Ssuchinitschi - Winter 1941/42.

German campaigns and battles 1919-1945.

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Ssuchinitschi - Winter 1941/42.

Post by tigre »

Hello to all :D; a multi-sided grout ......................................

Soviet winter offensive of 1941.

On December 16, 1941, Kalinin was liberated by the Red Army. On December 19, Hitler removed von Brauchitsch (OKH). On December 25, the Red Army liberated Istra, Rusa and Wolokolamsk. These days, Guderian withdrew his troops on his own against express orders to hold positions and was therefore relieved of his command and transferred to the Führer's reserve. On December 30, Kaluga finally fell into Soviet hands. While this was happening, from December 14, 1941, the 18th Panzer had to retreat in the face of the Soviet winter offensive and on December 25, 1941 it reached the southern bank of the Suscha east of Mtsensk.

For its part, in December 1941, the 216th Infantry Division was transferred to the eastern front from France by rail transport. The divisional formations split into three battle groups as they arrived and were deployed to the front under the command of other units. The division's HQ and a group at the regimental level were deployed in the Ssuchinitschi "Fortress", the other division regiments fought in Medy, Rzhev, Kirov and the Rollbahn Juchnow - Rosslawl.

A look at Battle Group Gilsa, on December 29, 1941 with the first transports of the 216. ID, the IR 396 arrived in Ssuchinitschi under the command of Oberstleutnant Schaer and his Adjutant, Hauptmann Hans Niebuhr. Both officers became the organizers of the successful defense, which was an energetic and continuous improvisation. The Division Commander and his Ia, Maj. Cossmann, arrived on December 30, but without a General Staff and without means of command. On December 31, 1941 / January 1, 1942 the encirclement of the Russians materialized. The Combat Group had about 5,000 men, of which about 3,400 were combat forces, which had to maintain a front of about 14 km, with the support of the Luftwaffe.

The combat mission given was: "Order of the Führer, the place will stand under all circumstances." It is doubtful that local conditions were clear. The order was given by the Ia of the Fourth Army, Oberstleutnant i.G. Stieff (conjured July 20, 1944) by telephone. The slogan of the Commander of IR 396 was: "Whoever is cast out of a village in a snowy desert is lost." He left no doubt about the hard fight that was expected.

Apparently the enemy was initially of the opinion that the defense of the site could quickly break down, as it had recently been successful in Kosielsk. Therefore, he attacked very energetically in the early days because he was very interested in quickly taking possession of the important railway hub for his supplies. He later switched to the tactic of attrition and threw most of his forces westward toward the old front of the invasion, convinced that Ssuchinitschi would fall into his lap like ripe fruit.

Sources: https://deacademic.com/dic.nsf/dewiki/1209591
Soldatenjahrbuch 1967. Page 52.
http://bernhardschulz.de/die_befreiung_ ... tschi.html
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... /216ID.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... /208ID.htm

Cheers. Raúl M 8).
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Front sector, where the crucial importance of the town is appreciated..............
Front sector, where the crucial importance of the town is appreciated..............
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Re: Ssuchinitschi - Winter 1941/42.

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Hello to all :D; more......................................

New mission for the 18. Panzer.

As early as January 6, 1942, the division received notification that it would be released from its position at an accelerated rate to take on another difficult task. What had happened in the meantime? Between the 2nd Panzer Army and the 4th Army, fighting to the north, there was a dangerous gap about 80 km wide on the Belew - Kaluga line. They had tried in vain to close it; but they lacked strength. Strong elements of the Soviet 10th Army constantly pushed into this gap to engulf the right wing of the 4th Army and ultimately separate the two armies. The situation had already worsened.

In this operationally dangerous situation and in an urgent search for reserves, the decision had been made to continue extending the front to the east of Orel. To this end, the 18th Panzer Division, although very exhausted and only operational with around 30 percent of its forces, and the 12th Rifle Regiment (Oberst Smilo Frhr. V. Lüttwitz) of the 4. Pz. Div. Had been thrown into the gap.

On January 7, the Chief of Staff of the 2nd Panzer Army (Frhr. Von Liebenstein) in Orel and on behalf of the Commander-in-Chief who was absent at the front (now General der Panzer Truppen Rudolf Schmidt) detailed the situation. The division was supposed to establish a connection with the Battle Group Gilsa north of Bryansk and thus consolidate the situation in the gap.

The march took place via Orel, Karachev to Bryansk, where the division would be subordinate to the XXIV. Panzer Corps (Willibald Freiherr von Langermann und Erlencamp, CoS Oberst Schilling). An attempt will be made to make available to the division of other forces (SR 12 and parts of the 208. ID just arrived from France).

Indeed, in January 1942, the 208.ID began its deployment on the Eastern Front, being deployed in the Shisdra area in Army Group Center. Deviating from the bulk, the Infantry Regiment 309, with strong parts of the Regiment and weaker parts of the Infantry Regiment 337, was detrained in the 9th Army area and employed there.

The parts of the division that reached the Shisdra area without being equipped for the Russian winter were immediately used to secure the city. To be mobile and operational, the infantry carts were exchanged for Panje sleds. In mid-January, the Kuzmany Group (Obstlt = Kdr IR 338) was formed with the HQ of the Infantry Regiment 338, parts of the Infantry Regiments 348, 337, 338 and parts of the Panzer Regiment 18. The Group Kuzmany was subordinated to the 18. Panzer Division to liberate the Group Gilsa (216. Infantry Division) in Ssuchinitschi, which had been encircled since the beginning of the year.

Sources: https://deacademic.com/dic.nsf/dewiki/1209591
Soldatenjahrbuch 1967. Pag 52.
http://bernhardschulz.de/die_befreiung_ ... tschi.html
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... /216ID.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... /208ID.htm

Cheers. Raúl M 8).
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Situation of the front at the beginning of January 1942.....................
Situation of the front at the beginning of January 1942.....................
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Re: Ssuchinitschi - Winter 1941/42.

Post by tigre »

Hello to all :D; more......................................

In Shisdra.

The march was motorized, by train and sled. The distance to the Shisdra area, where the HQ of the XXIV Panzer Korps was located, was about 300 km, partly on very poor, snow-covered, and partisan-clogged roads north and northwest of Bryansk, with mines laid on the snow-covered tracks. Hptm. Schaub (f) of SR 12 describes this march very precisely and emphatically and therefore shows the extraordinary difficulties of operational changes in the situation that put a lot of stress on people and their equipment and took a lot of time.

On January 11, 1942 Oberstlt. KUZMANY took command of all 208. ID units housed in Shisdra at 09:00 hours. A reconnaissance is scheduled and steps are taken to defend the position.

The 18. Pz. Div. assembled around January 14, the division's Staff went ahead of Shisdra to get acquainted with the development of the situation at an early stage. The city was quite attractive by Russian standards; There was even a spa with concrete bathtubs. The Division Commander and his Assistant, Major v. Reinhard (f), they occupied a nice wooden house, whose 3 rooms were well heated in the Russian style with a stove in the middle. There was a huge branching rubber tree in the living room that almost completely obscured the window. In contrast, the family cow was standing in a cage with vented louvers when the temperature hovered around 20/30 degrees Celsius.

By this time, the Russians had reached Kirov with their southern wing, strong parts as flank cover at Lyudinowo and to the east of it. Ssuchinitschi was encircled. After the first hard days of the attack, it was relatively calm.

On January 15, 1942, the Staff of IR 338 (208. ID) with the rest of the infantry and artillery parts still in Shisdra was placed under the command of the 18. Pz. Div as Group KUZMANY.

The order of attack of the XXIV. Pz. Korps contained the assignment for me to establish contact with the Gilsa Group, which was fighting in the harsh winter conditions some 80 km deep in the enemy rear. The following elements were available: the weak 18. Pz Div with about a dozen combat vehicles, the SR 12 (which was reinforced, among other forces by the II./ PR 18 on foot without a tank) and parts of the 208.ID and other remains of 208. ID under the command of Oberst A. Arndt.

No concept of operation was specified for the execution of the order. I don't know if the High Command gave the operation great prospects for success. But it's hard to guess, as tactically and operationally it was extremely daring. The enemy was known to be advancing west through Kirov with about 6 divisions. Lyudinovo was busy. To the south and southeast of it were partisan units or dispersed troops or Russian explorers. On the long route from Lyudinovo through Bukan in the direction of Ssuchinitschi there was enemy traffic, and it was to be expected that the enemy forces would be north of the road.

Sources: https://deacademic.com/dic.nsf/dewiki/1209591
Soldatenjahrbuch 1967. Pag 52.
http://bernhardschulz.de/die_befreiung_ ... tschi.html
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... /216ID.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... /208ID.htm

Cheers. Raúl M 8).
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Situation of the front on the inner flanks of the 2nd Pz Army and the 4th Army.........
Situation of the front on the inner flanks of the 2nd Pz Army and the 4th Army.........
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Re: Ssuchinitschi - Winter 1941/42.

Post by tigre »

Hello to all :D; more......................................

In Shisdra.

January 16, 1942. In the morning discussion about the hostile situation and own intentions at HQ of 18.PD (General NEHRING). Against the enemy, who had advanced to the west beyond Lyudinovo, two operations were prepared for January 17, 1942, in the north on Bukan and in the north-west on Lyudinowo.

Mixed Btl. ASCHEN dropped out of subordination under IR 338 and came under the orders of the 18th PD. Forces of the Group KUZMANY: Rgt.Stab mit Stabskp. with Cyclist Pi. and Nachr.-Zug (IG-Zug was subordinate to the Group KUNO in Skejewo). I. / IR 338 with 1., 10. and 12. / IR 338, 2./IR 338 with 1 Pel 14./ IR 338, K18, II./ IR 348 with 1 Pel 14./ IR 337, 6./ PR 18 (Oblt. Leinhoe). Dependent on cooperation with III./AR 208.

In the course of the afternoon, Bukan was taken by a stroke of reinforced II./IR 348. The remaining parts of the Group KUZMANY started to advance in the north during the night of January 16/17th, 1942. I. / IR338 had transferred most of the sledges to I./IR 337 to carry out the operation of the Group ASCHEN and had to move again.

My decision (Nehring) was first of all to move north on a broad front in order to clarify the situation with the enemy, at the same time to deceive him about my intentions and then, depending on the situation, to turn to Ssuchinitschi to the northeast. After the forces had gathered, on January 16, 1942: I. 18. Pz. Div. was split in 2 battle groups from Shisdra:

a) Oberst Kuzmany with 1 Batl each, of the 208th, 216th and 18th Panzer Div., reinforced by 6./Pz. Rgt. 18 and 2./AR 208 on Bukan, later turn onto Slobodka, Ssuchinitschi.

b) Oberst Erwin Jollasse, Kdr. SR 52, with I./SR 52, Batl. Major Aschen of the 208th Div. (Parts of IR 337, 338, 339!), Pz. Kp. V. Stünzner, l. / AR 208, 2./Pz. Jag. Abt. 88 on Lyudinowo with the task of destroying the enemy there.

Remaining 208th ID from area east of Shisdra, east of the Brjansk Dumitschy railway, with the order to advance on Ssuchinitschi and thereby simultaneously the right flank of 18th Pz. Div. to secure.

SR 12 reinforced from Djatkowo via Sukreml (on the road from Brjansk) to Lyudinowo, around the left flank of the 18th Pz. Div. to secure, at the same time to support the attack of the Jolasse group and to replace them there later.

The rest of the 18th Pz. Div. was named Div. Reserve deployed north of Shisdra.

Sources: https://deacademic.com/dic.nsf/dewiki/1209591
Soldatenjahrbuch 1967. Pag 52.
http://bernhardschulz.de/die_befreiung_ ... tschi.html
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... /216ID.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... /208ID.htm

Cheers. Raúl M 8).
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
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Re: Ssuchinitschi - Winter 1941/42.

Post by tigre »

Hello to all :D; more......................................

Development of the operation.

January 17, 1942. Execution went according to plan. The SR 12 made its way to Lyudinowo amid fighting and snow conditions and very difficult roads and deep tree barriers. Jolasse Group won there on January 17, with air support a brilliant success over the Soviet 323rd Rifle Division, which lost 16 guns, 9 anti-tank guns, 9 heavy mortars, a lot of equipment and ammunition, plus 150 prisoners and hundreds of dead. The Kuzmany Group, under the command of its one-arm Viennese commander, similarly made its way.

The hardships caused by winter were hardly imaginable: no winter gear, no winter oil for weapons and vehicles, radio equipment freezing, snow down to 0.80m, minus 20-30 ° C and more. Snowplows came in behind the spearhead to make the road usable.

The best companies fight their way through the snow on both sides of the road to the next village and attack the faltering enemy fighting in a narrow but deep structure like shock troops. Later on, mortars are used as heavy weapons to achieve rapid success and save lives. The mines claim victims because they are not recognized in the snow. Tree barriers impede advancement and are often under enemy fire. The supply route is particularly at risk as it is poorly or not at all insured.

Group Kuzmany: After a quiet night, II./ IR 348 sent a reconnaissance to Kotobitschi, Saprudnoje, the Roga settlement and the Jasenok settlement (8 km north-west of Oslinka). Kotobitschi was occupied by a stronger enemy. When the scouting troops established north of Bukan took firm hold, the opponents evaded further north and sought contact with the forces attacked by the Group Aschen near Lyudinowo.

During a reconnaissance advance in the forest area west and southwest of Bukan, 4 Pz Kw III of the 6. / PR 18 under the leadership of Oblt. Leinhoe with the support of 7. / IR 348, crushed an enemy supply for a counterattack on Bukan. The opponents had taken up position on the edge of the forest west of Bukan on both sides of the Bukan-Lyudinowo road and had joined in with the heavy mortars and machine guns already in place.

As a result of this action, a total of: 1 7.62 cm gun, 1 anti-tank gun, 17 heavy machine guns, 1 light machine gun (MG34), 4 heavy mortars, 1 mortar, 7 automatic rifles and 4 other rifles were captured or destroyed. as well as a large number of infantry ammunition of all kinds.

Sources: https://deacademic.com/dic.nsf/dewiki/1209591
Soldatenjahrbuch 1967. Pag 52.
http://bernhardschulz.de/die_befreiung_ ... tschi.html
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... /216ID.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... /208ID.htm

Cheers. Raúl M 8).
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
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Re: Ssuchinitschi - Winter 1941/42.

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Hello to all :D; more......................................

Development of the operation.

January 18, 1942. Reconnaissance to Poliki, Slawinka and Pyrinka. Faced with weaker enemy resistance, Kotbitschi, then Siminizy, could be taken. Slobodka found itself clear of the enemy and was occupied by advanced parts of II./IR 348. The enemy continued to retreat northward. The bridge over the Drogoshan had already been destroyed in previous operations and construction began immediately with the help of civilians. West of Bukan, on the road to Lyudinowo, it was possible to establish a connection with a reconnaissance group established there north of the Roga settlement.

January 19, 1942. Kuzmany Group: Regiment Staff with HQ Coy/IR 338, I. / IR 338, II./IR 348 reinforced, 6./PR 18; Kradsch. Btl. 18 passed under the direct orders of 18. Pz.
Fire support and cooperation: now II./AR 208; Reconnaissance southeast of Buda Monastyrskaja and Vydrowka, where weaker enemy forces were found, and north of Pechki, which was clear of enemies, Kamenka was occupied.
During the day, the main parts of the Kuzmany group moved to the Siminizy-Slobodka-Kotobitschi area. In the afternoon, a Russian scouting troop on horseback was captured at the eastern entrance to Siminizy. According to statements by the civilian population, the enemy had retreated further east and northeast on the night of January 19, 1942, taking with them some 60 wounded.

January 20, 1942 The task of the regiment was:
1.) Reach Bryni with a strong battalion and Dubrowka with another battalion.
2.) Advanced reconnaissance of the Chwano line and the railway line north of Koschatinka.
I./IR 338 was supposed to advance through Siminizy-Skatscok, the II. / IR 338 by Dubrowka and Aleksandrowka. As a result of a heavy snowfall on the way to Dubrowka, I./IR 338 marched through Maklaki, where there was a brief battle between the infantry spearhead and enemy patrols that fell back north with losses.

Dubrowka's eastern exit was reached by I./IR 338 around 11 a.m. Here, too, a weak enemy eluded after exchange of fire with the infantry spearhead. However, stronger snowdrifts and heavy snowstorms prevented it from advancing rapidly. The roads were not clear. Some of the men sank to their harness, the horses chest-high in the snow, the battalion had to use a sled path leading northeast.

About 150 m before the entrance to the village, both vanguard groups were attacked from the southern end of the village by stronger opponents with machine guns. In the hard fighting, however, they managed to reach the village entrance with good support from their own anti-tank guns, which had already set fire to several houses with the first shots and then, in fierce house-to-house fighting to force the enemy to retreat with hand grenades. House to house had to be fought doggedly, and it was not until dusk that the enemy abandoned the resistance and fled north, northeast, and northwest into the forest. The I./IR 338 was able to report as loot that day, 3 anti-tank guns, 5 heavy machine guns, 37 rifles, 5 automatic rifles with numerous ammunition and 12 prisoners. Own losses amounted to 2 dead and 4 wounded.

In the meantime, II./IR 348 had arrived at the ordered lodging places and had carried out reconnaissance as far as Semichasnoye, a place occupied by stronger opponents. I./IR 338 assumed protection of the northern flank during the group's subsequent advance and was subordinate to SR 52 from January 22 at 7:00 p.m. I./IR 337 was again subordinate to the group during the night of January 21, 1942.

Sources: https://deacademic.com/dic.nsf/dewiki/1209591
Soldatenjahrbuch 1967. Pag 52.
http://bernhardschulz.de/die_befreiung_ ... tschi.html
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... /216ID.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... /208ID.htm

Cheers. Raúl M 8).
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
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Re: Ssuchinitschi - Winter 1941/42.

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Hello to all :D; more......................................

Development of the operation.

January 21, 1942. When the connection with the I./IR 337 was established at around 09:00 a.m., the KUZMANY group advanced with strong spearhead from Aleksandrowka against Bryni. 1 km before Semchasnoye, the point was shot by 4 s.MG and some riflemen. Through an energetic attack, Oberstlt. KUZMANY himself in the forefront managed to take the place in a flash under the fire protection of the heavy infantry weapons and with the support of 3 Panzer III. Opponents moved north into the adjacent woods. Around 12:00 p.m. the place was completely cleared of the enemy.

After the group had been reorganized and a short rest, the further advance on Bryni was started. On the freely sloping slope in front of Bryni, the II./IR 348, which proceeded as the foremost battalion, at a distance of about 1.5 km already took fire from light and heavy Infantry weapons of the enemy and initially forced to take cover.

While 1 Pz.Kw. and all heavy Infantry weapons were attacking from the southeast on Bryni, The 7./IR 348 and 2 Pz.Kw. with a focus on north-west Skachok moved and took the place. the 5. and 6./IR 348 with a Pl of the 14./IR 337 attacked Bryni themselves. Well-positioned fire of the heavy weapons enabled the company to move forward in uncovered terrain. After a hard fight, Bryni and the district of Skachok were by 03:00 p.m. firmly in the hands of the KUZMANY group.

The enemy with a strength of about 1 Rgt., was completely surprised and fled to the north and northwest, and with scattered parts to the southwest, leaving behind 90 dead and 8 prisoners as well as numerous weapons. On these days the following were captured: 2 15cm guns with limbs, one 7.62cm gun, 2 s.Gr.W., 11 l.Gr.W., 2 s.MG, 4 field kitchens, numerous artillery and infantry ammunition, one equipment Field pharmacy, bandages, extensive office supplies, numerous horses and sleighs.

The I./IR 338 had successfully defended the place Koschatinka against repeated attacks by the enemy and with losses from the enemy. The CO of the 18th PD expressed his special appreciation to the KUZMANY group for the success of Bryni.

The reinforced 18th Pz. Div. moved slowly but steadfastly towards their still distant goal. It resembles a caterpillar whose limbs stretch, unlock and stretch again. For example, on January 21st, SR 12 secured the section Bukan-Ljudinowo.

January 22, 1942. The order of the KUZMANY group was the continuation of the advance on Popkowo. SR 52 covered on the right flank and rear by attacking Olodnewa, on which the K18 had been set the day before. SR 101 should follow towards Bryni. Reconnaissance was set up during the night to explore the routes Bryni-Twschanowo-Popkowo and Bryni-Brobrowo-Schiwodowka-Popkowo, as well as along the Bryn to Soroch and Gulzowa.

Bobrowo was considered occupied by about 2 enemy companies. firmly established. For the further advance of the group, therefore, without the possibility of a safety side, the only route in question was the route via Chwanwo. The strong scouting parties deployed on Chwanowo drove weaker opponents out of the place and initially remained there as standing security.

In the course of the afternoon the following were brought forward: II./IR 348 to Tschwanowo, I./IR 337 to Sorochka-Gulsowa and places north-east of it on the railway line to Ssuchinitschi were taken under fire several times by own artillery, since advanced scout troops had reported stronger enemy occupation there. On January 22nd the SR 12 secures from Kotobitschi to Lyudinowo.

Sources: https://deacademic.com/dic.nsf/dewiki/1209591
Soldatenjahrbuch 1967. Pag 52.
http://bernhardschulz.de/die_befreiung_ ... tschi.html
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... /216ID.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... /208ID.htm

Cheers. Raúl M 8).
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
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Re: Ssuchinitschi - Winter 1941/42.

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Hello to all :D; more......................................

Development of the operation.

January 23, 1942. At the assembly area in the morning, the I./IR 337 was attacked by an enemy company equipped with snowshoes from the forest northeast of Sorotschka. With little loss of their own, they succeeded in destroying 22 of the opponent's 40 men and bringing in several prisoners, while the remainder escaped into the forest south of Chwanowo and tried to disrupt the morning by means of small individual actions by the advance of the group. The advance on Popkowo was therefore delayed by several hours and could only begin around 9 a.m.

The II./IR 348, which had been deployed again at the front, fighting against weak enemy, reached the edge of the forest 1 km southwest of Popkowo north of the advance road at around noon via untracked paths. It found stronger opponents in the village itself, which according to prisoners' statements amounted to around 400 men. One of the tanks deployed at the front failed, Stabsfw. Melchior, who was later awarded the Knight's Cross, is badly wounded. After a short deployment, the simultaneous attack on the eastern and western parts of Popkowo was successful.

The enemy defended every single house to the end. The first houses were reached around 2 p.m., but it was not until about three hours of bitter house-to-house fighting between II./IR 348 and I./IR 337 that there was silence. The enemy withdrew, insofar as he was not destroyed, in a north and north-westerly direction with a strength of about 300 men.

Looted: 11 trucks loaded with ammo and explosives, 1 gun of 7.62cm, 1 s.MG, 2 l.MG, 2 s.Gr.W., 24 MP, 50 semi automatic rifles, numerous hand grenades, as well as Gr.W. and Pak ammo.

Over 100 enemy deaths were counted and 8 prisoners brought in. The own losses amounted to 10 dead, including 2 officers (Kp. Fuehrer) and 40 wounded.

Sources: https://deacademic.com/dic.nsf/dewiki/1209591
Soldatenjahrbuch 1967. Pag 52.
http://bernhardschulz.de/die_befreiung_ ... tschi.html
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... /216ID.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... /208ID.htm

Cheers. Raúl M 8).

Feliz Navidad - Feliz Natal - Frohe Weihnachten - Joyeux Noël - Merry Christmas - Wesołych Świąt!. :up:
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
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Re: Ssuchinitschi - Winter 1941/42.

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Hello to all :D; more......................................

Development of the operation.

January 24, 1942. While the SR 52 covered the northern flank of the KUZMANY Group by attacking Koschatinka and Dubrowka, the SR 101 protected the rear near Bryni Tschwanowo and the right neighbor (208. ID) was advancing over Usty and Kasar, the KUZMANY Group had the following task:
1.) Establish tactical union with the Gilsa Group (216. ID) in Ssuchinitschi.
2.) After reaching Gilsa Group to create a corridor by securing the places on both sides of the Popkovo-Ssuchinitschi road.
3.) When relieving Gilsa Group from Ssuchinitschi to form the reception position for them.

When it got light, however, the enemy attacked the forces deployed to secure Popkowo from a north-eastward direction along the railway line, with roughly a battalion. After a bitter struggle, the attack was repulsed at around 08:30 a.m. The enemy had left around 160 dead as well as numerous weapons and pieces of equipment. The KUZMANY Group was confronted by an enemy elite unit specially equipped in every way with machine guns, automatic rifles, snowshoes and snow shirts.

At about 10:30 a.m. the advance from Popkowo to Ssuchinitschi began with the II./IR 348, the I./IR 337, the 6./PR 18, Rgt.Stab and Stabs-Kp./IR 338, the II./SR 101 remained with parts of the now subordinate Pi.Btl.98 for site security in Popkowo. The enemy continuously disrupted the advance with machine-gun fire from Pitschalowo. At the height south of the entrance to the town of Mikhailovichi, the enemy had set up strong defensive forces. A reinforced company from GilsaGroup, starting from Ssuchinitschi, had attacked Mikhailovichi from the northeast at around 09:30 a.m.

The Soviet company, evading to the southwest, which had previously occupied the place, was wiped out by the II./IR 348 with the support of the tanks of the 6./PR 18. Losses suffered by the enemy amounted to about 60 dead, 2 7,62 cm guns, numerous machine guns, sleds and horses.

At 01:15 p.m., the connection between the Gilsa Group and the KUZMANY Group in the southern part of the village of Michailowitschi was established. Oberstlt. KUZMANY immediately reported the connection between the two groups to General von Gilsa by radio. In the course of the afternoon, opponents undertook several counter-attacks on the southern part of Michailowitschi from the east and covered the place with strong artillery and mortar fire. The attacks were repulsed with new losses for the enemy. The 5. / IR 338, subordinated to the II./IR 348, reached Nikolajewo around 04:00 p.m. and occupied the place, but had to evacuate it again at around 10:00 p.m. to very strong enemy forces, who were brought in after dark, and retreat to Popkowo.

The I./IR 337 with 1st and 4th / IR 337 did not get into Pitschalewo as intended because the place was strongly defended by the enemy. It had to withdraw to Popkowo. The Gilsa Group, which was trapped in Ssuchinitschi, had been relieved, but the advance road was not yet secured. Opponents pushed forward with stronger forces both from the east via Voronety and Nikolajewo and from the west via Pitschalewo on the only connection route. On the evening of January 24, 1942, the CO of the 2nd Panzer Army expressed his thanks and appreciation to the division for the special achievements of the day.

Sources: https://deacademic.com/dic.nsf/dewiki/1209591
Soldatenjahrbuch 1967. Pag 52.
http://bernhardschulz.de/die_befreiung_ ... tschi.html
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... /216ID.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... /208ID.htm

Cheers. Raúl M 8).

Feliz Año Nuevo - Happy New Year - feliz Ano Novo - gluckliches Neues Jahr - Bonne Année - Felice Anno Nuovo - Szczęśliwego nowego roku!! :beer:
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
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tigre
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Re: Ssuchinitschi - Winter 1941/42.

Post by tigre »

Hello to all :D; more......................................

Development of the operation.

January 25, 1942. To secure the corridor between Popkowo and Ssuchinitschi to the east, I./IR 337 was deployed at Nikolajewo, reinforced with 5./IR 338. The attack, carried out simultaneously from the south and southwest, supported by 5 tanks, it was successful. The place was in the hands of the KUZMANY Group. A counterattack immediately initiated by the enemy with tank support was repelled. The enemy was repulsed at Woronety. The group was able to meet its own heavy losses on I./IR 338 as well as several reserve weapons failures overnight. The supply of fuel and ammunition for the Pz Kw IIIb deployed at Nikolajewo posed difficulties.

The enemy had attacked Popkowo from the south and southwest around 02:00. When it was dark and well camouflaged, the enemy would sometimes come within 10 m of security posts. It was rejected leaving 38 dead.
The evacuation of the approximately 1,000 wounded from the Gilsa Group via Popkowo to Bryni began on the night of January 25-26, 1942.

January 26, 1942. The task of the KUZMANY Group remains to secure the Popkowo-Ssuchinitschi area against enemy attacks and, in particular, to secure traffic on the Rollbahn Ssuchinitschi-Popkovo to allow the evacuation of the wounded and a possible subsequent withdrawal of the Gilsa Group from Ssuchinitschi. II./SR 101 was to take the heavily defended city of Pitschalewo with tank support in the morning attack from the south and southeast to secure the advance path to the west.

The adversary, however, attacked Popkowo at around 03:30 from the south and southwest along the Rollbahn towards Bryni with about one company. The attack was repulsed. The Soviets attacked again from the same direction around 06:30 hours and were again repulsed, withdrew to the west, leaving the dead behind.

There was heavy artillery and mortar fire in Popkowo until 09:30. Due to the temporary uncertainty of the situation and the uncertainty about the exact enemy strength south of Popkowo, the attack on Pitschalewo was postponed. Around 09:30 hours the enemy attacked Nikolajewo with 3 medium tanks. Two tanks were destroyed by the reinforced I./IR 337, one of them with a concentrated charge.

At the same time to cover the initially open right flank of the KUZMANY Group, parts of the Gilsa Group attacked Woronety from the north with air support in the morning. This attack was supported by I./IR 337 with all heavy weapons and 3 tanks of 6./PR 18. After repelling the attack on Nikolajewo, the artillery itself attacked recognized targets at Pitschalewo, Gusowo and Woronety.

Sources: https://deacademic.com/dic.nsf/dewiki/1209591
Soldatenjahrbuch 1967. Pag 52.
http://bernhardschulz.de/die_befreiung_ ... tschi.html
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... /216ID.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... /208ID.htm

Cheers. Raúl M 8).
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
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tigre
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Posts: 6959
Joined: Sun Apr 10, 2005 5:42 pm
Location: Argentina

Re: Ssuchinitschi - Winter 1941/42.

Post by tigre »

Hello to all :D; more......................................

Development of the operation.

January 27, 1942. On the night of January 26-27, 1942, the enemy mined the Rollbahn between Chwanowo and Popkowo and between Popkowo and Michailowitschi. A tank, which was used to secure a transport of the wounded, struck a mine 2 km south of Popkowo and fell as did another tank with supplies leaving Bryni. Sappers were used to clear the mines.

SR 101, supported by 5 tanks from 9. / PR 18, took Pitschalewo. The enemy had about 150 men. It left 60 dead, including an officer. The Soviets fled to the north and northwest. Weaker enemy scout groups continued to move day and night into the forested area southwest of Popkowo on the Rollbahn towards Bryni and fired at smaller groups and individual vehicles.

January 28, 1942. The night passed in silence, apart from the sometimes heavy mortar, Pak and artillery fire at Popkowo. In the afternoon, the enemy attacked Pitchalowo from the north, with approximately one company. The attack was repulsed around 8:00 p.m. 4 heavy machine guns were captured. In the late afternoon, the last wounded were transferred from Ssuchinitschi to Popkowo and from here under infantry protection to Bryni.

In the evening news came that the Gilsa Group would be withdrawn from Ssuchinitschi that night and initially relocated to the area south of Kamenka. The KUZMANY Group received the order, with the former organization (I. / IR 337 in Nikolajewo, II. / IR 348 at Michailowitschi, II./ SR 101 at Pitschalewo, I. / SR 101 with remaining parts at Popkowo) retain the Nikolajewo-Michailowitschi -Pitschalewo line until the last parts of the Gilsa Group have crossed Popkowo to the southwest, then switch to the Pechenkino-Popkowo-Kuklino line. Preparations for these movements have been ordered.

Sources: https://deacademic.com/dic.nsf/dewiki/1209591
Soldatenjahrbuch 1967. Pag 52.
http://bernhardschulz.de/die_befreiung_ ... tschi.html
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... /216ID.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... /208ID.htm

Cheers. Raúl M 8).
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
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