Combat actions North of Kiev from November 3 to 6.
Posted: Fri May 26, 2017 10:44 am
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From the book Battle of Dnepr 1943 by V. Goncharov
В. Гончаров
Битва за Днепр. 1943 г
Combat actions in north of Kiev
Fights on 3 November.
At 8 hours on 3 November the troops of the 60th and 38th Armies began artillery preparation.
At 8:40 the infantry and tanks of direct support went over to the attack.
Despite the fierce fire resistance of the enemy and his furious counterattacks,
the troops of both armies broke through the enemy's defenses and advanced 5-12 km.
On the sites of the 17th and 18th Guards Rifle Corps,
the 60th Army conducted private battles to improve its positions.
The 77th Rifle Corps of the Army broke through the enemy's defense at the front of 3 km,
occupied the settlement of Sychevka and advanced westward by 4 km.
The 24th and 30th Rifle Corps, which dealt the main blow,
broke through the enemy's defenses on the front 18 km,
occupied the settlements of Fedorovka, Rovy, Rostesno, Glebovka and
by the end of the day they engaged in battles near the northern outskirts of Dymer.
The 30th Rifle Corps in the second half of the day brought into battle its second echelon -
the 141st Rifle Division.
The 38th Army broke through the enemy's defense in the sector of the 50th Rifle Corps and
on the right flank of the 51st Rifle Corps at the front 10 km.
After moving for 7 km, the army units seized the village of Dachi Pushcha-Voditsa.
In the center and on the left flank of the 51st Rifle Corps, and especially in the Vyshgorod area,
the enemy resisted stubbornly and held back the advance of our units.
Thus, the army's connections on the narrow front broke through only the first position of the
enemy's defense and started battles for the second position in the Dachi Pushcha-Voditsa area.
The artillery preparation of the attack in both armies (and especially in the 38th)
on the main attack directions was exceptionally powerful and effective.
In the first hours after the artillery preparation from the enemy's side,
only individual guns and mortars fired.
The first 2 km of the attacking infantry passed, without encountering any special resistance.
The organized artillery fire of the Germans began only in the afternoon.
Due to the large forest cover of the area,
during the whole day in the zone of both armies they were mostly forest battles.
This greatly complicated the offensive.
So, for example, in the forest near Fedorovka and Rostesno the enemy planted "kukushek"
with automatic weapons on the trees, delaying the advance of our infantry.
For combing the forest, small-caliber antiaircraft artillery batteries, anti-tank guns and
anti-aircraft machine guns were used.
A change of fire positions was made simultaneously by one-third of the entire artillery.
In the 60th Army, part of the artillery began to change the OP immediately
after the artillery preparation and moved to the artillery NP areas.
These batteries have greatly helped in solving the firing problems,
which appeared with the beginning of the attack of the infantry.
The 7th Artillery Corps accompanied the infantry with wheels
by only two combined brigades (one per rifle corps).
Consolidated brigades were composed of divisions and regiments,
which were armed with various calibers.
One composite brigade consisted of
two divisions of 152-mm howitzers, two divisions of 122-mm howitzers,
a division of 203-mm howitzers and a mortar regiment of 120-mm mortars.
The other brigade consisted of two divisions of 152-mm howitzers,
a regiment of 122-mm howitzers, a regiment of 76-mm guns and
a mortar regiment of 120-mm mortars.
The allocation of such improvised brigades was caused by
the need to have various calibers of artillery and
a lack of thrust in the artillery corps to accompany the infantry and tanks.
The bulk of the artillery supported the offensive of infantry from the main firing positions.
As a characteristic combat episode,
it is necessary to note the concentration of the fire of the entire artillery corps in one area.
This concentration of fire was twice carried out by the enemy's resistance units during
the battle of our infantry in the depth of defense.
In the first case, the fire was concentrated on the southern outskirts of Dachi Pushcha-Voditsa,
and in the second - at an altitude 153.8 southeast of the Dachi Pushcha-Voditsa (map 50 000).
As a result of powerful fire strikes, enemy resistance in these areas was quickly broken.
On the first day of the offensive, the 60th and 38th armies repelled five counterattacks of
infantry and enemy tanks in different sectors,
which he undertook with the help of his tactical reserves.
As a result of the day, the enemy suffered great losses,
a significant amount of military equipment was seized,
550 people were taken prisoner, among them several officers.
Interrogation of the prisoners and the study of captured documents confirmed
the former enemy grouping in the area.
On the first day of the offensive north of Kiev, the enemy began to hastily pull up reserves and
parts removed from other areas to the breakout area.
The aerial reconnaissance of the front detected the movement of columns of tanks and
motor vehicles (altogether 215 tanks and assault guns and up to 400 motor vehicles)
from the south to the north from the districts of the Beloy Tserkvi, Korsun-Shevchenkovsky.
On the first day of the offensive in the band of the 38th Army,
the enemy put in the fight part of the 20th Motorized Division and
drew the 8th Tank Division to the area of Dymer.
The 2nd Air Army conducted intense combat activity on the first day of the operation.
Before the attack on the Lyutezh bridgehead on the night of 3 November,
light night bombers fired 207 sorties to destroy the enemy's manpower in the districts of
Goryanka and Dachi Pushcha-Voditsa.
Because of the dense morning mist covering the territory east of the Dnieper,
where our airfields were located, the front aviation did not lead up to 10 hours of combat work.
The first sorties of fighters to cover the troops began at 10:20,
and the actions of the Sturmovik at 10:40.
Later on, during the whole day, the actions of the front aviation were very intensive.
The day was produced 938 sorties, including ground attack planes and
bombers produced 545 sorties, fighters - 174 sorties to cover the troops and
212 sorties to accompany attack planes and bombers,
the remaining sorties were carried out for reconnaissance purposes.
The Sturmovik operated in groups of 6-22 aircraft, and bombers - in groups of 14-24 aircraft.
Departures of groups were made with 5-10 minute intervals.
In total, there were 26 groups of attack planes and 5 groups of bombers.
The first echelon of aviation was struck during the period from 11:00 to 12:30,
the second from 13:50 to 14:40 and the third from 15:50 to 17:00.
In the first echelon, 171 ground-attack planes operated under the cover of 66 fighters,
in the second - 151 attack aircraft, 58 bombers and 59 fighters, and
in the third - 133 attack aircraft, 32 bombers and 48 fighters.
The blows were inflicted on the enemy infantry, as acting in battle formations,
and on a campaign, on artillery on firing positions and on tanks in areas of settlements
Goryanka, Dachi Pushcha-Voditsa and Priorka.
After the appearance of the first echelon of Sturmovik and fighters over the battlefield,
the enemy sharply increased the number of his fighters in the breakout zone.
The fighters accompanying our attack planes and bombers
repeatedly had to engage in fierce air battles.
The Bombing aviation of the enemy during the day in groups of 3 to 37 aircraft
bombed our troops on the Lyutezh bridgehead.
During the day, 286 sorties were flown by airplanes of all types of enemy aviation.
The fighters of the 2nd Air Army on this day covered the ground troops
on the Lyutezh bridgehead.
In the patrol area, there were simultaneously 2-3 groups of 8-10 planes each.
The patrol was continuous from 10:20 to 17:45.
During the day, fighters shielded the troops and escorted the Sturmovik and
bombers conducted 36 air battles,
In which 31 enemy planes were shot down -
13 bombers, 16 fighters and, 2 reconnaissance aircraft.
Their tasks the 60th and 38th armies were not fully implemented.
This created a threat of delaying the operation.
The presence of the 7th, 8th Tank and 20th Motorized Divisions in the nearest reserve
meant that battles on the approaches to Kiev on 4 November could take exceptionally
fierce character and that infantry of the 38th Army,
weakly saturated with infantry support tanks, would experience great difficulties.
The front commander insistently demanded the 60th Army
to increase the pace of the offensive and, at all costs, to fulfill the task of the day.
The success of the 38th Army in the Kiev direction also
largely depended on the success of this army.
The control of the battle in the corps-division on the first day of the operation
was not clear enough - primarily because of the unstable operation of the connection.
So, for example, with the beginning of the offensive after the first change of command and
observation posts, wire communication from the regiment to the corps
was not restored within twenty hours.
The Stavka Supreme High Command gave great importance
to the operation in the region of Kiev.
On the very first day of its beginning,
a telegram was sent to the commander of the front (cipher telegram No. 125485),
in which Stavka ordered
the operation begun on the right wing of the front not to be delayed,
since every extra day gives an advantage only to the enemy,
allowing him to concentrate his forces here, using good roads,
whereas the roads destroyed by the Germans in our location make it difficult and
restrict the maneuver.
Stavka demanded not later than 5 November to cut the Kiev-Korosten railway
east or west of the Irpin' river, depending on the situation and
not later than 5-6 November to seize Kiev.
Stavka indicated that the Kiev bridgehead is the most important and
most advantageous of the bridgeheads on the right bank of the Dnieper River,
which is of the utmost importance for the expulsion of Germans from the right-bank Ukraine.
В. Гончаров
Битва за Днепр. 1943 г
From the book Battle of Dnepr 1943 by V. Goncharov
В. Гончаров
Битва за Днепр. 1943 г
Combat actions in north of Kiev
Fights on 3 November.
At 8 hours on 3 November the troops of the 60th and 38th Armies began artillery preparation.
At 8:40 the infantry and tanks of direct support went over to the attack.
Despite the fierce fire resistance of the enemy and his furious counterattacks,
the troops of both armies broke through the enemy's defenses and advanced 5-12 km.
On the sites of the 17th and 18th Guards Rifle Corps,
the 60th Army conducted private battles to improve its positions.
The 77th Rifle Corps of the Army broke through the enemy's defense at the front of 3 km,
occupied the settlement of Sychevka and advanced westward by 4 km.
The 24th and 30th Rifle Corps, which dealt the main blow,
broke through the enemy's defenses on the front 18 km,
occupied the settlements of Fedorovka, Rovy, Rostesno, Glebovka and
by the end of the day they engaged in battles near the northern outskirts of Dymer.
The 30th Rifle Corps in the second half of the day brought into battle its second echelon -
the 141st Rifle Division.
The 38th Army broke through the enemy's defense in the sector of the 50th Rifle Corps and
on the right flank of the 51st Rifle Corps at the front 10 km.
After moving for 7 km, the army units seized the village of Dachi Pushcha-Voditsa.
In the center and on the left flank of the 51st Rifle Corps, and especially in the Vyshgorod area,
the enemy resisted stubbornly and held back the advance of our units.
Thus, the army's connections on the narrow front broke through only the first position of the
enemy's defense and started battles for the second position in the Dachi Pushcha-Voditsa area.
The artillery preparation of the attack in both armies (and especially in the 38th)
on the main attack directions was exceptionally powerful and effective.
In the first hours after the artillery preparation from the enemy's side,
only individual guns and mortars fired.
The first 2 km of the attacking infantry passed, without encountering any special resistance.
The organized artillery fire of the Germans began only in the afternoon.
Due to the large forest cover of the area,
during the whole day in the zone of both armies they were mostly forest battles.
This greatly complicated the offensive.
So, for example, in the forest near Fedorovka and Rostesno the enemy planted "kukushek"
with automatic weapons on the trees, delaying the advance of our infantry.
For combing the forest, small-caliber antiaircraft artillery batteries, anti-tank guns and
anti-aircraft machine guns were used.
A change of fire positions was made simultaneously by one-third of the entire artillery.
In the 60th Army, part of the artillery began to change the OP immediately
after the artillery preparation and moved to the artillery NP areas.
These batteries have greatly helped in solving the firing problems,
which appeared with the beginning of the attack of the infantry.
The 7th Artillery Corps accompanied the infantry with wheels
by only two combined brigades (one per rifle corps).
Consolidated brigades were composed of divisions and regiments,
which were armed with various calibers.
One composite brigade consisted of
two divisions of 152-mm howitzers, two divisions of 122-mm howitzers,
a division of 203-mm howitzers and a mortar regiment of 120-mm mortars.
The other brigade consisted of two divisions of 152-mm howitzers,
a regiment of 122-mm howitzers, a regiment of 76-mm guns and
a mortar regiment of 120-mm mortars.
The allocation of such improvised brigades was caused by
the need to have various calibers of artillery and
a lack of thrust in the artillery corps to accompany the infantry and tanks.
The bulk of the artillery supported the offensive of infantry from the main firing positions.
As a characteristic combat episode,
it is necessary to note the concentration of the fire of the entire artillery corps in one area.
This concentration of fire was twice carried out by the enemy's resistance units during
the battle of our infantry in the depth of defense.
In the first case, the fire was concentrated on the southern outskirts of Dachi Pushcha-Voditsa,
and in the second - at an altitude 153.8 southeast of the Dachi Pushcha-Voditsa (map 50 000).
As a result of powerful fire strikes, enemy resistance in these areas was quickly broken.
On the first day of the offensive, the 60th and 38th armies repelled five counterattacks of
infantry and enemy tanks in different sectors,
which he undertook with the help of his tactical reserves.
As a result of the day, the enemy suffered great losses,
a significant amount of military equipment was seized,
550 people were taken prisoner, among them several officers.
Interrogation of the prisoners and the study of captured documents confirmed
the former enemy grouping in the area.
On the first day of the offensive north of Kiev, the enemy began to hastily pull up reserves and
parts removed from other areas to the breakout area.
The aerial reconnaissance of the front detected the movement of columns of tanks and
motor vehicles (altogether 215 tanks and assault guns and up to 400 motor vehicles)
from the south to the north from the districts of the Beloy Tserkvi, Korsun-Shevchenkovsky.
On the first day of the offensive in the band of the 38th Army,
the enemy put in the fight part of the 20th Motorized Division and
drew the 8th Tank Division to the area of Dymer.
The 2nd Air Army conducted intense combat activity on the first day of the operation.
Before the attack on the Lyutezh bridgehead on the night of 3 November,
light night bombers fired 207 sorties to destroy the enemy's manpower in the districts of
Goryanka and Dachi Pushcha-Voditsa.
Because of the dense morning mist covering the territory east of the Dnieper,
where our airfields were located, the front aviation did not lead up to 10 hours of combat work.
The first sorties of fighters to cover the troops began at 10:20,
and the actions of the Sturmovik at 10:40.
Later on, during the whole day, the actions of the front aviation were very intensive.
The day was produced 938 sorties, including ground attack planes and
bombers produced 545 sorties, fighters - 174 sorties to cover the troops and
212 sorties to accompany attack planes and bombers,
the remaining sorties were carried out for reconnaissance purposes.
The Sturmovik operated in groups of 6-22 aircraft, and bombers - in groups of 14-24 aircraft.
Departures of groups were made with 5-10 minute intervals.
In total, there were 26 groups of attack planes and 5 groups of bombers.
The first echelon of aviation was struck during the period from 11:00 to 12:30,
the second from 13:50 to 14:40 and the third from 15:50 to 17:00.
In the first echelon, 171 ground-attack planes operated under the cover of 66 fighters,
in the second - 151 attack aircraft, 58 bombers and 59 fighters, and
in the third - 133 attack aircraft, 32 bombers and 48 fighters.
The blows were inflicted on the enemy infantry, as acting in battle formations,
and on a campaign, on artillery on firing positions and on tanks in areas of settlements
Goryanka, Dachi Pushcha-Voditsa and Priorka.
After the appearance of the first echelon of Sturmovik and fighters over the battlefield,
the enemy sharply increased the number of his fighters in the breakout zone.
The fighters accompanying our attack planes and bombers
repeatedly had to engage in fierce air battles.
The Bombing aviation of the enemy during the day in groups of 3 to 37 aircraft
bombed our troops on the Lyutezh bridgehead.
During the day, 286 sorties were flown by airplanes of all types of enemy aviation.
The fighters of the 2nd Air Army on this day covered the ground troops
on the Lyutezh bridgehead.
In the patrol area, there were simultaneously 2-3 groups of 8-10 planes each.
The patrol was continuous from 10:20 to 17:45.
During the day, fighters shielded the troops and escorted the Sturmovik and
bombers conducted 36 air battles,
In which 31 enemy planes were shot down -
13 bombers, 16 fighters and, 2 reconnaissance aircraft.
Their tasks the 60th and 38th armies were not fully implemented.
This created a threat of delaying the operation.
The presence of the 7th, 8th Tank and 20th Motorized Divisions in the nearest reserve
meant that battles on the approaches to Kiev on 4 November could take exceptionally
fierce character and that infantry of the 38th Army,
weakly saturated with infantry support tanks, would experience great difficulties.
The front commander insistently demanded the 60th Army
to increase the pace of the offensive and, at all costs, to fulfill the task of the day.
The success of the 38th Army in the Kiev direction also
largely depended on the success of this army.
The control of the battle in the corps-division on the first day of the operation
was not clear enough - primarily because of the unstable operation of the connection.
So, for example, with the beginning of the offensive after the first change of command and
observation posts, wire communication from the regiment to the corps
was not restored within twenty hours.
The Stavka Supreme High Command gave great importance
to the operation in the region of Kiev.
On the very first day of its beginning,
a telegram was sent to the commander of the front (cipher telegram No. 125485),
in which Stavka ordered
the operation begun on the right wing of the front not to be delayed,
since every extra day gives an advantage only to the enemy,
allowing him to concentrate his forces here, using good roads,
whereas the roads destroyed by the Germans in our location make it difficult and
restrict the maneuver.
Stavka demanded not later than 5 November to cut the Kiev-Korosten railway
east or west of the Irpin' river, depending on the situation and
not later than 5-6 November to seize Kiev.
Stavka indicated that the Kiev bridgehead is the most important and
most advantageous of the bridgeheads on the right bank of the Dnieper River,
which is of the utmost importance for the expulsion of Germans from the right-bank Ukraine.
В. Гончаров
Битва за Днепр. 1943 г