Battle of Korsun-Shevchenko(Hitler agreed with of gen. lie)

[Yuri]

And before defeat in battle of Korsun-Shevchenko in February 1944 known cases when the German generals did not disdain to compose frank fables, trying to hide the size of the failures.
The case in battle at Korsun-Shevchenko differs from previous themes, that this time in a fairy tale on wonderful flight from a pocket of 40,000 man is interested not only the German generals, but also personally Supreme Commander in Chief of Wehrmacht Adolf Hitler.

Whereas in previous cases Adolf Hitler or punished generals for lie or, at least, did not indulge them in this affair, shutting eyes to such "pranks" of his men.

To understand in what have coincided interests of the German generals and their Grand Overlord Adolf Hitler we will look at a situation in wider plan. Differently we will consider a context (background) of this battle.

First, we look on the german Wehrmacht from within. Thus we will look not only and not so much through a prism of memoirs of the German generals, which these misters have invented in calm of offices after total loss in war. We look on the german Wehrmacht by means of the documents made by the German officers in battle operations. We as well will take advantage of reports of interrogation of prisoners of war.

One of the main sources of the information (besides facts of common knowledge) will be documents, which I had possibility to find out for last year in fund 500 (fund of trophy documents) TsAMO. As far as I know, these documents were not published earlier anywhere. Often they - these trophy documents - contain many pages of the text and is far not all information in them concerns a theme designated in this thread. Therefore I will quote them them only that is necessary.
Too most it is fair and in relation to reports of interrogation of POWs.

That it was clear, on what it is informed in those documents from which I will give citations, for the first of them I will try translation of all text.
In this document it is created for five months long prior to the beginning of fight in Korsun-Shevchenko, however its contents will specify us in one of the reasons on which has forced Hitler to support lie of generals about flight 40,000 from pocket of Korsun-Shevchenko.

[Yuri]

Operations of 2nd battalion (Abteilung) 241st (motorized) an antiaircraft regiment during the period from August, 3 till August, 9th, 1943 in area Tomarovka - Grajvoron - Akhtyrka-.
-------------------------

Copy

2nd battalion /Abteilung/ of 241st (mot.) antiaircraft regiment /Flk. Reg./
Command point
On September, 3, 1943.

1. Operations
The battalion has been given /attach/ LII Army Corps. On August, 3, 1943 the battalion was deployed Tomarovka.
At a dawn the artillery of the opponent has opened strong concentrated fire across Tomarovka. Large formations of assault aircraft of the opponent attacked supply roads.

After that large forces of infantry and tanks of the opponent have gone over to the offensive on a first line of our defence around Kazatskoe on all sites from Rakovo to Dragunskoe. After the first line has been broken through, in the heart of defence our infantry has rendered unresisted. At 08 o'clock 00 minutes the opponent has taken possession Kazatskoe.
Battalion transports have replaced positions and have passed in Novo-Borisovka. 7th, 8th and 10th batteries of 241st (motorized) antiaircraft regiment have occupied anti-tank shut-off positions /Riegelstellung - by German - Yuri/ in front of Tomarovka, 7th battery of 241st (motorized) antiaircraft regiment to the east of Krasnostroshek, 8th battery - east suburb Bushkanoe, 10th battery is distributed between two other batteries, two platoons at 7th battery, one platoon at 8th battery and one platoon at 6th battery. 6th battery of 241st (motorized) antiaircraft regiment has taken positions for antiaircraft defence of 1500 m to the east of Tomarovka.

8th battery of 241st (motorized) antiaircraft regiment at midday after new reconnoiter has occupied anti-tank shut-off positions /Riegelstellung/ on a road fork 2,5км to the east of Tomarovka, 1,3 km western - northwest heights 217.5.

These positions are located on a defence first line. Our infantry neither ahead of positions, nor on these positions is not present. Batteries fence off the basic forces from constantly increasing pressure of tank groups of the opponent from the east to Tomarovka.
The commander of a battalion has collected a number of the infantrymen who have lost the parts in Tomarovka and has directed them on batteries, for the infantry cover of 7th and 8th batteries of 241st antiaircraft regiment. Reinforcements at 19.30 have started to arrive. At first there has arrived one engineer battalion. Then at 20 o'clock 00 minutes a battalion of tanks and assault guns, and also body (units) of 73rd grenadierial regiment.

7th battery of 241st (motorized) antiaircraft regiment has replaced positions in the evening and has passed to new positions on east suburb Tomarovka. 9th battery has taken positions to the east Kustovoe in the evening. Positions to the east of Tomarovka till the evening on August, 3rd, 1943 were kept only by forces of 2nd battalion of 241st (motorized) antiaircraft regiment. At 3 o'clock 00 min large forces of tanks of the opponent suddenly at support of the strongest artillery fire have gone over to the offensive from the northeast, the east and the southeast on a position to the east of Tomarovka and round Tomarovka. At 12 o'clock 30 min the opponent has taken possession Novaya Derevnya (New Village).

4августа 1943

The aircraft of the opponent the massed attacks from the big heights and on low-level flight (which participates from six to twenty planes IL-2 and LAGG) since morning supports approach of tanks. The advanced positions and roads in area Tomarovka, and also the highway of supply going from Borisovka, continuously are exposed to strong attacks of aircraft of the opponent dumping bombs and firing fire of the onboard weapon.
New the gun positions.
6th battery and 1st platoon of 10th battery of 241st antiaircraft regiment a southeast exit from Tomarovka (collective farm).
7th battery of 241st antiaircraft regiment anti-tank shut-off positions /Riegelstellung/ for near (direct) a protection to the south of collective farm of Kustovoe.
8th battery of 241st antiaircraft regiment in first half of day without changes, from the middle of day anti-tank отсечные positions of 1 km to the south of Seretino.
9th battery of 241st antiaircraft regiment on a position between collective farm at southwest suburb Tomarovka - collective farm of Kustovoe.

Mission: a near (direct) protection.

Battalion fire had been reflected approach of tanks of the opponent to Tomarovka, which have begun at 4 o'clock 00 min, and also beat off continuous attempts of Russian to reach highway from the south and the southeast. During these operations when the part of batteries took positions at highway and the part was on open district and fired over open sights from open the gun positions, antiaircraft batteries had no infantry cover. Even after the infantry heavy weapon has departed also last divisions of infantry have receded along highway, the antiaircraft artillery remained on the positions. Only after it became known (division of land forces have learnt it still earlier), that the battle group departs on east suburb Borisovka, batteries on which from three sides fired of tanks, mortars and infantry of the opponent, have departed according to the order on new positions of a protection along highway to Borisovka. Absence of infantry cover has forced batteries to occupy all-round defence and to organise self-defence against infantry of the opponent.

On August, 5th 1943

Break of tanks of the opponent to the north of Serotino. In second half of day at the opponent large army transfers from Novaya Derevnya (New Village) in Sergeevka. Threat of encirclement for battle group Zorgel occupying defence in area Tomarovka has amplified.

Air conditions without changes in comparison with August, 4th. In all area the massed attacks of fighter and assault aircraft of the opponent. In connection with conditions of the opponent intention 153th antiaircraft regiment again to use a battalion on positions in Tomarovka it has appeared impracticable. Besides, 19th tank division has demanded to continue defence highway Tomarovka-Borisovka from attempts of tank forces of the opponent to break with the south and the southeast.

Antiaircraft divisions have provided a withdrawal of all fighting divisions of a battle group and all backs and other divisions of a battle group and all backs and other divisions on highway to the south of Tomarovka to the basic forces in Borisovka.
In second half of day of 7th and 9th battery of 241st antiaircraft regiment have replaced the gun positions and have taken new positions at collective farm directly southeast Striguny. 6th battery of 241st antiaircraft regiment from 21 o'clock 00 minutes occupies gun positions around collective farm to the east of Borisovka. 8th battery of 241st antiaircraft regiment to be from 22 o'clock 00 min also to the east of Borisovka. 10th battery carries out as before of a problem of a near (direct) protection of heavy batteries.

On August, 6th, 1943

Battle group

In first half of day the opponent behaved easy, Tomarovka has been surrounded. Battle groups Sorgel and Deutsch and units /Einheit/ of 73rd Infantry Division have made the way from an encircle in Borisovka. 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th batteries of 241st antiaircraft regiment fence off Borisovka from the northeast, the east and the southeast. Batteries have stopped receding units of German infantry and together with them have held down the opponent on east suburb Borisovka and have made possible for a battle group to make the way from Tomarovka to the basic forces of Borisovka.

Soon positions of antiaircraft batteries already could not be kept without the infantry cover, some of these positions were already fired by our artillery. At last at 15 o'clock 30 min of the battery under strong pressure of the opponent have departed on east suburb Borisovka.
Army units of 9th Tank Division and 332nd Infantry Division with approach of twilight evacuated Borisovka. Till midnight they had no fighting contact with the opponent. Batteries of battalion made a march together with the battle groups Sorgel and Deutsch. At a dawn mid-flight columns, not having met the opponent, left on highway Chasovshchino.

On August, 7th, 1943

The operative staff of 2nd battalion /Abteilung/ of 241st antiaircraft regiment, strengthened 2nd platoon of 10th battery of 241st antiaircraft regiment, made a march together with the basic forces and before Beryozovka has encountered resistance of the opponent. Command was accepted by lieutenant Kase who was lost death brave at the head of the platoon. The operative staff of a battalion and 2nd platoon of 10th battery have cleared settlement Beryozovka of the opponent, have broken in the north through a new ring of an encirclement and have reached highway directly to the east of Golovshchino which was in our hands. Here at 10 o'clock 00 min they have joined a battalion.

At 16 o'clock 00 min the battle groups which have been again surrounded by the opponent, have broken from Golovshchino. Battalion batteries covered flanks of battle groups and interfered with russian tanks and infantry to get into Golovshchino.

Battle groups have acted from Golovshchino through southern suburb Novostroevka, northern suburb Bejrak in Bezemyanny /Anonymous/ highway of a march was under strong artillery fire of the opponent. At the night of profit in Bezemyanny /Anonymous/

On August, 8th 1943г.

Pressure of the opponent on Bezemyanny /Anonymous/, the opponent well is reflected by our aircraft supporting land armies. 2nd battalion of 241st antiaircraft regiment makes a march together with 19th tank division in the right mid-flight group. As the left mid-flight group 11th tank division moves. The following route bypassing the opponent is chosen: from Anonymous through Ponyri-Glotinski-Maldi-Bratenitsa-Olenka-Olenniki bypassing Nakaznye from the West - 3 km to the north of a road fork, that 10 km to the north of Bogodurtov in a northwest direction on Spornoe. In second half of day insignificant contact with the opponent.

On August, 9th 1943г.

In the morning on August, 9th the battalion has reached a first line of German defence at heights to the east Staraya Ryabina /Old Mountain ash/. 6th battery of 241st antiaircraft regiment still conducts southwest a railroad line going from Kirovka rearguard action with coming forces of the opponent.
In first half of day on August, 9th the battalion /2nd Abteilung/ has gathered to Akhtyrka and at 10 o'clock 00 min as mid-flight columns has acted from Akhtyrka to Zinkov.

Air conditions.

On August, 7-9 activity of aircraft of the opponent was weaker compared with activity on August, 6th. On August, 8 and 9 planes of the opponent almost did not appear at all. From the middle of day on August, 7 till August, 9 our aircraft effectively supported break of our battle groups from an encirclement.

II. Fight Conducting.

1) The armies.

Our offensive operations spent even by large forces to meet with failure, meeting strong defence and counterattacks of the opponent. Therefore our fighting activity was limited to operations of local value and constraining resistance. Especially in the first days (on August, 3-5, 1943) just during strong pressure of Russian, absence of our bombing aircraft considerably affected a course of operations. For reflexion of Russian attacks the antiaircraft artillery took positions on a first line, and remained there without any infantry cover (the commander of a battalion should collect itself the infantrymen who have lost the parts, and by cars to deliver them to a front line thus to create any infantry cover). In the beginning of Russian tank approach this infantry also has thrown positions, except for seven men who have remained in one battery.

2) the Opponent.

The opponent, as a rule, carried out the massed tank approaches, focusing on narrow strips of approach large tank forces. The tank avant-guard as a unit of six tanks which the infantry followed ahead moved. Further on a distance in most cases equal 1,000 m moved the main tank forces with the infantry landing, the motorized infantry and the guns on trailers. Use of tanks of close-range action on flanks for suppression of German anti-tank defence was often observed. Tank approach was preceded by strong storm fire of Russian artillery, actions of tanks were supported by attacks of connections of Russian assault aircraft (to 18 machines) which operated with waves. Having encountered resistance, the infantry of the opponent dismounted, place guns and mortars on a position and fastened fire fight while tanks moved forward, involving on itself fire of the defending. Then the infantry tried to filter into the gaps which have arisen in defence, that often it was possible to it even in the presence of weak forces of our infantry. Planes of the opponent of a IL-2 struck the massed blows to roads and the advanced positions. Approach to the purpose was carried out in strict flying formation to a system of a squadron by a wedge.

III. Interaction with land forces.

1) the General remarks.

Still there is an impression, that command instances of land forces consider an antiaircraft artillery of all calibres as the heavy infantry weapon or as the armour-piercing weapon and according to these representations put a problem antiaircraft artillery. Once the veterinary surgeon of the corps has transmitted directly to the commander of 10th battery of 241st antiaircraft regiment the order of the chief of an operations section of the corps to which the battery has been subordinated. Under this order the battery should take positions between assault guns to reflect attack of large forces of infantry of the opponent to these positions. Positions with which the battery should occupy, were under strong fire of artillery of the opponent and were unsuitable as gun positions for easy antiaircraft means owing to an insufficient field of bombardment. Our infantry before these positions was not.

Commanders of connections of land forces demanded use against infantry of the opponent of antiaircraft guns of 2.0 cm instead of easel machine guns. The same commanders of connections of land forces willingly placed an antiaircraft artillery on directions of the main blows of the opponent, not giving it of infantry. They tried to use an antiaircraft artillery as anti-tank artillery or assault guns. It is necessary to explain it absolutely false representations about possibilities of an antiaircraft artillery or full ignorance of its properties. During the period from August, 5 till August, 8 the antiaircraft artillery covered an infantry withdrawal after divisions of armoured cars have refused to carry out this mission as too dangerous.

2) Subordination.

Commanders of connections of land forces constantly tried to subordinate to themselves an antiaircraft artillery, referring thus on the command rights and to the rank.

The overland army used an antiaircraft artillery for performance of all missions both in defence, and in approach. Orders of an antiaircraft artillery from command instances of land forces often contradicted Air Forces orders. It is necessary to specify definitively a question - whether the antiaircraft artillery to land forces is subordinated or only is given. Presence of an antiaircraft artillery of land forces which operated in the same area, as an antiaircraft artillery of the Air Forces demanded appointment of the chief of an antiaircraft artillery. However command instances of land forces have disagreed on appointment of the chief of an antiaircraft artillery, having declared, that they will give orders of an antiaircraft artillery of land forces.

Against appointment of the adviser concerning use of an antiaircraft artillery they did not object. Thus it has not been created uniform management of all antiaircraft artillery. The post of the adviser concerning antiaircraft artillery use has appeared purely illusory as contrary to all supervising installations command instances of land forces disposed of use of an antiaircraft artillery of the Air Forces.

3) Infantry.

Antiaircraft artillery presence gave to infantry confidence of the forces. At failure of the commander of company, the company often broke up and it was possible to observe as soldiers on the single depart to points of gathering of soldiers lagged behind the unit, therefore our infantry only in very rare cases was ahead of positions of an antiaircraft artillery or even on one boundary with these positions. It is necessary to strengthen trust of infantry to our means of anti-tank defence as the infantry at approach of tanks of the opponent often departs also gunners should take up not only anti-tank defence, but also struggle against infantry of the opponent. Absence of German infantry often allowed infantry of the opponent to be put forward to the positions of the batteries which do not have infantry cover on distance to 100 m. Massed attacks of planes of the opponent of "IL-2" operated (have an effect) on infantry even worse, than tank threat.

4) the Heavy weapon of land forces.

Depress /restrain/ influenced on fighting spirit /competitive spirit/ troops non-interference to operations of our tanks, even heavy, as a part of whole units /Einheit - german/ battalion scale. So was, for example, on August, 4th where tank approach has been beaten off exclusively by an antiaircraft artillery. Even at urgent change of gun positions, which was carried out under the strongest fire of several tanks of the opponent (from a distance of 1,100 m) our requests for short-term fire support from flank fire means of our tanks deviated though nearby in inactivity there was a tank battalion. This battalion easy took of a position on a return slope when antiaircraft divisions have begun change of positions, during this change and after change. As a result concentrated fire of tanks of the opponent completely puts out of action one tractor and one gun of calibre 8.8 sm.

Use of anti-tank artillery also mismatched features of this sort of the weapon. Use of anti-tank artillery for performance of missions of a protection (_) on positions where tanks of the opponent did not appear was often observed. During deviation from an antiaircraft artillery the offer has arrived to use 8.8 sm anti-tank guns for cover of flanks and rearguard. This offer has been rejected on the ground that 8.8 sm anti-tank guns, ostensibly, are too motionless for performance of such missions while the same missions were put by much more motionless of 8.8 sm to antiaircraft guns.

5) the Antiaircraft artillery of land forces.

We could not observe use of an antiaircraft artillery of land forces. Interaction with an antiaircraft artillery of land forces was impossible, as the order of return of orders in an antiaircraft artillery of land forces was distinct from an order of return of orders in Air Forces antiaircraft artillery. We some times tried to establish connection with an antiaircraft artillery of land forces with a view of the interaction organisation, however, our attempts had no success. The uniform head operations of all antiaircraft artillery (land forces and the Air Forces) were not, as command instances of land forces disagreed on appointment of the chief of an antiaircraft artillery.

6) the Information on conditions.

The information on conditions was insufficient. Exact data on conditions could not be received even in the higher staffs of land forces. It conducted to losses, for example, one the projector installation of 10th battery of 241st antiaircraft battalion has been lost owing to absence of exact data about conditions. Besides, having of the timely information on conditions we could struggle better and more resolutely with hearings which were dismissed by receding armies and sometimes caused panic moods.

IV. Fighting experience.

1) Operations and a control of operations.

Battalion batteries have been united in three heavy fighting group. Each battle groop had one heavy battery and an easy antiaircraft platoon in the structure, besides, depending on conditions two or three fire platoons of easy batteries were given to the battery. Creation of antiaircraft battle groups in the above-stated structure quite has justified itself. From antiaircraft battle groups was required simultaneous realisation of missions and antiaircraft defence and land cover, this requirement was feasible only provided that antiaircraft battle groups occupy gun positions on removal from one to two kilometres and on return slopes. These positions should not be looked through by the opponent. On gun positions looked through by the opponent the opponent suppresses our antiaircraft artillery fire of the heavy weapon and antiaircraft batteries cannot carry out of a mission of antiaircraft defence. Antiaircraft artillery use on a first line, especially at full absence of infantry, is inexpedient.

Anti-tank positions should get out only as tank traps on return slopes or on forward slopes where visibility and a distance of shooting does not exceed 1,600 m. On distances over 1,600 m. the superiority of tanks of the opponent increases.
Experience has shown, that at occupation by an antiaircraft artillery of gun positions for land defence which are looked through by the opponent, tanks of the opponent depart on well covered positions located on distance of 3-5 km and from this distance hold antiaircraft artillery gun positions under fire, as ours, being out of reach of our heavy antiaircraft means.

In some cases antiaircraft battle groups obtained the order to take positions directly behind a fighting protection of infantry which departed at tank attack of the opponent. In this case correctly would be to subordinate operative to infantry an antiaircraft battle group. The choice of positions, and also time of change of positions should be given the commander of the battery, should not be specified in orders of the staffs located in deep back.

Often we sustained losses in manpower and the technical equipments because change of positions, according to the order was carried out during such moment when the position and the roads conducting to it, were under the strongest fire of the opponent. In days from August, 3 till August, 5 when our troops were exposed to regular attacks of planes of the opponent of "IL-2" followed think, whether it was better to leave an antiaircraft artillery part on gun positions for antiaircraft defence instead of almost all antiaircraft artillery to transfer on a position for land defence.

2) Supply.

Supply by fuel, ammunition and the foodstuffs was sufficient. Difficulties with transportation was not, thanks to the big stocks available in warehouses of an ammunition and in gasoline storage tanks, and also in …
Especially it is necessary to note exemplary supply by fuel, even at break from an encirclement.

3) Situation with motor transport.

Situation with motor transport was rather strained.
Absence of motor transportation columns of an antiaircraft artillery was felt catastrophically.
Ammunition should be brought up by machines of batteries, at failure of these cars the fighting capacity of the battery was threatened. Motor transport which was available in batteries, allowed to carry with itself only half of unit of fire, at the strengthened fire activity easily there could come a lack of an ammunition as only few machines were able deliver an ammunition from rear warehouses. The insufficient quantity of special heavy motor vehicles very affected transportation to batteries, especially on the fuel transportation. It is necessary to organise transportation .... to carry with itself according to the order a unit of fire and five ..... /in this place the document is not readable - Yuri/

4) The weapon and technics.

Heavy antiaircraft artillery.
For anti-tank defence ordnance of the sample «18» especially suit, at ordnance of the sample «36» is frequent get stuck a sleeve. The chassis of an antiaircraft gun 8.8 sm of the sample of «36» is too heavy and despite the weight can lift not enough cargo. On difficultly passable district bad manoeuvrability and the big weight of the chassis of ordnance «36» is especially appreciable.

5) Easy antiaircraft means.

There were no stoppers for a land part of spare holders for shop of disk-shaped springs. In conditions when fire platoons operated widely spaced, guns for long time failed owing to absence of spare parts.
The range finder-sight demanded thorough training of first crew number, spare first crew number could not be prepared sufficiently. At failure of first crew number his assistant was unable shoot precisely by means of a range finder-sight. Besides, at fast change of the purposes and in the conditions of maneuvering of high-speed machines too long time which is required for a laying, in most cases led to loss of the most effective distances of fire.
For firing on main objectives in air (planes "IL-2" and "LAGG") the sight is too combined, therefore immediately was necessary to pass to firing on tracer shells.

5) Medical-sanitary support.

After failure of an ambulance and the car with stocks of medical-sanitary means it was possible to render medical aid by the wounded man probably only in very limited volume. During a withdrawal and break the doctor at first as a result of influence of the opponent has lost a bag with tools, and then and itself together with a transport has lagged behind fighting columns, therefore medical aid was not.

6) Behaviour of troops.

The manpower of units of an antiaircraft artillery of the Air Forces behaved very well. Despite the superiority of the opponent in forces the fighting spirit of troops has not been broken. Even when the infantry running from front has put in departing columns, and spread rumours threatened to create a panic behaviour of divisions of an antiaircraft artillery was very good. When antiaircraft units covered a withdrawal already after leaving of tanks and infantry, their behaviour still was proof and exemplary.

V1. Lacks.

At a withdrawal and even during break the impression was made, that command fighting group operates irresolutely and too slowly. There was no resoluteness. In spite of the fact that the battle group had a considerable quantity of the weapon of all types flank cover was insufficient, therefore attacks of small units of infantry of the opponent brought the big mess. For example, during break from Golovchino all battle group has turned back, having met weak artillery and infantry fire of the opponent, subsequently was found out, that all number of the opponent was equaled twenty men. The infantry group allocated for combing of two sites of wood along highway long time totaled only 35 men though at the corresponding organisation it would be possible to allocate three high-grade battalions. As a result we have wasted precious time, the battle group during a half an hour remained in a divergence in Golovchino and the opponent who had in the beginning only weak forces of infantry, has had an opportunity to tighten tanks and the heavy weapon in a considerable quantity.

These tanks and the heavy weapon at march continuation to cause to a battle group the big losses. In Golovchino without the basis new 8.8 sm anti-tank guns have been undermined. All organisation of a withdrawal made impression of absence of a resolute and uniform management. It was especially appreciable, because receding armies had no internal discipline and demanded especially rigid management. This rigid management unfortunately was absent, that it was possible to notice under the uttermost disorder in which there took place a withdrawal. Often simultaneously on one highway moved four columns that did impossible any regulation of movement.

This disorder sometimes turned to a panic. The moral behaviour of land forces was very unstable. Many soldiers declared, that they were left to the mercy of fate by their commanders. As acknowledgement of truthfulness of these complaints that fact serves, that the battalion cars have picked up several officers who did not worry at all about destiny of one's units and did not try to return to them. As a whole the behaviour of units of land forces was panic and reckless. Various divisions did not care of the wounded men and left them to the mercy of fate. Cases were observed even when cars pressed wounded soldiers.

The appendix

Results of operations of 2nd battalion of 241st antiaircraft regiment during encirclement in area Tomarovka - Grajvoron.
It is brought down planes - 8
It is destroyed tanks - 11
It is shot down - 3
It is destroyed machine-gun nests - 26
-"- mortars - 12
-"- the anti-tank guns - 2
Jet installations - 1
Anti-tank guns - 4
Lorries with infantry - 1
It is taken captured - 80
It is beaten off attacks of the opponent - 20
It is killed the soldier and officers of the opponent - 300

The appendix 2.
Battalion losses:
Losses in manpower: 26 killed
Hard wounded - 61
Easily wounded - 14
38 missing men
Losses in an equipment:
8.8 sm of guns - 5
2.0 sm of guns - 8
Monitors antiaircraft fire «36» - 1
Special trailers «202» - 2
-.-. "51" - 2
60-sm a projector of installations - 4
Units 65 - 7
Field-kitchens - 2

---------------

[Yuri]

More low for presentation is given the map on which it is shown:
Starting position as of August, 3rd, 1943 on site Dragunskoe-Kazatskoe-Tomarovka-Rakovo where there was 2nd battalion of 241st antiaircraft regiment.

Settlements are mentioned in the report of 2nd battalion underlined

[Yuri]

From the report of 2nd battalion of 241st antiaircraft regiment it is visible, that in the end of summer of 1943 the moral condition of units of Wehrmacht has considerably gone down:
- units do not show care of the wounded comrades, leave them to the mercy of fate, moreover the wounded press by cars;
- the fighting spirit of troops has fallen to critical level (first of all in infantry but as and in tank units), soldiers leave fighting positions and leave in back even without pressure from the opponent;
- At officers the feeling of responsibility for the subordinates has weakened, officers do not aspire to find units.


The report content allows to see, that in the summer of 1943 the Red Army has surpassed the European opponents at all levels - in strategy, in art of carrying out of operations and tactics of conducting combat. This change of a military situation at the front the Great Patriotic War has been clearly realised Stavka (differently by General headquarters of Armed forces of the USSR). Not casually in one of days which it is mentioned in the report of 2nd battalion of 241st antiaircraft regiment, namely, on August, 5th, 1943 Supreme commander in chief Stalin has issued the order on effecting of victorious salute in capital of Soviet Union the city of Moscow - 12 volleys from 124 antiaircraft guns. It was first such order since June, 22nd, 1941. This salute has openly announced that in the Great Patriotic War there was a fundamental change that from this day the victory of Red Army over the numerous opponents does not raise any doubts, that it only time business, when the Red Army will enter in throw down Berlin - capital of Germany of the leader of most grandiose of all before carried out invasion of Europe into Russia.

As follows from documents the German Supreme Command of Wehrmacht not at once has realised to the full this basic change of a situation on East front.
It is curious, that when war in Europe already suited to the logic final about this first victorious salute in Moscow has recollected doctor Goebbels.

Here that doctor Goebbels in the diary about these Stalin victorious orders has written down on March, 14th, 1945 - that day Stalin has issued the order on effecting of three-hundredth salute in commemoration of capture of the city of Kustrin on the left coast of the river Oder.

Joseph Goebbels. TageBucher 1945. Die letzen Aufzeichnungen
On March, 14th, 1945, Wednesday
Yesterday
Military situation
…
Concerning a capture of city Kustrin Stalin has published now three-hundredth the order on a victory. These three hundred orders is original a criterion of our sufferings. As a matter of fact, we should prick up the ears at third order, but we have disregarded also thirtieth order, not having made serious conclusions, and now should perceive as ill fate three-hundredth the order. Containing in Stalin's order of the statement that on it three-hundredth a stage to a the Bolshevist victory the basic part the German war machine is crushed, not absolutely truly.
...

Hitler has realised about the occurred basic changes on East front not in favour of Wehrmacht, apparently, in the end of December, 1943.

However to war to a side of the problem we will address later. And now we will try to find out the reasons of falling of a moral condition in fighting units of German Wehrmacht.

About a part of these reasons we find out from German officers who in the beginning have arrived August, 1943 to area Belgorod-Kharkov (the Southwest direction) where there was 2nd battalion of 241st antiaircraft regiment which commander has made that realistic report is resulted above.
The officers who have arrived on front led by colonel Steidle (the former commander 767 Gr. Rg. 376 ID) were members of the Union of the German Officers created in the summer of 1943 from among captured. Colonel Steidle was the vice-president of this union. As is known, by the president of the Union of German Officers has been chosen the general from artillery Walter von Syedlitz (the former commander LI AK).
It is remarkable, that among the arrived members of the Union of German Officers there was a former commander of 1st battalion of 241st antiaircraft regiment major Buhler. Thus, two commanders of a battalion of 241st antiaircraft regiment (one incumbent, and the second former) summer of 1943 have appeared on the different sides of a front line.
It is remarkable as also that in December, 1942 to Stalingrad a pocket major Buhler was literally in one entrenchment with the commander of XIV Pz.Korp general Hube who, however, has not got to a captivity as on January, 10th, 1943 Hitler has ordered to it to take off from a the Stalingrad pocket by the plane and to prosecute subjects of supply of 6th Army.

In February, 1944 general Hube already as the commander of 1st Pz. A will throw one's own the tank divisions in approach that blow from out of to punch a gap in a ring of the encirclement, the created Red Army around Korsun-Shevchenko groupings.

In the beginning of February around an encirclement in Korsun-Shevchenko there will arrive general Seydlitz, general doctor Korfes (the former commander 295 ID) and general Lattman (the former commander 14 Pz. Div). On February, 9th the group of colonel Steidle will make for these generals a note «Estimation of a situation around the Korsunsky pocket». In this note colonel Steidle and it comrades use (apart from other) data which they have received from the analysis of the questionnaire executed by them among 1600 soldiers and officers, taken prisoner and containing in camp near Smela /settlement to the east from Korsun-Shevchenko/.
Here citations from «Estimation....» which allow to understand a part of the reasons promoting deterioration a moral condition of fighting units of Wehrmacht.

The report on the Korsun pocket

On January, 28th, 1944 in area Korsun 10 German divisions have been encircled. By means of a HQ of 2nd Ukrainian front we could organise at once our propagation on these surrounded divisions to induce them ¬ to capitulate and join liberation movement….
On the basis of an estimation of position of the German troops, ¬ made in writing colonel Steidle on February, 9th, 1944, we have addressed to the surrounded officers and ¬ soldiers with leaflets.
Besides, colonel Steidle has written the post card lieutenant general Cruise, to the commander of 389th infantry division. This letter together with the letter major general Lattman has been transmitted general Cruise by corporal Helmut Jacob from 11th company of 544th grenadierial regiment of 389th infantry division.
...
Our meetings with prisoners of war.
...
After the speech of colonel Steidle appeal to all camp, and final words of lieutenant Burck all camp, including officers, has joined ¬ liberation movement that has been fastened more than 1200 signatures and removal of emblems of German armed forces.
In our speeches we underlined, that in struggle against Hitler we are in the same row with Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, Belgians, Dutches, Alsatians etc., with liberation movements of the corresponding countries. Citizens of these countries were so are pleased by it, bombarded us with questions and willingly participated in all demonstrations.
....
The analysis of the questionnaire of National Committee
The Soviet HQ was good enough, that has printed our questionnaires which have perfectly justified. Therefore we bring an attention to the question on entering this system on all front. In such a way we will receive not only a good picture of moods to Germany, but also clear representation about successes of our propagation. The corresponding offer of Red Army will be made in Moscow.
…..
From all answers follows:……
The fear before the Bolshevism is extremely great. The German people in the weight can be relieved of this fear only by means of actions of wide character which we are going to discuss in Moscow.
...
Hence, 59 percent knew about National committee still before have been taken prisoner. However to any person the purposes and problems ¬ of National Committee were not known. From here follows, that Manifesto propagation should proceed. From resulted above data follows also, that it is extremely important to dump leaflets on the main knots of resistance.
...
Middle age of the captured: 29 years. Hence, in a pocket there were strong, efficient troops. Despite it, in a pocket there was a panic that it is possible to explain to the following:

1. Unsatisfactory command,

2. Shabby units

3. Absence of fighting spirit

4. Hopeless situation

5. Use at the front the soldier of rear services,

6. Bad combat training

7. Strong dilution some units soldiers non-German nationality, not having fighting spirit.

[Jan-Hendrik]

colonel Steidle

AgitProp for NKFD..nice "source"...well, the level of this fora is descending rapidly

From the report of 2nd battalion of 241st antiaircraft regiment it is visible, that in the end of summer of 1943 the moral condition of units of Wehrmacht has considerably gone down:

Yes, the status of one single Batl. represents the status of the whole Wehrmacht



Jan-Hendrik

[Yuri]

To the beginning 1943, that is after less than two years after intrusion of Europeans on territory of the USSR, unit of German Wehrmacht showed imitation (parody) of that than they were summer of 1941.
Per 1943 manpower in units represented allsorts from nationalities almost all countries of continental Europe.

Incur a huge losses on East front, the Supreme Command of the German armed forces resorted to various shifts, inventing ways of completion of the loss manpower.

In particular, have been developed special instruction (general field marshal Keitl has signed these instruction) for use at the front persons of not reached military age (youth at the age of 16 and 17 years), and as uses at the front unusable on a state of health for service in army by means of an appeal Imperial service of a labour duty. These of instruction contain 73 pages of the typewritten text.

Not reached military age of young men it was recommended to use as follows.

Young men of 16-17 years were called, ostensibly, for training at antiaircraft artillery schools. However such schools took places as it is possible more close to a front line. Created of young men, ostensibly, "educational" antiaircraft units replaced on air defence of objects (the bridge, railway station etc.) in rear areas of armies and groups of armies antiaircraft and a projector battalions of air forces (Luftwaffe) which went on anti-tank defence to a front line.

Use principle at the front as infantry of the men not suitable on a state of health for military service in army, consisted in the following. These people called, ostensibly, for serving of a labour duty in imperial service of a labour duty. However to direct it was necessary to a front line and under the pretext of that at the front there was a heavy situation to direct as infantry on a front line. Thus, as infantry battalions and companies of builders, butchers, bakers, hairdressers, drovers of cattle, veterinary surgeons and still everyone another began to operate.

Use principle at the front persons has been limited suitable for military service is simple. Such people directed to security and police units which took places in settlements near to a front line. These units subordinated to the commandant of garrison who used them at defence of that object for which answered. As the settlement in which there was security or police unit settled down near to a front line probability of that that the garrison will enter fight with parts of Red Army was very high.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Delivery in a captivity of 270 soldiers and officers

On January, 4th to the south of Novograd-Volynsk without resistance the grouping which was in an encircled 212 IR 147th German security division in number of 270 soldiers and officers has surrendered in a captivity.

Soldier Arthur Freze, the operator at a division headquarters, about circumstances of delivery in a captivity has told the following:

«All soldiers of our division are is limited suitable and, according to existing position, can serve only in rear garrisons. It was clear to us, that with such forces it is impossible to keep Novograd-Volynsk­. On January, 1st in connection with approach of Russian in units the panic has begun. Staff officers of the division, arranged in a city have been especially frightened. The chief of department of back, the captain, spoke:«It is full irresponsibility: the spare part consisting of badly armed, sick people, wish to force to keep a city».

On January, 2nd in Novograd-Volynsk Russian tanks have rushed. We have obtained the order to depart in a southern direction, but Russian submachine gunners have got to us into back. Officers have run away, having left soldiers to the mercy of fate. On January, 3rd hours per 5 evenings I personally saw, how the division commander lieutenant general ­Matershtok has broken from itself and has thrown a cap, awards and epaulets. ­ Obviously, he wished to disappear imperceptibly. I think, that it is now among captured or wanders somewhere on wood. In the morning on January, 4th all soldiers, tired and indifferent to everything, have thrown the weapon. It was clear: we are necessary to nobody, anybody does not care of us and it is necessary to think of itself. Soldiers began groups to leave in an arrangement of Russian and to surrender in a captivity. Thus, in a captivity nearby 300 persons of soldiers and officers have surrendered­­».
------------------------------------------------------------
Source: IVI MO RF. Documents and materials. f. 254. op. 504. d. 7. L. 115. The original


Listed above action on the one hand helped to liquidate deficiency of live force of infantry. On the other hand, and the reasons of it are clear, it did not promote a raising of fighting spirit of armies. About any firmness in battalions of bakers, builders, drivers, railwaymen and veterinary surgeons to speak it was not necessary. As a rule, hardly having seen coming unit of Red Army, a battalion of veterinary surgeons or builders the bridge escaped in back.

-----------------------------------------------------------------
The report of 181st heavy antiaircraft battalion /181 sFlk.Abt - Yuri/

181st heavy antiaircraft battalion
Operations section
On November, 17th, 1943
The appendix: without appendices

The content: the Report on fighting activity at approach of the Soviet troops in the morning on October, 24th, 1943 on blasting by 3rd battery of two antiaircraft guns of calibre of 8.8 sm and one antiaircraft gun of calibre 2.0 sm

In HQ 17th antiaircraft regiment /17 Flk.Rg - Yuri/
Operations section

On October, 24th, 1943 at 03.00 the opponent under cover of darkness and a fog has gone over to the offensive to Krivoy Rog, moving along highway of 4th class. The opponent has put in our defence on a site of 3rd battery of 181st heavy antiaircraft battalion.
The opponent conducted approach by force to a the rifle regiment at support about twenty tanks. As it was found out subsequently, the infantry of the opponent has been well armed by submachineguns, machineguns, anti-tank guns and mortars.....
Our infantry has departed. It were combined units (soldiers of a building battalion of the Air Forces /Luftwaffe - Yuri/, soldiers of one veterinary park, soldiers of the organisation Todt etc.). Receding infantry divisions passed about guns and even between guns, they managed to be stopped only deeply in back. Tanks have broken on 4-5 km in depth and have got into city centre.
After wound of the senior the lieutenant (oberleutnant) Spitner - by order of has accepted command of the battery the commander of 2nd battery of 861st (motorised) antiaircraft battalion the senior lieutenant (oberleutnant) Rading.
2nd battery of 861st (motorised) antiaircraft battalion covered heavy antiaircraft batteries. Russian infantry from the left flank also was in front put forward to battery positions on 50 m.
The battery fired on the opponent shells with high points of ruptures, from 2,0 sm of guns and small arms.
The opponent was already in battery back, position of the battery, the deprived infantry cover was critical. Senior lieutenant Rading has given the order on blasting of guns as he at all did not wish to give to the opponent of the guns in a serviceable condition. At this time senior lieutenant Rading could not hope for the help, he did not know, that tanks "Tigers", an assault battalion Pressler - will restore position and liquidate impaction.
As a result of blasting of one 8,8 sm the gun has completely failed, the second has received swell a trunk which can be eliminated. One 2,0 sm the gun has completely failed.
Senior lieutenant Rading has given the order to commanders of guns to undermine the guns. Itself was lost in it to combat and consequently cannot describe conditions at the moment of blasting and the reasons which have forced it to give the order to undermine the guns.
The commander of a battalion
The lieutenant colonel /signature - Yuri/.
------------------------------------------------------------------

It is necessary to remember, that units составленны from persons serving a labour duty (bakers, builders, veterinary surgeons etc.) as a part of land forces were not considered. Were not considered as a part of land forces as any sort units Luftwafffe (communication, builders, transport etc.)

Certainly, and such units have got to an encircled in area Korsun-Shevchchenko.
There was, for example, 276th antiaircraft battalion and infantry cover batteries, it infantry cover is necessary to note, also belonged Luftwaffe.
The special group railway command (group of destruction of tracks and bridges) has got to an encirclement also. Owing to not coordinations between various instances this railway group has destroyed on January, 30th, 1944 all track from Gordishche to Korsun-Shevchenko and has blown up the railway bridge through the river Ross Was grown. These actions have led to that all grouping concentrated near the Site of ancient settlement at deviation has lost on February, 10th all heavy technics and the heavy weapon.
It is remarkable, that the railway command which was at that time in a HQ of 8th Army did not submit to the commander of this Army.

[Yuri]

That who, probably, has not paid attention to a map in the first post of this branch. On this map it is visible, that in August, 1943 2nd battalion of 241st antiaircraft regiment operated on a site front where were including 332 ID and 167 ID.
In the end of January, 1944 together with ten more divisions of Wehrmacht units 332 ID and 167 ID will get in Korsun-Shevchenko a pocket. From the report of the commander of 2nd battalion of 241st antiaircraft regiment it is possible to size up a moral condition of units of these formations and about that the fighting spirit of soldiers is how much high.

Further on wider map with conditions on the beginnings of August, 1943 in it is more possible to see, that at that time on the right strips of action 2nd battalion of 241st artillery regiment were formations Army Group "KEMPF", and at the left formations VII AK.
Soon Army Group "KEMPF" to change the name on 8th Army, and as is known XI AK this army will get together with XXXXII AK 1Pz. A in Korsun-Shevchenko a pocket. To a pocket will get as left-flank units VII AK from Tank Army of general Hube (In January, 1944 VII AK adjoined to XXXXII AK 1Pz. A). Among trophy documents there are orders of a HQ 8th Army and a HQ VII AK dated the end of 1943. The content of these documents concern a theme considered at present and I will try to transfer them.

[Yuri]

301st Flak Abteilung of the Reserve of the Main Command
Room arrangement
On February, 13th, 1944

The appendix: no
The content: Loss of guns and an equipment

The report on battle activity.

In January and the beginning of February the Abteilung has been allocated for land defence of settlement Apostolovo in case of approach of the opponent. In interaction with lieutenant colonel Magling who was at that time the battle commandant Apostolovo, antiaircraft gun positions have been equipped so that they simultaneously could serve and for land defence. A considerable lack of these positions was that in system of all shore fortifications they placed almost on the first line. Besides, guns of my Abteilung made almost all heavy weapon of garrison Apostolovo. Therefore on other sites of front other positions with which the mobilised civilians within the next weeks should equip have been chosen.

After break of the opponent to the east Krivoi Rog, in the morning on February, 4th, 1944 the commander of 9th Pz. Div major general Iolase has accepted a management of Apostolovo defence. From its consent this very day on February, 4th the Abteilung has taken the reconnoitered positions arranged round a city, main defence area was east and northern parties. Platoons of single-barrel air-defence plants have been tightened and as a result by evening of a position have been held as follows:

North side: 1st battery of 301st Flak Abteilung as a part of three guns of calibre 8.8 sm, on the equipped position, besides, two guns 2.0 sm. One gun of calibre 2.0 sм are put forward for cover from the northwest.

West side: 2nd battery 301st antiaircraft Abteilung as a part of two guns of calibre 8.8 sm and one gun of calibre 2.0 sm on the equipped position.

East side: One gun of calibre 8.8 sm 2nd batteries 301th antiaircraft Abteilung about one gun of calibre 2.0 sm.

South side: One gun of calibre 8.8 sm 2nd battery 301th antiaircraft Abteilung with three guns of calibre 2.0 sm 3nd battery.
Besides, on an East side three guns of calibre 2.0 sm air forces which have been subordinated to Abteilung have been established.
....
Ammunition was in enough, it was available on all positions.


Within day the battle commandant has collected all military subdivisions deployed in a city, holiday-makers etc. and has created the infantry cover of a Apostolovo. However hastily hammered together garrison not was able defend successfully a little long time even from attacks of the opponent who does not have a numerical superiority. Therefore Apostolovo defence was not high-grade in spite of the fact that in the garrison disposal there were the shore fortifications created round a city and, besides, to garrison could support self-propelled guns and tanks "Panthers" which have arrived to a Apostolovo.

Actually operations have begun that about 01.00 strengthened prospecting grouping of the enemy has approached at night to the site of front occupied by companies of holiday-makers, under unverified indications this group has addressed to defending and has ostensibly managed to provide to itself an unimpeded access in a city. Thus it was not distributed any shot. Then, after a while, this prospecting grouping of the enemy has fastened firing in position area of limbers of Abteilung. These are firing it has appeared enough that all subdivisions holding east front of defence of the city of Apostolovo, without a shot have left the battle posts.
Thus, in defence front created with such carefulness, with use of all funds available means wide gaps which already could not be closed were formed.

To approach of a dawn Russian have filtered through these gaps in such quantity, that at other fronts of defence already on remains any prospects on successful resistance.
.....

Events developed in fast sequence.

Under fog cover, not meeting resistance, Russian infantry with small arms, has filtered into different units of a city. Gun positions have been cut off or bypassed. The fog very slowly dispersed. The batteries, almost everywhere presented to themselves, shot all ammunition to last shot, using all possibilities. Fire with high points of rupture from near distances to the opponent had been put the big losses. The personnel has successfully beaten off some attacks of the opponent and then has undermined guns. Together with tanks "Panthers" and the self-propelled guns «Hummel» which were making the way from an environment of the opponent courageous anti-aircraft gunners with the weapon in hands have broken strong resistance of the opponent, and left to one's own .

….

The commander of 9th tank division, and also commanders of sites unanimously confirm, that the staff of Abteilung of all ranks during the above described events operated safely and courageously.

Abteilung losses:
Personnel:
It is killed: 1 officer (captain Trefz, the commander of 1st battery of 301st air-defence Abteilung), 2 private soldiers.
Was missing: 6 private soldiers.
Wounded: 27 officers, corporals and private soldiers.
Equipment and arms:
Eight guns of 8.8 sm «37» with accessories;
Nine - “ - - ” - 2.0 sm «38» - » -;
Two control instruments antiaircraft fire «35/37»
Two 4 metre rangefinders «Р-40»
Six one-metre rangefinders «Р-36»
Eight special trailers «202»
Nine - “ - - ” - «52»
One - “ - - ” - «53»
Five machine guns of the sample «42»
Motor vehicles:
all cargo both automobile cars and motorcycles;
one 12 ton tractor;
one 1 ton tractor.

All spare parts and the tool.
After defence of a Apostolovo the Abteilung has been subordinated 9 tank divisions, easy batteries carried out air-defence defence at railway station, other subdivisions operated as an infantry.

The Abteilung commander has signed
The captain.------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------

colonel Steidle

AgitProp for NKFD..nice "source"...well, the level of this fora is descending rapidly

From the report of 2nd battalion of 241st antiaircraft regiment it is visible, that in the end of summer of 1943 the moral condition of units of Wehrmacht has considerably gone down:

Yes, the status of one single Batl. represents the status of the whole Wehrmacht



Jan-Hendrik

As you can see, dear Jan-Hendrik, "AgitProp for NKFD", as you will desire express oneself, has a rest. For it all commanders of all air-defence subdivisions and formations of Luftwaffe work up to the collar.

But if joking apart, this report of the commander of 301st Flak Abteilung does not demand special the comment.
However it is necessary to notice, that despite the statement of the commander of 301st air-defence Abteilung in back, it is possible not to doubt that the personnel of its unit as was captured by a panic.
Really, standing on the site attacked by small Russian infantry unit the battle group of 301st air-defence Abteilung has lost all guns (including eight expensive 8.8 sm of a gun) and all heavy machine guns, all control instruments fire and the rangefinders, all cars.
Thus losses in manpower of battle group were not considerable (three killed and six missing persons). Hence, its positions have not been subjected strong fire influences from the opponent. The personnel having yielded to a general panic has undermined the guns, motor vehicles and, having thrown all property, has receded not entering in battle with the small opponent.


P.S. Who does not know I inform that the settlement Apostolovo is to the south from Korsun-Shevchenko. From the report it is visible, that events occurred at the same time when there was a battle in Korsun-Shevchenko.

P.P.S. Well, Jan-Hendrik, in due time I promised, that I will find in archive documents on battle to Krivoi Rog. As you can see, I fulfil the promise. I have some more reports of commanders of an antiaircraft artillery across Krivoi Rog for the different periods of time.

[Yuri]

By the present moment I have got acquainted with several tens official reports of commanders of air-defence batallions and the regiments operating in territory of Ukraine in the autumn of 1943 and in the beginning of winter of 1944.
With rare exception in all these official reports considerable falling of a moral condition and sharp decrease fighting spirit in Wehrmacht's units, up to evasion from an engagement on the opponent as it is visible from the official report of the commander of 318th Flak Abteilung of a reserve of the main command and others is ascertained.

Almost mononational at the moment of intrusion of Europe into Russia the German Wehrmacht to the middle of 1943 has turned to motley troop on national structure which became vulnerable to influence of propagation of the opponent.
In these conditions activity the Union of German Officers (formed by general Syedlitz and its supporters) among Wehrmacht units could aggravate even more a moral condition of units and formations of Wehrmacht. Command of VII AK has very soon understood danger proceeding from group of general Syedlitz. It is clearly visible from the order of a headquarters of this corps from November, 22nd, 1943. In the appendix to this order it is mentioned activity of group of officers of colonel Steidle, that that has arrived on front only three months to birth of this order.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
1st Ukrainian front, on January, 12th, the written report

Command of 7th army corps of the German army has published on November, 22nd, 1943 under a signature stamp «For office using» the order entitled «Enemy propagation». In the order it is spoken:

VII AK
On November, 22nd, 1943
For office using

Enemy propagation

The opponent now again conducts active propagation on decomposition of German army. It comes true mainly by means of distribution of leaflets, and also through the newspaper «Free Germany»- organ of National committee «Free Germany». Russian propagation in comparison with propagation of the first year of war is now more thin and successful. Resulted arguments not always can be recognised at once as contradicting sensible mind. First of all, imaginary statements captured - the higher German officers - can create visibility of truthfulness if it is not obviously possible to open by comparison of leaflets of different series small, but considerable contradictions or falsification.

In particular again arrived replenishment can fall under its influence because of the ignorance of methods of the Soviet propagation, in particular its last kind with constant repetition same. To the replenishment arriving on the East, it is necessary to explain in details the purposes and methods of enemy propagation. It is necessary to show on numerous examples ¬ falsification and lie in propagation about what from time to time it is spoken in «Messages for troops» and «Messages for an officer corps». Last special number «Messages for an officer corps» from October, 1943 gives the analysis of value of National committee «Free Germany» and the Union of German officers and proves improbability of their existence.

Constant explanations and reduction of examples of falsity of the Soviet propagation it is necessary to support and consolidate among old soldiers resistibility to this enemy weapon. Each officer should imagine danger of enemy propagation, its version and receptions, to recognise all weaknesses in leaflets and in oral propagation so that them to expose. It should be clear to everyone, that propagation is the weapon, as well as everyone another, but the most mean and artful because it is turned to low instincts of the person. It is dug in a dirt with which it covers each particle of the truth. She aims in heart, being based on that experience, what even the strongest heart cannot resist against regular influence on it of poison and, at least, becomes uncertain and fluctuating. Each officer and the soldier should be got ¬ firm conviction that the unique purpose of the enemy is destruction us and that for achievement of this purpose he does not disdain any means. Undoubtedly, have influence heavy battles of this year and successes of Russian.

The formed gap in our moral spirit the enemy tries to deepen and expand with the propagation. By experience of 1918, the enemy tries to sow ¬ contentions, to set German ' the people on a management, on party, on army, парализова1'Ь us, to complicate, shake and this most to weaken force of our resistance, and finally to disarm. As the value, given Red Army to work on decomposition is great, appears from the order of the Military council of 6th Soviet Guards army grasped by us from June, 27th, 1943 In it on three densely printed sheets instructions on decomposition of the opponent contain. This order testifies to exclusively good ¬ organisation of the device which is occupied with work on decomposition, and about its good any equipment by auxiliary means. The special attention is given also to the reference to certain units and connections of the opponent. . («A poisonous folder») with the exposed falsification of the enemy in its leaflets, from the facsimile for 1941-1942 it is possible to receive Filing with return to a headquarters, in department 1c.

For the Commander of VII AK - the chief of a headquarters Gesterding


In the appendix to the order command of 7th army corps tries to deny authorship of colonel Steidle concerning its article in the newspaper «Free Germany» from October, 10th, 1943 about Munich and to prove "fictitiousness" of signatures and photos of members of National committee and the Union of German officers in leaflets etc. It is especially noticed, that ostensibly in the Soviet propagation and propagation of National Committee the officers's names, opposing national socialism in 1941-1942 are not mentioned more ....


------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------
Source: IVI MO The Russian Federation. Documents and materials. f. 254. op. 504. d. 7. l. 177-178. The original.

[Yuri]

And archive documents incontestably testify that fears commanding of Wehrmacht of all levels about a of moral conditions, strong-willed qualities and fighting spirit falling in troops was not vain.
After total defeat in battle of Kursk-Orel arch, and especially after capture by autumn of 1943 by Red Army of large bridgeheads on the right coast of Dnepr (which propagation of doctor Goebbels declared a barrier insuperable to Bolsheviks - East wall) in Wehrmacht troops the phenomena earlier inconceivable, namely capitulation of whole units led by officers - commanders of these units began to be marked.
--------------------------------
--------------------------------

1st Ukrainian front, on January, 3rd

On December, 31st, 1943 to the west of Krasnoarmeysk have surrendered in a captivity without resistance of 126 soldiers and officers of 6th and 7th companies of 2nd battalion 383 IR 208 ID among which four officers: the commander of 2nd battalion, the commander of 6th and 7th companies, an aide-de-camp of the commander of 2nd battalion, the commander of 1st battalion.

The commander of 2nd battalion ober-lieutenant Albert Bergman by order of whom all group has surrendered in a captivity, has shown:

«Our division held defence around of Malin. The division structure included the rests of 337th and 309th regiments in figure of 550 persons of soldiers and officers. Within last month we have lost 400 persons, and replenishments any have not received.

On December, 26th by order of the division commander major general Pikenbrok we have started to recede. Russian tanks continuously pursued us, the majority of soldiers has run up, communication with command any was not. At me remains 126 soldiers and officers - everything, that remains from 208 ID.

Near village Ivanovichi I have collected the soldiers and have given the order on delivery to a captivity together with the weapon in number of ten machine guns, four mortars, one gun and an ammunition to them. All this weapon has been handed over in full serviceability to Russian officers.

The commander of 6th company the lieutenant Franc and an aide-de-camp of the commander of 2nd battalion von Dershal have joined my decision a delivery in a captivity. I have made this decision because considered the further resistance senseless and criminal. If generals make mistakes soldiers and officers should not perish because of it. Such gross blunder the commander of our division, having given too late has admitted the order on departure; and all this war with Russia is a fatal flaw for which our people will pay off still for a long time. I consider, that to us it is necessary to achieve at any cost in the near future the compromise with Russia, differently we were lost.

I know, that in Russia there is an «Union of German Officers» under the guidance of the general von Syedlitz. I to it have believed only after have read in the Soviet leaflet the letter of general Syedlitz to general Model».

On January, 2nd at 19 o'clock the portable radio set of an intelligence section of a rifle corps has told, that 135 German soldiers and two officers from 2nd battalion 505 IR 291 ID have surrendered in a captivity.

...
Source: IVI MO Russian Federation. Documents and materials. f. 254, op. 504, d. 7, l. 115, 118. The original.



---------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------

Ober-lieutenant Verenberg, the company commander 662nd IR 339th ID.

«After heavy battles to the north of Bryansk our division has been sent on replenishment and rearrangement to Germany. On a way, in Brest, our division have held back and by order of the Wehrmacht's HQ have thrown in region of Kiev. Was heavy and bitter to understand, that the German army so is exsanguinated, what even our broken and disabled division numbering hardly one quarter of battle structure, again throw on front.
...
To each officer, and first of all our division commander, it was clear, that we are disabled. And, despite it, us have engaged to action that by order of Hitler to dump Russian from the western coast of Dnepr. The pity rests rescued after battle under Ljudinovo /to the north Bryansk – Yuri/, thawed on eyes in these heavy battles....

We have got under destroying firing of Russian mortars. The company has had the big losses, from 51 soldiers remains only 13. I saw, how my people perished, I have understood all senselessness of new Hitlerite adventure and that for the higher military command is indifferent what fate of simple soldiers. And I have decided to operate independently. I have collected the poor rests of my company and have told to my soldiers:

«Comrades! You know me for a long time already. Any of you knows, that I not the coward.
But I do not see any sense in this meat grinder. Fairly and openly I declare: any resistance is senseless. To hell this war together with Hitler. I surrender in a captivity. If you resolute guys follow my example ».
All 13 soldiers agreed with me. Soon, when Russian have begun again approach, we have lifted hands and have surrendered in a captivity...».
.....

----------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------

Source: Russian Archiv.GPW. Vol. 24(3). ll. 77-78

Above resulted the reports of commanders of air-defence Abteilungs and indications of captured German officers it is quite enough to size up level of a moral condition, battle qualities and fighting spirit in formations and units of the German Wehrmacht operating in Ukraine in the winter of 1944 as a part of an army group "South".

As it is easy to guess, that (that in the conditions, developed to the beginning of February, 1944) the reference to soldiers and the officers who have got in Korsun-Shevchenko a pocket, with an appeal to to surrender not one, and at once groups of the German generals the strongest impact could make and turn back accident - mass refusal of struggle continuation.
Danger of accident increased repeatedly if any generals (of those formations, that have got to a pocket) would respond to an appeal of general Syedlitz and others the Stalingrad generals.

Learnt during the First World War a trench life and well knowing psychology of the German soldier, the Supreme commander in chief of Wehrmacht Adolf Hitler is not worse than others (if not better any) understood all danger of the developed situation not only to an army group "South", but also as a whole for continuation of struggle of Europeans on all their East front.Especially, to a captivity to Bolsheviks could get high ranks Waffen-SS who as general Syedlitz would pass to the party of Russian and would began to agitate Europeans to follow on the same way.

Thus, the question consists in the following: whether battle qualities and fighting spirit of the formations which have got in the end of January, 1944 the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky pocket could, will cause a stir what commanders of air-defence Abteilungs and PoWs the German officers who were taken prisoner at that time drew? If differed, in what party and this difference was how much great. Differently, whether the Supreme commander in chief of Wehrmacht Adolf Hitler what anybody from the generals who have got in Korsun-Shevchenko a pocket, will not yield to a temptation could hope to rise on «a way Blucher», whether someone from generals on an appeal of general Syedlitz will respond to come over to the side of Russian?

The list of the formations which have got in the end of January, 1944 in Korsun-Shevchenko a pocket is more low given.
1. 108 GrPzR 14 Pz.Div
2. units 389 ID
3. 331 IR 167 ID
4. 72 ID
5. 57 ID
6. SS-5 Pz. Div «Viking»
7. SS-Br. «Wallonia»
8. 112 ID
9. 255 ID
9. battle group 332 ID
10 . 213 Sich. Div (without 177 Sich. Regt.)
11. 88 ID
12. 168 ID (without 448 IR)
13. units 198 ID
14. 158 IR 82 ID

[Yuri]

The most part of formations from this list took part in the Orel-Kursk battle which has occurred during the period from 05.07.1943 on 23.081943.
In the beginning of this grandiose slaughter it were:
112 ID - Orel arch (a North side of arena of battle)
82 ID, 88ID - Kursk camber (the central unit of arena of battle)
57 ID, 72 ID, 167 ID, 168 ID, 198 ID, 255 ID, SS-5 Pz.D."Viking" - Belgorod arch (a South side of arena of battle)
Besides other three formations were July, 1943 in the beginning:
213 Sich. Div - rear HG «Sud»
14 Pz. Div and 389 ID - France

On July, 5th, 1943 the Wehrmacht has begun operation the «Citadel».
In the north, from Orel the formations of an HG «Mitte» operated.
In the south, the party from Belgorod attacked formations of an HG "Sud".
Till July, 12th, 1943 the Red Army conducted defensive battles.

On July, 12th Red Army attacked northern (Orel) grouping of Wehrmacht - from Kozelsk in a direction on Khotynets 11th Guards Army has gone over to the offensive. The main blow has fallen to units 211 ID. Simultaneously to east in direction Bolkhov the auxiliary blow under which have got 112 ID and 208 ID was struck.
Since July, 12th northern group of Wehrmacht (2nd tank army and 9th army) has stopped approach under «Citadel» and has passed to defence. However the Red Army broke defence and Wehrmacht slowly receded on a line Ljudinovo - Brjansk - Dmitrovsk-Orlovsky that is handed over the Orel arch.

During this period, namely, on July, 26th, 1943 July in Italy there was a governmental revolution. Duche Mussolini have been displaced and arrested. The government was headed by marshal Badoglio.
Hitler has decided to suppress putsch in Italy by means of politically reliable formations, that is divisions Waffen-SS which were in it the moment conducted battles in the East.
Hitler has invited to conversation von Kluge - the commander of an HG "Mitte" - to solve this question.
On a course of dialogue von Kluge has concerned some questions which has represent for direct interest for our theme. In particular, von Kluge has mentioned a condition 112ID. Something was informed by von Kluge on use in battle of numerous building batallions as an infantry for reflexion of attacks of the opponent. Von Kluge it as some a reason concerning tactics application «burnt earth» has expressed.

Unfortunately I have not found in a network the reference to a site with the English text of record the Hitler's and von Kluge's meeting from 26.07.1943.
If someone can specify would be rather grateful.
For now for want of something better I give very bad transfer of this record.

Begun I pass.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
......

Fuhrer: I should understand to myself once again the general situation. It is a question that we should remove from front in the shortest term ­ some formations. 3rd tank division, first of all, concerns them­. It I should take from an army group "South" which, certainly, itself should keep and without that very wide front. This very heavy decision, but anything else does not remain to us. Here, in Italy, I can make something only by means of the first class formations which, first of all, are betrayed to fascism politically. We after all should restore in short terms so a lot of prophetic If we keep Northern Italy, nothing will frighten me...

v. Kluge: My Fuhrer! I pay attention that at present I cannot remove from front of any formation. It is absolutely excluded at the moment!

Fuhrer: But it is necessary for making...

v. Kluge: We can, liberate a few troops only after occupation position Hagen (9).

Cejtcler: First of all it is necessary to take away troops till this boundary, behind that it is possible to deduce «GroßDeutschland» and to hold it while here, and 7th ­ tank division should decrease soon.

v. Kluge: Such development of a general political situation was not supposed ­ us; we could not present to ourselves, that all so will turn out. ­ Now the new decision should be accepted: first of all it is necessary to leave the Eagle if we wish to keep own vital forces.

Fuhrer: It is absolutely clear, final.

v. Kluge: But then it will be necessary to begin withdrawal. However I cannot withdraw therefrom all population and take out all material stocks. It simply cannot be made during so short time, it will demand enormous work. Here very densely populated regions. Rashly it you will not make.
Besides, there is such question: strengthenings here, to the south a so-called position "Hagen", are only in a building stage.

Fuhrer: Yes, unfortunately.

v. Kluge: There's nothing to be done (that's that). At us many the building battalions and still any sort of devilry. There now there are rains and such down-pour, that it is impossible for itself to present it in general. All these the building battalions are compelled, were to put in order roads ­ instead of for a long time were here, in back, and to be occupied with erection of these positions. Besides, they should be thrown in battle only to reflect blows of the opponent.

Fuhrer: Probably, now rains will soon cease?

v. Kluge: I very much hope, today weather already has a little improved.

Fuhrer: However you should recognise nevertheless one, the mister ­ the field marshal: during the moment when this defence line basically will be reached,­ the certain number of a division should be liberated.

v. Kluge: My Fuhrer! I pay your attention that four divisions...

Fuhrer: Are exsanguinated.

v. Kluge: At me four divisions are absolutely exsanguinated.

Fuhrer: It I recognise, but how many divisions are broken by the enemy?

v. Kluge: But it yet all! There is a question and about so-called ­ the Karachev positions, my Fuhrer. If I take positions which are not equipped yet, and I will be again attacked by tanks and other ­ means, they will break tanks and if it occurs, there will come crisis. I speak about it once again only because now we have still good chances and also because with change of conditions we can get to extremely heavy position. I would like to bring once again you an attention to the question - would not be more practical ­ to depart at once for Desna: We should lean necessarily on the Karachev positions, at least, as against skeleton of defence. Troops can make toilet on them for the further withdrawal. So, I bring an attention to the question, was not more practical, whenever possible at once to depart for Desna.

Fuhrer: Here at them position reliable, and here the unreliable...

v. Kluge: … My Fuhrer, I cannot prematurely depart. I should construct at first positions Hagen, put them in order. I cannot depart rashly.

Fuhrer: About withdrawal rashly there can not be a speech!

v. Kluge: Anyway, not so quickly as it is provided now.

Fuhrer: you have provided What terms?

v. Kluge: We plan following terms: about five days...

Fuhrer: in general, by what time you intend to leave on these positions?

v. Kluge: We expected to hold them not earlier the beginning of September.

Fuhrer: It is not possible, it is absolutely impossible, the mister the field marshal!

v. Kluge: But at withdrawal always it is necessary to consider, as rear positions, what conditions in back are equipped. I should have the equipped positions on which it is possible to render though any resistance. Otherwise the opponent will saddle them, and I again will stick in battles and I can not liberate any troops...

Fuhrer: And still you should make it, the mister the field marshal. We here not misters of own decisions, on war frequently are required ­ decisions, which...

v. Kluge: My Fuhrer! If already it will be quickly ordered to me to depart... But nevertheless I pay attention that fulfilment of this idea rests against positions Hagen which are yet ready.

Fuhrer: These positions too are not ready, and the opponent, of course, ­ not begins to attack ­ the equipped positions...

v. Kluge: My Fuhrer! Существен in this business and a question on ­ anti-tank defence, all spins round it. The opponent with such force leans on us the artillery and tanks, that it here will manage to break.

Cejtcler: If to hold defence here, the mister the field marshal, how to me prompts a scent, half of division which as a result of it will be liberated, it would be possible to throw here, to use them within six days for civil work and then positions will be prepared.

v. Kluge: It you will reach nothing. In my opinion, the earliest term of employment of positions Hagen, - today at us 26, - approximately ­ in four weeks. If to count on the earliest term on it it is required from three about four weeks. This earliest.

Fuhrer: So long we definitely cannot wait, forces should be liberated earlier, differently it is all will not help.

v. Kluge: Then Заукель cannot take out all workers.

Fuhrer: It should be made! After all Sauckel so quickly ­ conducts evacuation.

v. Kluge: But, my Fuhrer, at it such weight of people! It will hammer to me in all bridges in back through Desna.

Fuhrer: How many in general here people?

v. Kluge: Some honeycombs thousand.

Cejtcler: Speak, 250 thousand.

Fuhrer: What is 250 thousand persons? Same nonsense!

v. Kluge: My Fuhrer! My troops for conducting battles are necessary to me, I cannot make the impossible.

Fuhrer: I immediately would send on errands people in back and would command, first of all, to build positions here!

v. Kluge: we already tried It. But now all of them on harvesting. Now there is a rye harvest. They yet have no concept, that it is necessary to them. They escape at night from building by the whole crowds to cut the rye. All it represents difficulties. Here it is organised nothing...

Fuhrer: What do you do with an oblique rye? To it set fire?

v. Kluge: Certainly, we should do it. We will admit, we should burn it. But whether there is at us for this purpose time? We should destroy it, and first of all, expensive cattle available in our disposal.

Fuhrer: In back, behind positions, I still...

v. Kluge: And here in back at me everywhere guerrillas who still not only are not broken, but more and more amplify. Besides their activity has increased in connection with assault of the big number of parachutists. And these 400 damned acts of sabotage on the railway!

Fuhrer: All it so; but from it varies nothing. The problem should be carried out...

Cejtcler: Perhaps the army group headquarters should make the plan in ­ which to provide, what we should make most earlier and thus we will undergo to what risk?

v. Kluge: We now will sit down for this work, I have grasped with myself the chief of an operations section (10). We once again will consider it. However all it depends on how there will be a construction ­ of positions Hagen. I would not like to sit down on the positions, which else there is no trace.

Fuhrer: all it is represented To me so if here there was no this big danger, I would tell: both divisions which you receive, immediately to give instead of 113th division.

v. Kluge: Yes, my Fuhrer, now they will not promote, of course, on a step forward. Here in general it is not conducted any more attacks. It is aimless, senseless...

Fuhrer: If only to keep road that it could ­ be used.

v. Kluge: Then it would be possible to finish all this business easy before winter.

Fuhrer: Instead of you could give immediately some formations held on building of fortifying?

v. Kluge: That is to take them at Model? Though they are compelled to reflect every day attacks, and cut a poor rests of 112 th, 211th, 208th divisions and 209th division...?

Cejtcler: These are the broken formations.

Fuhrer: it is good! If you take away the broken divisions in back on staffing then they can engage with civil work!

v. Kluge: Leaves, I should liberate troops and at the same time provide guards with them of roads on which there are all transportations. Troops are destroyed at the Bryansk woods flooded with guerilla gangs which very quickly are restored.

Fuhrer: That, I too should make heavy decisions, very heavy decisions.

v. Kluge: I willingly trust.

Fuhrer: But anything else to us does not remain.

v. Kluge: But before here it will not be finished this ­ business, I cannot give troop. It is excluded. Whether we can make it later, it will be visible.

Fuhrer: you should understand, that you should carry out this problem as soon as possible. For me it is absolutely clear: first, ­ in the near future we will take away a division «GroßDeutschland» and, secondly, you ­ should give a little more troops. A little tank, some infantry divisions...

v. Kluge: Only not tank, them at me...

Fuhrer: They will be taken and directed on the West.

v. Kluge: But I after all too should have tank divisions.

Fuhrer: Yes, but if you in rubbish not especially require the easier to you it to leave!

v. Kluge: With what rubbish?

Fuhrer: you have told: «It simply rubbish!»

v. Kluge: I did not speak it!

Fuhrer: No, it at you was pulled out, therefore we at you and will take away it.

v. Kluge: No, I did not mean it, my Fuhrer. At me
So there are not enough troops, I feel for them need. I wished to tell this expression: position is hardly tolerant.

Fuhrer: Yes, tanks at you are not present. Therefore I also speak: it is possible to give them. They will be directed on the West. I can quickly throw again them from the West, there it is possible to fill up them... I should take care of as soon as possible to receive 9th and 10th SS-divisions ...

v. Kluge: I should consider it once again: I know, that, it means. I will make all necessary!

Fuhrer: As it has been already told: the first, that is necessary, it to remove from front SS-corps … Was created desperate position. It should be realised. Pleasant it to name it is impossible! These are very heavy decisions caused by that we have approached to a crisis point.
-------------------------------------------------------------

[Yuri]

As a result Hitler has removed from East front only one SS-division - SS-1 LAH. This division has been directed to Italy. There to Italy have been directed from France 14 Pz. Div and 389 ID. Thus 389 ID has arrived in region Korsun-Shevchenko from Italy.
Interestingly that one year prior to events in Korsun-Shevchenko a pocket, котоыре as is known have occurred January-February, 1944, previous 389 ID it has been destroyed in the Stalingrad pocket in January-February, 1943. As Russian speak - from fate will not leave!
Last commander 389 ID to Stalingrad a pocket was general Lattman. And here one year later general Lattman has arrived together with general v.Syedliz to the again got to a division encirclement. Here he has addressed with the letter to the new commander 389 ID

To it it is possible to add that year before XI AK as has been destroyed in Stalingrad, and its commander general Streker was in a captivity

[Jan-Hendrik]

Excetpts of Documents from KTB A.O.K. 8 for the relevant time frame.



Jan-Hendrik

[Yuri]

Reading KTBs will not put harm if you remember one important thing.
In a KTBs it was entered far not all the document and/or the message, record of telephone conversations etc, in KTBs were entered short generalising record about this or that event.
To put it briefly, process of entering of record in KTBs is strongly similar to process of preparation of an oil cake.
As is known, the oil cake is the remainder after process of extraction of seeds of sunflower of all of the most valuable and useful.
As also record in KTBs is the remainder after "extraction" from the document and/or the message, a verbatim record etc, all the most important.
Figuratively speaking, record in KTB is a "documentary oil cake".
Therefore attempt to recreate a picture of past events on records about these events in KTBs is similar attempts to draw a sunflower, looking on an oil cake.
Who does not consider it, has every chance to get into a mess.

The vivid example confirming the aforesaid, is article «The Korsun ’-Shevchenkovskii Operation (The Cherkassy Pocket) (January-February 1944) The Soviet General Staff Study» certain Niklas Zetterling.

Apparently, all own critical «Comments» mister Niklas Zetterling has constructed exclusively on the content of records in KTBs various Wehrmacht formations.
In particular, he informs on following errors in «Study» concerning structure and a site of the German units which have got to a pocket:

Here, for example, that writes:
----------------------------
...
1. Statements on German strength.

p. 3 The Soviet study claims that the German salient, that was to become cut off, was held by nine infantry divisions, one panzer division and one panzer grenadier brigade. This is also repeated on pages 25, 34, 37, 102, 121, 145 and the map on page 19. Also on the map on page 4, one can find this data.
The German units given are 57, 72, 82, 88, 112, 167, 168, 255, 332, 389 infantry divisions and the SS-Wiking plus the SS-Wallonien brigade. Also the 213th Security division is sometimes included. Note that this in fact adds up to more than ten divisions, but the Soviet statements are not consistent with each other. If we look at each German division, we can conclude that the 57, 72, 88, 389 and SS-Wiking division were in fact encircled with most of their manpower. [3]. However, the 82nd Division was not at all involved in the operation. [4]

The 168th Division was present with the equivalent of one battalion [5] and minor elements of the 167th division was attached to 389th Division at the beginning of the operation, but most of the division was dissolved and used to beef up 376th division. [6]. The 112, 255 and 332 divisions had been combined into the Korps-Abt. B nearly three months ago. [7].
The Korps-Abt. B had the strength and organisation of a division, but possibly Soviet intelligence was mislead in this case.
Whatever the case, the statement in the study is not accurate.

In the end, it can not be said that the encircled force consisted of more than six divisions, many of them also had detached elements that were not encircled. In addition the SS-Wallonien brigade was encircled as well as a few GHQ troops.
….

2. Statements on German unit locations.

p. 4 The map shows the positions of the German divisions in the area. There are several faults connected to what is discussed for page 3 above. The 82nd Division should not be on the map.
There were no elements of the 167th Division on the western side of the salient. The 88th Division should be placed further south, approximately where 167th Division is incorrectly located on the map. The 213 Sec Div is placed near Kanev, when in fact only a regiment from the division was present, and it was located near Olshanitsa, not Kanev. Also, for some reason the 112th and 332nd Divisions are placed on the map. There were two regimental sized groups formed from remnants of these divisions that were part of Korps-Abt. B, but they were not deployed as shown on the map. Finally the 3rd Panzer Division should be north of the river, not south.
...
-----------------------------------

First, who read to everyone actually «Study» is evident clumsy attempt of mister Critic to use in the purposes small discrepancies not essential character.
He writes: «There were no elements of the 167th Division on the western side of the salient. The 88th Division should be placed further south, approximately where 167th Division is incorrectly located on the map».
However from the text «Study» it is clear, that on a map 2 the elementary typing error is admitted. Units of 167th infantry division should be specified on opposite (east) party of a ledge.
Moreover, typing errors about a site of units of 167th infantry division on a West side of a ledge and 213th Security Division are admitted only on a small map 2. Whereas on large (that is, on more detailed) map 6 site of units of 167th infantry division is shown correctly, namely, on a ledge East side.
The same and concerning a site of 213th Security Division, on a large map 6 site of its units is specified truly.
However for us at the moment interests not this clumsy the Niklas Zetterling's attempt to enter the readers in errors .
It is interesting to us to find out, what of units of 213th Security Division have got to a pocket in February, 1944 and where at this time there were other units of this division. From the Niklas Zetterling's articles we see, that this mister completely trusts records in KTB. In particular, he is assured, that 213th Security Division has not got to a pocket and tries to draw a picture of events in a pocket, looking on a "documentary oil cake" which takes from KTBs.

For own the purposes we will take advantage of reports of the German air-defence Abteilungs which in first half operated November, 1943 around the city of Zhitomir. Namely we will take advantage of reports:
-1st air-defence Abteilung 77th air-defence regiment;
- 2nd battery 96th air-defence Abteilung;
- 373rd heavy air-defence Abteilung;
- 125th mixed air-defence Abteilung;
- 650th projector air-defence Abteilung;
- 982nd easy air-defence Abteilung.
Reports of these air-defence units cover the period from November, 3rd till November, 18th, 1943 and in aggregate it contain about hundred pages of the typewritten text. From these official reports it is possible to restore a course of operations in region Zhitomir, more truly, on the northeast and southeast parties of a city.
However, us only that concerns 213th Security Division in this case will interest.
In a following post for presentation I will place maps with a site of 213th Security Division in November, 1943 and later.

Here I will place a map 2 and a map 6 of «Study» that it was possible to see, how Niklas Zetterling manipulates a typing error concerning 167th Infantry Division and 213th Security Division.

[GaryD]

First, who read to everyone actually «Study» is evident clumsy attempt of mister Critic to use in the purposes small discrepancies not essential character.

If what you quoted was all that Mr. Zetterling criticized then you'd be right, but his critique is much broader and full of more substantive issues.