The Polish Campaign

[4444]

I haven't got any details here on the May 1939 protocols

Neither have I. Apart from the details, I remember the French were obliged to undertake limited ground offensive on the 3rd day following the mobilisation, and to launch a full-scale ground offensive on the 15th day following the mobilisation. I do not remember much about the air force stipulations, but I think the French were obliged to fly bombing raids.

Will try to find something more in few weeks. For the time being, a brief 5 mins internet search returned only http://2ndww.tripod.com/Poland/politics.html but I think they are slightly misleading here and there.

[Fredd]

"I would rather have a German division in front of me than a French one behind me."
--- General George S. Patton

[Groscurth]

[quote="Fredd"]"I would rather have a German division in front of me than a French one behind me."
--- General George S. Patton[/quote]

hmm, ever heared of the Legion? Remember the first important tactical raids at dessertstorm and the way they performed in comparission with US troops.

The mountaintroops to are very highly qualified and better then most of there EU and US colleges in mountain fighting.

[Freiritter]

Thanks, Pirx.

[Fredd]

Thanks for an excellent link 4444.

Could you tell me why France and England declared the after 3 days? And did diplomatic agreement's provinsions require French and England first to issue an ultimatum? And why French wanted to give Hitler 4 days of free hand in Poland. My quess is the Great Statesman - Daladier counted on following. Within 4 days Hitler would seize Gdansk (Danzing) Bydgoszcz (Bromberg) and Silesia. After that, after accomplishing his goals he would sit with us to the table (like did in Muchen) and we with Chamberlain one more save Europe.

As for as somebody said limited Saar French'offensive' on 7th. As far as I recollect French Army moveg about 7 kilometers, when reached a minefield and German's unit. Germans opened fire and French soldier - how to say... fell back. One might add they were falling back rather quick

As for huge French cassualties in spring 1940 war (what was supposedely caused by agreement with Poland) No it was caused by short-sighted, ill-advised policy toward Hitler and Germany.

BTW. I admire Napoleon and I appreciate the fact that he wanted to give back Poles freedom (from own political reasons, noneless he did). I appreciate and respect all French died in WWII. Its nothing personal, I like French, I met few of them - very decent people. But matter of fact is that in the early stage of the war they political leaders turned out to be cowards (for what were admired by the solid part of society). Thanks God there was somebody like Churchill. I just imaged Daladier telling "I promise you blood, tears and sweat'

[Freiritter]

BTW, Pirx, what happened in the border battle?

[Richard Murphy]

Andy H. is going to kill me for this (He sent me his copy and I lost it!!) but Pallum's (sp?) "Then and Now" (I think its called "Blitzkrieg") book on the campaign in the West is one of the best sources, but, going purely from memory, basically the French made tentattive advances across the Saar, but halted as resistance stiffened as they reached the Westwall 's outposts.

To be fair, the French didn't take supporting Poland (With whom they'd held a treaty of mutual support for far longer than the UK did.) very seriously. It was obvious, to them, that they could do little to support them, though countless wargames held since have proven them wrong.

Accussing the French of timidity, in this regard, is fair comment. Accussing them (Especially the rank & file.) of cowardice is not.

Regards from the Park,

Rich

[sid guttridge]

Hi 4444,

Presuming your "after mobilisation" means after mobilisation was ordered rather than achieved, what you describe (limited offensive three days after mobilisation and full scale offensive on 15th day after mobilisation) coincides quite closely with what I know of French mobilisation plans and what actually happened.

The Sarre/Saar attack (or limited offensive) was launched on 7 September, four days after France declared war.

France needed 14 days to fully mobilise (see my earlier post). If France was to have launched a full scale offensive 15 days after it declared war this would have been 18 September. This was four days after the Polish Government had opened negotiations on the terms of its flight to Romania and the same day that it and its military High Command fled their own country and ordered all their forces to head for neutral borders.

If the Poles were no longer trying to hold their own country I think the French have an arguable case that they were absolved from any obligation to lay down masses of their own lives by launching a major offensive in support of a cause the Poles had already given up on.

Of course this all begs a lot of questions to which I do not know the answer, such as:

When did the French order full mobilisation? It might have been before they declared war.

Would the French have launched a major offensive if the Polish front had still been holding?

Did they make practical preparations for a major offensive after 15 days?

The rapid collapse of Poland left France in a very exposed position. It was facing a Germany with nearly twice its metropolitan population virtually alone. The British could put only four or five divisions into Europe in September 1939 - about 5% of the mobilised French Army - and would take two years to field a continental-scale army. The French were very cautious in September 1939, but one can see why.

I look forward to definitive details of French obligations.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Fredd]

So, what important reasons prevented French from ordered the mobilisation when international situation was aggravated? Moreover they insisted on they ally Poland not to doing so (ordered mobilisation). Hint maybe WAS AFRAID that such step will provoke Mr Hitler. How it was called 'appeasement' maybe?

Calling that 7 km long march an offensive is rubbish - or obviously French meaning the word 'offensive' differs widely from the meaning of the rest of the word. If you any doubt ask Germans, Britons, American, Russian what does 'offensive' means

[sid guttridge]

Hi Fredd,

The British and French had to wait for their ultimata to Germany to expire and for their parliaments to vote. However, this does not necessarily mean that their mobilisation was not under way during the two days between 1 September and 3 September. Indeed, the British Fleet mobilised on 31 August.

Furthermore, even if the French and British had declared war on 1 September the two extra days could have done nothing for Poland because its effective resistance lasted only about two and a half weeks - far too short a time for significant French, let alone British military pressure to be brought to bear.

Cheers,

Sid.

[sid guttridge]

Hi Fredd,

Polish mobilisation is a Polish responsibility, whatever the French may have wanted.

Furthermore, the first Polish divisions to be mobilised were called up in March 1939, in response to the occupation of Bohemia-Moravia and Memel, and were never stood down between then and 1 September. These were the very first formations mobilised by anyone in Europe, Axis or Allied, in the run up to WWII. The Poles were clearly not restricted by any French timetable for their mobilisation.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Fredd]

Thanks you Sid!

I respect your opinions - my point of view is that Hitler must have known that French and England would done nothing to fullfill its duty according to guarranties to Poland.

Let's assume we are Hitler and its late summer of 1939. We border with Poland (which we plan to invade) and French which have a really powerfull army. So would you, as a reasonable man, exposed your west border by sending most of our tanks, planes, and so on to the east border?

My question is- still unaswered why didn't French mobilise its army in say August. What prevented them? My answer is because don't plan to enter a war at all. They hoped war can be avoided by cost of another appesament of Hitler this time Poland was to cede some land to Germany.

The Poles were clearly not restricted by any French timetable for their mobilisation.

You are 100% right - it was very serious mistake by Polish authorities. For which they are the ones to blame. I wrote about it as an illustration of French attitude toward Poland and incoming war.

Best regards!
And I am saying it one more time, my view of past events doesn't influence my current opinion of France and French!

[Pirx]

BTW, Pirx, what happened in the border battle?

As You know, wehrmacht didn't attack along whole front line (over 1900 km) but in few points. In north was it railway from Germany trough "Corridor" to East Preussen (battle near town Chojnice), from east preussen in direction to Warsaw (battle near Wizna).
Main strike was from south-west, where army Krakow and Lodz has direct contact (battle near Mokra). And from south trough Jablonka pass.
Remember that wehrmacht has no experience, how their tactics will work, so OKW was a little carefull. German division was formed in 4 waves. Wave 1st, and 2nd were first line, best equiped and trained. 3rd and 4th were usually formed by reservist and veterans from IWW. Between 1 and 3rd September, Germans try break through polish lines in this places. September 3rd they achieve a braekthrough. In the same day Polish HQ ordered to withdraw on Wisla-San line. So rest of campaign was a race between Poles and Germans. Unfortunatly without air cover, with poor comunication, and thousands civilians on roads, they has no chanse to regroup forces.
This battles between 1st and 3rd september has common name "Border battle".

[sid guttridge]

Hi Fredd,

Your question presumes that Hitler was a "reasonable man". He was not. He was a high-stakes risk taker. He had already tried to mount a coup in Austria in 1934, to which even Mussolini was opposed, when he had only 10 under-equipped divisions. He reoccupied the Rhineland in 1936 when he had some 30 divisions on paper but actually not a single one fit for battle, while France could mobilise at least 80. He had been prepared to go to war over the Sudetenland in September 1938 when his army was relatively much weaker than it would be a year later when he attacked Poland.

It should be remembered that WWI had become a continent-wide conflict because of a series of inflexible, irreversible mobilisations by Austria-Hungary, Russia, Germany and France. As a result, in the 1930s all countries (presumably Hitler's Germany excepted) were acutely aware of the dangers of irreversible mobilisations making war inevitable. The French presumably did not want another world war to break out simply because somebody's premature mobilisation triggered another irreversible landslide to war.

For all its caution in 1939, it must be remembered that France paid a terrible price in blood and national humiliation in 1940 for honouring its obligation to Poland by declaring war.

I wouldn't describe myself as a great admirer of France, but I do think that the difficulties of its position in 1939 are not widely recognised and that the faults of the British and Poles are often overlooked.

Cheers,

Sid.

[4444]

Will try to find something more in few weeks

Zaloga turns out to be an invaluable source again (The Birth of Blitzkrieg, Osprey): “Polish and French general staff hold meetings in France, during which France pledges major offensive against Germany two weeks after an invasion” [p. 11]; “although the Poles left France convinced that the French army would launch a major attack against Germany involving between 35 and 38 divisions within two weeks of an attack on Poland, in fact Gamelin and the French general staff had no detailed plan for such an operation” [p. 19]