatiune fara restrictiuni. Nimeni nu ne poate cere altceva decat ceea ce noi consimtim a da, intre Germania si Romania neexistand pana la aceasta data nici o conventie, nici politica, nici militara.
In calitate de conducator al statului roman si de comandant al armatei, am deci dreptul de a impiedica orice act, care imi poate compromite prestigiul indispensabil exercitarii functiilor mele si am datoria sa sustrag din fata oricarei molestari ofiterii si soldatii romani, supusi unui tratament incompatibil cu onoarea si credintele tarii mele.
2. Cunoasteti contributia trupelor romane din esalonul I al armatei romane, care cu exceptia operatiunilor de la Odessa si Don, au sangerat sub ordinele armatei a 11-a germana, pe care ati comandat-o de la Nipru pana la Kerci si Sevastopol. Va sunt poate mai putin cunoscute operatiile corpului de armata general Dragalina si al trupelor din Caucaz, carora li se datoreste nu numai salvarea situatiei critice de la Donet, din iarna trecuta, dar si atingerea obiectivelor actuale de pe Don, Volga si muntii Caucazului.Fara falsa modestie, cred ca nu exagerez, daca afirm ca, fara prezenta trupelor romanesti in iarna trecuta, Crimeea putea fi pierduta si situatia de la Donet ar fi putut duce, daca nu la pierderea cel putin la amenintarea Ucrainei, de la est de cotul Niprului.
3.Fortele romanesti si esalonul II au fost promise comandamentului suprem german in timpul grelei crize prin care a trecut armata germana pe frontul de est, in iarna trecuta. Am cerut in schimb numai ca unitatile romane sa fie dotate la fel ca cele germane si sa fie transportate pe calea ferata pana in apropierea frontului, pentru economisirea echipamentului. S-au facut promisiuni, dar nu au fost respectate.
- trupele romanesti ala Armatei a 3 -a au facut 500-600 km pe jos pentru a ajunge pe front, in timp ce trupele germane au fost duse cu trenul pana in liniile cap de cale ferata, ba mai mult s-a dat ordin Marilor Unitati Romane, ca din garile de debarcare sa le transporte pana la pozitiile de lupta cu putinele camioane de care dispuneau;
-drept dotatie moderna s-a dat diviziei blindate romane 22 care grele germane si 2 companii anticar, i s-a refuzat insa grupul de recunoastere, iar majoritatea - nu totalitatea - diviziilor romane au primit ca unic mijloc de lupta contra carelor o baterie de 6 piese anti car grele cu tractiune hipomobila.
4. Pentru ca se se arunca un discredit asupra trupelor romane, in special ale Armatei a 3-a, spre completa dvs. identificare, va aduc la cunostinta urmatoarele:
-Comandamentul german prin domnii Weichs si Hauffe este responsabil de angajarea trupelor acestei armate in conditii cu totul dezavantajoase.
-Mi s-a afirmat ca frontul afectat Armatei a 3-a romane era pe Don, ceea ce ar fi constituit o situatie favorabila.
Recunoasterile noastre prealabile au constat ca afirmarea nu era deloc exacta, inamicul avand in mijlocul frontului armatei un cap de pod larg de 70 km si adnc de 25 km.
-Toate observatoarele erau in mainile lui. Am cerut sa se lichideze acest cap de pod inainte de intrarea trupelor noastre in sector. Mi s-a promis, dar nu s-a facut nimic. Am cerut atunci ca la intrarea trupelor noastre in linie, sa coopereze cu trupele pe care le inlocuim la reducerea capului de pod. Mi s-a promis, dar nu s-a facut nimic. Din contra in masura in care inlocuiam o unitate germana sau italiana, acestea dispareau fara macar sa previna si fara sa spuna unde se duc. Trupele noastre nu au gasit nici o organizare, nici o aparare antitanc, nici o retea de sarma, nici o baraca si au trebuit sa se instateze intr-o zona fara paduri, cu foarte putine sate sau acoperiri naturale, total secatuite de alimente si furaje de trupele ce ne-au precedat in sector. Ceva mai mult, au fost luate si depozitele care se gaseau in sector, lasandu-ne total numai la discretia aprovizionarilor, care se aduceau cu caii istoviti si insuficient hraniti, de la circa 120 km.
-Am cerut ca dupa intrarea in sector, sa lichidam nu numai capul de pod, dar -printr-un efort comun- sa ocupam si regiunea paduroasa de la nord de Don, care dupa mine era pozitie-cheie si a apararii intregului front din marele cot al Donului, dar si propice adunarii in ascuns a unor forte masive inamice, pentru executarea unui atac in stil mare. Daca pregatirea angajarii fortelor romanesti a avut lipsurile aratate nici nici executia nu s-a aratat la un nivel superior.
-Armata a 3-a fost intinsa pe un front de 150 km; incat nu puteam indeplini decat o misiune de avanposturi (un batalion de 4,5 km) si nu a dispus de rezerve decat de forte capabile cel mult sa opreasca mici patrunderi locale: 5 batalioane si 2 divizioane din divizia a 15-a infanterie si divizia a 7-a cavalerie pe jos (valoarea a 3 batalioane si un divizion de artilerie). Au mai fost aduse ulterior doua divizioane germane de vanatoare de care, nr.611 si nr.670.
Situatia se inrautateste si mai mult prin aceea ca a asupra diviziilor a 13-a si a 14-a infanterie, asupra carora s-a produs efortul atacului inamic, au fost in continuu atacate de la intrarea lor in front si pana la inceperea ofensivei sovitice.

Divizia a 13-a a fost atacata in intrvalul de timp de la jumatatea lunii septembrie pana la 18 noiembrie de 32 de ori; in zile si nopti, adeseori consecutive. Divizia a 14-a a fost atacata de 17 orin, in acelasi interval de timp. De aici a rezultat ca la 19 noiembrie divizia a 13-a infanterie avea pierderi de 115 ofiteri si 3648 trupa luptatoare. Divizia a 14-a infanterie avea pierderi de 98 ofiteri si 2163 trupa luptatoare.
-Pentru reactiuni ofensive, grupul de armate a concentrat in sectorul Armatei a 3-a, divizia 1 blindata romana si diviziile a 22-a si a 14-a blindate germane, acestea doua din urma reduse la 25% din valoarea normala.
Anterior se promisese de catre OKH constituirea urmatoarelor rezerve, deosebit de rezervele Armatei a 3-a romane: 4 divizii germane in zona Armatei a 3-a si 3 divizii romane in regiunea Rostov (corpul 6 armata). Nu s-a realizat nimic, mai mult, la inceputul lunii noiembrie, OKH ne- a obligat sa introducem in front si divizia a 7-a infanterie romana, locul unei divizii italiene.
- Hrana, materialele de fortificatii, carburantii, munitiunile, materialele necesare instalarii defensive nu au ajuns niciodata sa atinga macar cifra promisiunilor, necum a nevoilor reale. Date si documente se gasesc in insusi raportul colonelului Fink.
-Armata a 4-a, ale carei trupe luptau neintrerupt din luna ianuarie, si-a epuzat si consumat fortele, pastrand initial cu Corpul 6 armata un front de 120 km (de la 20 km pana la 50 km de divizie) si mentinand oamenii in linie pana la limita extrema a puterilor omenesti de 90-100 zile neintrerupt in neincetate lupte.
-Daca in ziua de 20 noiembrie, cand Armata a 4-a romana a fost atacata, sectoarele diviziilor erau micsorate (de 17 pana la 33 km), nu trebuie uitat ca valoarea combativa a 3 divizii (diviziile 1,2 si 4) era scazuta, la circa 50%.
-Mentionez numai ca Corpul 6 armata a consumat de la ianuarie pana la noiembrie, in afara de efectivele sale, inca 38 batalioane si 11 escadroane.
Daca lipsurile materiale ale Armatei a 4-a au fost in general mai mici decat ale Armatei a 3-a, lipsa combustibilului slabise oamenii pana la epuizare (cazul ofiterilor si soldatilor umbre decorati de d-l general Hoth), iar lipsa de furaje adusese intr-u hal de inanitie totala caii Corpului 6 Armata, ceea ce explica pierderile de material de artilerie in luptele de la sud de Stalingrad.
Imposibilitatea terenului in care a luptat Armata a 4-a este cunoscuta (lipsa totala de resurse si acoperiri, clima grea si nenumarate boli).
5. Reusita ofensivei rusesti nu se datoreste deci lipsei de eficienta a armatelor a 3-a si a 4-a romane, ci neprevederilor Comandamentului Grupului de armate "B", unei alegeri mestesugite din partea rusilor a zonelor de atac si concentrarii masive de forte in cel mai desavarsit secret.
Comandamentul rus a aplicat efortul sau la vest si la sud de Stalingrad, zone carora Grupul de armate "B" trebuia sa le acorde cu totul alta atentiune. Evenimentele au aratat-o.
Intarzierea constituirii comandamentului Don, provocata de neasteptata si neinchipuita rezistenta de la Stalingrad si din Caucaz, isi are partea ei fatala de contributie in tragicele evenimente traite.
Nici pregatirea bataliei, nici conducerea ei nu au putut fi la inaltimea misiunii. Tristul rezultat, ca si numirea d-voastra, dupa pronuntarea dezastrului, la un comandament fara titular, o dovedesc.
Am aratat personal generalului Hauffe banuiala mea ca inamicul va dezlantui un mare atac pe directia FROLOV - ROSTOV si pe directia BARMANKAK - KALACI, care erau cele doua axe de atac indicate, fiindca in afara de succese tactice locale, duceau si la consecinte grave strategice pe frontul germano-roman din Caucaz, Stalingrad si cotul Donului.
Grupul de armate Weichs si generalul Hauffe au subestimat valoarea inamicului si nu au luat in considerare gasind exagerate toate aratarile mele.
7. Am, domnule maresal, un trecut nepatat de 40 de ani inchinati armatei si tarii, in dreptate si onoare; am facut in aceasta lunga cariera 4 razboaie si 4 revolutii.
Nici in fata inamicului din afara, nici in fata acelui dinauntru, nu am dezarmat niciodata.
Am o raspundere politica si istorica si am o sacra datorie, fata de ostasii mei.
M-as dezonora daca as lasa sa fie dezonorti.
As fi un las, daca as tolera sa se comita lasitati in contra lor.
Sunt informat, in ultimul moment, ca sunt soldati de-ai mei care au luptat ca niste bravi si care acum sunt impuscati de soldatii d-voastra in incercuirea de la Stalingrad.
Sunt informat ca sunt ofiteri si subofiteri de ai nostri, carora le sunt smulse de la brau revolverele si armele lor de lupta de catre soldati de-ai d-voastra, care au stat mult departe in spatele frontului sau de soldati din unitati de lucratori.
De asemena, mi se raporteaza ca trupele romane aflate sub comandament german sunt supuse unui tratement neomenos.
Pentru cucerirea satului Dubowkij, Corpul 1 Armata Roman a primit ordin de la grupul Holidt sa atace de 7 ori, pentru ca nu a reusit prima data, cauzand-se pierderi de 40 de ofiteri, 15 subofiteri si 1392 trupa. Ce importanta tactica si strategica si strategica avea aceasta in ansamblul imems al frontului, ca sa determine acest masacru?
De ce se impun sacrificii inutile Marilor Unitati romane, cand in cazuri asemantaoare trupele germane sunt crutate? Relev cazul detasamentului von Courbier, care a fost trimis la Odessa pentru a ne ajuta sa spargem frontul defensiv. Detasamentul, tinut 2-3 saptamani in rezerva a atacat si dupa 2 ore, dupa ce a lasat pe teren cativa ofiteri si 200 de soldati, a oprit atacul si s-a retras fara sa mai incerce, sub cuvant ca nu are mijloacele necesare. Unul din comandantii germani s-a oprit sa marturiseasca ca tine sa faca "mea culpa" fata de infanteristul roman pe care-l credea pana atunci slab luptator. Pe cand la germani astfel de procedee sunt admise, generalul Holidt trimite soldatii nostri, fara sa le asigure sustinerea de foc si de mijloace masive, la masacru. Masacrarea cu vointa si pornire a unitatilor din Corpul 1 armata romana va produce un efect dezastruos asupra camaraderiei romano-germane si fara nici un folos militar in viitor. Sunt sigur ca veti fi de acord cu mine ca aceasta atitudine a comandamentului german nu este meritata de trupele romane, care s-au batut tot atat de bine cum s-au batut trupele germane in sector.
De ce, daca soldatii Armatei a 3-a nu au reusit sa opreasca atacul rusesc fiindca, "nu s-au batut cum trebuie", nu au resit nici unitatile germane, diviziile 22 si 14 blindate si divizioanele 611 si 670 de vanatori de care au fost si ele literalmente zdrobite, desi au primit socul dupa ce actiunea inamicului pierduse din intensitate, datorita imprastierii si luptelor cu noi? De acestia au fost bravi si ai nostri au fost fugari? Este cazul sa intreb ce au facut diviziile 62 si 294 de la care, dupa comunicarea Fuhrerului primita la 23.nov. se astepta depresurizarea Grupului Lascar? Se uita probabil ca atacul s-a produs pe o ceata atat de deasa, incat nici un armament pana la tunurile grele nu au putut sa traga, decat cand inamicul a intrat in pozitie si in baterii. Din acesta cauza nici aviatia nu a putut interveni. Nu cred ca alte trupe cu organizare, incadrare, instructie si experienta egala cu ale trupelor romane, ar fi putut face mai mult decat a facut Armata a 3-a, care timp de trei zile si-a mentinut pozitiile, dar a trebuit sa cedeze cand rezervele romane si germane nu au putut nici macar stavili puhoiul rusesc, necum sa-l respinga.
8. Sunt informat de asemenea ca, pe cand dumneavoastra incercati sa reconstituiti din oamenii ramasi noi unitati romanesti, domnul general Holidt a pulverizat divizia a 9-a, desfiintindu-i comandamentul, risipind pe fractiuni unele din unitati cu valoare combativa inca suficienta si transformand altele in unitati de lucru. Mai sunt informat ca unitati germane iau fara nici un scrupul, cu o indraznela fara seaman, caii serviciilor noastre si ii trec in ale lor, lasand pe ale noastre in drum . Sunt informat ca s-au luat serviciile noastre constituite si s-au trecut diviziilor 62 si 294, care au sosit pe campul de lupta fara servicii; in sfarsit sunt informat, domnule maresal, ca domnul Holidt se poarta cu comandamentele noastre cu o brutalitate neadmisibila intre oameni civilizati si intre soldati cu simtamantul onoarei. Acelasi domn general, trecand atat peste cele elementare principii de ierarhie militara si de ordine in exercitarea cu autoritate a comenzii, cat si peste cel mai elementar respect ce se datoreaste unui aliat, care face din toata inima si cu loialitate sacrificii imense pentru cauza comuna, fara sa fie obligat prin vreun angajament militar sau politic scris, a dat "ordine" Armatei a 3-a sa nu dea nici un ordin trupelor romane, decat prin intermediul dinsului si in acelasi timp a avertizat ca isi rezerva dreptul de a aduce acestor ordine orice modificare va crede de cuviinta.
9. Domnule maresal, in fata acestor fapte care in nici un caz nu ne poate dezonora pe noi, orice margine nu poate fi depasita si orice onoare nu poate fi calcata in picioare. Nu poate fi depasita si nu poate fi calcata - mai alesa fata de un soldat - care sa fie inarmat cum suntem inarmati, instruiti cum suntem instruiti, incadrati cum suntem incadrati, s-a batut pana acum cum s-a batut, s-a incarcat de o nepieritoare glorie si la a carei interventie camaraderesca si totala s-a recurs de multe ori, in ocazii grele si in momente critice, pentru trupele germane:
-cand marile unitati romane isi pun la dispozitia unitatilor germane in aceeasi lupta, aviatia si cel mai modern material de artilerie, de care dispun, cu toate ca dotatia lor este inferioara dotarii germane, si cu toate ca au in aceeasi actiune misiuni de aceeasi importanta;
-cand marile unitati romane actioneaza la Feodosia si asigura - cu pierderi enorme degajarea diviziei 46 de la Kerci;
-Cand 4 mari unitati romane alearga 300 km pe jos, pe ger de -30 C, ceea ce a dus la degerarea a 30% din oameni si moartea a 40% din caii artileriei lor, pentru a umple spartura de la Donet, depasesc frontul german si fara tunuri patrund 30 km in adancime;
-Cand alte mari unitati romane, care mergeau la o alta deastinatie, sunt oprite din drum si aruncate in lupta, pentru a izgoni adversarul, care sparsese frontul german, si reusesc sa opreasca inamicul si sa lege frontul (cazul diviziei 19 la est de Noworosisk);
-Cand alte 4 divizii romane trec Donetul si Donul cu armatele a 4-a si intaia blindata germane si ajung in urmarirea inamicului pe Volga, prin lupte si marsuri neintrerupte de zi si noapte de 800 km la scara cu unitati blindate germane;
-Cand o armata are dosarele tuturor marilor unitati pline de nenumarate scrisori oficiale si de ordine de zi prin care se lauda atitudinea si ne onoreaza bravura soldatului, ofitrului si comandamentului roman;
-Cand aceeasi armata este citata de peste 100 de ori in comunicatele Fuhrerului;
-Cand o armata pierde intr-o singura batalie, din 160 000 luptatori, 80 000 de oameni (din care rusii anunta numai 37 000 de prizonieri), luptatorii acelei armate nu pot fi calificati drept fugari si lasi, cum nu au fost calificate drept fugare unitatile germane, care la Donet au abandonat tot materialul motorizat iarna trecuta, cand au fost silite sa se retraga 100 km inapoi;
-Cand o armata are in aceeasi lupta 3 generali care nu se predau si cad, lipsiti de cartuse si de hrana, alaturea de ultimul lor luptator si cand un al patrulea general, tot in aceesi lupta moare cu ultimul om de la ariegarda, lovit de un obuz de tun, tras drept in piept de un car inamic;
-Cand in Armata a 3-a au fost divizii care au pierdut morti in lupta corp la corp, doi din trei comandanti de regimente de infanterie, cinci din sapte comandanti de batalioane, doi din sase comandanti de divizioane si toti comandantii de comapanii si de baterii; cand un comandant de brigada de artilerie trece in bateria in care era fiul sau, trage impreuna cu el ultimile proiectile si dupa aceea se sinucid impreuna, iar un comandant de regiment moare de artilerie moare grea moare in lupta la baioneta;
-Cand un comandant de batalion, dupa cinci zile de lupta continua, fara hrana si fara munitie si fara o secunda de gandire, sare cu oamenii extenuati si scapa de la distrugere materialul de aviatie si aviatorii de la Obliwskaia;
-Cand in divizia 2 munte au fost oameni care extenuati de lupte, au ajuns in asa hal de oboseala incat nu mai puteau nici apasa pe tragaci;
-Cand Fuhrerul a cinstit si onorat cu cele mai mari distinctii armata romana si cand dintre aliatii dvs., noi am avut primul general decorat cu frunzele de stejar la Crucea de cavaler al Crucii de Fier si primul ofiter superior decorat cu Crucea de cavaler a crucii a de fier.
Aceasta armata nu poate fi tratata ca armata de fugari, soldatii ei nu pot fi impuscati ca niste netrebnici fara judecata si raspundere, de orice ofiter sau soldat german.
Au fost, desigur, domnule maresal si cazuri de defectiuni. Ele au fost si datorita faptului ca, unele unitati de zece luni stau pe un ger cumplit sau in noroi si pe calduri caniculare numai in linia intai, cu mana pe tragaci, fiindca din lipsa de rezerve nu au putut niciodata fi trecute inapoi pentru repaus.
Nu s-a intamplat acelasi lucru cu trupele germane din frontul de sud, care au fost trase uneori inapoi pentru repaus si refacere, unele chiar au fost transportate pe fronturi secundare sau in interior.
Cazurile de defectiuni raportate la totalitatea armatei au fost izolate. Ele au fost si sunt si in armata d-voastra si in orice armata. Dar numai eu singur si comandamentele romane au dreptul dupa o judecata fie chiar sumara, dar numai dupa judecata, sa pedepseasca cu moartea pe netrebnici.
Aveti si d-voastra soldati dezertori, care ratacesc in spatele frontului si prin tara mea. Aveti altii care s-au dat la acte de contrabanda si jaf pe teritoriul nostru si altii care nerspectand regulile circulatiei au trecut peste pietonii fara sa lase urma, cum se trece peste un card de gaste. Au fost cazuri cand soldatii germani au atacat cu revolverul pe soferii nostri prinsi izolati, iau dat jos de pe masina si au fugit cu masina.
Au fost ofiteri si subofiteri de-ai d-voastra, carora le-am dat ce-a mai frateasca ospitalitate in tara si care drept rasplata au inarmat pe legionari in contra mea, i-au dirijat din umbra in actiunea lor criminala, care tindea la rasturnarea regimului si la uciderea mea miseleasca si care dupa rebeliune au imbracat pe capii robilor in haina soldatului si ofiterului german si i-au trecut peste granita, ascunsi in camioane germane sau amestecati printre soldatii germani. Au fost cazuri cand soldatii d-voastra au fost prinsi vanzand materiale de arme militare populatiei noastre. Totusi, domnule maresal, cu toate aceste multiple si grave fapte, care toate au fost aduse la cunostinta Misiunii militare si Legatiei germane, nimeni nu si-a ingaduit in aceasta tara sa generalizeze cazuri izolate, fiindca stia ca l-as fi executat. Au fost defectiuni si la formatiunile germane pe timpul atacurilor rusesti de la 19 si 20 noiembrie. Dovada marele numar de soldati germani razleti, care s-au adunat la Morozowskaja.
In schimb, pentru ca s-au vazut coloane romanesti retragandu-se din ordin sub urmarirea tancurilor rusesti sau oameni izilati, care in majoritate apartineau serviciilor si au fost luati de ofiterii germani drept fugari de pe front, s-a aruncat soldatilor romani epitetul de fugari. Necunoasterea limbii a sporit confuzia.
Nimeni de la noi nu si-a ingaduit sa pateze onoarea armatei germane cu calificativele cu care este dezonorata sub ochii impasibili si uneori din ordinul ofiterilor germani armata noastra, fara a cunoste realitatile, toate realitatile. Comandantii si ofiterii germani cu vointa, sau dintr-o inexplicabila mentalitate, au tolerat unor soldati germani si s-au facut partasi cu ei in atitudinea luata fata de niste bravi ofiteri si soldati romani, de a caror infrangere nu pot fi ei singuri vinovati si in fata carora nu se poate arunca blamul de oricine si cu atata usurinta. Eu am incredere incredere in in loialitatea si in spiritul de dreptate al Fuhrerului. Am aceasta incredere, caci noi am scris alaturea de d-voastra nenumarate pagini de glorie si sunt sigur ca Fuhrerul cu genialitatea, loialitatea si simtul dreptatii ce-l caracterizeaza, va intelege mahnirea si revolta mea, va lua masuri contra vinovatilor si va reabilita pe soldatul roman ultragiat, cand va cunoaste aceste fapte in adevarata lor lumina. Oricare ar fi judecata si aprecierea d-voastra, va rog domnule maresal, nu numai ca camarad dar si in virtutea raspunderii pe care o am fata de soldatii mei si fata de poporul meu, sa faceti sa inceteze cu un minut mai devreme aceasta stare de fapt si in privinta tratamentului soldatului roman si in privinta comandamentului lor. Soldatul roman nu poate fi comandat decat de ofiterul si comandamentul roman. El nu poate fi umilit de un strain, cu atat mai putin de un camarad de arme, chiar cand greseste. El nu poate fi masacrat in atacuri inutile, cum nu au fost masacrate nici diviziile germane nr.62 si nr.294.
El nu poate fi pedepsit decat de ofiterul roman. De bravele noastre unitati nu poate dispune oricine dupa bunul sau plac, dupa cum nu poate dispune nici de ale d-voastra. Constitutia tarii mele opreste acest lucru, dupa cum o opreste pentru d-voastra constitutia si onoarea tarii d-voastra. Eu sunt dator sa va previn ca, daca nu inceteaza acesta atitudine si aceste fapte, voi avea de examinat situatia fortelor noastre in cadrul frontuli d-voastra. In acelasi timp, imi ingadui, a va arata ceea ce soldatii si ofiterii germani ignoreaza, ca in lunga, dureroasa si glorioasa istorie de doua mii de ani a poporului roman, se gaseste cazul unic in istoria popoarelor cand voievodul, conducatorul si luptatorii au preferat, dupa ce au pierdut ultima lupta de aparare, sa piara prin otravire impreuna cu capii si unitatile lor, decat sa se predea sau sa traiasca in robie si in dezordine.
Poporul roman de azi nu va fi, domnule maresal, mai prejos de strabunii sai.
Primiti, va rog, excelenta, salutul meu camaraderesc. Maresal Antonescu 9.12.1942

[George Lepre]

Hi Athanarthic -

If you could provide a translation for this letter it would be most appreciated. I'm sure there are a number of forum members who would like to read it.

Best regards,

George

[Athanaric]

The Romanian units seemed to be not well enough equiped. Out-dated equipment and all created some problems and overall I think in some ways the Romanians caused some of the downfalls in some battles.

Hitler have promised Antonescu romanian soldiers will receive military equipment when they take the fighting positions nord of Stalingrad (the Don Bend) and south of Stalingrad (Kalmuk steppe). They received nothing: not anti-tank artilery, no wire barbed web constructed, no mined fields, no antitank and antipersonnel mines, no heavy artilery, no vehicles for troops transportation from Rostov to front line, no reserves. These are similar to italians and hungarians! Romanians tank hunters have used the antitank rockets launchers from 70m and 100m short distances. At he Don Bend the soviets have already creadted three bridgeheads: Serafimovich, Kletskaia and Deviatkin. Antonescu ask Hitler to destroy these bridge heads but Hitler refused. He considered the Antonescu demand is exagerated. The soviets lounch a huge artilery preparation and then 700 tanks supported by infantry pass over the romanian lines. Only about 70-80 tanks have been destroied by romanian tank hunters. Some romanian units remain encircled in three areas on the Don Bend Sector. In three days (november 19-22) romanian losses were 80 000 soldiers. The soviets reported 37 000 pows. They can be see in ww2 footage because have fur hats instead of helmets.

[HeinrichFrey]

The Romanian units seemed to be not well enough equiped. Out-dated equipment and all created some problems and overall I think in some ways the Romanians caused some of the downfalls in some battles.

Hitler have promised Antonescu romanian soldiers will receive military equipment when they take the fighting positions nord of Stalingrad (the Don Bend) and south of Stalingrad (Kalmuk steppe). They received nothing: not anti-tank artilery, no wire barbed web constructed, no mined fields, no antitank and antipersonnel mines, no heavy artilery, no vehicles for troops transportation from Rostov to front line, no reserves.

In general I agree. It fits to my researches from today. But You must not forget the weeks of fighting of the german troops in "Fall Blau" since Charkov in may. The troops blooded out especially since the midth of september. No relief troops und the ammunition was low. As the romanian troops came in, they were classified "ready for all types of attacks". And they fought brave and with the respect of the german soldiers. And my granduncle Friedrich Mott died with them. He is missing in action in centre of Stalingrad since Dec., 1st 1942.
Regards
Matthias

[Athanaric]

The Romanian units seemed to be not well enough equiped. Out-dated equipment and all created some problems and overall I think in some ways the Romanians caused some of the downfalls in some battles.

Hitler have promised Antonescu romanian soldiers will receive military equipment when they take the fighting positions nord of Stalingrad (the Don Bend) and south of Stalingrad (Kalmuk steppe). They received nothing: not anti-tank artilery, no wire barbed web constructed, no mined fields, no antitank and antipersonnel mines, no heavy artilery, no vehicles for troops transportation from Rostov to front line, no reserves.

In general I agree. It fits to my researches from today. But You must not forget the weeks of fighting of the german troops in "Fall Blau" since Charkov in may. The troops blooded out especially since the midth of september. No relief troops und the ammunition was low. As the romanian troops came in, they were classified "ready for all types of attacks". And they fought brave and with the respect of the german soldiers. And my granduncle Friedrich Mott died with them. He is missing in action in centre of Stalingrad since Dec., 1st 1942.
Regards
Matthias

A ww2 veteran from my village escaped from Stalingrad encirclement. He took the fighting position in the Don Bend area in november 1942, before the Uranus Operation. In fact on the Don Bend front it was not a continous front ditch/tranchee line. There were advanced isolated fighting position ocupied by romanians soldiers. Their mission was to keep the position against russion infantry atacks. Behind them, 400-500 meters distance were german artilery positions. Some russian atacks were performed during the nights, in silent. They used to use bayonnets against romanians. Some times the romanians were surprised. At first shootings sound, the germans wake up and open fire using heavy machine-guns. They launched illuminating rockets and cleared the area in less than one hour. Rarelly more! He survive the 21 nov atack, because he was not on the main stream of the soviet atack. They (romanian and germans) retreat to south-east in Stalingrad direction. When they arrived in Stalingrad, they haven't know the Stalingrad is in an encirclement. They realise this in December '42. During a night after that, with 4-5 romanians soldiers they begun the adventure to get out there. During the followings nights they were walking westward and during the day they stayed on the graound, partially covered with snow to simulate they are dead. The entire field west of Stalingrad was covered with dead soldiers bodies. He never seen so many dead bodies untill the horizont line. A lot of ravens eat from dead bodies. The secret of the succes escaping was "during the day don't move under any circumstances". One of them was shooted despite the fact he was warned:"don't move, any moving is discovered by russian! they will kill all of us!". Indeed a russian soldiers observed and shooted him. Also other russians open fire against dead bodies covered the area around romanian soldier shooted. After five nights they arrived on the romanian front line positions. In that winter, the narator of this facts was taken prisoneer and sent in Siberia. In 1946 he was freeed. In 2002 when he died he was still convinced in Russia is only one season: winter.

regards,
Iulian Arion, Gura-Vaii, Ialomita, Romania

[Athanaric]

Hi Athanarthic -

If you could provide a translation for this letter it would be most appreciated. I'm sure there are a number of forum members who would like to read it.

Best regards,

George

This is a a part of the translation:
Mister Fieldmarshall,

I have been informed and I am in deeply sad due to the report Gen. Steflea send to you and I reinforce my unplessure for the facts he have presented to you and also for incomplet solving that you have done (translation note: my apologise for my english but the idea is that Gen. Steflea send a report to von Manstein but he ignored and Marshall Antonescu send this letter to Manstein to reinforce the facts and to added some new facts to that report ).


1. Romania offered almost all trops with best oficiers, soldiers well trained the best military equipment we had together with german military forces to destroy the bolshevism, fullfill by this an european role, far away from roumanian national and political goals. This roumanian generosity does not be considered as an obligation without restrictions. Nobody may ask something else except we agreed to provide (translation note: nobody is allowed to ask more than we agree to give i.e nobody have the right or can invoke a right to take more). So far, between Germany and Romania does not exist a convention neither military nor political. As a ruler of Romania and as a military suprem commander, I have the right (i.e. I have the power) to forbid any acts that can compromise my prestige and autority I need to perform my duties. It is my obligation to protect againt any humiliation romanian soldiers and oficiers that they have been by incompatible treatment with honor and faith of my country (translation note: roumanian soldiers and oficiers had been humiliated when Antonescu wrote this letter).



2. You know very well the front line romanian military troops contribution,except operations from Odessa and Don river, have fight under yours direct orders from Dnipper to Kerch and Sevastopol. May be you know only a few about military operations under Gen Dragalina commands/orders and roumanian troops from Mt. Caucasus that save critical situations on Donets, last winter, but also their contributions to meet the actual targets on Don, Volga and MT. Caucasus. (transl. note: during '41-'42 winter, romanian troops save critical situations on Donets river and during 1942 they heve important contributions to meet the actual targets on Don, Volga and Mt. Caucasus). I do not exagerate if Ia say that without roumanian troops Crimeea could have been lost last winter and situation from Donets river could conduct to threatnes or loos of that part of Ukraine from the bend of Dniepper eastward.



3. The romanian forces from the second line have been promised to OKH during the crisis of the german military forces last winter, on the east front. I asked that romanian military forces to be equiped similar to german units and to be transported by rail-way close to the front line to preserve the resources. OKH agreed but did not proceed to keep promises.
-roumanian troops of the 3rd Army go on walk 500-600- km to ocupied their positions to the front line. In the same time germen troops have been transported by train. OKH ordered to roumanian commanders of great military units to trasport by trucks (vehicles) the german troops from rail-way stations to the front (traslation note: in fact OKH confiscated de romanian military transport vehicles to transport german troops and as a consequence, romanian troops gent on walk 500-600 km ).
-instead of modern and approppriate military equipment, roumanian units receive 22 tanks (trasl.note: 22 panzer iv, with 75 mm cannons ) and 2 companies antitank cannons (traslation note: less than 70 antitank cannon-artilery). OKH refused a group to alocate a reconn. group (aircraft unit that collect data about enemy). Majority of romanian divizions (not all of them) [trasl. note one divizion means 10 000 soldiers] received as antitank 6 cannons (guns) movable by horses [trans. note: one divizion has to fight on a front lengt of 20 km to 50 km with 6 cannons! ].


4. Because roumanian army is discredited, specially the 3rd Roumanian Army (RA), for you complete informations I inform you about the followings:
-The German Commandament (english: HQ or german OKH) by gentlemen Weichs and Hauffe is responsible because they engage this army (ie. the 3rd R.A) in inaproppriate conditions
- I have informed that the front line was on the Don river bank, that I considered favorable. We discovered by search and collect data that it is not the truth. The enemy had a bridge head length of 70 km and deep inside of 25 km, in the midlle of the front of the 3rd RA.
-All observations points were enemy control. I have asked to anihilate this previously our soldiers take fighting positions in that front sector. OKH promised to do this but they didn't. I asked that when roumanians enter into positions to cooperate with the forces are to be replaced (german and italian) to cooperate and together to reduce the bridge head. OKH promised but they didn't do something. Contrary as german units or italian units were replaced they desapere without to prevent roumanian when and where they are going to go. Roumanian troops didn't find any logistic organized: no antitank defense, no barbed wire web/network, no barracks, no forests , only a few villages, no natural resources, all food and grass for horses were depleted by the troops we replaced in that sector. Moreover they depled the deposits were in that sector, so roumanian had to provide supply from 120 km distance with starving horses.
-I asked that after romanian troops take positions, together to anihilate not only the bridge head but by common efforts to conquer from enemy the forest region from north bank of the Don river. In my opinions that was a key position of the entire front from the great Don bend. For enemy was an aproppriate location hide huge military forces for a large scale atack. The preaparadnes was unappropriate and the execution/performings too.

-The 3rd R.A was spread out on a 150 km of front. It was not possible to create a continously front line but only advanced isolated fighting positions (a batalion = about 200 soldiers had to keep a 4.5 km front length) with small reserves able to prevent only isolated enemy intruders. For entire 150 km length front, only 5 batalions and 2 divizioane (= about 20 pieces of artillery, I am not sure) from the 15 th infantry divizion and the 7th cavalry divizion on walking (i.e. cavalry without horses) equivalent with 3 batalions and 1 artilery divizion. After that arrived two german divisioane antitank, nr.611 and 670.
The situation become worse because the 13 th and the 14 th divizions were on the main direction of the soviet atack. Moreover from the moment they took position, they were under atack continously till soviet great offensive.

-The 14th romanian division was atacked 32 times day and nights from the midlle of september till 18 november often two succesive atacks. The 14th divison was atacked 17 times in the same time interval. in november the 19 th, the 13th infantry division have losses of 115 oficiers and 3648 fighters (soldiers). The 14th div have 98 oficiers losses and 2163 fighters.

-For counter-reactions against russian atack, in the sector of the 3rd R.A. it was concentrated the first roumanian armoured division and the 22nd and the 14th armoured german division, both of them with only 25% of nominal power (i.e. with only 25% of the number of tanks from a normal number of tanks).

Priviously to this, OKH promised the following reserves for the 3rd RA:4 german divizions close to the 3rd RA and 3 romanian divizions in Rostov region. Nothing was done. At the beging of november OKH orderd us to introduce in the front the 7th romanian infantry divizion instead of an italian divizion. Food, materials for fortifications, fuel, ammunition, defensive logistics was not at the expectations level. The data and documents are in the colonel Flik's report.


-The 4th Romanian Army, whose troops are fighting continously since January, exhousted its forces keeping initially with the 6th Army Corp a front length of 120 km (20 km to 50 km for fighting divizion)[trasl.note: it seem that because of lack of reserve, Antonescu prefered a larger front line for fighting divizion but keep in reserve another one and shifted: one time a divizion fighting and the another rested as reserve, one time the fighing divizion rested and the rested divizion sent to fight. I am not sure! ]. This keep the romanian troops in extreme conditions: fighting 90 to 100 days without interruption.
-In 20 november when the 4th RA was atacked, the sectors per divisions was decreased from 17 km to 33 km and you must taken into account that the combat capacity of the 1st, 2nd and 4th divizions was decreased to 50%.
I mention that the 6th Romanian military corp consumed from January to November 38 batalions of soldiers and 11 cavalry escadrons.
-Despite the facts the conditions were beter than the 3rd RA, lack of fuel decreased fighting capacity of the troops, close to colapsing (translat. note: they had to move on walking because the vehicles have no fuel). This is the case of the soldiers (look like shadows/ghosts) decorated, rewarded by Mr. General Hoth. The lack of grass/hay/food for horses of the 6th military Corp were the cause of the horses innanition (starvation). This is the explication of the heavy losses of materials and pieces of artilery on the Suoth-Staligrad front of the 4th RA sector (without force of horses the artilery were not possible to move).
It was know harsh conditions in the 4th RA sector: terrain without natural protections, without natural resources, difficult climatic conditions and ilness.

5. The russian offensive success is not due to the 3rd and the 4th Romanian Army inefficiency. It is due to the High Commandament (HQ) of the Army Group "B" haven't anticipated the front sector russian will atack, very clever moment and place of atack due the fact russian concentrated massive hidden forces in secret. The Russian High Commandament (i.e. STAVKA-translation note) atacked west and south from Stalingrad, regions that Army Group B had to payd more atention (i.e. STAVKA decided to atack theese region because they knew they are vulnerable because were neglected by Army Gropu B). The events proved theese. Delaying time in forming Don High Commandament because the military forces have been non-intelligent diverted to Stalingrad and Caucasus resistence against russians military forces, was contributing to this tragedy.

The prerequisitions and the leading process of the batlle from the Don Bend were under expectations. The final results of the batlle and the fact you have been appointed as a commander of a military structure that do not exist, (because the disaster have already happened) prove this.
I have presented (in person) Gen. Hauffe my intuition that the enemy will unleashed a large scale atack on the directions from FROLOV to ROSTOV and from BARMANKAK to KALACH theese two were most vulnerable for german-roumanian troops from the Don Bend, Stalingrad and Caucasus Montains.
Army Group Weichs and Gen. Hauffe have underestimated the enemy and they haven't take into account my hypothesis. They considered are exagerated.

7. In the last moment, I am informed that my soldiers who faught with bravery in the front line are now shooted by your soldiers in encirclement from Stalingrad. I am informed that our oficiers and under oficiers are desarmed by yours soldiers that have rasted far behind front line. I received reports that romanian troops that fight under german commanders are treat in an humiliation manner. To conquer the village Dubowkij, the Group Holidt ordered 7 times to the Romanian Army Corp 1 to atack, because they didn't win for the first time. This produce the following casualities: 40 oficiers, 15 under suboficiers and 1392 soldiers. What tactical and strategical importance had this village for the front, into justify this massacre?
Why they ask romanians theese sacrifices and during that the german army are protected? I reveal the case of detashment von Courbier at Odessa. They have been sent to support us in the siege of Odesssa, to broke the russian defensivve lines. That detashment was keep in reserve for two-three weeks. However after 2 hours on the beatlefield they gave up after they loos some oficiers and about 200 soldiers. They have gone motivating they do not appropriate logistic to contiune. One of the germans commander stop to say:"mea culpa" because I said the romanian infantry soldier is weak fighter. This procedures of abandon the beatle field invoking "lack of logistics" are allowed when are involved german soldiers, Gen. Holidt send romanian soldiers in an infantry atack without aproppriate artilery preparation/support. He send them in a massacre.

[Victor Nitu]

Hitler have promised Antonescu romanian soldiers will receive military equipment when they take the fighting positions nord of Stalingrad (the Don Bend) and south of Stalingrad (Kalmuk steppe). They received nothing: not anti-tank artilery, no wire barbed web constructed, no mined fields, no antitank and antipersonnel mines, no heavy artilery, no vehicles for troops transportation from Rostov to front line, no reserves. These are similar to italians and hungarians! Romanians tank hunters have used the antitank rockets launchers from 70m and 100m short distances. At he Don Bend the soviets have already creadted three bridgeheads: Serafimovich, Kletskaia and Deviatkin. Antonescu ask Hitler to destroy these bridge heads but Hitler refused. He considered the Antonescu demand is exagerated. The soviets lounch a huge artilery preparation and then 700 tanks supported by infantry pass over the romanian lines. Only about 70-80 tanks have been destroied by romanian tank hunters. Some romanian units remain encircled in three areas on the Don Bend Sector. In three days (november 19-22) romanian losses were 80 000 soldiers. The soviets reported 37 000 pows. They can be see in ww2 footage because have fur hats instead of helmets.

A steel helmet won't do you anygood at that temepratures. You would be frozen stiff before any action takes place. The turcana hat wasn't too practical though and from 1943 onwards it was replaced with a Russian style fur hat, with protective bands for the ears.

Getting back to the topic, there were no "rocket launchers" in the Romanian arsenal at that time. The main anti-tank weapons for the Romanian pioneers were the Molotov cocktail, grenades and AT mines. The 75 mm Pak battery assigned to each division of the 3rd Army were also effective when facing Soviet armor. However, they were too few and too dispersed.

Antonescu knew well how ill-equipped were the troops he sent to the front and even entered into conflict with general Iacobici, the chief of the General Staff, who did not want to send as soldiers as he could properly equip. The conflict ended when Iacobici was fired and replaced with the more docile Steflea, who had commanded "Antonescu's division" (the 3rd).

The main problems the 3rd Army faced at the Don's Bend were:
- lack of proper reserves, both in numbers and mobility
- poor logistics and as a result small stocks of ammo
- lack of in depth prepared defensive positions

Despite this and their vast superiority in numbers, the Soviets struggled harder than expected to brake through the front of the 13th and 14th Infantry Divisions. In fact, the actual breakthrough occured when the Soviet tank, mechanized and cavalry corps bypassed the Romanian resistance points and left the rifle divisions to deal with them. Under these circumstances, more reserves, especially mobile forces that could be quickly deployed to meet the advancing Soviet mechanized troops would have been of much more important than any number of 75 mm AT guns Germany could have spared. The same goes for larger stocks of ammo and proper supply lines, which would have helped the Romanian infantry keep the Soviet rifle divisions at bay much longer.

Regarding the veteran from your village, I am curious in what unit he served. The 23rd Regiment Ialomita was with the 10th Division, which at that time was in the Caucasus.

We have a number of interviews with veterans on our webpage (http://www.worldwar2.ro) and, if you want to take him an extended interview, we would more than gladly publish it.

[Athanaric]

Hitler have promised Antonescu romanian soldiers will receive military equipment when they take the fighting positions nord of Stalingrad (the Don Bend) and south of Stalingrad (Kalmuk steppe). They received nothing: not anti-tank artilery, no wire barbed web constructed, no mined fields, no antitank and antipersonnel mines, no heavy artilery, no vehicles for troops transportation from Rostov to front line, no reserves. These are similar to italians and hungarians! Romanians tank hunters have used the antitank rockets launchers from 70m and 100m short distances. At he Don Bend the soviets have already creadted three bridgeheads: Serafimovich, Kletskaia and Deviatkin. Antonescu ask Hitler to destroy these bridge heads but Hitler refused. He considered the Antonescu demand is exagerated. The soviets lounch a huge artilery preparation and then 700 tanks supported by infantry pass over the romanian lines. Only about 70-80 tanks have been destroied by romanian tank hunters. Some romanian units remain encircled in three areas on the Don Bend Sector. In three days (november 19-22) romanian losses were 80 000 soldiers. The soviets reported 37 000 pows. They can be see in ww2 footage because have fur hats instead of helmets.

A steel helmet won't do you anygood at that temepratures. You would be frozen stiff before any action takes place. The turcana hat wasn't too practical though and from 1943 onwards it was replaced with a Russian style fur hat, with protective bands for the ears.

Getting back to the topic, there were no "rocket launchers" in the Romanian arsenal at that time. The main anti-tank weapons for the Romanian pioneers were the Molotov cocktail, grenades and AT mines. The 75 mm Pak battery assigned to each division of the 3rd Army were also effective when facing Soviet armor. However, they were too few and too dispersed.

Antonescu knew well how ill-equipped were the troops he sent to the front and even entered into conflict with general Iacobici, the chief of the General Staff, who did not want to send as soldiers as he could properly equip. The conflict ended when Iacobici was fired and replaced with the more docile Steflea, who had commanded "Antonescu's division" (the 3rd).

The main problems the 3rd Army faced at the Don's Bend were:
- lack of proper reserves, both in numbers and mobility
- poor logistics and as a result small stocks of ammo
- lack of in depth prepared defensive positions

Despite this and their vast superiority in numbers, the Soviets struggled harder than expected to brake through the front of the 13th and 14th Infantry Divisions. In fact, the actual breakthrough occured when the Soviet tank, mechanized and cavalry corps bypassed the Romanian resistance points and left the rifle divisions to deal with them. Under these circumstances, more reserves, especially mobile forces that could be quickly deployed to meet the advancing Soviet mechanized troops would have been of much more important than any number of 75 mm AT guns Germany could have spared. The same goes for larger stocks of ammo and proper supply lines, which would have helped the Romanian infantry keep the Soviet rifle divisions at bay much longer.

Regarding the veteran from your village, I am curious in what unit he served. The 23rd Regiment Ialomita was with the 10th Division, which at that time was in the Caucasus.

We have a number of interviews with veterans on our webpage (http://www.worldwar2.ro) and, if you want to take him an extended interview, we would more than gladly publish it.

I tried to find out the name of the regiments they fought. I was not able because they are passed over. However some search I could tray in military archives, if it is possible. For Don Bend and Kalmuk steppe, new recruits from Romania were sent on the front in autumn 1942. Also from Crimeea romanian troops were sent in Stalingrad area. In that winter romanian soldiers fought in german units, under german command. Of course there were romanian officiers gave direct orders to romanian troops. In his response to Antonescu, Erick von Manstain mentioned this as temporary acts of command. Many western historians (english and americans) consider after Stalingrad encirclement, the romanian troops in that area ceased to exists. Romanian troops who escaped from local encirclement, from Don Bend and the Kalmuk Steppe have been incorporeted in the german units have tried to broke the siege of Stalingrad (Gen. Hoth). Gruparea Aeriana de Lupta (in an ad-hoc translation: Aircraft Fighting Group - AFG) was involve in actions together with Luftwaffe against soviets. In entire war against soviets AFG launched 1.927.700 tons of bombs [source: Alesandru Dutu, Florica Dobre, Leonida Loghin, Armata Romana in cel de al doilea razboi mondial. 1941-1945, Editura Univers Enciclopedic, Bucuresti, 2001, pag. 40].