Decisionmaking before Rommel's attack on 21st january 1942

[julian]

A quote from Siegfried Westphal 'Erinnerungen', Hase & Koehler 1975 pp 145-146, on how the decision was reached to attack on 21 st january 1942.

'Rommel and I each flew in a Storch over the new position. The image that presented itself from the air could render the observer timid. The emptiness of the future battlefield was depressing; one saw a few groups of freezing Italian soldiers, from time to time also a few guns. That was all except a high number of supply vehicles. Now one saw correctly and very vividly how big the losses of above all the allies had been. With this small bundle we could impossibly withstand a new British large assault. When we saw each other again after the landing, Rommel thought that I did not look very confident. He also did not look overly happy. From now on all our endeavours were aimed at how we could meet this dilemma.
The IC Major von Mellenthin submitted an overview,which I had asked, about the predicted strength of the enemy in front of our frontline on the 20th january and its projcted gradual growth until the end of february. At a comparison with our strength, until 25th january, a light superiority resulted for the Panzergroup. From then on the ratio of forces changed more and more to our disadvantage. Therefore, according to my opinion, we had to attack before the 8th army had closed up from depth. At first, Rommel did not tend to accept my proposal. I asked him to sleep on the matter. Next morning he greeted me with the words 'Topp, it will be done.' It was clear to us that the plan could only succeed , when the intention remained secret. Otherwise it was to be feared that Bastico or the Commando Supremo informed by him or also the OKW would have a run in with us. The Commander in chief South also had to remain out of the game at first , When many knew about it, there was the danger that the enemy would be informed by imprudent talk. The whole plan rested on absolute surprise. In addition, Rommel was considered by Cavallero in Rome and also by the German offices there, as a man that had to be 'braked'. This prejudice originated from the very first beginning when he alledgedly drove forward too carelessly and therefore too far to the east. That Italian North Africa would have since long been completely lost if Rommel had remained on the defensive according to orders, one had forgotten or maybe not understood. Only the chief of staff of Bastico, Gastone Gambara was taken into our confidence because we needed him. He lent us fuel and trucks.
I have to mention that Rommel had sent Gause again to Europe, to intensify the logistics. He returned at the beginning of february. '

[julian]

A little excerpt from Schlachtbericht Afrika 18 November 1941- 6.Februar 1942:

" 17.01.1942 Beurteilung der Lage

.........................With a longer existence of this favourable ratio of forces cannot be counted. On the contrary, it was to be expected that the enemy would reach a strong superiority towards 01.02.1942 by bringing forward more troops.Then the british command could start the attack with good prospects of success. With the wideness of the front and the still low combat power of the Italian troops one had to expect that if not on the first day of attack, on the second or third day of the attack broad and deep breakthroughs would succeed on several sectors of the front which could not be checked by the mot.corps. It was therefore unlikely that the front would resist such an attack conducted with strong forces for very long. From this discovery the decision matured to use the now existing own superiority to forestall the enemy by a concentric attack of both mot.corps."
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