to Timo
Not really. There were reports that Wittmann was taken down by 1st Polish Armored Division (and also by 4th Canadian Armored Division or 33rd British Independent Armored Brigade - all of them reported destruction of this tank). You probably know that there was also theory that Wittman was finished by attack aircraft Hawker "Typhoon" MkIB of RAF, by use of HE rocket (no battlefield reports of this kind however, but the way the Wittmann's tank was destroyed resembled very much bomb raid).
Finally it was decided (upon battle reports and analysis of wreckage) that it was done by fire from tanks of "A" Squadron of Northamptonshire Yeomanry, precisely most likely by "Firefly" commanded by Sergeant Gordon (gunner - Trooper Joe Ekins). So all merits for destruction of the most skillful tank commander of WWII goes to Brits (and not to Poles unfortunatelly ;o) )..
The Polish Campaign
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Panzermeyer
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From Fall Weiss to Fall Gelb - evolution of the Heer
FROM FALL WEISS TO FALL GELB - evolution of the Heer
A. POLAND – FALL WEISS
TOTAL HEER TROOPS 26th August – 1st September 1939 :
7 Panzer Divisionen, 4 Leichten Divisionen, 4 ID (mot), 3 Geb.Div. and 87 ID = 105 divisions
On 1st September 1939, the German Army is still immature, it lacks some equipments and is far from being organized around the Blitzkrieg concept. The chain of command is still very classical and the armored units have not the importance they will gain later. 5 Korps include motorized units but there is no specific group dedicated to large mechanized operations beyond the tactical level. All the Panzer Divisionen and Leichten Divisionen are dispersed. Only the 10. Armee has in some extend some concentrated mechanized troops, the Panzerwaffe of September 1939 is not directed towards a specific Schwehrpunkt of the front.
The Panzerwaffe in Poland is mainly used in localised actions and not in big strategical manoeuvres with several Korps working together. The Panzer Divisionen and Leichten Divisionen are then particular because of their fire power and mobility but in Poland their role is not the one they will show the world later. They made no fantastic breakthroughs, some Infanterie Division did as well without being motorised like the 10.ID and the 17.ID (XIII. AK, 8. Armee) which pierced the Polish lines without armor support between 1st and 4th September 1939. On 6th September they had reached Lodz at 150 km from their departure line.
The size of the Panzerwaffe is too limited in 1939 and its practical use is not yet well defined, the old school favouring the classical warfare is also still powerful in the German HQ.
Once the breakthroughs achieved, the German units led a classical Kesselschlacht war and the mechanized units were often badly used, completely dispersed, often engaged in urban warfare (the 4.PzD was used to enter in Warsaw in 9th September and had 60 damaged/destroyed tanks in this type of combat not in favour of armored units) and they led often front attacks instead of outflanking their enemy.
In the Infanterie Divisionen the men were 20-25 years old in the 1. and 2. Wellen (70 divisions) but sometimes 35-45 years old in the 3. and 4. Wellen (35 divisions), especially in the Landwehr. The training and equipments were very good for the 1. and 2. Wellen but largely insufficient for the 3. and 4. Wellen sometimes issued with WW1 equipments. The German infantry is also massively horse drawn / foot infantry and there is usually 1 motor vehicle for 2 to 6 horses according to the units that are considered. In 1939, this infantry led most of the battles and 42 of the infantry divisions remained to face the West front. In 1939, the German army is still very classical but in maturation and it already includes several innovations like the organization of the Panzer Divisionen :
• The Panzerwaffe formed in 1934 includes 7 Panzer Divisionen and 4 Leichten Divisionen (light armored divisions) beside the 4 ID (mot). It is the most powerful element of the Heer but only 16% of the tank are armed with a 3.7cm or a 7.5cm gun, 84% of the tanks are PzI, PzII or command tanks. At the tactical, mobility and flexibility level the German mechanized units were superior to their valiant opponents but the tank / infantry / artillery / air support cooperation was not yet completely mature even if already tested in some extend in Spain.
• The close air support provided by the Ju-87s and Hs-123s.
• The grossly omnipresent tactical air reconnaissance played a major role in Poland and later in France : spotter aircrafts (Hs-126s and Fi-156s) were accompanying the troops during their advance to communicate the enemy positions and direct the supports. Reconnaissance squadrons were detached to the Korps, Armee and even sometimes divisions.
In Poland and particularly later in France, Greece and Yugoislavia, Blitzkrieg tactics were used. In Poland the battle turned into something that greatly resembled the Kesselschlachten from World War I even if more motorized. On the other hand, the Blitzkrieg proper was revealed later to the Allies.
POLISH ARMY 1939
About 52 divisions (39 infantry divisions, 11 cavalry brigades, 2 armored brigades and independent units)
995 tanks and armored cars
About 3500 field artillery pieces
About 400 planes
1) Infantry
30 infantry divisions + 9 reserve infantry divisions
Each with :
3 infantry regiments
1 light artillery regiment
1 heavy artillery battalion (12 pieces)
1 engineer battalion
1 transmission company
1 AA battery
Each infantry regiment contains :
3x infantry battalions
1x MG battalion
Total : 84 infantry regiments + 6 mountain infantry regiments
2) Cavalry
11 cavalry brigades
Each with :
3 to 4 cavalry regiments
1 light artillery squadron (12 pieces)
1 AA battery
1 engineer company
several service units
Each cavalry regiment contains :
4x squadron
1x MG company
several service units
Total : 38 cavalry regiments
3) Armored units
2 armored/motorized brigades, each with :
1x Vickers light tank company
2x recon TK tankettes company
Independent units :
2x 7TP tank battalions
2x 7TP tank companies
1x Renault R35 battalion
3x FT17 tank companies
11 cavalry brigades and 18 infantry divisions had also 1 recon company with WZ armored cars or TK, TKS or TKF tankettes.
Total :
50x Renault R35 (French 37mm SA18 gun)
135x 7TP (20 with two MG-armed turrets, 115 with a good 37mm Bofors gun)
102x FT17 (about 70 with a French 37mm SA18 gun)
34x Vickers tanks (47mm Vickers QF gun)
574x TK, TKS or TKF tankettes (24 TKS tankettes were armed with 20mm wz.38 FK-A gun)
100x armored cars (of those were armed with the French 37mm SA18 gun : 6 Peugeot, 30 armored halftracks Citroën-Kégresse wz.28, 10 armored car wz.29 close to the French Laffly 50AM, 30 armored cars wz.34 based on a Citroën-Kégresse chassis).
That makes a total of 995 armored vehicles. 269 tanks, 24 tankettes and 76 armored cars equipped with 20mm, 37mm or 47mm guns = 369 vehicles armed with guns. The 37mm SA18 gun is the same than the one of the majority of the French tanks in 1940 (FT17c, R35, FCM36, most of the Hotchkiss H35 and H39).
4) Artillery
Apart from the divisional artillery there were also
23x heavy artillery groups
3x super heavy artillery groups
20x siege artillery platoons
The AT artillery is present as
- platoons in the cavalry brigades
- companies in the infantry regiments
Total :
Field Artillery :
1374x 75 mm Mle1897 French guns
466x 75mm Mle1902 Russian guns
900x SKODA 100 mm howitzers
254x 105 mm Schneider French guns
43x 120 mm guns
340x 155 mm Schneider French howitzers
27x very heavy 220 mm mortars
AT artillery :
1200x 37 mm Bofors guns
AA artillery :
306x 40 mm Bofors guns
156x 75 mm Bofors guns
POLISH LOSSES :
200,000 losses (66,300 KIA, 133,700 WIA and MIA)
787,000 prisoners
188 aircrafts + many escaped to Rumania
ENGAGED BY GERMANY
About 63 divisions
2771 tanks (16% of the tank armed with a 3.7cm or a 7.5cm gun)
About 5000 field artillery pieces
About 3000 planes
GERMAN LOSSES :
40,390 losses (13,110 KIA, 27,280 MIA and WIA) + Soviets (3379 KIA)
285 aircrafts definitely destroyed (+ 279 damaged ones)
218 tanks definitely destroyed (8.5% of the engaged tanks)
B. THE PHONEY WAR
Fall Weiss allowed to test some Blitzkrieg principles at the tactical level and the German HQ wanted to upscale this concept. The Germans did more than replace losses between the Polish and French Campaigns. They created new divisions and improved their army in terms of equipments, chain of command and doctrine. The 8 months of the phoney war gave them the time to adapt and develop the German army. In September 1939 on the western front, France + BEF + Belgium + Netherlands together could align 125 divisions. The Heer with its 105 divisions had to increase its size and power.
• At the eve of Fall Gelb there are 153 Heer Divisions and also 2 Waffen-SS ID (mot). The Leichten Divisionen had been transformed into Panzer Divisionen. Created in 1936, these Leichten-Divisionen were based on the model of the French DLM. In Germany like in France, the cavalry wanted its own tanks because it was frightened to loose influence. After Poland the 1., 2., 3. and 4. Leichten-Divisionen became the 6., 7., 3. and 4. Panzer-Divisionen and the 5. PzD has been created. The German army in May 1940 had therefore 10 Panzer Divisionen, 6 ID (mot) and 1 newly created Kavalerie division. The armored units were better armed (more tanks were armed with 3.7cm and 7.5cm guns (16% - 452 tanks - in Poland and 36% - 914 tanks - in France) and also better armored (for example when you look at the Panzer IVs, more Ausf. A/B in Poland and more Ausf.C/D in France).
• The 3. and 4. Wellen Infanterie Division from the Polish campaign were largely improved, younger men were enlisted and the equipment was modernized. In 1940, 15 of these divisions were frontline units.
• The chain of command is also modified and modernized. During Fall Weiss, the German army lacked some specific HQ especially for armored units, the chain of command is very traditional. For Fall Gelb a new, more flexible chain of command was developed and could already be used during operation Weserübung.
C. FALL GELB (10th May – 25th June)
TOTAL HEER TROOPS 10th May – 25th June 1940 :
10 PzD, 4 ID (mot), 1 Kav.Div., 3 Geb.Div., 126 ID and 7 Landesschützen Div. = 153 divisions
+ Waffen SS divisions :
Totenkopf (mot), SS Verfügung (mot)
A complete new HQ and ad-hoc structure is created with Gruppe Kleist for the initial phase, on the basis of the XXII. Armee Korps (mot) HQ. Gruppe Kleist includes 3 motorized Korps directed toward the Schwehrpunkt of the Ardennes. They contain 3 ID (mot) and 50% of the armored divisions (5 Panzer Divisionen). Unlike in Poland, the mechanized elements are well concentrated and have a real strategic role. To add to that, the 5.PzD and 7.PzD of the XV. Armee Korps (mot) are only several kilometers north of Gruppe Kleist. Therefore 7 Panzer Divisonen are concentrated against the weak area of the Ardennes. It is the very first time that such means are concentrated. In 4 days and 170 km, Gruppe Kleist crossed the Ardennes and established a bridgehead beyond the Meuse river. The Channel is reached on 20th May 1940, trapping many allied units.
Fall Gelb is also the first operation seeing the extensive use of the ad-hoc formations called Kampfgruppen : inter-arms cooperation at the tactical level to quickly give an answer to an evolving situation. These formations give a superior adaptability to the German army. The French army will be able to organize such units in June when leaving the obsession of trying all the time to reorganize a continuous front and rather organizing inter-arms strongpoints.
An other decisive element during Fall Gelb is the so-called "Auftragstaktik" giving a big autonomy and individual initiative to the subaltern officers. The operations were also often led by high ranking officers goinf directly on the front to have a real idea of what was happening on the field. This way of thinking the command tasks was at first introduced by general von Seeckt (commander of the Heeresleitung from 1919 to 1926). The chain of command is therefore less centralized and more flexible whereas in Poland if the roots of the change were already there, the command structures were very traditional. Add to that the wide and wise use of important communication means (many radio sets), a well organized logistics and you have a powerful army.
The western campaign of 1940 can be seen as the best example of Blitzkrieg carried out, also later against Greece and Yugoslavia but it couldn't work anymore in Russia which was too big. In Poland it was much more a classical Kesselschlacht and the too weak Leichten-Divisionen where after that transformed in Panzer-Divisionen. A large faked attack was undertaken in Belgium and in the Netherlands where paratroopers and airborne troops were used to secure important points. France and United-Kingdom sent their best forces in Belgium and in the Netherlands. Later, the main forces attacked in an unexpected place where only second-rate divisions resisted them. Here the German Panzer Divisionen pushed on almost without concern for their flanks, leaving the cleaning up to the infantry. Meanwhile, the Luftwaffe attacked as support for the Panzers and the infantry.
The Polish army fought very bravely with less means than the French army but too often I have heard that the Germans suffered more losses in Poland than in France, or that the French army didn't fought and ran to surrender which is totally wrong. The German means and tactics were also superior in May 1940 than in September 1939 which seems to be easily forgotten.
The Polish army suffered grossly 200,000 losses in 35 days (5714 per day) and the French army about 300,000 losses in 45 days (6667 per day), both have fought bravely and Poland was attacked during the same time by the Soviets (France at the end of June by the Italians).
The idea that France did not fight is just false, it was defeated in shame because quickly for the country as it was seen in 1939, yes, but the soldiers were courageous and died too for their homeland.
In 1940, in 45 days, the French army lost 100,000 KIA on the battlefield. In the same time the Germans lost 45,000 KIA. Despite lacks in the high command, the French soldiers did resist to the enemy each time they were well commanded on the front.
The French fought very well as companies, battalions and sometimes divisions (if it was a good one) but generally horribly as armies when facing the Panzerwaffe because it was too fast but they were not worse than the German infantry divisions ... doctrine (conception and use of tanks), communication issues etc. The French Army didn't loose because of a lack of material (though a high lack of radios, bombers, especially AA weapons and AA ammunitions) and its armament was as good as the German one, the reasons are both the doctrine at the military level and several political decisions as well as the German innovations.
ENGAGED BY GERMANY
135 divisions (10 Panzerdivisionen, 6 motorized infantry divisions : 2.ID (mot), 13.ID (mot), 20.ID (mot), 29.ID (mot), SS Totenkopf (mot), SS Verfügung (mot), 1 cavalry division partly motorized)
About 4500 planes
About 7500 field artillery pieces
About 2600 tanks (2542 according to Jentz), 185 SP guns and 1200 armored cars
GERMAN AND ITALIAN LOSSES (whole western campaign until the end of the battle of France) :
- 156,492 losses (27,074 KIA, 111,034 WIA, 18,384 MIA). This first figure established on 25th June 1940 has been corrected later to 45,218 German KIA (with the MIAs) + 111,034 WIA.
- 6100 Italian losses in the French Alps in a few days (642 KIAs, 2691 WIAs, 2151 frozen men and 616 POWs)
- 1236 planes definitely destroyed (+ 323 damaged) (about 500-600 victories for the French air force).
- 839 tanks definitely destroyed (33% of the tanks engaged according to Jentz)
ENGAGED BY FRANCE
• the equivalent of 13 divisions on the Maginot line
• 6 divisions initially left to face the Italians
• 77 divisions in the north east (with 3 DLM and 3 DCR : 6 armored /mechanized divisions + 5 DLC partially motorized/mechanized but half of them are very weak) : none of these divisions were the equivalent in power and combined arms that a Panzer Division.
A total of about 96 French divisions + 9 British divisions = 105 divisions (+the Belgian and Dutch divisions) facing a total of 135 German divisions.
On 5th June 1940, after the first losses and encirclements of the northern armies, there were only 43 French divisions left, facing more than 100 German divisions !
About 2100 planes
About 9,000 field artillery pieces
About 3200 tanks but only about 2500 "modern" ones and about 600 armored cars
FRENCH LOSSES :
- 302,000 losses (100,000 KIA and about 202,000 WIA)
- 1,450,000 prisoners after the armistice
- 892 aircrafts (the big majority because of the Flak)
- no data for the AFVs ... 2000+ destroyed/abandoned or captured.
Allied losses according to Karl-Heinz Frieser (Oberst Bundeswehr, MFGA) in his book "Blitzkrieg Legende" and Gérard Saint-Martin in "L'arme blindée française" :
• Belgian losses in 19 days : 7,500 KIA, 15,850 WIA
• Luxembourg : no resistance
• Dutch losses in 6 days : 2,890 KIA, 6,889 WIA
• British losses in 26 days : 3,457 KIA, 13,602 WIA, 3,267 MIA
• French losses in 45 days : 92,000 KIA and about 210,000 WIA (other common sources indicate 120,000 "fallen for France" but this figure includes POWs who died in German hospitals or camps as well as some civilians KIA – grossly about 100,000 French troops died during Fall Gelb).
The Swiss historian Eddy Bauer says also that the Germans lost much more men in the second part of the western campaign, in France the resistance was harder when time advanced.
156,492 German losses (KIA, MIA, WIA) in 45 days, that's 3477 losses per day but in fact the French resistance was all days harder : 2499 German losses per day between the 10th May and the 3rd June but 4762 German losses per day between the 5th and the 24th June. You can compare that to the 4506 German losses per day during operation Barbarossa from 22nd June to 10th December 1941. Once again the western campaign was much more deadly than the common myth admits it.
Regards,
David
A. POLAND – FALL WEISS
TOTAL HEER TROOPS 26th August – 1st September 1939 :
7 Panzer Divisionen, 4 Leichten Divisionen, 4 ID (mot), 3 Geb.Div. and 87 ID = 105 divisions
On 1st September 1939, the German Army is still immature, it lacks some equipments and is far from being organized around the Blitzkrieg concept. The chain of command is still very classical and the armored units have not the importance they will gain later. 5 Korps include motorized units but there is no specific group dedicated to large mechanized operations beyond the tactical level. All the Panzer Divisionen and Leichten Divisionen are dispersed. Only the 10. Armee has in some extend some concentrated mechanized troops, the Panzerwaffe of September 1939 is not directed towards a specific Schwehrpunkt of the front.
The Panzerwaffe in Poland is mainly used in localised actions and not in big strategical manoeuvres with several Korps working together. The Panzer Divisionen and Leichten Divisionen are then particular because of their fire power and mobility but in Poland their role is not the one they will show the world later. They made no fantastic breakthroughs, some Infanterie Division did as well without being motorised like the 10.ID and the 17.ID (XIII. AK, 8. Armee) which pierced the Polish lines without armor support between 1st and 4th September 1939. On 6th September they had reached Lodz at 150 km from their departure line.
The size of the Panzerwaffe is too limited in 1939 and its practical use is not yet well defined, the old school favouring the classical warfare is also still powerful in the German HQ.
Once the breakthroughs achieved, the German units led a classical Kesselschlacht war and the mechanized units were often badly used, completely dispersed, often engaged in urban warfare (the 4.PzD was used to enter in Warsaw in 9th September and had 60 damaged/destroyed tanks in this type of combat not in favour of armored units) and they led often front attacks instead of outflanking their enemy.
In the Infanterie Divisionen the men were 20-25 years old in the 1. and 2. Wellen (70 divisions) but sometimes 35-45 years old in the 3. and 4. Wellen (35 divisions), especially in the Landwehr. The training and equipments were very good for the 1. and 2. Wellen but largely insufficient for the 3. and 4. Wellen sometimes issued with WW1 equipments. The German infantry is also massively horse drawn / foot infantry and there is usually 1 motor vehicle for 2 to 6 horses according to the units that are considered. In 1939, this infantry led most of the battles and 42 of the infantry divisions remained to face the West front. In 1939, the German army is still very classical but in maturation and it already includes several innovations like the organization of the Panzer Divisionen :
• The Panzerwaffe formed in 1934 includes 7 Panzer Divisionen and 4 Leichten Divisionen (light armored divisions) beside the 4 ID (mot). It is the most powerful element of the Heer but only 16% of the tank are armed with a 3.7cm or a 7.5cm gun, 84% of the tanks are PzI, PzII or command tanks. At the tactical, mobility and flexibility level the German mechanized units were superior to their valiant opponents but the tank / infantry / artillery / air support cooperation was not yet completely mature even if already tested in some extend in Spain.
• The close air support provided by the Ju-87s and Hs-123s.
• The grossly omnipresent tactical air reconnaissance played a major role in Poland and later in France : spotter aircrafts (Hs-126s and Fi-156s) were accompanying the troops during their advance to communicate the enemy positions and direct the supports. Reconnaissance squadrons were detached to the Korps, Armee and even sometimes divisions.
In Poland and particularly later in France, Greece and Yugoislavia, Blitzkrieg tactics were used. In Poland the battle turned into something that greatly resembled the Kesselschlachten from World War I even if more motorized. On the other hand, the Blitzkrieg proper was revealed later to the Allies.
POLISH ARMY 1939
About 52 divisions (39 infantry divisions, 11 cavalry brigades, 2 armored brigades and independent units)
995 tanks and armored cars
About 3500 field artillery pieces
About 400 planes
1) Infantry
30 infantry divisions + 9 reserve infantry divisions
Each with :
3 infantry regiments
1 light artillery regiment
1 heavy artillery battalion (12 pieces)
1 engineer battalion
1 transmission company
1 AA battery
Each infantry regiment contains :
3x infantry battalions
1x MG battalion
Total : 84 infantry regiments + 6 mountain infantry regiments
2) Cavalry
11 cavalry brigades
Each with :
3 to 4 cavalry regiments
1 light artillery squadron (12 pieces)
1 AA battery
1 engineer company
several service units
Each cavalry regiment contains :
4x squadron
1x MG company
several service units
Total : 38 cavalry regiments
3) Armored units
2 armored/motorized brigades, each with :
1x Vickers light tank company
2x recon TK tankettes company
Independent units :
2x 7TP tank battalions
2x 7TP tank companies
1x Renault R35 battalion
3x FT17 tank companies
11 cavalry brigades and 18 infantry divisions had also 1 recon company with WZ armored cars or TK, TKS or TKF tankettes.
Total :
50x Renault R35 (French 37mm SA18 gun)
135x 7TP (20 with two MG-armed turrets, 115 with a good 37mm Bofors gun)
102x FT17 (about 70 with a French 37mm SA18 gun)
34x Vickers tanks (47mm Vickers QF gun)
574x TK, TKS or TKF tankettes (24 TKS tankettes were armed with 20mm wz.38 FK-A gun)
100x armored cars (of those were armed with the French 37mm SA18 gun : 6 Peugeot, 30 armored halftracks Citroën-Kégresse wz.28, 10 armored car wz.29 close to the French Laffly 50AM, 30 armored cars wz.34 based on a Citroën-Kégresse chassis).
That makes a total of 995 armored vehicles. 269 tanks, 24 tankettes and 76 armored cars equipped with 20mm, 37mm or 47mm guns = 369 vehicles armed with guns. The 37mm SA18 gun is the same than the one of the majority of the French tanks in 1940 (FT17c, R35, FCM36, most of the Hotchkiss H35 and H39).
4) Artillery
Apart from the divisional artillery there were also
23x heavy artillery groups
3x super heavy artillery groups
20x siege artillery platoons
The AT artillery is present as
- platoons in the cavalry brigades
- companies in the infantry regiments
Total :
Field Artillery :
1374x 75 mm Mle1897 French guns
466x 75mm Mle1902 Russian guns
900x SKODA 100 mm howitzers
254x 105 mm Schneider French guns
43x 120 mm guns
340x 155 mm Schneider French howitzers
27x very heavy 220 mm mortars
AT artillery :
1200x 37 mm Bofors guns
AA artillery :
306x 40 mm Bofors guns
156x 75 mm Bofors guns
POLISH LOSSES :
200,000 losses (66,300 KIA, 133,700 WIA and MIA)
787,000 prisoners
188 aircrafts + many escaped to Rumania
ENGAGED BY GERMANY
About 63 divisions
2771 tanks (16% of the tank armed with a 3.7cm or a 7.5cm gun)
About 5000 field artillery pieces
About 3000 planes
GERMAN LOSSES :
40,390 losses (13,110 KIA, 27,280 MIA and WIA) + Soviets (3379 KIA)
285 aircrafts definitely destroyed (+ 279 damaged ones)
218 tanks definitely destroyed (8.5% of the engaged tanks)
B. THE PHONEY WAR
Fall Weiss allowed to test some Blitzkrieg principles at the tactical level and the German HQ wanted to upscale this concept. The Germans did more than replace losses between the Polish and French Campaigns. They created new divisions and improved their army in terms of equipments, chain of command and doctrine. The 8 months of the phoney war gave them the time to adapt and develop the German army. In September 1939 on the western front, France + BEF + Belgium + Netherlands together could align 125 divisions. The Heer with its 105 divisions had to increase its size and power.
• At the eve of Fall Gelb there are 153 Heer Divisions and also 2 Waffen-SS ID (mot). The Leichten Divisionen had been transformed into Panzer Divisionen. Created in 1936, these Leichten-Divisionen were based on the model of the French DLM. In Germany like in France, the cavalry wanted its own tanks because it was frightened to loose influence. After Poland the 1., 2., 3. and 4. Leichten-Divisionen became the 6., 7., 3. and 4. Panzer-Divisionen and the 5. PzD has been created. The German army in May 1940 had therefore 10 Panzer Divisionen, 6 ID (mot) and 1 newly created Kavalerie division. The armored units were better armed (more tanks were armed with 3.7cm and 7.5cm guns (16% - 452 tanks - in Poland and 36% - 914 tanks - in France) and also better armored (for example when you look at the Panzer IVs, more Ausf. A/B in Poland and more Ausf.C/D in France).
• The 3. and 4. Wellen Infanterie Division from the Polish campaign were largely improved, younger men were enlisted and the equipment was modernized. In 1940, 15 of these divisions were frontline units.
• The chain of command is also modified and modernized. During Fall Weiss, the German army lacked some specific HQ especially for armored units, the chain of command is very traditional. For Fall Gelb a new, more flexible chain of command was developed and could already be used during operation Weserübung.
C. FALL GELB (10th May – 25th June)
TOTAL HEER TROOPS 10th May – 25th June 1940 :
10 PzD, 4 ID (mot), 1 Kav.Div., 3 Geb.Div., 126 ID and 7 Landesschützen Div. = 153 divisions
+ Waffen SS divisions :
Totenkopf (mot), SS Verfügung (mot)
A complete new HQ and ad-hoc structure is created with Gruppe Kleist for the initial phase, on the basis of the XXII. Armee Korps (mot) HQ. Gruppe Kleist includes 3 motorized Korps directed toward the Schwehrpunkt of the Ardennes. They contain 3 ID (mot) and 50% of the armored divisions (5 Panzer Divisionen). Unlike in Poland, the mechanized elements are well concentrated and have a real strategic role. To add to that, the 5.PzD and 7.PzD of the XV. Armee Korps (mot) are only several kilometers north of Gruppe Kleist. Therefore 7 Panzer Divisonen are concentrated against the weak area of the Ardennes. It is the very first time that such means are concentrated. In 4 days and 170 km, Gruppe Kleist crossed the Ardennes and established a bridgehead beyond the Meuse river. The Channel is reached on 20th May 1940, trapping many allied units.
Fall Gelb is also the first operation seeing the extensive use of the ad-hoc formations called Kampfgruppen : inter-arms cooperation at the tactical level to quickly give an answer to an evolving situation. These formations give a superior adaptability to the German army. The French army will be able to organize such units in June when leaving the obsession of trying all the time to reorganize a continuous front and rather organizing inter-arms strongpoints.
An other decisive element during Fall Gelb is the so-called "Auftragstaktik" giving a big autonomy and individual initiative to the subaltern officers. The operations were also often led by high ranking officers goinf directly on the front to have a real idea of what was happening on the field. This way of thinking the command tasks was at first introduced by general von Seeckt (commander of the Heeresleitung from 1919 to 1926). The chain of command is therefore less centralized and more flexible whereas in Poland if the roots of the change were already there, the command structures were very traditional. Add to that the wide and wise use of important communication means (many radio sets), a well organized logistics and you have a powerful army.
The western campaign of 1940 can be seen as the best example of Blitzkrieg carried out, also later against Greece and Yugoslavia but it couldn't work anymore in Russia which was too big. In Poland it was much more a classical Kesselschlacht and the too weak Leichten-Divisionen where after that transformed in Panzer-Divisionen. A large faked attack was undertaken in Belgium and in the Netherlands where paratroopers and airborne troops were used to secure important points. France and United-Kingdom sent their best forces in Belgium and in the Netherlands. Later, the main forces attacked in an unexpected place where only second-rate divisions resisted them. Here the German Panzer Divisionen pushed on almost without concern for their flanks, leaving the cleaning up to the infantry. Meanwhile, the Luftwaffe attacked as support for the Panzers and the infantry.
The Polish army fought very bravely with less means than the French army but too often I have heard that the Germans suffered more losses in Poland than in France, or that the French army didn't fought and ran to surrender which is totally wrong. The German means and tactics were also superior in May 1940 than in September 1939 which seems to be easily forgotten.
The Polish army suffered grossly 200,000 losses in 35 days (5714 per day) and the French army about 300,000 losses in 45 days (6667 per day), both have fought bravely and Poland was attacked during the same time by the Soviets (France at the end of June by the Italians).
The idea that France did not fight is just false, it was defeated in shame because quickly for the country as it was seen in 1939, yes, but the soldiers were courageous and died too for their homeland.
In 1940, in 45 days, the French army lost 100,000 KIA on the battlefield. In the same time the Germans lost 45,000 KIA. Despite lacks in the high command, the French soldiers did resist to the enemy each time they were well commanded on the front.
The French fought very well as companies, battalions and sometimes divisions (if it was a good one) but generally horribly as armies when facing the Panzerwaffe because it was too fast but they were not worse than the German infantry divisions ... doctrine (conception and use of tanks), communication issues etc. The French Army didn't loose because of a lack of material (though a high lack of radios, bombers, especially AA weapons and AA ammunitions) and its armament was as good as the German one, the reasons are both the doctrine at the military level and several political decisions as well as the German innovations.
ENGAGED BY GERMANY
135 divisions (10 Panzerdivisionen, 6 motorized infantry divisions : 2.ID (mot), 13.ID (mot), 20.ID (mot), 29.ID (mot), SS Totenkopf (mot), SS Verfügung (mot), 1 cavalry division partly motorized)
About 4500 planes
About 7500 field artillery pieces
About 2600 tanks (2542 according to Jentz), 185 SP guns and 1200 armored cars
GERMAN AND ITALIAN LOSSES (whole western campaign until the end of the battle of France) :
- 156,492 losses (27,074 KIA, 111,034 WIA, 18,384 MIA). This first figure established on 25th June 1940 has been corrected later to 45,218 German KIA (with the MIAs) + 111,034 WIA.
- 6100 Italian losses in the French Alps in a few days (642 KIAs, 2691 WIAs, 2151 frozen men and 616 POWs)
- 1236 planes definitely destroyed (+ 323 damaged) (about 500-600 victories for the French air force).
- 839 tanks definitely destroyed (33% of the tanks engaged according to Jentz)
ENGAGED BY FRANCE
• the equivalent of 13 divisions on the Maginot line
• 6 divisions initially left to face the Italians
• 77 divisions in the north east (with 3 DLM and 3 DCR : 6 armored /mechanized divisions + 5 DLC partially motorized/mechanized but half of them are very weak) : none of these divisions were the equivalent in power and combined arms that a Panzer Division.
A total of about 96 French divisions + 9 British divisions = 105 divisions (+the Belgian and Dutch divisions) facing a total of 135 German divisions.
On 5th June 1940, after the first losses and encirclements of the northern armies, there were only 43 French divisions left, facing more than 100 German divisions !
About 2100 planes
About 9,000 field artillery pieces
About 3200 tanks but only about 2500 "modern" ones and about 600 armored cars
FRENCH LOSSES :
- 302,000 losses (100,000 KIA and about 202,000 WIA)
- 1,450,000 prisoners after the armistice
- 892 aircrafts (the big majority because of the Flak)
- no data for the AFVs ... 2000+ destroyed/abandoned or captured.
Allied losses according to Karl-Heinz Frieser (Oberst Bundeswehr, MFGA) in his book "Blitzkrieg Legende" and Gérard Saint-Martin in "L'arme blindée française" :
• Belgian losses in 19 days : 7,500 KIA, 15,850 WIA
• Luxembourg : no resistance
• Dutch losses in 6 days : 2,890 KIA, 6,889 WIA
• British losses in 26 days : 3,457 KIA, 13,602 WIA, 3,267 MIA
• French losses in 45 days : 92,000 KIA and about 210,000 WIA (other common sources indicate 120,000 "fallen for France" but this figure includes POWs who died in German hospitals or camps as well as some civilians KIA – grossly about 100,000 French troops died during Fall Gelb).
The Swiss historian Eddy Bauer says also that the Germans lost much more men in the second part of the western campaign, in France the resistance was harder when time advanced.
156,492 German losses (KIA, MIA, WIA) in 45 days, that's 3477 losses per day but in fact the French resistance was all days harder : 2499 German losses per day between the 10th May and the 3rd June but 4762 German losses per day between the 5th and the 24th June. You can compare that to the 4506 German losses per day during operation Barbarossa from 22nd June to 10th December 1941. Once again the western campaign was much more deadly than the common myth admits it.
Regards,
David
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Musashi
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As usual, very informative and detailed post written by David.
Let's clarify a few things.
The reserve divisions almost did not have any AT guns, AA guns and their artillery was very weak. The soldiers were armed with Label and Berthier rifles, Chauchat LMGs and Hotchkiss HMGs (both WWI-era). They jammed very often.
No, as I mentioned 2 AA guns, so half of battery
Some cavalry brigades had 16 75mm guns (instead of 12) and some an armoured cars squadron or tankette company.
27 uhlan
10 mounted rifles
3 light horse (chevau-leger) [don't laugh of my errors, I don't speak French at all
]
Some of them were being produced in Poland under Czechoslovakian licence.
My comment about the rest of your post soon.
Regards,
Chris
Let's clarify a few things.
The opponent of VIII German Army was Polish "Lodz" [the Polish characters are illegible on this forum] Army. VIII Army had four infantry divisions, while Lodz Army had four infantry divisions and two cavalry brigades. However, Lodz Army's three divisions and one cavalry brigade were attacked by X German Army and just one infantry division and one cavalry brigade were attacked by 4 divisions of VIII Army. 1,3 (10th Infantry Division even without heavy artillery battalion and Kresowa Cavalry Brigade by Polish side) division to 4 (supported by much larger number of artillery and aviation). Do you expect a miracle? I can add armoured units of X Army attacked the boundary line of "Lodz" and "Krakow" Armies. It was no choice. One had to pull back to avoid of encirclement.They made no fantastic breakthroughs, some Infanterie Division did as well without being motorised like the 10.ID and the 17.ID (XIII. AK, 8. Armee) which pierced the Polish lines without armor support between 1st and 4th September 1939. On 6th September they had reached Lodz at 150 km from their departure line.
You added brigades to make divisions while brigade is an equivalent of 1/3 division. There were not armoured brigades in Polish Army, but two motorised cavalry brigades (such brigade consisted of 2 motorised cavalry regimets + 2 tankette companies + 1 light tank company + AT battalion).About 52 divisions (39 infantry divisions, 11 cavalry brigades, 2 armored brigades and independent units)
Not quite. 211 light tanks + 600 tankettes (TKS and TK-3) + armoured cars.995 tanks and armored cars
Theoretically. Out of 30 first-line Polish infantry divisions only 11 had heavy artillery battalions (I can give you their numbers if you wish) while none of 9 reserve division had heavy artillery battalion. Polish ID had 27 AT guns (while German one 75 motor-drawn AT-guns), 20 81mm mortars (German one 54) and much less number of howitzers. Four AA 40mm guns didn't provide almost any AA protection (2 AA guns for a cavalry brigade)[Polish infantry division]
Each with :
3 infantry regiments
1 light artillery regiment
1 heavy artillery battalion (12 pieces)
1 engineer battalion
1 transmission company
1 AA battery
The reserve divisions almost did not have any AT guns, AA guns and their artillery was very weak. The soldiers were armed with Label and Berthier rifles, Chauchat LMGs and Hotchkiss HMGs (both WWI-era). They jammed very often.
Cavalry
11 cavalry brigades
Each with :
3 to 4 cavalry regiments
1 light artillery squadron (12 pieces)
1 AA battery
1 engineer company
several service units
No, as I mentioned 2 AA guns, so half of battery
Some cavalry brigades had 16 75mm guns (instead of 12) and some an armoured cars squadron or tankette company.
No, 40 cavalry regiments.Total : 38 cavalry regiments
27 uhlan
10 mounted rifles
3 light horse (chevau-leger) [don't laugh of my errors, I don't speak French at all
]
It did not fight in the campaign. It was evacuated to Romania, hoping it would be moved to France and would fight with Germans later.1x Renault R35 battalion
900x SKODA 100 mm howitzers
Some of them were being produced in Poland under Czechoslovakian licence.
Some of them were being produced in Poland under French licence.254x 105 mm Schneider French guns
I don't think all of them were Bofors, some tens of them were WWI-era AA guns. I'll check the numbers if you wish.156x 75 mm Bofors guns
We discussed it and came to agreement. I can add 993 tanks and armoured cars were destroyed or knocked down (many of them were able of repairing later).218 tanks definitely destroyed (8.5% of the engaged tanks)
My comment about the rest of your post soon.
Regards,
Chris
Ezekiel 25:17. "And I will strike down upon thee with great vengeance and furious anger those who attempt to poison and destroy my brothers. And you will know I am the Lord when I lay my vengeance upon you."
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Musashi
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So, David...
here we go.
My old source (from 1986) Waclaw Krol - Polish wings over France [its author was a Polish pilot fighting over France] claims so [the quotes are yours]:
-750 Me-109
-200 Me-110
-1100 level bombers (He-111, Ju-88, Do-17)
-350 Ju-87 Stuka
-350 recon planes (mostly Hs-126)
Two German Aerial Flotillas (1 and 4) were deployed deep in the German territory and did not participate in the campaign (2000 planes)
Italians had 1400 planes, but the source doesn't provide information how many of them were used.
- 137 infantry, motorised and cavalry divisions,
- 5 armoured divisions (including one British)
- 46 tank battalions (3000 tanks together, probably with the armoured divisions)
- 1800 combat planes
Out of that the French had:
1st AG commanded by Gaston Bilotte:
34 divisions (21 ID, 3 mechanised, 6 motorised, 4 cavalry)
2nd AG commanded by Gaston Pretelat manned the Maginot Line:
26 1/2 ID + 1 Cavalry Division.
3rd AG commanded by Antoine Besson deployed by the Italian border:
9 1/2 ID
21 infantry divisions as a reserve deployed along whole front
BEF - 10 divisions including 1 armoured
Belgian Army - 23 infantry divisions [not so small, IMHO]
Dutch Army - 10 ID
2 or 3 Polish infantry divisions [I don't remember] and 1 armoured brigade
[Strange, I don't see proper French armoured divisions]
He claims so:
The French pilots shot down 684 German planes and 285 probably.
They lost approx. 900 planes.
The Germans lost totally 1401 planes including:
- 605 bombers
- 371 fighters
- 425 recon, liaison and transport
- 1272 pilots
Regards,
Chris
here we go.
My old source (from 1986) Waclaw Krol - Polish wings over France [its author was a Polish pilot fighting over France] claims so [the quotes are yours]:
According to my source there were 2750 German combat planes in 2 Aerial Flotillas:ENGAGED BY GERMANY
135 divisions (10 Panzerdivisionen, 6 motorized infantry divisions : 2.ID (mot), 13.ID (mot), 20.ID (mot), 29.ID (mot), SS Totenkopf (mot), SS Verfügung (mot), 1 cavalry division partly motorized)
About 4500 planes
About 7500 field artillery pieces
About 2600 tanks (2542 according to Jentz), 185 SP guns and 1200 armored cars
-750 Me-109
-200 Me-110
-1100 level bombers (He-111, Ju-88, Do-17)
-350 Ju-87 Stuka
-350 recon planes (mostly Hs-126)
Two German Aerial Flotillas (1 and 4) were deployed deep in the German territory and did not participate in the campaign (2000 planes)
Italians had 1400 planes, but the source doesn't provide information how many of them were used.
According to my source the allies had:ENGAGED BY FRANCE
• the equivalent of 13 divisions on the Maginot line
• 6 divisions initially left to face the Italians
• 77 divisions in the north east (with 3 DLM and 3 DCR : 6 armored /mechanized divisions + 5 DLC partially motorized/mechanized but half of them are very weak) : none of these divisions were the equivalent in power and combined arms that a Panzer Division.
A total of about 96 French divisions + 9 British divisions = 105 divisions (+the Belgian and Dutch divisions) facing a total of 135 German divisions.
On 5th June 1940, after the first losses and encirclements of the northern armies, there were only 43 French divisions left, facing more than 100 German divisions !
About 2100 planes
About 9,000 field artillery pieces
About 3200 tanks but only about 2500 "modern" ones and about 600 armored cars
- 137 infantry, motorised and cavalry divisions,
- 5 armoured divisions (including one British)
- 46 tank battalions (3000 tanks together, probably with the armoured divisions)
- 1800 combat planes
Out of that the French had:
1st AG commanded by Gaston Bilotte:
34 divisions (21 ID, 3 mechanised, 6 motorised, 4 cavalry)
2nd AG commanded by Gaston Pretelat manned the Maginot Line:
26 1/2 ID + 1 Cavalry Division.
3rd AG commanded by Antoine Besson deployed by the Italian border:
9 1/2 ID
21 infantry divisions as a reserve deployed along whole front
BEF - 10 divisions including 1 armoured
Belgian Army - 23 infantry divisions [not so small, IMHO]
Dutch Army - 10 ID
2 or 3 Polish infantry divisions [I don't remember] and 1 armoured brigade
[Strange, I don't see proper French armoured divisions]
This author claims Polish pilots flying in Polish 1/145 Squadron and in French squadrons shot down 52 9/10 (probably 3) German planes and 6 3/5 damaged.GERMAN AND ITALIAN LOSSES (whole western campaign until the end of the battle of France) :
- 1236 planes definitely destroyed (+ 323 damaged) (about 500-600 victories for the French air force).
He claims so:
The French pilots shot down 684 German planes and 285 probably.
They lost approx. 900 planes.
The Germans lost totally 1401 planes including:
- 605 bombers
- 371 fighters
- 425 recon, liaison and transport
- 1272 pilots
Regards,
Chris
Ezekiel 25:17. "And I will strike down upon thee with great vengeance and furious anger those who attempt to poison and destroy my brothers. And you will know I am the Lord when I lay my vengeance upon you."
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Panzermeyer
- Supporter
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- Joined: Wed Nov 13, 2002 4:51 am
- Location: France
Hello Chris,
The Polish small arms you listed are probably only for the reserve divisions isn't it ? They represent the wide majority of the French standard infantry armament, just the Chauchat which is present in second line elements and the FM 24/29 being the typical LMG.
Beside the about 5200 (I think, including 1200 in 7.92mm) Hotchkiss Mle1914 HMG in the Polish army you had also some 8000 Browning Mle1930 HMG and I guess about 500 Browning Mle1928 (BAR) isn't it ? Were the more numerous rifles the French ones or the Mauser : wz.1898, wz.1898a, Kbk wz.1898, Kbk wz. 1929 etc. ?
I know all the divisions are not the same .... This is the same for the French divisions and the Germans ones. There were also not 75 AT guns in all the German divisions ... sometimes only 36-39 (if 3 in the AA), the regiments having then only AT rifles.
Concerning the AA guns, you know a typical French infantry division (if at full potential) has only 6 AA guns ... also far from suffcient. I think at that time only the Germans had many organic AA guns.
In 1940, the French army France had 20x 94mm Vickers AA guns beside about 40x Schneider 90mm AA guns (Mle 1926/1930 and 1939) and about 135x 105mm Mle1915/1934 AA guns.
From the 1695x 75mm AA guns listed, 876x are based on the 75mm Mle1897 gun and fire the 75x350R shell (75mm Mle1897/1939, Mle1913/1934, Mle1915/1934 and Mle1915). The other 819x 75mm AA guns are based on the 75mm Mle1928 Schneider gun and fire the 75x837R shell (75mm Mle1917/1934, Mle1930, Mle1932, Mle1933 and Mle1928/1939). That makes a total of 1890 potentially available heavy AA guns. In comparison at the same time, the Germans had more than 2500 8.8cm and 10.5cm AA guns.
The French army had only about 270 light AA guns (13.2mm) and 1311 medium AA guns (20-40mm) available in May 1940. Further deliveries led to about 1900 medium AA guns available. In comparison, the Wehrmacht on 10th May 1940 had about 6500 2.0cm and 3.7cm AA guns covering the troops advancing in France. These AA guns caused the main losses in the French air force while the Luftwaffe encountered much less AA fire.
About the number of aircrafts the 4500 is a typo of my word file, it should be written 2500.
In fact on 10th May the number of immediately operational aircrafts was :
France : 879
UK : 384
Belgium : 118
Netherlands : 72
--> 1453 allies
Germany : 2589
The total available on the front + the rear on 10th May :
France : 3097 (only about 2100 useful)
UK : 1150
Belgium : 140
Neterlands : 82
--> 4469 allies
German : 3578
As for the divisions if you look only at the crude numbers (my numbers were for the 10th May)
- A total of 104 French divisions in the North-East (including fortress and reserve ones) but 117 in total
- 10 British if you want, on 10th May the 1st Armoured Division is not yet ready in France
- 22 Belgian (Frieser reports that he knows only Cooper and Jacobsen telling about 23 ones but it is also a circulating number)
- 10 Dutch
--> About 146 allied divisions facing the 135 German ones
But that gives less information ... The French armored units for example are smaller and include far less organic elements than the German Panzer Divisionen.
Coming to the tanks I have listed them on 10th May 1940 :
1) France
Number of French tanks in France on 10th May 1940 in COMBAT units : 2711 'modern' (3181 total)
Hotchkiss H35 : 355
Hotchkiss H39 : 481
Renault R35/39 : 900
FCM36 : 90
Somua S35 : 264
Renault D2 : 45
Renault B1bis : 206
--> 2711 'modern' tanks
Renault FT17 : 462 (obsolete)
FCM-2C: 8 (obsolete)
--> 470 obsolete tanks which were very rarely used in combat and sometimes simply scuttled
Number of French armored cars in France on 10th May 1940 : 575
The total number of French tanks in COMBAT UNITS (3181 tanks) seems quite impressive but :
• these tanks are spread on the whole metropolitan territory not all facing the German main attacks and their ability to concentrate tanks
• this number includes only 2711 'modern' tanks + FT17 tanks and a few FCM-2C
• among the 1736 H and R tanks, only about 25% (430 tanks) are armed with the 37mm SA38 gun. Only 350 37mm L/33 SA38 guns had been delivered until April 1940 to equip various Renault R35 (then called R39), Hotchkiss (H35 and H39) and a few FCM36 tanks (So the 430 numbers could even be overestimated on 10th May 1940). Concerning the FCM36 tanks only very few were converted and the 37mm SA38 gun equipped mainly Hotchkiss tanks and in priority the Hotchkiss H39 tanks (newly produced ones or converted ones, in priority the platoon commander tanks).
2) Belgium
8 ACG-1, 42 T15 and 228 T13 = 278 AFVs
3) Netherlands
25 armored cars
4) United Kingdom
308 tanks and 56 armored cars
Among them there are only 23 Matilda II. All the other have no AT capacity
The 1st AD (general Evans) came during May with 284 more tanks (including 150 Cruisers with an AT capacity). The 1st AD lost 120 tanks out of 165 in the first attack against the Abbeville bridgehead. About 47 more British tanks were lost in Arras. Other tanks were lost around Calais and Boulogne and many tanks abandoned.
5) Germany on 10th May 1940 :
Tanks in the 10 Panzerdivisionen
(source : Thomas L. Jentz on http://niehorster.orbat.com/011_germany ... -05-10.htm)
• Pz.Kpfw. I : 643 (total available : 1077)
• Pz.Kpfw. II : 880 (total available : 1092)
• Pz.Kpfw. III : 349 (total available : 381)
• Pz.Kpfw. 35(t) : 118 (total available : 143)
• Pz.Kpfw. 38(t) : 207 (total available : 238)
• Pz.Kpfw. IV A/B/C/D : 281 (total available : 290)
• Pz.Bef. : 148 (total available : 244)
--> 2626 tanks
+ 117x 4.7cm L/43.4 Pak(t) (Sfl) auf PzKpfw I
+ 6x 8.8cm Flak (Sfl) auf Zugkraftwagen 12t (Sd.Kfz.
+ 24x Sturmgeschütz III
+ 38x 15 cm s.I.G.33 auf Pz.Kpfw.I
--> 185 SP guns
+ about 1150 armored cars
So about the same number of allied AFVs versus German AFVs : 3951 vs 4046 (or 4423 vs 4046 if the obsolete French FT17 and FCM-2C tanks are counted)
If you want to look more at the OoB :
http://www.orbat.com/site/ww2/drleo/500 ... rance.html
http://france1940.free.fr/oob/oob.html
The crude comparison of tank numbers gives not a good representation of the reality on the battlefield. The allied used their tanks often spread among the infantry to provide support while the Germans concentrated all their tanks in schematically 10x270 tanks in 10 Panzer Divisionen. On the French side for example only about 960 tanks were included in big armored/mechanized units, all the other tanks were spread in various units and on the whole theatre of operation. Imagine yourself being attacked by hornets ; it is the same difference than between being attacked by 100x1 hornets or 1x100 hornets ... not really the same issue.
The German "superiority" was mainly due to :
• all the changes I have explained in the Heer in my previous post
• better tactical regulation, much more concentrated armor (usually 4 vs 1, sometimes 8-10 vs 1 odds)
• higher speed and mobility of the German tanks
• tracer and smoke shells available in the German tanks (not in the French ones)
• more radio sets allowing to better organize and control the manoeuvers
• mostly always presence of observation planes (Hs126 and Fi156) to provide information about the allied position and direct artillery and aerial support
• mostly omnipresent close air support
• German tanks were spreading into the allied rears … difficult then to preserve a HQ or a fuel supply dump … leading to tanks being abandoned and scuttled due to lack of fuel
• better and faster German logistical organization (and far less hindered by aerial attacks or artillery fire)
• 1-man turret in most of the French tanks and several very recently constituted units lacking training
• …
Germany's victory occurred as a result of a combination of factors, including air superiority, strategic and tactical innovation (including concentration of their armor), and the failure of the allies to anticipate or respond effectively to German tactics. However, it occurred in spite rather than because of German tanks.
The German ground forces suffered a lot in 1940 on the Western front. 839 German tanks and numerous armored cars were definitively destroyed (for example about 2/3rd of the armored cars of the 7.PzD were knocked-out before the 1st June 1940). That gives of course not the total number of AFVs that were not operational after the campaign and repaired later.
For example the tanks of the 4.PzD (one of the two PzD during the battle of Gembloux) :
Before the battle of Hannut / Gembloux : 345 tanks
On 15th May after the battle the 4.PzD had : 204 tanks not operational
One day later at the evening, 153 tanks remained unavailable, this number is including destroyed tanks, tanks in routine maintenance and tanks in the repair workshops. As the German hold the ground they could repair and recover their tanks if they were not completely destroyed.
---
German replacement tanks arriving at the end of May : 288
• Pz.Kpfw. I : 48
• Pz.Kpfw. II : 35
• Pz.Kpfw. III : 71
• Pz.Kpfw. 35(t) : 35
• Pz.Kpfw. 38(t) : 36
• Pz.Kpfw. IV A/B/C/D : 19
• Pz.Bef. : 44
Detailed German losses in May / June :
• Pz.Kpfw. I : 182
• Pz.Kpfw. II : 240
• Pz.Kpfw. III : 135
• Pz.Kpfw. 35(t) : 62
• Pz.Kpfw. 38(t) : 54
• Pz.Kpfw. IV A/B/C/D : 97
• Pz.Bef. : 69
source : Panzertruppen 1, Thomas Jentz, Schiffer
These losses of course does not include StuG III, Panzerjäger I, 15cm s.I.G.33 auf Pz.Kpfw.I and all the armored cars or other vehicles that have been lost. Not speaking of the ones having been repaired.
---
Concerning the foreigners in the French army, beside the Foreign Legion units and the colonial units, there was also a Czech division in France, in fact only two regiments could be formed : 1st RIT (régiment d'infanterie tchécoslovaque) which served with the French 23e DI (division d'infanterie) and the 2nd RIT with the 239e DLI (division légère d'infanterie).
There were Polish pilots on Morane-Saulnier 406 and Caudron 714 aircrafts, not on Bloch fighters I think.
There were 2 Polish infantry divisions formed in France and 1 armored brigade.
The 1st Polish infantry division (1st DIP) formed in France did not see combat until 13th June and a week later it was dissolved. This division began forming in October 1939 as a result of the accords signed between France and Poland over the formation of a Polish army in France equipped with French armament. The soldiers from this division were often called 'Grenadiers' in remembrance of the Polish Grenadiers who served under Napoleon Bonaparte.
The 2nd DIP was deployed in mid-June to the Belfort defences and a withdrawal battle towards the Swiss border along French divisions. They fought well, often until close combats with the German infantry.
The 10th armored brigade consisted only of the 1st tank battalion and one motorized infantry battalion. The Polish tank battalion operational in June was composed of 17 Renault R35/39 and 28 Renault R40. The R39 and R40 being armed witht the long 37mm gun.
Regards,
David
The Polish small arms you listed are probably only for the reserve divisions isn't it ? They represent the wide majority of the French standard infantry armament, just the Chauchat which is present in second line elements and the FM 24/29 being the typical LMG.
Beside the about 5200 (I think, including 1200 in 7.92mm) Hotchkiss Mle1914 HMG in the Polish army you had also some 8000 Browning Mle1930 HMG and I guess about 500 Browning Mle1928 (BAR) isn't it ? Were the more numerous rifles the French ones or the Mauser : wz.1898, wz.1898a, Kbk wz.1898, Kbk wz. 1929 etc. ?
I know all the divisions are not the same .... This is the same for the French divisions and the Germans ones. There were also not 75 AT guns in all the German divisions ... sometimes only 36-39 (if 3 in the AA), the regiments having then only AT rifles.
Concerning the AA guns, you know a typical French infantry division (if at full potential) has only 6 AA guns ... also far from suffcient. I think at that time only the Germans had many organic AA guns.
In 1940, the French army France had 20x 94mm Vickers AA guns beside about 40x Schneider 90mm AA guns (Mle 1926/1930 and 1939) and about 135x 105mm Mle1915/1934 AA guns.
From the 1695x 75mm AA guns listed, 876x are based on the 75mm Mle1897 gun and fire the 75x350R shell (75mm Mle1897/1939, Mle1913/1934, Mle1915/1934 and Mle1915). The other 819x 75mm AA guns are based on the 75mm Mle1928 Schneider gun and fire the 75x837R shell (75mm Mle1917/1934, Mle1930, Mle1932, Mle1933 and Mle1928/1939). That makes a total of 1890 potentially available heavy AA guns. In comparison at the same time, the Germans had more than 2500 8.8cm and 10.5cm AA guns.
The French army had only about 270 light AA guns (13.2mm) and 1311 medium AA guns (20-40mm) available in May 1940. Further deliveries led to about 1900 medium AA guns available. In comparison, the Wehrmacht on 10th May 1940 had about 6500 2.0cm and 3.7cm AA guns covering the troops advancing in France. These AA guns caused the main losses in the French air force while the Luftwaffe encountered much less AA fire.
About the number of aircrafts the 4500 is a typo of my word file, it should be written 2500.
In fact on 10th May the number of immediately operational aircrafts was :
France : 879
UK : 384
Belgium : 118
Netherlands : 72
--> 1453 allies
Germany : 2589
The total available on the front + the rear on 10th May :
France : 3097 (only about 2100 useful)
UK : 1150
Belgium : 140
Neterlands : 82
--> 4469 allies
German : 3578
As for the divisions if you look only at the crude numbers (my numbers were for the 10th May)
- A total of 104 French divisions in the North-East (including fortress and reserve ones) but 117 in total
- 10 British if you want, on 10th May the 1st Armoured Division is not yet ready in France
- 22 Belgian (Frieser reports that he knows only Cooper and Jacobsen telling about 23 ones but it is also a circulating number)
- 10 Dutch
--> About 146 allied divisions facing the 135 German ones
But that gives less information ... The French armored units for example are smaller and include far less organic elements than the German Panzer Divisionen.
Coming to the tanks I have listed them on 10th May 1940 :
1) France
Number of French tanks in France on 10th May 1940 in COMBAT units : 2711 'modern' (3181 total)
Hotchkiss H35 : 355
Hotchkiss H39 : 481
Renault R35/39 : 900
FCM36 : 90
Somua S35 : 264
Renault D2 : 45
Renault B1bis : 206
--> 2711 'modern' tanks
Renault FT17 : 462 (obsolete)
FCM-2C: 8 (obsolete)
--> 470 obsolete tanks which were very rarely used in combat and sometimes simply scuttled
Number of French armored cars in France on 10th May 1940 : 575
The total number of French tanks in COMBAT UNITS (3181 tanks) seems quite impressive but :
• these tanks are spread on the whole metropolitan territory not all facing the German main attacks and their ability to concentrate tanks
• this number includes only 2711 'modern' tanks + FT17 tanks and a few FCM-2C
• among the 1736 H and R tanks, only about 25% (430 tanks) are armed with the 37mm SA38 gun. Only 350 37mm L/33 SA38 guns had been delivered until April 1940 to equip various Renault R35 (then called R39), Hotchkiss (H35 and H39) and a few FCM36 tanks (So the 430 numbers could even be overestimated on 10th May 1940). Concerning the FCM36 tanks only very few were converted and the 37mm SA38 gun equipped mainly Hotchkiss tanks and in priority the Hotchkiss H39 tanks (newly produced ones or converted ones, in priority the platoon commander tanks).
2) Belgium
8 ACG-1, 42 T15 and 228 T13 = 278 AFVs
3) Netherlands
25 armored cars
4) United Kingdom
308 tanks and 56 armored cars
Among them there are only 23 Matilda II. All the other have no AT capacity
The 1st AD (general Evans) came during May with 284 more tanks (including 150 Cruisers with an AT capacity). The 1st AD lost 120 tanks out of 165 in the first attack against the Abbeville bridgehead. About 47 more British tanks were lost in Arras. Other tanks were lost around Calais and Boulogne and many tanks abandoned.
5) Germany on 10th May 1940 :
Tanks in the 10 Panzerdivisionen
(source : Thomas L. Jentz on http://niehorster.orbat.com/011_germany ... -05-10.htm)
• Pz.Kpfw. I : 643 (total available : 1077)
• Pz.Kpfw. II : 880 (total available : 1092)
• Pz.Kpfw. III : 349 (total available : 381)
• Pz.Kpfw. 35(t) : 118 (total available : 143)
• Pz.Kpfw. 38(t) : 207 (total available : 238)
• Pz.Kpfw. IV A/B/C/D : 281 (total available : 290)
• Pz.Bef. : 148 (total available : 244)
--> 2626 tanks
+ 117x 4.7cm L/43.4 Pak(t) (Sfl) auf PzKpfw I
+ 6x 8.8cm Flak (Sfl) auf Zugkraftwagen 12t (Sd.Kfz.
+ 24x Sturmgeschütz III
+ 38x 15 cm s.I.G.33 auf Pz.Kpfw.I
--> 185 SP guns
+ about 1150 armored cars
So about the same number of allied AFVs versus German AFVs : 3951 vs 4046 (or 4423 vs 4046 if the obsolete French FT17 and FCM-2C tanks are counted)
If you want to look more at the OoB :
http://www.orbat.com/site/ww2/drleo/500 ... rance.html
http://france1940.free.fr/oob/oob.html
The crude comparison of tank numbers gives not a good representation of the reality on the battlefield. The allied used their tanks often spread among the infantry to provide support while the Germans concentrated all their tanks in schematically 10x270 tanks in 10 Panzer Divisionen. On the French side for example only about 960 tanks were included in big armored/mechanized units, all the other tanks were spread in various units and on the whole theatre of operation. Imagine yourself being attacked by hornets ; it is the same difference than between being attacked by 100x1 hornets or 1x100 hornets ... not really the same issue.
The German "superiority" was mainly due to :
• all the changes I have explained in the Heer in my previous post
• better tactical regulation, much more concentrated armor (usually 4 vs 1, sometimes 8-10 vs 1 odds)
• higher speed and mobility of the German tanks
• tracer and smoke shells available in the German tanks (not in the French ones)
• more radio sets allowing to better organize and control the manoeuvers
• mostly always presence of observation planes (Hs126 and Fi156) to provide information about the allied position and direct artillery and aerial support
• mostly omnipresent close air support
• German tanks were spreading into the allied rears … difficult then to preserve a HQ or a fuel supply dump … leading to tanks being abandoned and scuttled due to lack of fuel
• better and faster German logistical organization (and far less hindered by aerial attacks or artillery fire)
• 1-man turret in most of the French tanks and several very recently constituted units lacking training
• …
Germany's victory occurred as a result of a combination of factors, including air superiority, strategic and tactical innovation (including concentration of their armor), and the failure of the allies to anticipate or respond effectively to German tactics. However, it occurred in spite rather than because of German tanks.
The German ground forces suffered a lot in 1940 on the Western front. 839 German tanks and numerous armored cars were definitively destroyed (for example about 2/3rd of the armored cars of the 7.PzD were knocked-out before the 1st June 1940). That gives of course not the total number of AFVs that were not operational after the campaign and repaired later.
For example the tanks of the 4.PzD (one of the two PzD during the battle of Gembloux) :
Before the battle of Hannut / Gembloux : 345 tanks
On 15th May after the battle the 4.PzD had : 204 tanks not operational
One day later at the evening, 153 tanks remained unavailable, this number is including destroyed tanks, tanks in routine maintenance and tanks in the repair workshops. As the German hold the ground they could repair and recover their tanks if they were not completely destroyed.
---
German replacement tanks arriving at the end of May : 288
• Pz.Kpfw. I : 48
• Pz.Kpfw. II : 35
• Pz.Kpfw. III : 71
• Pz.Kpfw. 35(t) : 35
• Pz.Kpfw. 38(t) : 36
• Pz.Kpfw. IV A/B/C/D : 19
• Pz.Bef. : 44
Detailed German losses in May / June :
• Pz.Kpfw. I : 182
• Pz.Kpfw. II : 240
• Pz.Kpfw. III : 135
• Pz.Kpfw. 35(t) : 62
• Pz.Kpfw. 38(t) : 54
• Pz.Kpfw. IV A/B/C/D : 97
• Pz.Bef. : 69
source : Panzertruppen 1, Thomas Jentz, Schiffer
These losses of course does not include StuG III, Panzerjäger I, 15cm s.I.G.33 auf Pz.Kpfw.I and all the armored cars or other vehicles that have been lost. Not speaking of the ones having been repaired.
---
Concerning the foreigners in the French army, beside the Foreign Legion units and the colonial units, there was also a Czech division in France, in fact only two regiments could be formed : 1st RIT (régiment d'infanterie tchécoslovaque) which served with the French 23e DI (division d'infanterie) and the 2nd RIT with the 239e DLI (division légère d'infanterie).
There were Polish pilots on Morane-Saulnier 406 and Caudron 714 aircrafts, not on Bloch fighters I think.
There were 2 Polish infantry divisions formed in France and 1 armored brigade.
The 1st Polish infantry division (1st DIP) formed in France did not see combat until 13th June and a week later it was dissolved. This division began forming in October 1939 as a result of the accords signed between France and Poland over the formation of a Polish army in France equipped with French armament. The soldiers from this division were often called 'Grenadiers' in remembrance of the Polish Grenadiers who served under Napoleon Bonaparte.
The 2nd DIP was deployed in mid-June to the Belfort defences and a withdrawal battle towards the Swiss border along French divisions. They fought well, often until close combats with the German infantry.
The 10th armored brigade consisted only of the 1st tank battalion and one motorized infantry battalion. The Polish tank battalion operational in June was composed of 17 Renault R35/39 and 28 Renault R40. The R39 and R40 being armed witht the long 37mm gun.
Regards,
David
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Musashi
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No, you are wrong. As I wrote Polish pilots flew also in the French squadrons and were attached to the small units defending important French factories (Les Escadrilles Legeres de Defence, Les patrouilles de protection) [units consisted of 3-6 planes, the German phrase Kette, I don't know the English word describing, this unit, I mean 1/4-1/3 of French escadrille].There were Polish pilots on Morane-Saulnier 406 and Caudron 714 aircrafts, not on Bloch fighters I think.
They had following French (and even Dutch-made and U.S-made) planes at their disposal:
CR-714 Cyclone
Marcel Bloch-152
Dewoitine 510
Dewoitine 520
Morane Saulnier 406
Curtiss Hawk 75
Koolhoven FK-58
I guess it's a couriosity for you
So for example Polish unit (6 pilots) "Ja" commanded by Cpt. Franciszek Jastrzebski was attached to French 2/1 Squadron in Buc airfield (near Paris). They were equipped with MB-152.
Unit "Ce" commanded by Lt. Arsen Cembrzynski attached to French 2/6 squadron in Chateaudron airfield. They used both MB-152 and MS-406. According to author MS-406 had been destroyed by German bombs before and the French Squadron was being rearmed with MB-152.
After declaration of war by Italy, the Suadron was moved to Avinion airfield and rearmed with D-520.
Unit "Jan" commanded by Lt. Wojciech Januszkiewicz was attached to French 2/7 Squadron (Is-sur-Tille airfield). Rearming with D-520 was underway when the pilots arrived.
Unit "Kr" (4 pilots and a few mechenics) commanded by Mjr. Zdzislaw Krasnodebski was arrived to Chateaudun airfield and was armed with MB-152. Then they joined French 1/55 Squadron in Etampes airfield (near Paris).
Unit "Wi" commanded by Mjr. Edward Wieckowski (6 pilots and a few mechanics)was attached to French 3/9 Squadron in Bron airfield. They flew on MB-152.
Unit "Ga" commanded by Lt. Aleksander Gabszewicz (6 pilots and a few mechanics) flew on MS-406 in Bron, and then they defended your city Lyon
flying on MB-152. On June 1st they were moved to Bernay airfield and attached to French 3/10 Squadron (MB-152).
Unit "Wy" (6 pilots) commanded by Mjr. Eugeniusz Wyrwicki were attached to French 2/10 Squadron, which flew on MB-152.
Unit "Ba" commanded by Lt. Wienczyslaw Baranski (3 pilots) was attached to French 3/6 Squadron which was being moved to Le Luc airfield and they flew on D-520.
Unit "Pa" commanded by Lt. Ludwik Paszkiewicz (3 pilots) was attached to French 2/8 Squadron in Deauville airfield near Le Havre.
They flew MB-152.
I am too tired now to translate informations about the Polish units defending French factories, for example unit "Ko" (7 pilots) defended Bourges Aircraft Factory from 11 May and they flew on Curtiss Hawk-75's.
If you are interested I'll finish it on Thursday or Friday.
Regards,
Chris
Ezekiel 25:17. "And I will strike down upon thee with great vengeance and furious anger those who attempt to poison and destroy my brothers. And you will know I am the Lord when I lay my vengeance upon you."
According to Jentz, Germans lost "definietly" (as u said) 419 tanks in Poland, and 839 in France - not 218 in Poland and 839 in France!!!GERMAN LOSSES :
40,390 losses (13,110 KIA, 27,280 MIA and WIA) + Soviets (3379 KIA)
285 aircrafts definitely destroyed (+ 279 damaged ones)
218 tanks definitely destroyed (8.5% of the engaged tanks)
GERMAN AND ITALIAN LOSSES (whole western campaign until the end of the battle of France) :
- 156,492 losses (27,074 KIA, 111,034 WIA, 18,384 MIA). This first figure established on 25th June 1940 has been corrected later to 45,218 German KIA (with the MIAs) + 111,034 WIA.
- 6100 Italian losses in the French Alps in a few days (642 KIAs, 2691 WIAs, 2151 frozen men and 616 POWs)
- 1236 planes definitely destroyed (+ 323 damaged) (about 500-600 victories for the French air force).
- 839 tanks definitely destroyed (33% of the tanks engaged according to Jentz)
But from that 419 tanks in Poland, only 236 (not 218 again!!!) were irreparably lost (rest were repaired in Reich, for example by canibalization method), and of that 839 from France - only 389 were irreparably lost!!!!
So we can say that Hitler lost 389 tanks in France and 218 in Poland, or we can say that he lost 419 in Poland and 839 in France - but we CANNOT say that he lost 839 in France and 218 (236?!) in Poland !!!!
Last edited by Domen121 on Wed Aug 01, 2007 11:04 am, edited 20 times in total.
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Christoph Awender
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Hi Christoph
Poland lost in combat 350 AFVS, number of irreparably lost vehicles is difficult to establish, because of German victory in the campaign (nobody tried to repair them after campaign, eventually Germans tried).
Number of total lost Soviet tanks is given at about 50 (according to Russian sources).
German Army lost in combat 674 Tanks and 319 Armoured Cars (according to German sources), of them, 416-436 tanks were repaired, 236-250 were totally lost. 0 Armoured Cars were repaired, all were totally lost. 550-570 AFVS were irreparably lost.The german army lost 236 tanks (total losses) in the POland campaign.
Poland lost in combat 350 AFVS, number of irreparably lost vehicles is difficult to establish, because of German victory in the campaign (nobody tried to repair them after campaign, eventually Germans tried).
Number of total lost Soviet tanks is given at about 50 (according to Russian sources).
There are many misconceptions over the September campaign one of the main ones concerns the French agreement to launch an offensive "not earlier than the 15th day after mobilisation" after a German attack. This was given during the Franco Polish staff talks in May 1939 but the military protocol agreed upon was not operative untill the political protocol was signed by Bonnet the French Foreign Minister and had been ratified. Bonnet being suspicous of the British had no intention of committing France to an offensive without Britains entry into the war and the protocol was not signed and ratified till September 4th.
The guarantee to Poland had not been given because the British cared about Poland but they did care about Germany dominating europe and it was necessery to give the guarantee to keep Poland, as they thought, from joining the German camp. The Poles did not inform the British that talks with Germany had broken down when the guarantee was given and the British thought it would strengthen the Poles in discussions and that they would make concessions in Danzig over which Britain thought Germany had a good case. Rumania was of greater importance but Poland was needed in creating an eastern front against Germany and keeping Rumania out of Germanys clutchs. If Poland sided with Germany all the small states of eastern europe would probably follow. It was thought unlikely that Hitler would start a european war over Danzig.
The British and French had no illusions about Polands ability to withstand a German attack. When the guarantee was given the advice of the British Chiefs of Staff was that "there was probably no way in which France and ourselves could prevent Poland and Rumania from being overrun". Polands job was to tie down the German army if war came while Britain and France built up their forces in the west because of this no aid was sent as it would have been lost when Poland fell, the estimate was probably after a few months.
At a British Chief of Staff meeting in June it was reported the French had put forward three alternatives in the event of a German attack on Poland. These were do nothing, limited offensives on land in the west, all decisions to be made at the time of the crisis. The British strategy was to prepare for a long war and wear Germany down.
The orders issued by the Polish High Command on the 8th about establishing a defensive line on the Vistula, Bug, Narev rivers shows to anyone who posesses a prewar map of Poland that the campaign was decided and would now be a large mopping up exercise.
Polish military dispositions like much of their diplomacy was based on illusion. Polish military planning was aimed at the Soviet Union the draft of a plan for war with Germany was only completed in 1936 and plans were not completed by September 1939. It seems no overall plan for mobilisation, supply (dumps in the west) defence and counter attack in the event of a German attack existed. The French warned the Poles their military dispositions were unsound.
The guarantee to Poland had not been given because the British cared about Poland but they did care about Germany dominating europe and it was necessery to give the guarantee to keep Poland, as they thought, from joining the German camp. The Poles did not inform the British that talks with Germany had broken down when the guarantee was given and the British thought it would strengthen the Poles in discussions and that they would make concessions in Danzig over which Britain thought Germany had a good case. Rumania was of greater importance but Poland was needed in creating an eastern front against Germany and keeping Rumania out of Germanys clutchs. If Poland sided with Germany all the small states of eastern europe would probably follow. It was thought unlikely that Hitler would start a european war over Danzig.
The British and French had no illusions about Polands ability to withstand a German attack. When the guarantee was given the advice of the British Chiefs of Staff was that "there was probably no way in which France and ourselves could prevent Poland and Rumania from being overrun". Polands job was to tie down the German army if war came while Britain and France built up their forces in the west because of this no aid was sent as it would have been lost when Poland fell, the estimate was probably after a few months.
At a British Chief of Staff meeting in June it was reported the French had put forward three alternatives in the event of a German attack on Poland. These were do nothing, limited offensives on land in the west, all decisions to be made at the time of the crisis. The British strategy was to prepare for a long war and wear Germany down.
The orders issued by the Polish High Command on the 8th about establishing a defensive line on the Vistula, Bug, Narev rivers shows to anyone who posesses a prewar map of Poland that the campaign was decided and would now be a large mopping up exercise.
Polish military dispositions like much of their diplomacy was based on illusion. Polish military planning was aimed at the Soviet Union the draft of a plan for war with Germany was only completed in 1936 and plans were not completed by September 1939. It seems no overall plan for mobilisation, supply (dumps in the west) defence and counter attack in the event of a German attack existed. The French warned the Poles their military dispositions were unsound.
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sid guttridge
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Carl Schwamberger
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Choice of Automatic Rifle
Just a small question. Does anyone know the reason the Browning Automatic Rifle was chosen? The French Chatellerault (M29?) design of 1924 or a variant of the Czech ZB26 (British BREN) ect.. appear better weapons. While the Browning was reliable the top mounted magazine & the larger ammo capacity favor the other LMG/automatic rifles available.
We must connect military reasons with politician reasons.Glyndower wrote: Polish military dispositions like much of their diplomacy was based on illusion. Polish military planning was aimed at the Soviet Union the draft of a plan for war with Germany was only completed in 1936 and plans were not completed by September 1939. It seems no overall plan for mobilisation, supply (dumps in the west) defence and counter attack in the event of a German attack existed. The French warned the Poles their military dispositions were unsound.
Poles in fact deploy forces not well, but there was probality that Germans did not invade whole Poland but just "corridor". Compare that with sending German troops to north Africa after "Torch". Completly idiocy from military point of view, but it was important to keep Italy in war as long as possible.
And that's not true that Polish planning was aimed only against USSR. Plans of war against Germany were rady in 1938, however I may agree that that plans were wrong.
amicus Plato, sed magis amica veritas
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phylo_roadking
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I think everyone would agree was that the one thing the Poles could NOT expect was a TWO-front war! Even after the Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement...which was ALWAYS referred to as a NON-aggression pact! Which is as good a piece of political-military subterfuge as any I've seen - as the "hidden clauses" on Poland actually made it an AGGRESSIVE pact!
Even if the Poles could have anticipated this - a few weeks is NOT enough time to even begin planning a major defensive campaign against a simultaneous attack.
Regarding the quality of the Poles' planning against a German attack - remember that through the 1930s Germany's military capability was constantly changing; NOT just in size, but also in nature; the sort of infantry-heavy attack anticipated from 1933-37 was quite different from that that would have had to have been planned for from '37 to '39, once the armoured element of blitzkrieg had proved itself in Spain. Marry that to constantly-chaning aerial capabilities...the aircraft used in Spain for example had been relegated to transport duties or 2nd-line use by September 1939, and the capability of Poland's airforce was spiralling down against modern monoplanes and heavy armaments. So the Poles were stuck with having to plan and replan for campaigns across a period of several years where the "enemy's" capabilities and strengths were constantly changing - whereas theirs were not changing fast enough to match.
If an invasion of Poland had come as part of a war after Munich in 1938, the Poles could have hoped to hold the Germans for much longer, but not by September 1939. Pity the British and French hadn't tied some sort of "lend lease" scheme to their political declarations!
Even if the Poles could have anticipated this - a few weeks is NOT enough time to even begin planning a major defensive campaign against a simultaneous attack.
Regarding the quality of the Poles' planning against a German attack - remember that through the 1930s Germany's military capability was constantly changing; NOT just in size, but also in nature; the sort of infantry-heavy attack anticipated from 1933-37 was quite different from that that would have had to have been planned for from '37 to '39, once the armoured element of blitzkrieg had proved itself in Spain. Marry that to constantly-chaning aerial capabilities...the aircraft used in Spain for example had been relegated to transport duties or 2nd-line use by September 1939, and the capability of Poland's airforce was spiralling down against modern monoplanes and heavy armaments. So the Poles were stuck with having to plan and replan for campaigns across a period of several years where the "enemy's" capabilities and strengths were constantly changing - whereas theirs were not changing fast enough to match.
If an invasion of Poland had come as part of a war after Munich in 1938, the Poles could have hoped to hold the Germans for much longer, but not by September 1939. Pity the British and French hadn't tied some sort of "lend lease" scheme to their political declarations!
"Well, my days of not taking you seriously are certainly coming to a middle." - Malcolm Reynolds